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In all his books, Gary would always write a dedication to myself, my daughters and his family 
in the acknowledgements. It is an honour to at last repay that kindness with a little dedication 
of my own. 
 
Gary’s first contact with the OU was in May 1987 when he applied to be an associate lecturer.  
As a young law graduate, he was keen to test out his skills and knowledge and, more 
importantly, pass them on. Unfortunately, that first contact resulted in a firm rejection! Gary 
hadn’t realised that the OU didn’t have a Law School and that there were no plans to create 
one. 
 
Fast forward ten years and Gary found himself in London launching the new OU Law 
Programme with Cherie Blair. He was so excited to take up the challenge and hard work of 
creating a new Law School from scratch, and determined to make a success of it.  He spelt 
out his motivation at a dinner to celebrate the first OU Law graduates in 2002.  He said he 
understood the importance of law because it touched everyone’s lives from birth to death and 
beyond; and for the lowliest individual to multi-national corporations and Governments.  
Despite this he said, ‘only a minuscule portion of the overall population realistically had the 
chance to study law’.  He felt that for Law to work properly it had to be not only for the people, 
but of the people and that the challenge for the 21st century was to make the legal profession 
more representative. As he put it, ‘variety is the spice of Law as much as it is of life’. He wanted 
to move from a position where Law Lords took OU degrees, to where the OU educated the 
future Law Lords!  
 
In his valedictory speech Gary spoke of his admiration for Jenny Lee and the social benefit of 
the OU.  From its inception in 1997, to the time of his leaving, the Law School grew from 700 
students and 25 associate lecturers, to 7000 students and 400 associate lecturers and was 
the largest Law School for undergraduates in the UK. This was thanks not only to Gary, but 
also to all the dedicated people who worked with him over the 15 years and 29 days he spent 
at the OU. At the end he felt he had made a contribution to the diversification of the legal 
profession as he had set out to do. He wrote of his days at the OU that, ‘almost all of them 
had been an absolutely wonderful, unalloyed privilege’. I know that he would be glad that the 
OU Law School continues in its successes and, as ever, most of his praise would be for the 
hardworking students who ensure that his vision will become reality. 
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Around the time of the birth of the Open University, Mr Justice Megarry set out a fundamental 
lesson on open-mindedness: “As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, 
the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were 
not …’ John v Rees [1970] Ch 345, 402. This essay takes ten examples rarely explored in law 
schools to encourage reflection on how to keep an open mind, rather than succumb to 
prejudice in pre-judging people, cases or issues. ‘The path of the law’ was the title of a famous 
lecture by the great American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, which ends, as does this essay, 
by affirming such an unusual collection of stories: ‘The remoter and more general aspects of 
the law are those which give it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become 
a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo 




Around the time of the birth of the Open University, Mr Justice Megarry set out a fundamental 
lesson on open-mindedness: 
‘As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is 
strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of 
unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable 
conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by 
discussion, suffered a change.’2 
Fifty years after the case was reported, this insight needs constant reiteration as a safeguard 
against witch-hunts3 and as a positive encouragement to draw the most out of deepening our 
 
1 This essay began as my inaugural professorial lecture, delivered at The Open University on 4 May 2017. My 
grandson, Joshua Wright, was watching on-line in Switzerland at the age of two and a half, while my 
granddaughter, Madeleine Lewis-Oakes, was there in the lecture-hall on campus in Milton Keynes, aged 5 
months. The essay is dedicated to them and to Madeleine’s brother, Theo, who was born in 2019. I am grateful to 
generations of students, to Lisa Claydon, other colleagues, friends and family for comments, especially my son, 
Jamie. The usual disclaimers apply, that others, particularly Joshua, Madeleine, Theo and Jamie, are not 
responsible for any of my errors, judgments or mis-judgments. 
2 Megarry J, John v Rees [1970] Ch 345, 402. [1969] 2 All ER 274 Quoted, for example, in Sandra Fredman & 
Simon Lee, ‘Natural Justice for Employees: the Unacceptable Faith of Proceduralism’ (1986) 15 Industrial Law 
Journal, 16. As a barrister and lecturer, Megarry had been prosecuted for submitting false tax returns but the 
judge directed the jury to acquit as there was no intention to defraud. The lingering effect on his career of this 
experience may have influenced Megarry’s emphasis on ‘unanswerable charges which, in the event, were 
completely answered’. 
3 A prime example would be ‘Operation Midland’. A fantasist initially known as ‘Nick’, later revealed to be Carl 
Beech, claimed to have been abused by politicians and other public figures; the police and Tom Watson MP 
seemed to believe him, with terrible consequences for the reputations of others, and the well-being of them and 




understanding of law. It is the most significant dictum I have encountered in my studies of the 
law over five decades. It is beautifully expressed. It is original in its composition but it nods to 
the history of the law. It is rigorous in its sub-clauses but compelling in its overall message. In 
a sphere of life where hierarchy usually rules, it comes in a humble first instance decision, the 
facts and context of which are rarely recalled. It was initially missed by the system of court 
reporting but speaks to us over half a century later. It sums up the essence of open-
mindedness, which is in turn the essence of law and justice. It warns against pre-judging, 
which is the root of prejudice. It hints at the possibility of redemption, which might be the hope 
of us all in an age given to harsh judgments of the past and of others in the present. It is, in 
essence, a plea against the rush to assume fault and a hymn, instead, to open-mindedness. 
Critics bewail the practice of lawyers, as they see it, of relying on technicalities. In this essay, 
I focus instead on a nobler aspect of thinking like a lawyer, one which could be helpfully 
adopted in wider life, namely keeping minds open to the possibility that all is not as it first 
seemed. Such a mindset is wary of jumping in to judge a story on first, partial or even partisan, 
impressions. Approaching a problem with a closed mind is how ‘prejudice’ gets its name, 
because of the tendency to pre-judge a person or an issue.    
Megarry’s dictum gives a nobler understanding of why it is important that lawyers or others 
should be allowed to invoke the need for a fair process and why it would be wrong for their 
clients to be pre-judged. It is part of the art of lawyers to make their points in a compelling 
manner. Megarry’s life-long practice of noting down aphorisms, publishing many in 
miscellanies,4 shaped his style. The phrase ‘fixed and unalterable’, for example, would be 
known to him as a description of the famously, or notoriously, inflexible decrees of the Medes 
and Persians, as attested in the Bible.5 Megarry’s whole passage conjures up, even against 
such determined positions, the need in a just society for decision-makers to keep their minds 
open until they have considered the evidence.  
In giving ten examples against which to test Megarry’s wisdom, this essay broadens the range 
of materials routinely presented to law students and other citizens as emblematic of law. There 
is only one case here from the Court of Appeal and one from the Supreme Court of the UK, 
neither well-known. Some of these ‘cases’ did not even make it to court. Others are at the 
modest level of magistrate or other first instance decision-making. Each can only be sketched 
briefly, in a single paragraph. Each has been chosen as an antidote to assuming that an 
incident is open and shut. Megarry’s dictum is not taken as providing a complete taxonomy of 
errors. Its sub-themes could be seen as tautologous, albeit that they were combined to great 
rhetorical effect. Instead, each of these ten sagas is presented as offering a particular insight 
into Megarry’s broad and wise assertion about the path of the law. Few readers will warm to 
all the characters who are featured. Whoever is demonised in a reader’s circle or by society 
is exactly the person whose case should be a touchstone for the application of Megarry’s 
litany. The aim is partly to encourage the sharing of other experiences, other examples of 
‘open and shut cases that, somehow, were not’, because restricting students to appellate hard 
cases or even uneasy cases is not conducive to a well-rounded, liberal education in, or 
through, the law. As the American academic and judge Charles E Clark observed of Karl 
Llewellyn, ‘his principle of pedagogy’ was ‘not to tell his students truths, but to force them to 
seek out the answers themselves’.6  
 
and reckless police officers although the report was redacted and so it took until late 2019 for the full scale of the 
mistakes to be widely known.  
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/04/operation-midland-met-police-boss-urged-to-consider-her-
position. 
4 Three Miscellany-at-Law books (Stevens, 1955) and one Arabinesque-at-Law (Wildy, 1969). 
5 Esther i.19, Daniel vi.8. 
6 C Clark, ‘K N Llewellyn’, (1962) 29 University of Chicago Law Review 614. 
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John v Rees 
Although the John v Rees case was only reported in 1970, it was decided in 1968. Its context 
was an argument between members of the Labour Party in Pembroke, Wales. Desmond 
Donnelly, the MP for the constituency had published a book called Gadarene ’68.7 The book’s 
subtitle was ‘The Crimes, Follies and Misfortunes of the Wilson Government’. Yes, that was a 
Labour MP attacking his leader and his government’s policies, a practice which is common to 
many political parties in many countries, both before and after that era. A meeting of his 
constituency party called to deselect Donnelly, but not just for this, broke up in disorder. His 
supporters were summarily expelled from the party. The issue for Megarry J was whether they 
were entitled to a hearing before expulsion. Whether they should have been accorded that 
opportunity as a principle of natural justice. For all the reasons given below and for all the sub-
clauses of Megarry’s aphorism, a hearing might explain behaviour in such a way as to change 
the decision-maker’s mind. This aspect of the turmoil in the local party was part of wider 
litigation which has been admirably explained by J Graham Jones.8 As for Desmond Donnelly, 
he was a complex character who described himself as an Englishman with an Irish name 
representing a Welsh seat, and who had been born in India, with, according to Donnelly, ‘no 
personal racial prejudice at all – I grew up completely bi-lingual in English and Hindustani’.9 
The paragraph in which that appears, however, has other controversial statements about the 
‘British problem … At root it is a colour problem and of alien civilisations and incompatible 
habits’ and he believed that what he claimed was his own lack of personal racial prejudice ‘is 
not the case with the majority of the insular British people’. Donnelly was a maverick, a trouble-
maker and a troubled soul. He hopped from one political party to another. He concluded that 
harsh book, Gadarene ’68, with a beautiful manifesto of his own but he took his own life a few 
years later.   
2. Opening up the Law 
The Open University received its Royal Charter in 1969, the year after this case was decided. 
The judge’s poetic reminder of basic propositions remains timely fifty years later. It speaks to 
the values of the Open University, which is one of the finest achievements of the very same 
Wilson government that Donnelly was berating. Megarry’s aphorism encourages us to await 
a deeper understanding of the facts of a controversy, warning us against pre-judging or 
prejudice. At its most idealistic, it is encouraging open-mindedness. In this essay, a quartet of 
lessons illustrates Megarry’s sub-clauses. In keeping with the spirit of the Open University’s 
first law professor, Gary Slapper,10 original or at least unusual examples are used as a fresh 
alternative to the familiar cases presented to law students. In the tradition of inaugural lectures, 
I also offer a glimpse or two of my own path, or meandering, in the law. In the spirit of the 
Open University’s mission, musings on these sagas are directed towards students in particular 
but all of us in general. Broadening out from the experiences of students who have been mis-
judged, we can then move from Megarry’s strictures about errors towards a more expansive, 
positive approach to educating ourselves in and through the law.  
1 Students in trouble with their studies, their university, or the police (or anyone in any 
trouble of any kind) can still succeed in the law and wider life. Ideally, any difficulties 
caused by others could be addressed through a fair hearing at the time but, if that does 
not happen, there are often later opportunities to explain what was initially assumed to 
be inexplicable. 
 
7 Desmond Donnelly, Gadarene ’68 (William Kimber, 1968). 
8 http://www.pembrokeshirehistoricalsociety.co.uk/the-pembrokeshire-general-election-of-1970/. 





2 It follows from such experiences that we should not rush to judgment when others 
are accused of behaving badly. Instead, we should hold on to the presumption of 
innocence, not pre-judging others, learning from reading fiction and watching detective 
dramas on screen that the most obvious suspect is not necessarily the guilty one, 
recognising that there can be smoke without fire, and that even if someone is 
convicted, there might have been a miscarriage of justice. 
3 More positively, the converse of a miscarriage of justice, a delivery or perhaps a 
carriage, has its own impact: the unheralded humanity and dignity, under pressure, of 
a just decision under the rule of law has the power to transform individuals, 
communities and society. 
4 It follows that we should always be refreshing our understanding of the characters 
and the character, even the genius, of the law and of wider life if we would like to 
become, or remain, open-minded. 
These lessons combine to form a celebration of, and call for, cultivating open-mindedness in 
the law and in society through reflection on twelve supposedly open and shut cases.  
The phrase Megarry uses, ‘The Path of the Law’,11 is the title of a famous lecture given to 
Boston University law students at the end of the nineteenth century by the great American 
judge and jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jnr. He began by saying that the path of the law is 
not a mystery. That is where Holmes goes wrong. The law is a mystery and the path is the 
wrong metaphor. These points are related. A path is usually beaten through the most direct 
route but the law, like this essay, meanders or, as I would put it, has twists and turns. As Mark 
Twain observed, the African-American pilots on the Mississippi had to know the shape of the 
river, every bend, the depth at every point, and to be alert to the fact that the river is in constant 
flux.12  
Of course, other disciplines are also full of excitement but when it comes to having fun, nobody 
can match the only other professor to have given an Open University inaugural lecture in law 
during these first fifty years, the late Gary Slapper, who invented and popularised a category 
of ‘weird cases,’13 which did so much to draw students and the public into an appreciation of 
the law. He had a serious intent, both in establishing himself and the Open University in the 
hearts and minds of lawyers and in educating us all.14  
2.1 Categorising cases as weird, easy, hard, uneasy or not ‘open and shut’   
Although there are variations on the idea of ‘weird’ cases15, the more familiar expressions are 
that law students mostly consider ‘hard’ cases, as opposed to ‘easy’ cases. Hard cases are 
ones where lawyers reasonably disagree on the interpretation of the law. I have previously 
suggested a sub-set of hard cases which raise such moral qualms that I call them ‘un-easy’ 
cases.16 If you do not have a sense of ethical unease, whichever way you would decide, then 
you have probably not understood the moral issues and diverse perspectives at stake. This 
essay, however, addresses some of those supposedly simpler cases, the seemingly easy 
 
11 O W Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457.  
12  William G Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River, (Princeton University Press, 1998) see Mark Twain, 
Life on the Mississippi, quoted in the epigraph and at p275, Bowen and Bok, Preface at pxlix. 
13 Gary Slapper, Weird Cases (Wildy, 2009). 
14 For example, this tweet by Gary Slapper about lawyers’ rivalry from their student days captures something 
about F E Smith, who became Lord Birkenhead: 
https://twitter.com/garyslapper/status/325180123055804417?s=20. 
15 eg  ‘misleading’ or ‘uncommon’ cases, A P Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law, 1927; Uncommon 
Cases (Methuen, 1935). 
16 Simon Lee, ‘Uneasy cases’ in Brice Dickson & Paul Carmichael, The House of Lords: Its Parliamentary and 
Judicial Roles, (Hart, 1998); Simon Lee, Uneasy Ethics (Random House, 2003). 
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ones, those that appear to be open and shut cases, which are apparently strewn across the 
path of the law.  
2.2 Towards open-mindedness 
This essay argues that open-mindedness matters and needs to be developed through the 
guidance of this Megarry dictum and the often painful experience of practising, failing, trying 
again, still failing but still striving to be open to argument. This is the essence of a legal 
education but is much needed in wider life. If we pre-judge cases or issues as open and shut 
when they are not, then our prejudice can cause damage to other individuals, to communities, 
to society and to ourselves. More generally, we can all learn all the time from the study of law 
and of other disciplines to be more open to the evidence, to insights, to the truth, to the facts. 
This is especially important in an era dubbed as ‘post-truth’, a time of ‘fake news’. Being or 
becoming open-minded is not itself an open and shut case. It requires humility, imagination, 
constant attention and a commitment to self-improvement.  
Some people do not seem to want to be open-minded, at least on their core beliefs, or sense 
of identity, or their insistence that one factor can explain everything. Even for those who really 
do wish to be open-minded, not just to say we are, but actually to be or become or remain 
open, we have to think about it and work at it. So this essay is not a claim to be especially 
open-minded myself. It is more of a coaching manual for those who might surpass me in this 
endeavour. 
2.3 The meaning of ‘open and shut’? 
As a start, what is it, in the open and shut metaphor, which is being opened and shut? We 
could be comparing a legal case, or any other issue, to the opening and shutting of a suitcase, 
a file, a door, a gate, a window or a book, to give a few examples. All of these can be partially 
opened or partially shut. Some can be shut but not necessarily locked. If Megarry’s metaphor 
is going to work, is that which is being opened and shut the kind of thing which can be strewn 
over or around a path? Paths or, in my preferred imagery, rivers, are not usually strewn with 
windows, doors or books, although canals do have locks. It is our minds which are most likely 
being described as open or shut, or closed, when we consider Megarry’s sub-categories of 
unanswerable charges, inexplicable conduct, fixed & immutable policies. An open mind is not 
an empty mind. Keeping your mind ajar is not about keeping it in a jar.  
The ten incidents, not all ‘cases’ as normally understood, have been chosen partly for their 
obscurity, as otherwise readers would come to them with more of a risk of pre-judging, and 
partly because of the fame, or later fame, of some of the people involved or because I predict 
that greater fame will follow. The lessons of Megarry’s dictum, though, need to be lived out in 
a different kind of obscurity, in the little steps we each take along the path of the law towards 
social justice. I am going to call these ten examples by the name of the principal character: 
Bob, FE, JK, Mrs P, Cornelia, Harper, Winston, Gerry, Eamon and Jennie. 
(1) Bob: informed questioning can reveal distortions in an official’s view of events 
A postgraduate student, Robert, who already had a first class undergraduate degree in Law, 
was found guilty of dangerous driving on the word of two police officers and fined £40. This 
was in Oxford decades ago. The same student then pleaded guilty to attempting to steal a 
street-lamp and was fined £5. The second offence was missed, or glossed over, by the media, 
this mattered to the defendant who had political ambitions. Then, on appeal against his 
conviction for dangerous driving, his barrister had a problem in wishing to cite his client’s clean 
driving record and challenge the police officers account for fear of allowing the prosecution to 
reveal Robert’s other conviction. The strategy was not to put the defendant on the stand but 
to produce a witness, the fellow passenger. That student failed to turn up on time. The court 
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adjourned. Eventually, the witness arrived, looking dishevelled. The judge asked why he was 
late. He said defiantly that he was playing rugby for his college. At this point, the case seemed 
open and shut. What happened next? The deputy recorder asked which college the witness 
was representing. No, it was not the judge’s college but it was his father’s college. It was their 
first cup final. So things started to look up and then the court became more open-minded to 
the idea that the police might be lying. The barrister for the defendant asked the two police 
officers the same question, without the other one present in court to hear the answer: was the 
window, through which the defendant was said by them to have made an obscene gesture, 
fully down or three-quarters down? One said fully, one said three-quarters. Since the barrister 
knew from the defendant that neither could be true, because the window of the van did not 
open or shut like that but had one fixed panel and one sliding panel which could only be 
partially pushed out sideways, it was game, set and match to the defendant. Well done, that 
barrister and that witness for the defence in the 1950s. The defendant was a Rhodes Scholar 
at Oxford, Bob Hawke, who was elected Prime Minister of Australia in 1983, 1984, 1987 & 
1990.17  
(2) F E: such differing accounts do not necessarily mean perjury by an official 
 
A second case takes us back to 1897, when the Prince of Wales was visiting Oxford and was 
met by a demonstration. Metropolitan Police on horseback, supplementing the local 
constabulary, made lots of arrests including a Mr Smith,18 a young don who had recently 
graduated with the Vinerian Scholarship for the best papers in the Bachelor of Civil Law which, 
despite its name, is a Masters degree. The police arrested Smith, put him in a cell overnight 
and charged him with assaulting a police officer and obstructing the police in the discharge of 
their duty. Great law professors came to his aid. Dicey wrote to him, offering £5 towards a 
barrister for his defence, and sat in the front row of the magistrates’ court alongside Professors 
Anson and Markby. Smith defended himself. He challenged the police officer’s evidence that 
Smith had hit him, claiming that he, Smith, had kept his hands behind his back. The prosecutor 
asked, ‘What do you mean by accusing this officer of wilful and corrupt perjury?’ Smith said 
that perjury was only one of five possibilities. Another was that he himself was committing 
perjury. A third was that the police officer was honestly mistaken. The fourth was that he 
himself was honestly mistaken. And the fifth was that the apparently irreconcilable accounts 
were somehow reconcilable (which could have been another phrase in Megarry’s list of open 
and shut cases). Smith, often known by his initials F E, was acquitted and later became the 
Solicitor-General, then the Attorney-General and then, as Lord Birkenhead, the Lord 
Chancellor. In the middle of that sequence, he asked Dicey, in his eighties, to appear with him 
as counsel for the Crown in a House of Lords appeal during the First World War, on whether 
the royal prerogative survived when a statute was passed, a gesture which was, I suspect, a 
generous nod towards Dicey’s support in 1897.19 
(3) J K: avoid pre-judging a case because we like or dislike one of the litigants 
 
There was a claim a decade ago against the author J K Rowling of misappropriating a virtually 
unknown author Adrian Jacob’s ideas in a work of fiction. A similar charge is often made 
against musicians, from George Harrison to Led Zeppelin. J K Rowling sought to have the 
case struck out but the judge thought there was a possible case. Nobody doubts that J K 
Rowling created Harry Potter as a work of originality. Suppose, however, that her agent had 
 
17 Simon Lee, Vincent’s 1863-2013 (Third Millennium, 2014), 111-112, referring to Blanche d’Alpuget, Robert J 
Hawke: A Biography (Penguin, 1984). 
18 This is the Smith about whom Gary Slapper tweeted concerning his prize and the runner-up, Holdsworth, fn15  
https://twitter.com/garyslapper/status/325180123055804417?s=20. 




many years before received Adrian Jacob’s manuscript of a children’s story about a wizard, 
rejected it and genuinely forgot about it. Suppose now that the agent in conversation offers 
some ideas to the author when she is under pressure to meet deadlines for sequels and 
honestly forgets that some of those ideas have come from Adrian Jacob’s earlier manuscript. 
J K Rowling is innocent of any conscious wrongdoing and is accordingly indignant and was 
able to ‘win’ the case in the eyes of the media if only because Adrian Jacob’s estate could not 
afford to pay J K Rowling’s and her publisher’s legal costs into court so the action was 
discontinued.20 But the truth of what happened is not open and shut. It is obscure and 
sometimes one side cannot afford the cost of access to justice. The agent is dead, the 
relatively unknown writer is dead, the famous author’s notebooks were not yielded up in the 
course of litigation, and accounts differ as to whether the agent and the almost unknown author 
only met once, as the agent claimed, or more often, as Adrian Jacob’s estate claimed and as 
both had homes on the small Maltese island of Gozo. It is perfectly possible, however, that an 
idea was transmitted and absorbed without any bad faith on the part of anyone. 
(4) Cornelia: an advocate who has herself experienced discrimination can help a 
vulnerable defendant weather the storm 
Cornelia Sorabji21 has been described as India’s and the UK’s first woman barrister and as 
Oxford’s first female law student. There can be quibbles about the technicalities of being called 
to the Bar but without doubt she was a pioneer of women in the law, both in India and in the 
UK. She is variously reported as having been appointed as the Legal Assistant or as the Lady 
Assistant to the Court of Wards. Her first case was different. It was what our Open Justice22 
initiative would call ‘pro bono’. On returning to India in 1894, having studied in England, she 
was not allowed to qualify as a barrister (actually, for decades) but was asked nonetheless to 
help a woman accused of murdering her husband. Cornelia Sorabji recognised that the 
Statutory Law of India allowed ‘any person’ to defend the accused and the Bombay High Court 
confirmed that therefore a woman could appear in court. Witnesses were openly being bribed 
by the prosecution who had charged a woman with the murder of her husband. The case 
seemed open and shut. Sorabji realised that there was something even more elemental than 
the lure of money in a disadvantaged rural community, namely the weather. She persuaded 
the all-male jury that in the monsoon it would not have been possible for the body to have 
been left in the pools of blood in the location in which it was found, on a steep slope. The blood 
and the body would have been washed down the hill. It was much more likely that the murderer 
was the chief ‘witness’ against the accused, a man in debt to the murder victim, who then 
planted the body and blamed the victim’s wife. 
(5) Mrs P: outsiders appreciating the traditions of fair play  
The accusation of racism is often thrown at politicians and political institutions. For example, 
it seems inexplicable to some that the Home Office would do this or that, or not do this or that, 
unless it is because the decision-maker is racist. At the time of writing, we have a Home 
Secretary from an ethnic minority background, Priti Patel, as was her immediate predecessor 
Sajid Javid, but the department is still accused of racism. Conversely, the Home Office is often 
praised for its comparative liberalism under Roy Jenkins as Secretary of State in the Labour 
governments led by Harold Wilson from 1965 to 1967 and again from 1974 to 1976. But I have 
written about a lost or neglected case23, one in which the Home Office in the midst of that 
Jenkins era’s legislation against sex and race discrimination, tried to delay an Indian and a 
Bangladeshi woman from exercising their partial rights to citizenship. Mrs Phansopkar and 
 
20 Allen v Bloomsbury & Another [2010] EWHC 2560 https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/2560.html. 
21 Cornelia Sorabji, India Calling: the Memories of Cornelia Sorabji (Oxford University Press, 2001); Richard 
Sorabji, Opening Doors: the Untold Story of Cornelia Sorabji (I B Tauris, 2010).   
22 Open Justice http://law-school.open.ac.uk/open-justice. 
23 Simon Lee, ‘Lord Denning, Magna Carta and Magnanimity’ (2015) 27 Denning Law Journal 106.   
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Mrs Begum were refused entry at Heathrow and told to go back home, to India and 
Bangladesh, to apply, where the queue would take fourteen months. The Court of Appeal 
found for the women using creative arguments including one from Magna Carta in the 
thirteenth century, that justice delayed is justice denied. The two barristers in this case had 
themselves been refugees. One of those, Sibghat Kadri QC, had himself been interned without 
trial as a student in Pakistan, before securing his own release with a writ of habeas corpus. 
The Home Office claimed that it would have been ‘queue-jumping’ for the women to have their 
citizenship decided at Heathrow. The judges saw the case differently, that the underlying value 
of the law was in vindicating their rights swiftly.   
(6) Winston: it is never too late for technology to re-open a shut case  
Winston Silcott was tried for three murders in the 1980s but did he actually commit any of 
them? He was acquitted of the first. When he was convicted of the third, it emerged that he 
was on bail for the second. MPs called for the judge who let him out on bail to resign. On the 
next day’s BBC Breakfast TV and ITN News at lunchtime, I commented on this breaking news. 
Even then, it was important to bear in mind that Winston Silcott could appeal and that those 
accusing Judge Lymbery of inexplicably giving him bail were legislators who had determined 
the framework within which the judge made that decision.24 The campaign by the women of 
the area25 played a huge part in challenging the perception that Silcott was guilty. I like to think 
that in continuing to discuss the iniquities of such cases when I moved to Queen’s University 
Belfast I might have sparked, or at least not dampened, the interest of law students there, one 
of whom went on to be Winston Silcott’s courageous and determined solicitor on this side of 
the Irish Sea. Tony Murphy26 eventually succeeded in getting the conviction quashed and 
continues to argue that the conviction for the murder of the second, for which Winston Silcott 
served seventeen years in prison, was wrong because the killing was in self-defence. Those 
who believe there is no smoke without fire will be susceptible to the line that someone in this 
position has been released on a ‘technicality’. So it is important to emphasise that there never 
was any scientific evidence that connected Winston Silcott to this third murder, of PC Keith 
Blakelock in the Broadwater Farm or Tottenham riots, no image of him on any of the extensive 
CCTV footage of the riots that evening, suggesting that he was in his sister’s flat, as he 
claimed, observing the curfew of his bail condition and keeping out of trouble, there was no 
confession and only unreliable claims by youngsters that he was the leader of the gang. Silcott 
allegedly stated that they would not stand by those claims in court, and this was interpreted 
as a kind of admission of his involvement. What tipped the balance on appeal against 
conviction was that the invention of ESDA testing which showed that this ambiguous statement 
was not actually made by Silcott but was added later, made up by the police27. Electrostatic 
deposition analysis can show whether notes were made contemporaneously by examining the 
indentations on subsequent pages.    
(7) Gerry: opening up official records can re-open a shut case decades later  
 
To give a sense of the time-span involved in righting this next wrong, the first Open University 
graduation took place on 23 June 1973 and the relevant decision by a government minister, 
an interim custody order (ICO) was taken on 21 July 1973. The UK Supreme Court made its 
decision in May 2020,28 concluding that Gerry Adams had been interned unlawfully in 1973 
 
24 Simon Lee, ‘Bail Conditions’ (1987) 103 LQR, 327 
25 Legal Action for Women, A Chronology of Injustice (Crossroads, 1998) 
26 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/oct/20/ukcrime. 
27 https://www.theguardian.com/fromthearchive/story/0,,1092766,00.html. 
28 R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19, [2020] 1 WLR 2077,  https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0104-
judgment.pdf Lord Kerr: ‘At stake on this appeal is the validity of the ICO made on 21 July 1973. Although an ICO 




and so could not have been guilty of attempting to escape unlawfully. Mr Adams was widely 
believed to have been a leader in the IRA but was certainly known later in the ‘Troubles’ to be 
President of Sinn Fein, an abstentionist MP and a major figure in the peace process, notably 
in the Adams-Hume dialogue. Along the way, he was one of the people whose voice had to 
be dubbed and/or subtitled, when the broadcasting restrictions were in force from 1988. When 
I left Queen’s University Belfast in 1995, both the leading counsel in this case, Sean Doran 
QC for Mr Adams and Tony McGleenan QC for the Secretary of State, were colleagues in the 
Law School and the latter had been one of my first students there. At the same time, Sir Brian 
Kerr was a High Court judge but now he was the presiding judge in this appeal, who gave the 
main judgment with which his fellow Justices all agreed. In between times, he had been the 
Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. His predecessor but one, then Sir Brian (later Lord) 
Hutton, was the barrister who, as leading counsel to the Attorney General in 1974, gave his 
opinion that the order in 1973 was not lawfully made. This was because in Brian Hutton’s view, 
endorsed 46 years later by the Supreme Court, it should have been the Home Secretary 
himself, not his Minister of State, who had to consider the case of Mr Adams. It was only when 
Cabinet papers were released many years later that Gerry Adams’ lawyers became aware of 
this and brought the proceedings which eventually resulted in this judgment.  
(8) Harper: as fiction shows, characters evolve 
In watching films and television, and in our crime fiction reading, we know that the case is not 
as open and shut as it first seems, the obviously guilty person is usually innocent and the 
seemingly innocent are the ones to watch. In Broadchurch, Line of Duty or any number of 
episodes of Morse, Lewis, Endeavour, or Midsomer Murders, we do well to remember the 
presumption of innocence. In series 3 of Broadchurch, for example, there was such an 
unedifying collection of men in the small town, including a recently released rapist, that we 
could suspect them all. The challenge is to ask why can we not be as discerning, imaginative 
and yet measured in viewing politics, law and the media in real life as we have become adept 
at suspending judgment in our watching of crime drama? Instead, we are ready to think the 
worst of others, to believe that our real life and our fictional heroes are villains after all. In 
Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird,29 Atticus Finch, for instance, was a hero to Barack Obama 
and many others but has now been written off as a ‘racist’ by some after the publication of 
another book by Harper Lee, Go Set A Watchman.30 At Queen’s University Belfast in the early 
1990s, we had asked all first year law students to write a very short sequel to the one book 
 
legislation provided that the statutory power to make the ICO arose “where it appears to the Secretary of State” 
that a person was suspected of being involved in terrorism. There is no evidence that the Secretary of State 
personally considered whether the appellant was involved in terrorism. On the assumption (which is common to 
the parties to the appeal) that he did not, the question arises whether the ICO was validly made.  
‘5. The reason that this matter has come to light so many years after the appellant’s convictions is that under the 
“30-year rule” an opinion of JBE Hutton QC (later Lord Hutton of Bresagh) was uncovered…  
‘6. Mr Hutton was the legal adviser to the Attorney General when he gave his opinion. It was dated 4 July 1974 
and responded to a request for directions in relation to a proposed prosecution of the appellant and three others 
involved in the attempted escape on 24 December 1973. Mr Hutton concluded that a court would probably hold 
that it would be a condition precedent to the making of an ICO that the Secretary of State should have considered 
the matter personally.  
‘7. The appellant became aware of Mr Hutton’s opinion in October 2009. He had not appealed his convictions 
before then. Sometime after learning of the opinion, he applied for an extension of time in which to appeal his 
convictions… the power invested in the Secretary of State by article 4(1) was a momentous one ... The provision 
did nothing less than give the Secretary of State the task of deciding whether an individual should remain at 
liberty or be kept in custody, quite possibly for an indefinite period … 
‘39… there was no reason to apprehend (at the time of the enactment of the 1972 Order) that this would place an 
impossible burden on the Secretary of State. Indeed, the subsequent experience with Mr Merlyn Rees scotches 
any notion that this should be so... 
‘41. The making of the ICO in respect of the appellant was invalid. It follows that he was not detained lawfully. It 
further follows that he was wrongfully convicted of the offences of attempting to escape from lawful custody and 
his convictions for those offences must be quashed.’ 
29 Harper Lee, To Kill A Mockingbird (Heinemann 1960). 
30 Harper Lee, Go Set A Watchman (HarperCollins,2015). 
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they had almost all studied at school, Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird. They asked for a 
‘model answer’ which, of course, was missing the point and beyond me but I did eventually 
write my own response to the task. It was then published in the second edition of our book of 
teaching materials from this pioneering course on learning legal skills.31 A quarter of a century 
later, it emerged that Harper Lee had written her own ‘sequel’ or, to be precise, that the novel 
we knew was developed at the suggestion of an editor from her original manuscript. My 
version can now be compared with Harper Lee’s Go Set A Watchman. In mine, the young girl 
narrator, Scout, is now known by her proper name, Jean Louise, and is being appointed as 
the first woman Justice of the United States Supreme Court. In Harper Lee’s own version, she 
is indeed known as Jean Louise, but is in a dead-end job. In mine, she cares for Atticus Finch, 
her father, in his dying moments. In Harper Lee’s version, she is outraged by Atticus and 
denounces him as a racist. But media reports that Atticus is a racist are not the last word. 
Harper Lee was, in my opinion, drawing not only on her father’s legal career but also on the 
life of the father of one of her fellow law students at the University of Alabama. Hugo Black 
had been a member of the Klu Klux Klan when seeking election to the US Senate but he 
became one of the most liberal of US Supreme Court Justices in history. Atticus was not a 
Klan member but had encountered the Klan and other racists. The charge of racism against 
Atticus is not unanswerable. Indeed, it is answered in Go Set A Watchman by Atticus’s brother, 
Jack. Part of the point back in the 1990s was to challenge students to write a chapter in a book 
composed by others, much as judges are writing a chapter in the story of the common law, 
where earlier chapters were written by others. Partly, it was to encourage students in Northern 
Ireland to walk in someone else’s shoes, to see the world from someone else’s porch. Partly, 
it was to build on a shared experience. I would like to think it was one of a host of ideas that 
contributed in a small way to influencing the mind-sets of a generation of influential people in 
Northern Ireland. Former students have told me that this was a formative experience which 
acquired even more meaning twenty-five years later when they could judge their version 
against not only mine but, more importantly, Harper Lee’s. The title Go Set A Watchman 
comes from the Bible and indicates that part of maturing as a person is to develop one’s own 
conscience, not to rely on a father figure or any other hero but to take responsibility for one’s 
own judgment calls.   
(9) Eamon: when justice prevails, rather than miscarries, it can be transforming  
The converse of a miscarriage of justice, a delivery or perhaps a carriage, has its own impact: 
the unheralded humanity and dignity, under pressure, of a just decision has the power to 
transform individuals, communities and society. The starting point here is a judge keeping an 
open mind under intense pressure. Even some of the enemies of the state can end up 
respecting the open-mindedness of the judiciary. I admired the courage, integrity and 
independence of Mr Justice Higgins and wrote his obituary for The Guardian,32 when he died 
in 1993. But four years later, a more powerful tribute came from a convicted murderer, IRA 
man, Open University and Queen’s law student, Eamon Collins, who was himself later 
murdered by the IRA. He was tried by Mr Justice Higgins, acting as judge and jury in a Diplock 
Court, who acquitted him in 1987 of another murder charge. Collins had spent two years on 
remand. Ten years later, he crafted a remarkable tribute to the judge and the rule of law: 
‘there could be such a thing as the impartial application of the rule of law … the contrast 
with our revolutionary justice was extreme… What he was saying was that in his eyes, 
the prosecution had failed to exclude the reasonable possibility that I had been treated 
in such a way as to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. So even though he 
suspected I was guilty as hell, he was willing to let me walk free … I could feel nothing 
but admiration for this judge who, on such a fragile legal abstraction, had set free a 
 
31 Simon Lee, ‘Lawyers were children once’ in Simon Lee & Marie Fox, Learning Legal Skills, Blackstone, 2nd 
edition, 1994, 304-305. 
32 Simon Lee, ‘Justice without fear or favour’, The Guardian, 7 September, 1993. 
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man from an organization which even during the trial had tried to murder him by firing 
a rocket at his home.’33 
This was despite the fact that Eamon Collins himself believed that ‘ordinary’ people on the 
Clapham omnibus ‘would probably have liked to have seen me hung, drawn and quartered, 
with my entrails fed to rabid dogs, and my head stuck on a pike for public edification’.34 No 
wonder, then, that Eamon Collins explained that, ‘the judge’s words had sent a real shock 
through my body. I felt peculiarly emotional about them’.35  
(10) Jennie: consider an experiment in prejudices 
One of the principal founders of the Open University was Jennie Lee MP, the minister given 
responsibility by the Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the 1960s for making a ‘University of the 
Air’ happen. In the 1920s, as a student at Edinburgh, she had conducted what she called ‘An 
Experiment in Prejudices’. She gave all her student notebooks to the Open University. The 
OU’s archivist, Ruth Cammies, had helped me in the preparation of my inaugural lecture in 
2017 and, knowing of my interest in institutional history, mentioned to me that this archive 
existed. I read through all the hand-written student notes deposited by Jennie Lee and asked 
permission to publish her account of a student project she undertook in Psychology. This was 
run in our Year of ‘My-gration’, a sequence of 250 blogs in 2018, which was, as far as I am 
aware, the first time that her account of this particular experiment has been made public,36 Her 
analogy of the mental and physical well-being and education of children has a particular 
resonance in 2020, given the Covid 19 pandemic and the dramatic actions, including lockdown 
and the closure of schools, taken to protect children and adults. For Jennie Lee believed that:  
‘if poverty and war are to be abolished, the schools must make it their duty to search 
for and destroy harmful anti-social germs in the mind of children as rigorously as 
disease germs are removed from their bodies…I carried out an experiment with five 
groups of children, averaging forty-five in each group. They were selected from schools 
in varied environments, a rural area, a small town, a large town, a mining village and 
an aerodrome centre. The children were given a list of the nations of the world and 
asked to write opposite each country whether they liked, disliked, or were indifferent to 
its inhabitants, and WHY.’  
Jennie Lee conceded that, ‘Such an experiment takes no claim to scientific thoroughness’ but 
concluded:  
‘what an indictment of our educational system that only two out of two hundred and 
twenty two children had learned to do their own thinking and to reply in most cases 
that they had no opinion as they did not know enough to form one.’ 
Jennie Lee was studying Law and Education, as well as Psychology. An undergraduate project 
in one of her three subjects over ninety years ago could not be expected to satisfy the 
standards of a major research project today but the spirit of her inquiry and the basis of her 
concern, arising out of reading the latest literature available to her, has much to commend it. 
Her initiative reflects her character, the breadth of her outlook and her passion for countering 
prejudice through education, all of which stood her and us in good stead when she led the 
creation of the Open University. 
 
33 Eamon Collins, Killing Rage, (Granta, 1998) 339-341 
34 ibid 340 




3. Conclusion: a never-ending striving to be open-minded 
These first fifty years of the Open University are not, of course, the beginning or the end of 
understanding an open-minded approach to law and to life. Nevertheless, there was a kind of 
genius in the origins of the Open University, in more than one sense. The first Chancellor, 
Lord Crowther, famously said that the University should be ‘open to people, places, methods 
and ideas’.37 It was the most imaginative and pioneering of new universities, with the most 
imaginative and pioneering approaches to widening access and lifelong learning. The 
government that brought us the Open University was the same one, led by Harold Wilson, that 
was so criticised by one of its own backbenchers, Desmond Donnelly, with whose story this 
essay began and which gave rise to the Megarry observation about open and shut cases.   
A contender for the accolade of the most open-minded lawyer or politician or public figure of 
the twentieth century in this country would be the Lord Chancellor in that Wilson government, 
Gerald Gardiner. He fought in the First World War but was a conscientious objector in the 
Second, when he served with  a Friends’ Ambulance Unit (although not a Quaker himself). In 
the early 1950s, he successfully represented Jennie Lee and Michael Foot in the House of 
Lords in a libel action brought by Lord Kemsley against Tribune newspaper38 and, most 
famously, in the early 1960s he successfully defended Penguin’s publishing of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover in the courts. As a radical Lord Chancellor, he established the Law 
Commissions and led the Practice Statement declaring a change in our highest court’s 
approach to precedent.39 He brings us back to the cases of Bob and F E who are not the only 
people to have reached high office in law or politics after finding themselves in trouble with the 
authorities as students. Gerald Gardiner had graduated from Oxford with Fourth Class 
Honours in Law, just after the First World War, before achieving the rare feat for a 
postgraduate student of being expelled.40 He was summoned by the Vice-Chancellor, Lewis 
R Farnell41, and summarily dismissed for having published a pamphlet by a recent graduate. 
Her essay was critical of women’s colleges for being restrictive. The principals of the women’s 
colleges were indignant and Gardiner was punished. Dilys Powell, the author, went on to 
become one of our foremost film critics and an expert witness for the defence in that Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover trial. Women’s colleges, Gerald Gardiner and universities went on to 
become more liberal, more open, more imaginative. What did Lord Gardiner do in retirement, 
while being Chancellor of the Open University? He enrolled as an undergraduate student.42 In 
the inaugural lecture from which this essay is derived, I gave Lord Gardiner the last word, by 
playing a video of him recalling that he had told the Wilson Cabinet that the Open University 
would be remembered as their government’s greatest achievement. That government opened 
our minds directly through the Open University and indirectly with the stimulus the OU gave to 
other universities and to people everywhere to find new ways to learn at all stages of life. For 
students, including researchers, of the law, this means we have to be open to other disciplines 
and people who think differently to us, open to going out into places where the path of the law 
has rarely strayed, to seek to understand the perspectives of the marginalised, no longer vote-
less but still voiceless, or at least only heard uneasily when they burst through our sound-
proofed bubbles.  
 
37 OU archives, Year of My-gration, 2018, http://www.open.ac.uk/research/news/day-4-year-mygration. 
38 Kemsley v Foot & Another 1952 AC 345 http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs3/1952AC345.html. 
39 [1966] 1 WLR 1234. 
40 Muriel Box, Rebel Advocate (Victor Gollancz, 1983) 42.  
41 L R Farnell, An Oxonian Looks Back (Hopkinson, 1934), records with some pride some other illiberal 
tendencies in his leadership roles but even he is not beyond redemption. He once saw and praised an illiterate 
tram conductor in Germany who recognised and treated kindly a Nobel Prize-winning Roman lawyer, Mommsen. 
Farnell recognised a genius in more than one sense here, a respect for lifelong learning in the German people.  
42 Box, ibid 214, graduating in Social Sciences in 1977. 
14 
 
I learned at Yale Law School that any argument is but one view of the cathedral.43 That allusion 
is to Monet’s studies of the Cathedral at Rouen. Monet chose different times and seasons to 
capture the atmosphere differently, though he painted from the same vantage-point. If we 
imagine painters all around the cathedral or all around the metaphorical public square, each 
impression tells us something about the ostensible object but also something about the 
perspective of the artist and the atmosphere in between the two. For example, whether we 
are painting a picture of a cathedral or of the law or of politics, the view can be very different 
from the left or the right. The whole story cannot be discovered from the outside. We need to 
explore the life and purposes of a cathedral from the inside in order to understand it.  
One of the things law does is to provide a focus, a subject to paint, rooting our discussion of 
high-minded values in particular, often low-level sets of facts, usually with a need for a decision 
one way or another. So why does law capture our attention? Part of it is to do, of course, with 
the authority of the law, its combination of moral stance and the coercive power of the state. 
But it is also partly to do with its drama and its ability to distil some abstract issue into a practical 
question, usually in the context of a specific dispute, a case wending its way through the 
courts. The media love the opportunities given by sport, court cases and parliamentary votes 
to speculate on who will win, to report on what happens and then to analyse why people won 
or lost. There is a danger in all this of legal fetishism, that we become fixated on the law as a 
false target. Similarly, the underlying danger of the ‘open and shut’ attitude is that we become 
fixated on our initial hunch and are reluctant to hear alternative explanations of an issue.   
Challenging such closed-mindedness is not the preserve of the Open University or of the last 
half-century. For example, Francis Bacon’s critique of received wisdom, written in 1620, 
identified four false idols, giving them names which could sound fresh in a 2020 business 
school tract on marketing and leadership, the idols of the Tribe, the Cave, the Marketplace 
and the Theatre. Bacon was writing in Latin but an English translation of his point against what 
might now be called groupthink or confirmation bias (the first half of XLVI) runs thus44: 
‘The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the 
received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and 
agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be 
found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some 
distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious 
predetermination the authority of its former conclusions may remain inviolate.’ 
Each age needs to have this emphasised in its own way. Forty years after Bacon, Matthew 
Hale, later Chief Justice, wrote ‘Things Necessary to be Continually had in Remembrance’, 
rules or reminders to himself on his initial appointment to the Bench in 1660:45 
‘That in the execution of justice, I carefully lay aside my own passions,  
and not give way to them however provoked. 
That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any judgment at all, 
till the whole business and both parties be heard. 
That I never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve 
myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard… 
That I be not biased with compassion to the poor, or favour to the 
rich in point of justice. 
That popular or court applause or distaste, have no influence into any 
thing I do in point of distribution of justice. 
 
43 G Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
44 F Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620. 
45 Matthew Hale, Things Necessary to be had Continually in Remembrance, 1660, reprinted eg by Merrymount 
Press, 1937 and quoted eg in Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, (Penguin 2010). 
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Not to be solicitous what men will say or think, so long as I keep 
myself exactly according to the rule of justice.’ 
 
To have these things ‘continually’ in mind is a challenge. As Bowen & Bok conclude their 
examination of race in American universities and society, ‘The “river” that is the subject of this 
book can never be “learned” once and for all’46, referring to Twain’s realisation that the great 
river had to be learned upstream and downstream. So striving to live out Megarry’s call to 
open-mindedness is an unending task. Every day, we can find further examples of seemingly 
‘open and shut cases which, somehow, were not’.  
Just as Hale was putting the spirit of Bacon into reminders to himself, Megarry was consciously 
echoing Holmes from seventy years before. Very few people now read through to the 
conclusion of Holmes’ lecture on The Path of the Law but it ends with this affirmation of a 
quirky and abstract collection of incidents:47  
‘The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal 
interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, 
but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a 






46 William G Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River, (Princeton University Press, 1998). 







Thoughts on the Four 





Devolution, debate and change: Changing the UK’s 
constitutional settlements 




Devolution has been ‘a process not an event’ resulting in new constitutional settlements . This 
chapter covers the processes of devolution, processes which mirror the first 50 years of the 
Open University and the first 22 years of the OU Law School. The chapter explores the 
devolution of powers to parliaments in Scotland and Wales. It begins with the referendums of 
the early 1970s and traces events leading up to both the initial transfer of powers and those 
resulting in subsequent transfer of powers. The process has not been without its critics and 
the use of differing models helped create complexity re-enforcing historical legacies. 
Devolution created new legal orders and challenged accepted traditional constitutional theory. 
The story is not yet over. 
 
1. Introduction  
The establishment of The Open University (OU) in 1969 changed the landscape of higher 
education in the United Kingdom (UK). Its mission of being ‘Open to people, places, methods 
and ideas’1 and its promotion of social justice through high quality education2 has challenged 
thinking around educational practices. In the 50 years since it was established it has 
transformed the lives of many through its work and partnerships. It has students in over 90% 
of UK postcodes3 and continues to hold a unique position within the UK’s Higher Education 
sector working across, and receiving funding from, all four UK nations. In celebrating its 50th 
anniversary its Vice Chancellor expressed pride in being the UK’s only four nations university.4   
During the OU’s 50-year history there have been significant changes and challenges within 
the higher education landscape. These mirrored the significant political, legal and 
constitutional changes taking place within the UK itself. Changes regarded as unlikely by many 
fifty years ago have now transformed the educational, legal and political landscapes within the 
UK. This chapter will focus on one aspect of those changes, the creation of new legislatures 
within the UK in Scotland and Wales.  
 
1Mission: About the university< http://www.open.ac.uk/about/main/strategy-and-policies/mission> (accessed 9 
October 2020). 
2 Ibid 1. 
3 Data from 2019. 
4 ’50. A movement of millions a mission of one’ Open University 2019 
<http://www3.open.ac.uk/documents/1/vs19080444243116.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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2. The referendums: Politics as a driver and inhibitor 
To provide context this section considers the calls for devolution that re-surfaced and grew in 
the 1960s. As politicians were considering a ‘University of the Air’5 they were also making 
commitments to some form of devolution.6  The Welsh Office had been established in 1965 
(the year in which planning for the OU began in earnest) and the Northern Ireland Office in 
1972 (The Scottish Office had been in existence since 1885). Further, and more significant, 
plans for change were to follow.  
In 19667 and 19678 both the Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties won parliamentary seats 
in by-elections. By 1969 both parties were gathering momentum and seen as possible 
contenders for further Labour parliamentary seats in both Wales and Scotland. There were 
growing successes in local elections too. Disagreement in the Labour Cabinet9 as to how to 
respond to this threat in Labour strongholds grew and led to the establishment of a Royal 
Commission on the Constitution in 1969. The Commission’s remit was broad and included 
examining various structures of the constitution including local government administration. It 
considered, amongst other matters, devolution, federalism10 and the possible division of the 
UK into separate sovereign states. The work took some four and a half years to complete11 
and the final report was not unanimous. Several commissioners published their own views 
under a Memorandum of Dissent.  Independence or federalism was rejected in favour of 
elected devolved assemblies. The Memorandum of Dissent reflected the disagreements over 
both the terms of reference and interpretation of the evidence gathered.12    
In a parliamentary debate on the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1973 Lord 
Beaumont of Whitley noted: 
Now that the debate over Europe is, with due respect […] more or less over, this debate 
and subject will become more and more important and will be the main constitutional 
one in forthcoming years.13 
He went on: 
Our position is simple: we agreed with the analysis contained in the Majority Report to 
the extent that: ‘Government is remote and insufficiently sensitive to the views and 
feelings of the people.’ […] we endorse the belief expressed […] in their Memorandum 
of Dissent when they say that the necessary reforms should have three main 
objectives: first, to counter the decline they consider has taken place this century in 
the extent to which the British people govern themselves; secondly, to reduce the 
 
5 See <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-
lives/relationships/collections1/parliament-and-the-1960s/jennie-lee/> accessed 9 October 2020. 
6 Edward Heath ‘Declaration of Perth’ 1968 in which the Conservative party committed to Scottish devolution. 
This was followed in 1970 by a report led by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign Secretary, recommending the 
creation of a Scottish Assembly. 
7 Gwynfor Evans MP first Plaid Cymru MP. Elected to represent the Carmarthen constituency. 
8 Winnie Ewing SNP to represent the Hamilton constituency. In local elections the same year the SNP gained 69 
seats. In local elections in 1968 the SNP gained 40% of the vote. 
9 Harold Wilson became UK Prime Minister on 16 October 1964. Following a general election in 1966 he held 
power until 1970. Elected in 1953 to the Huyton constituency as a Labour MP having previously held the seat of 
Ormskirk. Harold Wilson is associated with the establishment of the Open University. The Open University 
represents the realisation of his plans for a ‘University of the Air’ outlined in the mid1960s.  
10 The Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969 also considered the UK’s economic and constitutional 
relationships with the Isle of Man and Channel Islands.  
11 The first chair Lord Crowther died in 1972 and Lord Kilbrandon took over. The report is also referred to as the 
Crowther and Kilbrandon Report. 
12 Royal Commission on the Constitution: Papers and Evidence: the National Archives 
<https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9085> accessed 9 October 2020.  
13 HL Deb 12 December 1973 vol 347 cols 1157-76. 
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present excessive burdens on the institutions of Central Government; thirdly, to 
provide adequate means for the redress of individual grievances.’14 
By the time the report was published a Conservative government15 was in power. In 197416 a 
White Paper ‘Democracy and Devolution: proposals for Scotland and Wales’17 was published. 
The paper proposed handing over certain governmental and administrative powers to directly 
elected Assemblies for Scotland and Wales, with the Scottish Assembly having legislative but 
not tax-raising powers and the Welsh Assembly having executive powers only. A further report 
followed in 1975, ‘Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales’.18 In their 
response to this paper the Scottish Law Commission noted: 
‘much depends upon the precise way in which the devolved and retained matters are 
specified, but it is clear that any system which envisages the specification of both will 
enhance the difficulty of ascertaining the precise scope of the devolved powers […] it 
follows that there will be room for considerable uncertainty as to scope, and difference 
of opinion depending on whether the matter is viewed from an English or from a 
Scottish standpoint.19 
By 1974 both the Labour and Conservative parties were making commitments in their 
manifestos20 to a Scottish Assembly and powers to spend a share of the UK’s budget.21 Labour 
promised to also create an elected Assembly in Wales. 
In 1976 a Scotland and Wales Bill was published.22 During the second parliamentary reading 
in the House of Commons the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, noted: 
I doubt whether any major measure has come before the House after such extensive 
discussion, certainly not in recent years. That is as it should be in the case of a 
constitutional measure of such great scope and lasting importance. This is a measure 
for Wales and Scotland and a measure for preserving the unity of the United Kingdom. 
[,,,] 
We do this because we believe the people of Scotland and of Wales look to Parliament 
to reach a definite conclusion on the Bill and not just to allow it to be filibustered into 
oblivion. Now that the Government have placed the Bill before Parliament, Scotland 
and Wales are entitled to a clear verdict and not just an interminable and never-ending 
flow of argument.  
The parliamentary debate on the Bill will be one of great constitutional importance.  
 […] 
 
14 HL Deb 12 December 1973 vol 347 col 1159. 
15 A Conservative government under Edward Heath had come to power in June 1970. 
16 The February election of 1974 was won by a Labour majority of 4 seats. Labour became a minority 
government. In an October election the same year they held on to power with a majority of 3 seats. 
17 Democracy and Devolution: proposals for Scotland and Wales: the national Archives 
<https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3081357> accessed 9 October 2020. 
18 Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales: the National Archives 
<https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11121883> accessed 9 October 2020. 
19 Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No. 32 Comments on White Paper ‘Our Changing Democracy: 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales’ para 6. These concerns continue to also have resonance today.  
20 Each published separate manifestos for Scotland and Wales.  
21 ‘Putting Britain First’ 1974 Conservative manifesto and ‘Britain will win with Labour’ 1974 Labour manifesto.  
22 HC Deb 13, 14 and 15 December 1978 Vol, 922, col 974-1150, col 1249-1486, col 1559-1661, col 1735-1876. 
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The purpose of the Bill, therefore, is to give the Scottish and Welsh people a surer 
guarantee and a more relevant instrument of national identity.23 
The second reading was made possible by a concession, an agreement that referendums 
would be held in the nations of Scotland and Wales. Significant parliamentary time had been 
allowed for the debates, but the bill faced fierce opposition and failed to get through all 
necessary parliamentary stages. The hopes that it would not be ‘filibustered into oblivion’ 
proved fruitless.24 It was a blow to those seeking to more fully recognise the diversity of the 
UK and highlighted the significant political differences that existed. Devolution and the politics 
associated with it were fracturing existing political party politics, crossing boundaries and 
alliances. Similarities can be drawn with debates over European Union (EU) membership. 
Constitutional debates in the UK appear to sit uncomfortably in the arena of politics.   
Following swiftly on from the 1976 defeat further legislation was introduced and in 1978 both 
the Scotland Act and the Wales Act25 were passed. Differing devolution settlements had 
always been proposed for Scotland and Wales but at this stage a new approach of separate 
legislation was adopted. That approach began the process which created an unequal public 
understanding. One that lasted well into the second decade of the next century.     
The bills were both introduced in November 1977. They progressed together through the 
parliamentary approvals process receiving Royal Assent in July 1978.26 However, throughout 
the debates and progress of the bills the Scottish Bill was always placed first in debates.27 
Whilst there was widespread coverage of the Scotland Bill there was minimal coverage of the 
Wales Bill outside Wales.28 Coverage also often concentrated on the political issues and 
debates as new alliances were created and MPs worked together in new partnerships to either 
support or defeat29 the bills. The different provisions for devolution, including the differing 
character of the settlement proposed for Wales compared to Scotland were not widely 
appreciated or understood. This approach laid the groundwork for subsequent proposals 
creating a form of unintentional bias and perpetuating both State and political behaviour.  
The Scotland and the Wales Acts received Royal Assent in 1978 but could only become law 
if voted for by a majority of voters in Wales and Scotland. Referendums30 were held on 1 
March 1979. A small majority of Scots voted ‘Yes’31 but only a minority voted ‘Yes’32 in Wales. 
In each case the 40% threshold imposed was not met. The result had significant and long-
term political implications for the UK33 and the Scotland Act and the Wales Act were repealed 
in June 1997 by Order in Council34. What had started as an intention to recognise the diversity 
and history of the UK, to protect the Union and safeguard votes had led to division, an 
upending of traditional party politics and growing nationalism. Negotiating constitutional 
 
23 HC Deb 13 December 1976 vol 922, col 975.   
24 The Government had to abandon the Bill when it failed to survive a guillotine motion (45 Labour MPs 
abstained).   
25 HC Deb 14 November 1977 Vol 939, col 51-214, 1978 Wales Act and Scotland Act 1978. 
26 HC Deb 25 January 1978 vol, 942, col 1424-1553 at 1543. At committee stage an amendment from Labour 
backbencher George Cunningham was introduced. This required the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament 
an order repealing the Act unless at least 40% of the eligible electorate voted "yes". The amendment was 
approved by 166 votes to 151. 
27 eg HC Deb 26 July 1977 vol 936, col 313-28 Mr Cledwyn Hughes at 317 and response at 318. 
28 London based press dominated the debate. They outsold local newspapers in Wales by around 7:1. The 
debate was not widely communicated to the Welsh electorate either.  
29 See eg the press coverage of the ‘gang of six’ Welsh Labour MPs who opposed devolution.  
30 HL Deb 21 July 1997 vol 581, col 1240-74 at 1245. These were advisory referendums. 
31 Turnout was 63.3%. 32.9 % voted ‘Yes’, 30.8 % voted ‘No’. 
32 Turnout was 58,8%. 20.3 % voted ‘Yes’ 79.7% ‘No’. 
33 HC Deb 28 March 1979 vol, 965 col 461-590 at 461 and 584. The Labour Government lost the no confidence 
vote by one vote. In May 1979 a Conservative Government was elected. The Conservatives held power for the 
next 18 years.  
34 Wales Act 1978 (Repeal) Order 1979. Scotland Act 1978 (Repeal) Order 1979. 
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change presented challenges for every political party.35 The traditional centralised 
Westminster model was being challenged in ways not seen before. A position not helped by 
the role of the Westminster Parliament36 as both State-wide and Nations legislature.      
The referendums in 1979 were not the end of the matter. Changes again began to be called 
for in the 1980s and 1990s as the pattern of political support in Scotland and Wales37 began 
to differ significantly from England. These calls were recognised in the Labour Party manifesto 
for the 1997 election, which contained a commitment to hold a referendum on devolution in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.38 The Labour Government39 published a White Paper, 
‘A Voice for Wales’40  and ‘Scotland’s Parliament’41 in July of the same year. The white papers 
outlined proposals for a devolved Assembly in Wales and a Scottish Parliament. Referendums 
were held in Wales and Scotland on 18 September 1997. 
In the House of Lords debates Lord Sewel, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Scottish Office, noted: 
As someone who was born and brought up in England, pursued part of my education 
in Wales and has lived most of my life in Scotland--I value the Union. But the enduring 
value of the Union is its diversity. What we are doing is to establish structures of 
government that not only recognise that diversity but encourage it to flourish. 
I have said that our proposals are about revitalising democracy. We want to revitalise 
democracy in Scotland and Wales. We want a new politics--a more inclusive, 
consensual politics. That is why we have devised an electoral system that will ensure 
the fair representation of different points of view. That is why we place great emphasis 
on a strong committee system and ideas like pre-legislative scrutiny. 
While many of us enjoy the theatre of this House and of Parliament generally, we must 
recognise that many of our fellow citizens are deterred from making a contribution to 
public life by the adversarial and confrontational style of our politics42. We want to 
change that. We want a parliament and an assembly in which a much wider range of 
people will wish to participate. And I say quite frankly that that is going to be a challenge 
to the political parties and their selection processes, but we need it. The two 
countries—the UK—need a change in their approach to politics. It needs a more 
inclusive legislature.43 
The emphasis in the devolution debates was now refocused on political change, democracy 
and strong pre-legislative scrutiny. The bills were debated at the same time and passed 
through the parliamentary process in tandem.44  
 
35 See also the 1975 UK wide referendum on membership of the European Community. 
36 Referred to here as the Westminster Parliament. The Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act 1927 section 2(1) 
gives the full title as the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Throughout 
these referendums and during the ‘Troubles’ the position of Northern Ireland received less attention in 
constitutional debates despite the 1973 referendum on Northern Ireland sovereignty.  
37 The combination of the policies of the UK Conservative Government in the 1980s and the Conservative Party’s 
low levels of electoral support in Wales led to renewed calls for Wales to have its own legislature. 
38 ‘Devolution: Strengthening our Union’ 1997 Labour Party manifesto. 
39 The Labour Party won the general election with a majority of 179. Share of votes: Labour 45%, Conservative 
31%, Liberal Democrat 17% and other 7%. In Scotland the SNP polled a 22% share of the vote in Scotland and 
Plaid Cymru a 10% share in Wales. 
40 A Voice for Wales- the Government’s Proposal for a Welsh Assembly (Cm 3718, 1977) 
41 Scotland's Parliament (Cm 3658, 1977)  
42 This remains in evidence at the UK’s Prime Ministers Question Time. 
43HL Deb 30 Jul 1997 vol 582, col 186. 
44 Alongside the Northern Ireland Bill which followed the 1998 Belfast Agreement. 
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As an aside, as it touches upon matters of devolved competencies, in the same debate Lord 
Sewel also noted: 
There have been a number of questions about our proposals for giving the Scottish 
parliament and the Welsh assembly a say in European Union affairs. The Scottish 
executive and parliament and the Welsh assembly will have important roles in relation 
to European Union issues. Both will have the fullest and most direct possible 
involvement in policy formation within the United Kingdom. The Scottish and Welsh 
voices must be heard in relevant negotiations on policy at all levels, up to and including 
the Council of Ministers, including the scope to speak directly on behalf of the UK in 
those negotiations.45 
Evidence from recent years is that this commitment to full involvement has yet to be realised.46   
In Scotland turnout for the referendum was 60.2 per cent. A majority (74.3 per cent of those 
who voted) supported devolution. A further 63.5 per cent voted for tax-varying powers47. In 
Wales turnout for the referendum was 50.1 per cent. A small majority (50.3 per cent of those 
who voted) supported devolution. Because no thresholds had been stipulated, a simple 
majority vote was all that was required to give a mandate for devolution.  
The process of devolution began and in 1999 new legislatures in Scotland and Wales were 
established.48 Despite the emphasis at the time on democracy and political change the move 
to devolved powers in three of the four UK nations has led to significant constitutional 
implications. The constitutional statutes creating the new legislatures, and the subsequent 
amendments, have challenged notions of the ‘English’ constitution written about by Bagehot, 
Dicey and Bingham.49  
The referendum results themselves did not lead to the breakup of the Union so feared by many 
politicians but they were of their time and the subsequent referendum on EU membership50 
has not only changed the UK’s political landscape even further but has also changed opinions 
around the devolved settlements and the future shape of the UK itself.  
3. Devolution: Scotland  
The Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament and outlined the law-making 
process, as well as on what matters laws can be made. The Scottish Parliament has full 
legislative competence51 (it can pass both primary and subordinate legislation) in devolved 
areas.  
Devolution took the form of a reserved powers model; Schedule 5 contained a list of ‘reserved 
matters’.52 These were matters which were to be reserved for the UK Parliament53 and on 
which only the UK Parliament could make law. There was, however, no similar list of devolved 
 
45 HL Deb 30 July 1997 vol 582, col 188.  
46 In particular around negotiations with the EU as international policy is a reserved matter. Many EU policies 
however touch on matters which are devolved and over which the Nation governments have exclusive 
competence.  
47 This question was not included on the Wales ballot in 1997.  
48 Also, in Northern Ireland 
49 Walter Bagehot ‘The English Constitution’ (London: Chapman and Hall,1867), Albert Venn Dicey Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (MacMillan,1885), Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2010). 
50 23 June 2016. England 53.4% leave 46.6% remain. Scotland 38% leave 62% remain. Wales 52.5% leave 
47.5% remain. Northern Ireland 44.2% leave 55.8% remain. UK overall 51.9% leave 48.1% remain. 
51 s29 Scotland Act 1998 as amended. 
52 Schedule 5 Scotland Act 1998 as amended. 
53 From this point in the chapter the Westminster Parliament will be referred to as the UK Parliament as an 
indicator of its reserved powers across the UK and to distinguish it from the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments.  
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matters on which the Scottish Parliament could legislate. Matters on which the Scottish 
Parliament can legislate are, in effect, all those matters that are not ‘reserved’.  
The Scotland Act 1998 was the beginning and devolution in Scotland has not stood still. It has 
been an evolving process, and one which, at times, has been a direct political response from 
the UK Government to changes in both Scottish society and politics.54  
The third elections to the Scottish Parliament were held in 2007. For the first time the SNP 
held more seats than Labour.55 In August 2007, the Scottish Government published ‘Choosing 
Scotland’s future: a national conversation: independence and responsibility in the modern 
world’.56 The purpose was to promote ’conversation’ on Scotland’s constitutional future, a 
discussion around possible independence amongst other matters. One outcome was the 
unification of the opposition parties within the Scottish Parliament. The leaders of the three 
opposition parties issued a joint statement opposing any plans for an independence 
referendum.57  
Within Scotland public awareness of the work of the Scottish Parliament was high. Its work 
had proved popular within Scotland and it had the ability to respond to local and national 
issues. A number of its legislative provisions led the way for other UK legislatures.58 
Transparency and public engagement were at the core of its work.59 This, together with a 
changing political landscape led, in 2007, to an agreed review. In December 2007, in a 
parliamentary debate60 around the agenda for the future of Scotland, it was noted: 
That the Parliament, recognising mainstream public opinion in Scotland, supports the 
establishment of an independently chaired commission to review devolution in 
Scotland; encourages UK Parliamentarians and parties to support this commission 
also and proposes that the remit of this commission should be: To review the 
provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in the light of experience and to recommend any 
changes to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the Scottish 
Parliament to better serve the people of Scotland, that would improve the financial 
accountability of the Scottish Parliament and that would continue to secure the position 
of Scotland within the United Kingdom, and further instructs the Scottish Parliamentary 
Corporate Body to allocate appropriate resources and funding for this review.61 
The Conservative Party leader noted: 
Strengthening devolution while continuing to secure the position of Scotland within the 
United Kingdom is not just an honourable but a highly important commitment. It is 
bigger than any one political party, because it dwarfs party politics. We are talking 
about shaping the constitutional direction of travel of our nation for the future, not just 
because it is sensible and pragmatic to do that eight years on, but because it 
overwhelmingly reflects what Scotland wants to happen.62 
 
54 As a response to the referendum on Scottish independence held in September 2014. 
55 SNP 47 seats, Scottish Labour Party 46 seats, Scottish Conservative Party 17 seats, Scottish Liberal 
Democrats 16 seats. The SNP formed a minority government. Alex Salmond was appointed as First Minister. 
56  Scottish Government ‘Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation: Independence and Responsibility 
in the Modern World’ 2007.  
57 See BBC 13 August 2007 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6944185.stm> accessed 9 October2020. 
58 See for eg on health and social care, environment, alcohol minimum pricing, period products in schools. 
59 This includes public engagement and legislative consultations across Scotland, a five-star tourism award, 
events and annual awards.  
60 SP OR 6 December 2007, col 1. S3M-976 was moved by the Labour leader in the Scottish Parliament, Wendy 
Alexander. Motion agreed: For 76, Against 46, Abstentions 3. 
61 SP OR 6 December 2007 cols 4133-85. 
62 Ibid col 4143. 
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The Commission on Scottish Devolution63 (The Calman Commission64) was supported by the 
UK Parliament and formally announced by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Des Browne:65 
The Government welcome that Parliament’s support for the aim of strengthening 
devolution and securing Scotland’s place in the Union. We are therefore giving our full 
support to this cross-border, cross-party review. 
The remit of the Calman Commission was to: 
review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in light of experience and to recommend 
any changes to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the Scottish 
Parliament to serve the people of Scotland better, improve the financial accountability 
of the Scottish Parliament, and continue to secure the position of Scotland within the 
UK. 66 
The remit had not gone far enough for everyone though as Scottish independence had not 
been included: 
Although we welcome any contribution to the national conversation, we regret that the 
Parliament has agreed to establish a commission that deliberately excludes 
independence—not just the favoured option of the largest party in the Parliament, but 
the favoured option of a substantial proportion of the Scottish people.67 
Following wide-ranging consultations, the Commission made a number of recommendations 
in its final report.68 Recommendations were made in relation to fiscal autonomy, further 
devolution of powers, improvements to intergovernmental relations (IGR) and the legislative 
processes of the Scottish Parliament. It saw devolution as a success that could be built on. 
In the UK Government’s response ‘Scotland’s Future in the United Kingdom. Building on ten 
years of Scottish devolution’ Gordon Brown noted: 
The Scottish Parliament and the other devolved legislatures are now firmly entrenched 
in the United Kingdom’s constitution. They help to make that constitution one fit for the 
21st century. But there is more reform and modernisation to come. The plans in this 
White Paper are an important part of that.69 
Acknowledgement of the changes within the UK’s constitution was being made and the role 
played by devolution becoming more widely recognised. Focus had, for the time being, moved 
from the politics. In a Westminster Hall debate on the Scotland Act 1998 in April 2008 it was 
noted: 
Everyone in this Chamber agreed that more powers are required for the Scottish 
Parliament. Who would have believed that the Conservative, Liberal, Scottish National 
and Labour parties would now demand more powers for the Scottish Parliament? It is 
 
63 Commission on Scottish Devolution ‘The future of Scottish devolution within the Union: a first report’ December 
2008 and final report ‘Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century’ 2009. 
64 Known by this abbreviation the Commission was chaired by Professor Sir Kenneth Calman. 
65 HC 25 Mar 2008: Col 7WS.  
66 Ibid 63 and HC 25 Mar 2008: Col 8WS.The terms of reference mirrored the motion approved by the Scottish 
Parliament December 2007. 
67 SP EU 11 December 2007 The Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon. 
68 Ibid 63.  




remarkable, and we should take a moment to appreciate its full significance and 
importance. […] Now everyone is talking.70 
The UK Government’s commitment to implementing the Calman report resulted in The 
Scotland Act 2012. This made several changes to the devolution settlement for Scotland. 
These included the renaming of the Scottish Executive as the Scottish Government,71 
Paragraph 8 of the explanatory notes to the 2012 Act state that: 
As the Act changes the devolution settlement for Scotland, the Act contains provisions 
which alter the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (for example, relating 
to air weapons) and provisions which alter the executive competence of the Scottish 
Ministers (for example, relating to the power to prescribe drink-driving limits). The 
Scottish Parliament gave its consent to the provisions in the Act that trigger the Sewel 
Convention on 18 April 2012.72  
In the 2011 elections the SNP achieved a majority73 in the Scottish Parliament and the 
question of independence once more became a focus. As the ‘constitution’ was a reserved 
matter there were questions as to who had power to call and hold a referendum. A solution 
needed to be found and the Edinburgh Agreement74 reached in 2012 made provision for a 
referendum. An Order in Council approved by both Houses of the UK Parliament and the Privy 
Council gave the Scottish Parliament powers to hold, on or before 31 December 2014, an 
independence referendum.75 
A Scottish Referendum Bill76 was presented to the Scottish Parliament and received Royal 
Assent in December 2013. The electoral franchise was extended, and 16 years olds were able 
to vote in a Scottish referendum for the first time77. The referendum was announced in March 
2013 and held in September 2014. Fierce campaigning took place, particularly during the later 
stages of the campaign. The UK Government made several commitments to extend the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament in an aim to cement the Union. Two days before the 
referendum a statement signed jointly by David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband78 
promised voters ‘permanent and extensive new powers’ and that the Scottish Parliament 
would have a say in how much was spent on the NHS in Scotland.79 
Whilst there were debates over a proposed independence date the referendum result was in 
favour of staying within the UK. In a turnout of 86.4 per cent the vote 55.3 per cent voted no 
and 44.7 per cent yes. Immediately following the referendum Lord Smith of Kelvin was tasked 
with overseeing and delivering a cross-party agreement on the shape of improved and 
enhanced devolution for Scotland.  
 
70  HC Deb 2 Apr 2008: Column 270WH. Pete Wishart MP Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Cabinet Office).   
71 S 12 2012 Scotland Act. See also associated legislative consent motion S4M-02625: Lodged: 16 April 2012 
Debated 18 April 2012. 
72 See <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/11/notes/division/2> accessed 9 October 2020. 
73 SNP 69, Scottish Labour Party 37, Scottish Conservatives 15, Scottish Liberal Democrats 5, Scottish Green 
Party 2, Independent 1. 
74 HM Government and the Scottish Government ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the 
Scottish Government on an Independence Referendum for Scotland’. Signed 15 October 2012. 
75 The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013 
76 See< https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/61076.aspx> and 
https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/60464.aspx both accessed 9 October 2020. 
77 Forming part of wider SNP policy this was widely supported by other political parties including Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats and Green party.  
78 Leaders of the UK Conservative Party, Liberal Democrats and Labour Party respectively. 
79 Opinion is divided as to whether the promises were delivered see eg 




The ‘Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’.80was delivered in November 2014. In his forward Lord Smith noted: 
This agreement is, in itself, an unprecedented achievement. It demanded compromise 
from all of the parties. In some cases that meant moving to devolve greater powers 
than they had previously committed to, while for other parties it meant accepting the 
outcome would fall short of their ultimate ambitions. It shows that, however difficult, our 
political leaders can come together, work together, and reach agreement with one 
another.81 
The report had been agreed by all five of the main Scottish political parties and outlined further 
powers for the Scottish Parliament. In carrying out his work Lord Smith had ‘sought to give a 
voice to the public and the various organisations that make up the fabric of Scottish life’.82 The 
Scotland Act 2016 which resulted transferred additional powers to the Scottish Parliament. 
The powers of the Scottish Parliament have grown significantly since the original devolution 
settlement.83 Their growth has been incremental and piecemeal but before moving on it is 
worth looking back to consider the opinions of those initially tasked with the setting up of the 
Scottish Parliament. Key features include its openness, transparency of process and 
proactivity in engaging with the Scottish public. For all this work the Scottish Parliament has 
received international recognition. In events to mark the 20-year anniversary ‘expectation 
versus reality’, Holyrood’s original steering group delivered their assessment of the Scottish 
Parliament at twenty: 
World class legislation on, among other things, different approaches to the funding of 
higher education, climate change, free personal care, the smoking ban, proportional 
representation in local government elections, land reform and many other areas has 
more than vindicated the case for a legislative body in Scotland. The Scottish 
Parliament is now a fundamental and valued aspect of public life in Scotland and both 
the institution and its Members enjoy high recognition levels among the country’s 
electorate.84 
The journey of devolution in Scotland is not over. More twists, turns, straight stretches and 
dead ends lay ahead. With the departure of the UK from the EU it remains unclear how and 
to whom the exclusive competencies of the devolved legislatures and governments will return. 
Gains made under devolution may be lost and power concentrated once again at the centre 
in Westminster. Calls for independence also remain.85 
Having explored devolution in Scotland, the next section will consider the process in relation 
to Wales.  
 
80 Smith Commission (2014b) ‘Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament’. 
81 Ibid 4. < https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171029/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
82 Ibid 80. 
83 Now often referred to as the most powerful devolved legislature in the world. See eg BBC News Report May 
2016< https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35716653> accessed 9 October 2020. 
84 Consultative Steering Group ‘Reflections on 20 years of the Scottish Parliament’ 2019. The report also 
commented on the apparent polarisation of politics see para 4 and 8. 
85 See Referendums (Scotland) Act 2019 approved December 1999, received Royal Assent January 2020 and 
eg BBC News January 2020 < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-51284836> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
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4. Devolution: Wales 
Proposals for devolution in Wales differed significantly from that in Scotland. The UK 
Government adopted an asymmetrical model for devolution. This difference was justified on 
several grounds including historical differences and a sense of citizenship86. Wales’ journey 
over the past twenty years has been a complex one. This complexity has led, on occasion, to 
a lack of public engagement and support.87 It was the Secretary of State for Wales, Ron 
Davies, who, in 1997, described devolution as “a process not an event”.88 No-where has this 
been truer than in relation to Wales. 
The White Paper ‘A Voice for Wales’ proposed an Assembly of 60 members which would 
assume most of the former powers of the UK Government’s Secretary of State for Wales. 
These include executive powers, and powers to make law in the form of ‘secondary 
legislation’,89 where these powers had been granted under an Act of Parliament passed by 
the UK Parliament. There were no plans for the Assembly90 to have primary law-making 
powers.91  The model adopted was one of transferred powers92 and of executive devolution. 
This model was derived partly from the precedent of local government, with ministerial 
functions and powers over secondary legislation belonging to the Assembly.  
Following the referendum vote the Government of Wales Act 199893 provided for the 
establishment of an Assembly of 60 members94. The Welsh Assembly had authority to pass 
secondary legislation affecting Wales (in specified areas) and executive powers as to how UK 
laws were implemented in Wales95. It could not pass primary legislation or raise taxes, 
although it was able to debate issues that extended to Wales.  
The Welsh Assembly was welcomed by many and several positive outcomes resulted. Public 
access was greater and an inclusive and consensual rather than divisive style of politics 
developed. It had achieved the aim of bringing decision making closer to the people. However, 
there were several challenges that led to calls for further change. The model of a single 
corporate structure adopted96 was problematic with both legislative and ministerial functions 
in one body.97 It differed significantly from the Scottish ‘reserved’ model. As noted on Law 
Wales: 
 
86 Although by this stage there were few differences between the powers of the Secretary of State for Scotland 
and the Secretary of State for Wales.  
87 See, for example, voter turnout.  
88 Address to the Institute of Welsh Affairs Gregynog Seminar, 9-10 Jan. 1999; 'Datganoli: proses nid 
achlysur=Devolution: a process not an event' (Gregynog Papers, vol. 2, no. 2), 4 Feb. 1999 
89 Secondary legislation is traditionally associated with the UK Parliament. In Scotland and Wales, the term 
subordinate is more commonly used. This is a more descriptive term reflecting the type of legislation. Differing 
processes and procedures exist in each parliament.  
90 Unlike Scotland there was a single corporate structure which had its own legal personality. There was no 
formal division between executive and legislative authority. This raised question around the separation of powers.  
91 Primary legislation is used to describe laws passed by the legislative bodies of the UK e.g. Acts of the UK 
Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. Subordinate legislation or 
secondary legislation is delegated legislation made by a person or body under authority given by primary 
legislation. 
92 The Scottish Parliament was created under a reserved powers model. 
93 Assembly for Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999 transferred of powers to the National Assembly. 
94 Divided into 40 constituency representatives and 20 members for regional seats. 
95 This could have the important consequence that legislation might be brought into force in Wales but not in 
England, or vice versa. 
96 Which arguably had implications for the principle of the rule of law in the UK’s constitution and the doctrine of 
separation of powers where governance is traditionally divided into three branches each with separate and 
independent powers and responsibilities: an executive, a legislature and a judiciary.  
97 This settlement did not reflect the devolved settlements in other Nations. Some saw this as re-enforcing 
traditional attitudes and approaches.   
28 
 
In the early years of devolution many struggled to differentiate between those who 
exercised power (the cabinet of Ministers appointed by the First Minister as leader of 
the main political party in the National Assembly) and the National Assembly itself as 
an institution. 
Although a system of delegations of power from the National Assembly to the First 
Minister and from the First Minister to other Ministers and staff was put in place 
reflecting a traditional division between an executive and legislature, in practice this 
system proved difficult to understand and operate.98 
In 2002, discussions and debates took place that led to a resolution by the Assembly to 
separate the roles of the executive and legislative as far as was as possible and the term 
‘Welsh Assembly Government’ was introduced to highlight the difference between the work of 
the Executive, the Cabinet and the Assembly. The debates led to the establishment of an 
independent commission, the Richards Commission99 to consider the powers and electoral 
arrangements of the Assembly.  
The Richards Commission100 reported in 2004.101 Its recommendations102 had major 
implications for the future of devolution in Wales. These included the separation of the 
legislature and the executive, their establishment as separate legal entities, electoral reform 
and the suggestion of enhancing the powers of the Assembly so that it operated in a similar 
way to the Scottish Parliament. It concluded that this would enable the current difficulties to 
be overcome. Finally, it noted, that the Assembly needed more powers to meet the needs of 
the people in Wales.103 
Following the report, the UK Labour Government published a White Paper ‘Better Governance 
for Wales’104 in 2005. In his introduction the Secretary for State for Wales, Peter Hain,105 noted: 
With equal numbers of male and female members, and pioneering commitments to 
open government, sustainable development and equal opportunities, the Assembly 
has been a progressive institution, which has rapidly established itself as part of our 
political landscape and attracted interest from around the world.  
The Assembly has given Wales a stronger, more democratically accountable voice in 
Britain and in Europe. And the partnership with the UK Government has worked well.106 
This consultation was followed by the Government of Wales Act 2006107 which made a number 
of significant changes to the devolution settlement  including powers for the Assembly to seek 
permission to create legislation on devolved issues108 separating the executive and legislature 
 
98 Law Wales: Branches of Government in Wales < https://law.gov.wales/constitution-government/intro-to-
constitution/three-branches-government/?lang=en#/constitution-government/intro-to-constitution/three-branches-
government/?tab=overview&lang=en> accessed 9 October 2020. 
99 An appointments process was used to ensure transparency.  Five Commissioners were appointed following 
open competition and interview.  
100 Evidence was widely gathered with 115 evidence sessions, 3 seminars,2 consultation papers, over 300 
written submissions and 9 public meetings with the final one held at the National Eisteddfod in Meifod. 
101 Report of the Richard Commission ‘Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National 
Assembly for Wales’ 2004. 
102 Which were unanimous although on Commissioner, Ted Rolands a former Labour MP for Merthyr, wanted to 
see a referendum before further powers were given. 
103 See eg BBC news report 31 March 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/3585575.stm.> accessed 9 
October 2020. 
104 Ysgrifennydd Gwladol am Wales, Trefyn Lywodraethu well I gymru (Cmd 6582, 2005). Secretary of State for 
Wales, Better Governance for Wales (Cmd 6582, 2005). 
105 Labour MP for Neath. 
106 Ibid 104, 2. The introduction went on to say that devolution had strengthened the United Kingdom and 
reduced Nationalism. A claim that was to become outdated less than a decade later.  
107The act has been significantly amended since 2006. 
108 These took the form of Assembly Measures and enabled enhanced legislative powers to be gained.  
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by establishing the Welsh Government as an executive body and making provision for further 
referendums on extending the powers of the Welsh Assembly109. 
However, Devolution Guidance Note 9110 noted: 
From May 2007, the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales will be 
much more limited in scope than the executive functions of the Welsh Ministers. This 
is a direct consequence of the unique nature of the Welsh devolution settlement.111 
Although a response to the Richards Commission, the 2006 Act did not go far enough for 
many. Growing public awareness and a sense of opportunity created by the support shown 
within Wales for greater powers for the Welsh Assembly and by the UK Government led to 
calls for further change.  
In 2007 the ‘One Wales’112 coalition was created by Plaid Cymru and Labour. They committed 
to the principles of social justice, sustainability and inclusivity whilst noting the work that had 
been undertaken to reach a joint agreement they set out a vison for the future of Wales.113 
Opportunities offered by the 2006 Act were to be built on. The commitment included: 
There will be a joint commitment to use the Government of Wales Act 2006 provisions 
to the full under Part III and to proceed to a successful outcome of a referendum for 
full law making powers under Part IV as soon as practicable […] 
Both parties will then take account of the success of the bedding down of the use of 
the new legislative powers already available and, by monitoring the state of public 
opinion, will need to assess the levels of support for full law-making powers necessary 
to trigger the referendum.114 
In 2010115 Assembly Members voted to support a referendum on further law-making powers. 
The UK Government passed the necessary legislation116 and a non-binding referendum117 
was held in March 2011. The question put to voters concerned the powers of the Welsh 
Assembly and whether it should have full law-making powers in the twenty areas under its 
jurisdiction. The majority voted for full law-making powers. This resulted in amendments to 
existing legislation giving powers to the Assembly law in relation to all 20 devolved areas.118 
 
109 The National Assembly now had the power to make laws for Wales in defined areas. However, the process 
was complex and usually achieved through Legislative Competence Orders approved by the National Assembly 
and by both Houses of the UK Parliament. It was also done by framework powers conferred directly on the 
National Assembly through sections that were included in Acts of the UK Parliament.  
110 Devolution Guidance Notes are issued for Whitehall Departments by the UK Government. Guidance Note 9 
outlined arrangements for managing new legislation affecting the responsibilities of either the National Assembly 
for Wales or the Welsh Assembly Government. See < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/devolution-
guidance-notes> accessed 9 October 2020. 
111 Devolution Guidance Note 9: Post-devolution primary legislation affecting Wales Para 8. 
112 ‘One Wales: A progressive agenda for the government of Wales. An agreement between the Labour and Plaid 
Cymru Groups in the National Assembly’ published 27th June 2007. 
113 The vision included both visionary and practical policies such as the all Wales coast path.   
114 Ibid 112, 6.   
115 An All Wales Convention had been established by the Welsh Assembly Government. The purpose was to 
gauge public understanding of the devolution settlement and assessing whether a referendum could be 
successful. It concluded that the settlement was not well understood but “that a ‘yes’ vote in a referendum was a 
possibility.  
116 This was done by Statutory Instrument and not Act of the UK Parliament see The National Assembly for 
Wales Referendum (Assembly Act Provisions) (Referendum Question, Date of Referendum Etc.) Order 2010.  
117 Turnout was 35.6 %, (the second lowest in a major referendum; turnout for the London Mayoral election had 
been lower). 50.3% voted yes and 49.7% no. The campaign had not sparked popular interest and the complex 
nature of the devolution settlement posed a challenge in explaining what was being proposed. 
118 Schedule 7 of the Government for Wales Act 2006 as amended. 
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The power came into effect almost immediately in May 2011. Wales had now moved to a 
conferred powers model of devolution.119  
In 2013 a memorandum of understanding120 (MoU) was published. This set out principles 
outlining how the UK Government and governments of the devolved administrations121 would 
work together. It also created a Joint Ministerial Committee, attended by representatives of 
the three devolved administrations and the UK Government. The MoU noted: 
However, the UK Government will proceed in accordance with the convention that the 
UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except 
with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The devolved administrations will be 
responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required for this purpose on an 
approach from the UK Government.122 
This will be returned to later and is included here as events have been considered in a 
chronological order.   
Following the 2011 referendum and transfer of greater powers123 the UK Government 
established the Silk Commission to consider the future of the devolution settlement in Wales. 
The remit of the Commission was:  
Part I: Financial Accountability: To review the case for the devolution of fiscal powers 
to the National Assembly for Wales and to recommend a package of powers that would 
improve the financial accountability of the Assembly, which are consistent with the 
United Kingdom’s fiscal objectives and are likely to have a wide degree of support.  
Part II: Powers of the National Assembly for Wales: To review the powers of the 
National Assembly for Wales in the light of experience and to recommend 
modifications to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the United 
Kingdom Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales to better serve the people 
of Wales.124 
In 2012, the Silk Commission published Part I125 of its report, making recommendations on the 
financial powers of the Assembly. Part II making recommendations on the Assembly’s future 
legislative powers and arrangements was published in 2014.126 In Part II it was concluded: 
We believe that the people of Wales will be best served by a clear, well-founded 
devolution settlement; and by political institutions that operate effectively and efficiently 
and work together in the interests of the people they serve. Devolution of power to 
Wales should benefit the whole of Wales and the United Kingdom.  
 
119 As noted in Silk II ‘Empowerment and Responsibility – Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales’ at 2.2.5 ‘the 
fourteen years of devolution in Wales have seen broadly three stages of development’. 
120 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government, 
the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee Presented to 
Parliament by Command of Her Majesty and presented to the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and laid before the National Assembly for Wales. October 2013.  
121 The Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive.  
122 Ibid para 14. 
123 Law making powers in 20 specified areas without involvement from the UK Parliament or Whitehall. 
124 Comisiwn ar Ddatganoli yng Nghymru, Commission on Devolution in Wales ‘Empowerment and 
Responsibility: Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales’ 2014. See Box 1.1 in 1.1.9. 
125 Comisiwn ar Ddatganoli yng Nghymru, Commission on Devolution in Wales ‘Empowerment and 
Responsibility: Financial Powers to Strengthen Wales’ 2012. 
126 Comisiwn ar Ddatganoli yng Nghymru, Commission on Devolution in Wales ‘Empowerment and 
Responsibility: Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales’ 2014. 
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Any proposed changes to the devolution settlement should be tested according to the 
principles of accountability, clarity, coherence, collaboration, efficiency, equity, stability 
and subsidiarity.127 
The Wales Act 2014 resulted from Part I of the Report. This created several new financial 
powers enabling the Assembly to legislate128 on devolved taxes129 and made technical 
changes130 to the Government of Wales Act 2006. Part II recommended that Wales move to 
a reserved powers131 model for devolution. In response to this recommendation the UK 
Government undertook a consultation and published ‘Powers for a Purpose’ in 2015.132 In the 
introduction the Secretary of State for Wales, Stephen Crabb,133 noted: 
I want to establish a clear devolution settlement for Wales which stands the test of 
time. I firmly believe that there should always be a clear purpose for devolving new 
powers to the Assembly, and that the Assembly and the Welsh Government should 
use any new tools and levers to put Wales in a stronger position to develop as a nation. 
[…]. Discussions will continue as we move to implement this agreement, particularly 
with regards to developing the reserved powers model. I believe we now have a strong 
blueprint for a new Wales Bill in the next Parliament.134 
A blueprint for further devolution and a move to a reserved powers model was outlined. The 
2017 Wales Act followed. The National Assembly and the Welsh Government became a 
permanent part of the UK’s constitutional arrangements.135 The Act amended the Government 
of Wales Act 2006.136 Powers to relation to Assembly elections137 and other matters such as 
speed limits and marine licencing138 were also outlined.  
In addition, the 2017 Wales Act gave powers to the Assembly to change its name. By this 
time, it had commonly become known as the Senedd. To reflect the move to a reserved 
powers model Assembly members agreed unanimously that the name of the Assembly should 
reflect its constitutional status as a national parliament. There was however disagreement over 
possible names.139 
In February 2019 the Elections (Wales) Bill was introduced. The Bill proposed to lower the 
voting age for Assembly elections to 16 and change the name of the Assembly. The Senedd 
and Elections (Wales) Act 2019 came into force in January 2020 and on 6 May 2020, the 
Assembly formally changed its name to Senedd Cymru or Welsh Parliament.140  
 
127 Ibid 126. Paras 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
128 The need for a referendum on Welsh rates income tax was removed by the Wales Act 2017.  
129 See subsequently The Tax Collection and Management (Wales) Act 2016 and The Land Transaction Tax and 
Anti-avoidance of Devolved Taxes (Wales) Act 2017. 
130 These changes included lengthening the term of an Assembly to 5 years and preventing an individual from 
being an MP and AM simultaneously.  
131 Anything not reserved would be devolved, and the National Assembly for Wales would be able to pass laws in 
those areas. This would put the Assembly on the same footing as the Scottish Parliament.  
132 Secretary of State for Wales ‘Powers for a Purpose: Towards a Lasting Devolution Settlement for Wales’ 
(Cm9020, 2015). 
133 MP Preseli Pembrokeshire, Conservative Party. 
134 Ibid 132 pp 6-7. 
135 s A1 Government of Wales Act 2006. They could not be abolished without the agreement of the people of 
Wales. In a similar fashion to the way in which the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government have been 
placed as a fixture of the UK’s constitution.  
136 In particular s 108A, Schedule 7A and Schedule 7B. 
137 In December 2017 the Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform recommended lowering the voting age for 
Assembly elections to 16. 16-year olds vote in the 2021 May elections for the first time.  
138 However, unlike Scotland Wales does not have its own separate legal jurisdiction.  
139 See BBC news 9 November 2019 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-49973487> accessed 9 
October 2020.  
140 More commonly referred to as the Senedd. 
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Welsh devolution has been a complex journey and the complexity continues. Both England 
and Wales share one legal jurisdiction141  and both the Welsh and UK Parliaments can now 
create laws within that jurisdiction. In 2017 the Welsh Government, firmly committed to an 
open and transparent system of laws and law-making set up ‘The Commission on Justice in 
Wales’. The report142 that followed set a long-term vision for the future of justice in Wales. It 
noted: 
We address our report to the Welsh Government. It has been our privilege to be given 
the opportunity by the Welsh Government to undertake this task. We hope that we 
have discharged the heavy responsibility placed on us. The evidence we obtained 
about the current justice system in Wales is presented in an unvarnished manner. Our 
recommendations, radical though some need to be, will give the people of Wales a 
better means of achieving a system which provides access to justice, can be trusted 
to deliver justice and puts justice again at the heart of their nation and its prosperity. 
It remains to be seen whether calls for the devolution of justice are answered. Scotland had 
retained its separate legal jurisdiction, so the question had not arisen as part of the devolution 
settlement there. 
5. Legislative process and legislative competence: transparent or opaque? 
Having considered the process of devolution this section considers specific aspects in relation 
to the Welsh and Scottish Parliaments. 
The Scottish and Senedd Cymru 143 both follow set processes in law making. These are set 
out in the legislation creating144 their legislative powers. Although more streamlined than those 
used in the UK Parliament145 they still require several stages to be followed and there is 
emphasis on legislative scrutiny at committee stages. If these processes are not followed, then 
any legislation produced as a result is void. 
Both the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru can also only act within their legislative 
competence. This is generally considered against a number of criteria: that the UK Parliament 
can only legislate for or in relation to Scotland or Wales in relation to reserved matters; the UK 
Parliament cannot modify certain enactments (these include the Human Rights Act 1998, 
certain provisions of the Acts of Union 1705-6 and the European Communities Act 1972146); 
any legislation must be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and with European Union147 law and the Scottish Parliament cannot remove the Lord Advocate 
from their position as head of the system for criminal prosecution. The concept of legislative 
competence is important because in both the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru the 
legislative competence of any Bill has to be assessed before it is introduced, and an 
opportunity provided for it to be challenged after a Bill is passed but before it becomes law. 
 
141 Wales and England have shared one legal jurisdiction and court system since the abolition of the Court of 
Great Session in Wales in 1830. Though the abbreviation English Legal System (or ELS) has been in widespread 
use and is misleading.  
142 The Commission for Justice in Wales Report ‘Justice in Wales for the people of Wales’ 2019. 
143 The Scotland Act 1998 and The Government of Wales Act 1998. Section 36(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 
required there to be at least three distinct stages to which Bills are subject, including a stage when MSPs can 
debate and vote on the general principles of a Bill, a stage when they can consider and vote on its details and a 
final stage when the Bill can be passed or rejected. 
144 Some authors use the word creating, others use devolving. 
145 For the UK Parliament see < https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/.> For the Scottish 
Parliament see <https://www.parliament.scot/visitandlearn/100530.aspx>. For the Welsh Parliament see 
https://senedd.wales/en/bus-home/bus-legislation/Pages/bus-legislation.aspx.>  
146 Reference is now to retained EU law. 
147 Ibid 146. 
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Legislative competence148 has become a way of determining whether an Act has been 
produced within the powers of the Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru. This represents a 
change in the legal culture of both Scotland and Wales. Practising and academic lawyers had, 
until this point, been taught that an Act of Parliament was law. With the introduction of the 
Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru they must now question whether an Act of Parliament 
is law. If an Act of the Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru has been passed in an area 
where there is no legislative competence, that Act can be challenged.149 Where such issues 
arise, they will be determined by a court. The final court for the determination of these issues 
is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 
However, there are many twists and turns in the narrative of devolution. Legislative 
competence and compliance with EU law have been brought into sharp focus in recent years 
by the debates and negotiations around UK Government plans for leaving the EU. Both Welsh 
and Scottish Governments have questioned the plans and sought to have their voices 
heard.150 The UK Government has failed to liaise on several occasions leading to challenges 
and opposition. It remains unclear how the exclusive competencies of the Scottish Parliament 
and Senedd Cymru will be returned from the EU. Plans for these to go to UK Government 
Minsters and then be delegated were, at one time, felt appropriate by the UK Government. 
Politics once again seems to have intervened in what have become constitutional settlements. 
There is on-going debate and tension between a return to a centralised model and one of 
subsidiarity. In 2018 the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee published a report on ‘Devolution and Exiting the EU: reconciling differences and 
building strong relationships’.151 The committee noted that: 
Devolution is now an established and significant feature of the UK constitutional 
architecture and should be treated with respect to maintain the integrity of the United 
Kingdom. The Government needs to bring clarity to the situation by setting out, in 
response to this Report, its Devolution Policy for the Union152… 
At the time of writing there has been no UK Government response. 
In a twist that relates to the concept of ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’153 the legislation which sets 
out the powers of the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru154 states ‘But it is recognised 
that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the […] Parliament’. Legislative consent motions have been the 
result.155 Defined by the UK Parliament as ‘the means by which a devolved legislature 
indicates that it is content for the UK Parliament to pass a law on a devolved matter’,156 and 
 
148 Initial challenges were often brought on grounds under the Human Rights Act, however, since 2008 
challenges based on legislative competence alone have grown.  
149 A declaration of incompatibility is issued in relation to the UK Parliament and the legislation remains law 
unless the UK Parliament repeals it.  
150 ‘First Ministers call on the Prime Minister to work with, not against, the devolved nations’ Press Release 
September 2017. Also eg statements made by the First Ministers including 19 December 2018 at 
<https://www.gov.scot/news/brexit-talks-3/ > accessed 9 October 2020 and Y Cyfarfod Llawn (Plenary Session) 5 
September 2019 at 245.  
151 House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee ‘Devolution and Exiting 
the EU: reconciling differences and building strong relationships’ Eighth Report of Session 2017-19, HC 1485.  
152 Ibid 150. Summary section, 3.  
153 A much-used phrase in recent years by politicians in relation to the UK’s departure from the EU. It is a 
multifaceted concept, but the view espoused often draws upon is the work of A.V. Dicey an English Jurist writing 
in the early twentieth century and his ‘Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’ n 49 above. 
154 The Scotland Act 2016 s 2 which amended the Scotland Act 1998 and the Wales Act 2017 s 2 which 
amended the Government of Wales Act 2006. 
155 Legislative consent memoranda are laid before the Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru.  
156 UK Parliament Glossary < https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/legislative-consent/> accessed 
9 October 2020.  
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sometimes referred to as Sewel motions,157 they provide an example of a convention which 
was put on a statutory basis.158 They cover three areas: legislation which changes the law in 
a devolved area of competence, alters the legislative competence of a devolved legislature or 
alters the executive competence of devolved minister. In theory the powers of the Welsh or 
Scottish parliaments or Welsh or Scottish minsters cannot be reduced. However, to be 
successful, the convention relies upon trust and cooperation between governments and 
political parties, and events in the recent decade including increasing polarisation between 
political parties and changes in voting patterns have helped highlight its limitations. Plans for 
to UK and its four Nations post EU membership are unclear159 and the UK Supreme Court 
views legislative consent motions as a convention which are not subject to judicial review.160 
However, in the previous decade the UK Parliament enshrined both the Scottish Parliament 
and Senedd Cymru as part of the UK’s constitution.161 This was not done via referendum but 
formed part of the evolving piecemeal approach to the devolution settlements. This can only 
be overturned by vote of those living in each Nation. A contradictory approach has emerged. 
There are new constitutional features which resulted from referendums in Scotland and Wales, 
there has been no referendum on the subject in England, the underlying constitutional 
principles draw on the work of English constitutional lawyers and the concept of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty is used by politicians to overcome all. 
In a further twist in 2015 the House of Commons approved a change in its Standing Orders.162 
This created a process known as ‘EVEL’ or ‘English Votes for English Laws’.  The Speaker of 
the House of Commons determines whether a bill can go through this process. The changes 
introduced additional stages in the parliamentary process between the Report Stage and Third 
Reading of a Bill. If a Bill goes through this process only MPs representing English 
constituencies receive a vote. However, the acronym is misleading as the process can also 
be applied to Bills which cover both England and Wales.163 
6. Conclusion 
Common themes emerge through the discussions surrounding devolution; a devolving of 
powers in the interests of strengthening the Union, political divide, debates around democracy 
and constitutional change, recognising diversity, consultations, reports, transparency and 
referendums.    Devolution has not been a straightforward narrative or journey, whether in 
Scotland or Wales and debates over the UK’s exit from the EU add additional twists and turns. 
Neither the Scottish Government or Welsh Government are content with the current position, 
with the UK Government’s policy on EU negotiations or the lack of consultation on matters 
within their exclusive jurisdiction under the ‘reserved powers’ model they now share. Calls for 
independence are growing in both Nations.164 The Welsh Government recently published a 
 
157 Lord Sewel, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland announced the policy in the House of 
Lords during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998. 
158 Ibid 153. 
159 On 8 January 2020 Scottish Parliament voted to withhold consent for the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill. 
160 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
(Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5 
161 S 63A Scotland Act 2016. Government of Wales Act 2006 s A1. 
162 Implementing Conservative Government Policy but also seen by some commentators as highlighting a disjoint 
between the nature and purpose of the Union. See ‘Governing England 
English Identity and Institutions in a Changing United Kingdom’ published in 2018. 
163 In which case MPs representing English and Welsh constituencies receive a vote. For more detail see 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/public/english-votes-for-english-laws/ accessed 9 October 2020.  
164  Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020. Scottish Government ‘Protecting Scotland, Renewing Scotland: The 
Government's Programme for Scotland 2020-2021’ 2020. ‘Poll: Support for independence hits historic high of 
58%’ 14 October 2020 <https://news.stv.tv/politics/poll-support-for-independence-hits-historic-high-of-58?top 
>accessed 3 December 2020. For Wales see YouGov poll January 2020 and coverage eg < 
https://nation.cymru/news/support-for-welsh-independence-up-5-in-new-yougov-poll/> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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report on the reforms that they see as necessary to put the Union on a sustainable footing for 
the future. That concludes: 
Future constitutional developments in the United Kingdom should be considered on a 
holistic basis and on the basis of constitutional principle, rather than by way of ad hoc 
reforms to particular constitutional settlements. This should be undertaken by a 
constitutional convention. The case for a written constitution should form part of the 
convention’s deliberations.165 
However, whilst devolution remains mired in political debates and traditional constitutional 
thinking the way forward remains unclear. Politicians may talk of a Union that is stronger 
together, but the successes of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Parliament raise questions 
about the future constitutional shape of the UK. However, discussions around the changing 
nature of parliamentary sovereignty tend to remain in academic publications and the court 
room. In ‘Reforming our Union: Shared Governance in the UK’166 the First Minister of Wales 
commented on the vacuum in the UK’s Government thinking. A House of Commons paper 
noted: 
there are different views on where sovereignty, and therefore where ultimate authority, 
lies. The UK Government’s position is that the sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament is a constitutional fact. Yet the range and extent of areas where Parliament 
can legitimately exercise its power have been altered by the devolution settlements, 
which has introduced political considerations that has arguably qualified sovereignty 
within the UK. It is the exact nature of that qualification which is contested between the 
devolved administrations and the UK Government. 
[…] 
Any discussion of devolution would be incomplete without serious consideration of the 
position of England within the constitutional architecture of the UK. We received 
evidence pointing to a significant asymmetry between the representation of the people 
of England within the Union when compared with the people of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. We recommend that the Government sets out, as part of its 
statement of ‘Devolution Policy for the Union’, how the different parts of England are 
to be fairly and effectively represented.167 
The United Kingdom exists because of a series of historical events and the Union has been a 
pragmatic one. This century will see some of its greatest challenges, challenges that come 
from within. It is unclear at what point calls for a UK-wide conversation around the UK’s 
constitution would be heeded and whether the opportunities created by devolution will be used 
to inform that conversation. Lord Beaumont of Whitley’s thoughts expressed in the 
parliamentary debate on the Royal Commission on the Constitution remain as relevant today 
as they were in 1973. 
7. Finally 
 
We began this Chapter noting the 50th anniversary of the OU. The university accepted its first 
law students in February 1998 and planning for the law degree mirrored the debates and 
referendums on devolution. Law School academics work across all four UK nations and have 
 
165 Llywodraeth Cymru: Welsh Government ‘Reforming our Union: Shared Governance in the UK’ 2019 Chapter 9 
Annexe 1 para 20. 
166 Ibid 163. 




watched and debated the devolution process over the past twenty years. We hope this chapter 
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1969 determined the UK’s fate as an European Union (EU) Member State. Finally, with the 
‘cock’ who crowed ‘NON’ twice making way, the route was clear for the UK to join the then 
European Community. The UK became a Member State in 1973 but it was neither smooth 
sailing to get to that point nor has it been since. The early years of membership were marked 
by doubts over the nature of the developing communities and the role the UK would be playing 
in that development were it to leave or remain. This led to a first UK referendum in 1975 on 
membership which confirmed the UK government’s decision to join. Forty-one years later, a 
second referendum decided the UK should leave and paved the way to a slow exit. In between 
lay numerous economic crisis and domestic as well as international political challenges. 
As the last full year of UK EU Membership, 2019 marks an end to a struggling ‘ever closer’ 
relationship. This chapter will shed some light on the 50 years of struggle between the what is 
now the European Union and the UK. It will draw on historical, political, economic and legal 
perspectives in examining the relationship. It will present an overview of the humble 
beginnings of the EU and the UK’s role in that, and the relationship’s stormy youth, when the 
world faced a global economic crisis. This chapter will examine whether the UK was being led 
or was leading in key matters of EU policy and law; in doing so it will consider arguments 
around sovereignty, or rather what there was to gain back after 2019. Lastly, it will in its 
conclusions draw from the evidence of the past 50 years to imagine how the challenges of the 
past can be overcome to enable a functioning relationship in the 50 years ahead. 
 
1. Introduction 
“It is to re-create the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it 
with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We 
must build a kind of United States of Europe. 
In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys 
and hopes which make life worth living.” 
Winston Churchill1 
 
Every analysis of political relationships needs to be set in its historic context to evaluate the 
impact of the relationship on the countries involved, and their legal systems, if it is to be of any 
value. Context matters and the context of the early foundations of the UK’s relationship with 
 
1 Winston Churchill, ‘Speech on a Council of Europe’ (Zurich, 19 September 1946) 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14362> accessed 03 October 2020. 
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the European Union (EU) is war in Europe.2 Not just any war, a world war, the second in the 
same century, causing death, suffering, poverty and economic crisis amongst other evils.  
Churchill’s plea, made in Zurich, is to be seen in that context. The ‘United States of Europe’ 
he envisaged would counteract the perceived threat from the Eastern communist Union, and 
provide stability to the continent. His vision aimed to prevent central European nations falling 
into what seemed to be established routines of warmongery for a third time in the same 
century, or indeed ever again.3 Unification of Europe was meant to “make it plain that any war 
[…] becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”4 
While Churchill is on the list of European pioneers, his relationship with continental Europe, 
and his understanding of the UK’s role within Europe as a whole, was not that of a 
wholehearted Europhile.5 Just 16 years before his Zurich address, and therefore before the 
war, Churchill saw the UK “with Europe, but not of it”.6 The Second World War had clearly 
shifted Churchill’s thinking, and with that he becomes a suitable symbol for the complexities 
that were to define the relationship between the UK and the EU. 
The UK consciously decided not to become part of the founding communities, seeing itself as 
one of the Allies and therefore untouched by the rationale of any form of unification within 
Europe. When it later on was keen to join the ‘ever closer Union’, it was blocked from doing 
so, because of the communities unanimity rules - directly by de Gaulle’s adamant “Non!”.7 
While some argue the UK ‘missing the boat’ of membership at the founding stage caused 
unsurmountable friction between the EU to be and the UK, others are convinced that the two 
parties are too dissimilar, thus a relationship of any form was bound to fail eventually.8 
This paper will explore the turbulent journey of the UK and EU as neighbours, partners and 
divorcees. In doing so, it will discuss different approaches to the analysis of this relationship 
in historic, political, economic and legal discourses. Some of these will complement each 
other, others will be in direct conflict. The chapter will demonstrate, how domestic challenges 
in the UK always impacted the way the country viewed its place in a European union, but also 
how its self-centredness led to self-fulfilling crisis. This paper will offer a view with regards to 
the UK’s leadership role within the EU and show how long lasting the political impact of UK 
membership will be on the bigger union’s structure and form. In its conclusions, the paper will 
consider what a fully functioning future relationship between the UK and the EU would need 
to acknowledge and overcome, discussing whether there may be a role the UK cannot escape 
in Europe and the world, whether it will like it or not. 
 
 
2 The complex relationship between Great Britain, Ireland & Northern Ireland cannot be given justice within the 
limitations of this paper. As the EU membership included Northern Ireland and other parts of the UK, reference 
throughout this chapter will be made to the UK, although citations will use the country reference as made by the 
author.   
3 Winston Churchill; ‘Speech on a Council of Europe’.  
4 Robert Schuman, ‘The Schuman Declaration’ (9 May 1950) <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en> accessed 21 September 2020. 
5 A list of European pioneers can be found on one of the official EU websites <https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/history/eu-pioneers_en> accessed 03 October 2020; Discussing some of the pioneers and their 
motives critically is Alan S. Wilward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Routledge 1992) 333 – 363. 
6 Will Morrisey, Churchill and de Gaulle The Geopolitics of Liberty (Rowman & Littlefield 2015) 96. 
7 Wilward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State 338. 
8 Among others: Anthony Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait: A Warning and a Way Out (Hollis & Carter 1960) 103; 
Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945 – 1970 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1971); James Allison, ‘The 
European Rescue of Britain’ in Fernando Guiaro, Frances M.B.Lynch and Sigfrido M. Ramirez Perez, Alan S. 
Milward and a Century of European Change, (Routledge 2012) 511; Ann Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 
(Cavendish Publishing Limited 2003) 415 f; Mark Baimbridge, Philip B. Whyman & Brian Burkitt, Moored to the 
Continent? Future Options for Britain and the EU (Andrews UK Limited 2012) 23. 
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2. Humble Beginnings 
 
“The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting 
up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the 
federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have 
long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been 
the most constant victims.” 
Robert Schumann9 
 
Schumann very clearly outlined the focus of the community that was about to be built in the 
centre of Europe. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community united the 
economic interests of France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg; and in doing so set the tone for other communities. There was a real pressure 
to achieve nothing less than “the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.”10 
The UK sat comfortably outside this project, viewing itself as a world power that had guided 
and supported peace in Europe. It showed no appetite to join any form of formal community;11 
to be fair, there was “a whole raft of Europes” to choose from at this point.12 Unique to its 
European neighbours, the UK’ saw its interests as firmly aligned with its Commonwealth, in 
which Britain continued to view itself as the central power, benefiting substantially 
economically and politically from these well-established relations.13 As the six European 
nations under the Treaty of Rome continued to prosper as the European Economic Community 
(EEC), outpacing the UK’s economic growth of the late 1950s, the UK slowly started to 
reconsider its position, eventually driving the founding of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) as an attempt to even up disparities in growth with its neighbours.14 This enabled free 
movement of goods between the UK, the EFTA members (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Austria, Switzerland and Portugal) as well as the EEC, but this did not stimulate the UK 
domestic economy sufficiently to emulate the growth created within the EEC. 
The UK started to seriously consider joining the six, leading some to argue that this decision 
was based solely on economic considerations.15 Crowson suggests the picture was somewhat 
more complex, however, and involved political considerations as well. One particular influence 
was the ‘special’, yet ever changing, relationship between the USA and the UK, and another 
the UK’s persistent fear of a diminishing “diplomatic clout” in Europe.16 Saunders quotes the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Derick Heathcoat-Amory noting in 1960 that “entry was ‘a 
political act with economic consequences’, rather than the reverse.”17 Some argue that the 
Suez crisis was a particular catalyst for the UK’s change of mind regarding membership, as 
 
9 Schuhmann, ‘The Schuman Declaration’. 
10 ibid. 
11 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 415. 
12 N.J. Crowson, Britain and Europe – A Political History Since 1918 (Routledge 2011) 1. 
13 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 415; Alan S. Milward, The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945 – 
1963, The UK and The European Community, Vol. I (Whitehall History Publishing 2002) 188; Frances M.B.Lynch 
and Fernando Guiaro, ‘A Lifetime’s Search for a Theory of Historical Change, Introduction to the Work of Alan S. 
Milward’ in Guiaro, Lynch and Perez, Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change 118 ff; Crowson, 
Britain and Europe 79. 
14 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 415. 
15 Anne Deighton, ‘The Labour Party, Public Opinion and the ‘Second Try’ in 1967’ in Oliver J. Daddow, Harold 
Wilson and European Integration, Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC (Routledge 2016) 40; Crowson, 
Britain and Europe 80. 
16 Crowson, ibid 13.  




the crisis led to insecurity over the role of Britain in the world.18 Historians continue to argue 
about, whether it was the threat of an overpowering Soviet Union, the disappointment following 
Suez, or the thriving economies of the six, that caused the UK to look differently at its potential 
relationship with them. Crowson, however, summarises the UK’s motivation neatly, in 
reference to Milward, providing an oversimplification: The UK had to prevent the fading of its 
global influence by all means necessary.19 
It took the UK three attempts to join the EEC. It is no coincidence that the UK’s application 
succeeded the same year that Charles de Gaulle, French President till 1969, resigned.20 Until 
then, the previous two applications fell victim to the Communities unanimity rule as France 
vetoed UK membership.21 The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, saw the French 
President as “the cock on a small dunghill” concerned about the power shift likely to occur with 
the UK’s accession.22 The reference to the dunghill is to the comments of a French Agriculture 
Minister who summarised the rationale for the French opposition as: “Mais il y aura deux coqs. 
Alors ce n'est pas aussi agréable [But where you have two cockerels that would not be at all 
agreeable!]”.23 Anecdotes like this serve as evidence that it was not just the views of the 
Macmillan government at play, but an inheritance of personal preference and the history of 
past conflicts that  influenced decision making in the infantile united Europe.24  
The UK’s accession to the EU was finally completed in 1973, but there was some reluctance 
expressed by politicians and some members of the UK public. Two years later, in 1975, it was 
felt advisable to hold the UK’s first referendum on EU membership. There is much scholarship 
on the domestic politics at play at the time, seemingly viewing the Labour government and 
Harold Wilson as significant contributors to the EEC accession success.25 However, the two 
main political parties were very divided on the ‘issue of Europe’ throughout the 1960s and 70s. 
They have remained so ever since. The announcement of the 2016 referendum and its 
aftermath if anything deepened the division in public opinion within the UK, but this difference 
of public opinion was not a reflection of political party allegiances.26 
So far, the focus of the chapter has been on how politicians dealt with the question of 
accession and closer ties with the UK’s mainland neighbours. The UK public was given a very 
selective and specific version of what the UK’s new partnership would mean for them from the 
late 50’s onwards. It was promised that membership “would bring higher standards of living, 
though it was admitted that food prices would rise because of the ending of cheap imports 
from the Commonwealth under preferential tariffs, and Britain would be required to make large 
 
18 Among others: Ralph Dietl, ‘Suez 1956: A European Intervention?’ (2008) 43 Journal of Contemporary History 
259; Crowson, Britain and Europe 73; Tore T. Petersen, ‘Suez 1956, European Colonial Interests and US Cold 
War Prerogatives’ in Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer (eds), European – American Relations and the Middle East, 
From Suez to Iraq (Routledge 2011) 11; Peter J. Beck ‘”The Less Said about Suez the Better”: British 
Governments and the Politics of Suez’s History, 1956 – 67’ (2009) CXXIV (508) The English Historical Review 
605; G. C. Peden ‘Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power’ (2012) 55(4) The Historical Journal 1073; Pnina 
Lahav ‘The Suez Crisis of 1956 and its Aftermath: A Comparative Study of Constitutions, Use of Force, 
Diplomacy and International Relations’ (2015) 95 Boston University Law Review 1297. 
19 Crowson, Britain and Europe 73. 
20 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 417. 
21 Stephen Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community: From Rejection to Referendum, 
1963 – 1975 (Routledge 2013) 7. 
22 ibid, in reference to Charles de Gaulle’s opposition to UK membership and an anecdote of an exchange 
involving Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. 
23 ibid; On the complexity of the UK-French relationship with a focus on Churchill and de Gaulle’s also see: 
Morrisey, Churchill and de Gaulle The Geopolitics of Liberty 327 ff. 
24 Morrisey, Churchill and de Gaulle The Geopolitics of Liberty analyses the complex history of Churchill and de 
Gaulle’s through the lenses of their personal experiences and background. 
25 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 417. 
26 Crowson, Britain and Europe 91; Anne Applebaum, ‘A Transformed Political Landscape’ (2017) 28 Journal of 
Democracy 53, 54 f; Sara B. Hobolt, ‘The Brexit Vote: a Divided Nation, a Divided Continent’ (2016) 23 Journal of 
European Public Policy 1259, 1260; Saunders, Yes to Europe!  57 f, 61 f; Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot, Britain 
and Europe from Churchill to Blair, (Macmillan 1999) 270 f. 
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contributions to the central EEC budget.”27 There was no discussion of how EU law had 
already evolved, through a series of decisions of the European Court of Justice mainly, into a 
directly applicable source of law within the Member States, equal, if not supreme to the 
domestic law. The UK public was unconvinced regardless, but “the House of Commons [voted] 
to approve the terms negotiated and for the government to be given the necessary authority 
to enter into a Treaty of Accession by 356 votes to 244 in October 1971,” paving the way to 
accession.28 The public was left with their expectations of improved living standards and 
promise of a thriving economy, mixed with a profound understatement of the complexities of 
community law at the time and a lack of understanding for the background and context. This 
set the tone for the continuing disconnect between the UK’s actual relation to the later EU and 
the public perception of the same within the UK.29 
3. Stormy Youth 
 
“The story of ‘Britain and Europe’ has often seemed better suited to the 
psychiatrist than the historian.”30 
The 1970s were a challenging decade for the UK, arguably with or without EEC membership, 
and arguably because of its disconnection from the Commonwealth. The EEC partners were 
facing a comparable “economic slump” coinciding with the UK’s accession.31 In the UK inflation 
was high, so was unemployment and the measures introduced by governments to counter 
both lead to “a wave of union militancy which made [the measures] completely ineffective”.32 
The “conflict and class war in industry, a sharp downturn in the economy, a flight to extremism 
in political life, and a rise in public and domestic violence” were exacerbated instead.33  
While some view this as early evidence of an unrealistic overvaluing of the economic boost 
any cross-European partnership would ever be able to give, the UK’s situation in the 70’s 
really represents one of many symptoms following a shock to the world economy as a whole.34 
The EEC was in no position to cushion the blow for its members. 
The 1975 referendum was proposed at a politically challenging point in the UK’s history, 
considering the turmoil of economic crisis significantly impacting the UK’s societal structures 
at home and abroad. It had been mooted by politicians on several occasions and continued 
to be mooted after the UK finally succeeded and completed its accession.35 The approaching 
accession accelerated the public debate in the UK and calls for a referendum grew louder in 
the early 70’s. It was argued that where a general election cannot test consent of the public, 
a referendum was the only alternative “for voters to intervene”.36 Saunders summarises three 
streams of thought presenting a referendum as a necessity:37 First, the UK’s constitutional and 
political framework would be subject to fundamental change with EEC membership. Second, 
Members of Parliament, borrowing sovereignty from the electorate for their time in parliament, 
“were exceeding their powers by voting for membership”. Third, a referendum was a potential 
 
27 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 417 – 418. 
28 ibid. 
29 Matthew Watson, ‘Brexit, the Left Behind and the Let Down: The Political Abstraction of ‘the Economy’ and the 
UK’s EU Referendum’ (2018) 13 British Politics 17; Hobolt, ‘The Brexit Vote’. 
30 Saunders, Yes to Europe! 31. 
31 ibid 83. 
32 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 420. 
33 Kenneth O. Morgan ‘Britain in the Seventies – Our Unfinest Hour?’ (2017) XXII- Hors série|2017, Revue 
Française de Civilisation Britannique <http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1662> para 3 accessed 09 October 
2020. 
34 Baimbridge, Whyman & Burkitt, Moored to the Continent? 47; Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 422; Mel 
Watkins, ‘Seventies: From Boom to Economic Crisis’ (1997) 15 Compass: A Jesuit Journal 6.  
35 Saunders, Yes to Europe! 67 ff. 
36 ibid 68 – 69 ff. 
37 ibid 70 ff. 
42 
 
saviour, reinvigorating British democracy, which saw a decline in general election participation 
also reflecting badly on the results of the two main parties.38  
Harold Wilson during his first term as Prime Minister strongly resisted calls for a referendum. 
He felt that referenda were contrary to UK tradition, undemocratic tools of despots in support 
of Nazism and Fascism.39 He was thus making a constitutional argument focussing on the UK 
only and not one in relation to the EEC. Ironically, in his second term, it was Wilson who had 
to lead the preparations for the 1975 referendum. Labour’s “change of persona between 
government and opposition” created an ambiguous stance on the issue of EEC membership. 
The Conservative government’s efforts in relation to the UK – EU relationship under Prime 
Minister Edward Heath could not be supported by Labour for domestic political reasons 
alone.40 Supporting the idea of a referendum supported Labour’s elections campaign in 1974, 
which also promised negotiations of terms with the EEC.41 Agreeing and holding this 
referendum “constituted a threefold revolution”, Wilson’s change of heart being one.42 Added 
to that was a fundamental change to the “practice of the British constitution” together with an 
overturning of “the most basic assumptions of British political thought”.43 Saunders sees this 
as evidence of “the disruptive potential of the European question and its capacity to rewrite 
the constitutional practice of member states”, a fitting summary also when referring to the 
sister referendum in 2016.44 
Promises to re-negotiate the terms of membership with the EEC in preparation for a 
referendum formed part of the UK’s election campaign in 1974, particularly on the side of the 
Labour party.45 While what was eventually achieved was approved by the House of Commons, 
the government remained split on whether these new terms were sufficient or whether 
“continued EEC membership [was] not only […] economically disadvantageous, but as 
damaging to national sovereignty”.46 
A deciding argument for the referendum was the view that if “people are not to participate in 
this decision, no one will ever take participation seriously again.”47 Lyon even argues that the 
referendum came too late for the public: “Membership had not brought the economic 
advantages claimed, but there was a sense that there was no going back to the pre-1973 
position—too many markets had been lost and relations with the Commonwealth were 
irreparably damaged.”48 Contrary to Lyon’s claim public opinion continued to shift in favour of 
membership with 31 % thinking UK membership of the European Community was a good thing 
in September 1973, increasing to 47 % in May 1975.49 As the referendum happened, two 
thirds of the public voted in favour of membership with a turnout of  around 64 %.50 
This was meant to settle the question of membership for the UK once and for all, and the 
referendum was used as reference point whenever the question of another public vote was 
 
38 ibid 69 – 72. 
39 ibid 64. 
40 Young, This Blessed Plot 271, 275. 
41 Vaughne Miller, ‘The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum’ (13 July 2015) Briefing 
Paper Number 7253 House of Commons Library 5 ff <https://researchbriefings.files. 
parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7253/CBP-7253.pdf> accessed 26 October 2020. 
42 Robert Saunders, Yes to Europe! 65. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 421. 
46 ibid 422. 
47 Young, This Blessed Plot 275, citing Tony Benn. 
48 ibid 
49 Miller, ‘The 1974-75 UK Renegotiation of EEC Membership and Referendum’ 19. 
50 Ibid 25; Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 421 
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raised in the face of increasing EC power.51 Indeed, it would take forty years for a referendum 
on the same topic to feature in an election campaign again.52 
4. Leading and Being Led 
 
“Heavy Fog in the Channel. Continent Cut Off”53 
During the 2016 EU referendum campaign it was continuously claimed, that the UK would be 
subjected to EU policy and law without real influence or ‘say’.54 A particularly striking claim for 
those UK representatives at work in the EU institutions as they were, at least indirectly, called 
purposeless.55 The claim also stands in direct contrast to the UK’s successful position as EU 
Member State and yet outside the common currency and Schengen area, both of these being 
obligatory for candidate countries wanting to join the EU now.56 
Are there simply two sides to the UK’s story? The one when in Brussels, or Strasbourg for that 
matter, where UK diplomacy carried weight, the well-respected senior civil servants working 
closely with their European counterparts, influencing EU policy through the institutions right 
into the heart of other Member States.57 Then the other, at home, where appetite for an ‘ever 
closer Union’ is as big as that for tea gone cold and where it feels impossible to prove how 
successful UK representatives are in persuasion and policy making in the UK’s interest.58 
Arguably, this summary overlooks the differences of opinion within the UK’s own political 
sphere and societal spectrum. The historically pro-European London would likely take 
changes in policy and law driven by Brussels better than the English north or Wales, in 
comparison.59 
There is also the issue not only of perspective but of approach. If a relationship is mainly 
viewed through an analysis of costs and benefit, the result may be quantifiable, but is it 
accurate?60 Any analysis of “achievement and failure” in the UK’s policy approaches in the EU 
“cannot be presented in the form of a simple balance-sheet”.61 Relying on analysis of Council 
voting, Member State governments were in opposition in only 2% of votes between 1999 and 
2011, counting over 2500 votes.62 This can hardly be read as the UK government being mostly 
outvoted. 
 
51 Lyon, ibid 422. 
52 David Cameron, ‘EU Speech at Bloomberg’ (2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/eu-speech-at-
bloomberg> accessed 09 October 2020. 
53 Maja Kluger Rasmussen, ‘Heavy Fog in the Channel. Continent Cut Off’? British Diplomatic Relations in 
Brussels after 2010’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 709, 709. 
54‘The Battle of Evermore, The Referendum Campaign’ The Economist (London, 16 June 2016) 24. 
55 Richard Corbett, former Member of the European Parliament for the UK in a Labour seat, was among the ones 
most outspoken, setting up his own ‘myth busting’ page <https://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/category/ 
mythbusters/> accessed 10 October 2020. 
56 Robin Niblett, ‘Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth’ (2016) Research Paper Europe Programme, May 
2016, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House; Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter, ‘Britain's 
Influence in the EU’ (2020) 236 National Institute Economic Review 7; Sara Hagemann, Sara B. Hobolt 
and Christopher Wratil, ‘Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council Voting’ 
(2017) 50 Comparative Political Studies 850. 
57 One example being the UK veto to the Fiscal Compact, discussed by Rasmussen, ‘Heavy Fog in the Channel. 
Continent Cut Off’?’ 709 – 710. 
58 Dragging to the surface the tension between London and Brussels and the diplomacy at work was Lionel 
Barber, ‘The Men Who Run Europe’ Financial Times (London, 11 March 1995) 32. 
59 YouGov The Times survey on EU referendum voting intention published 18 May 2016 available online 
<https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/05/18/eu-referendum-remain-lead-four> accessed 26 
October 2020. 
60 Heavily focussing on such approach are Baimbridge, Whyman & Burkitt, Moored to the Continent? 46 ff; 
Offering an alternative are Menon and Salter ‘Britain's Influence in the EU’. 
61 Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945 – 1970 291. 
62 Hagemann, Hobol and Wratil, ‘Government Responsiveness in the European Union’. 
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The reality is yet again more complex, as political persona and contrary international and 
domestic interests come into play. When comparing reports of the UK’s engagements with the 
EU  with domestic announcements reporting on the same, the UK representatives duplicity is 
all too visible.63 This behaviour is as old as the UK’s membership, Thatcher being a prominent 
example who, “as she took Britain further in [the EU], she stoked the fire of those who opposed 
this every step of the way.”64 While all of “her political energy was directed against it”, Thatcher 
played an active part in a transforming Union, one of the significant achievements at time 
being the abandonment of the unanimous vote in the Council.65 While ‘inveighing’ “about the 
relentless advance of the EU and the restrictions placed on [the UKs] own pursuit of a free 
market economic as a cure for all domestic evils” Thatcher’s actions supported the increase 
of powers on the then EC side.66 
The developments ahead of the Maastricht Treaty being ratified in 1993 serve as another 
example of UK hesitance leading to different versions of membership, seemingly for the UK’s 
benefit and under new leadership of Prime Minister John Major. Whilst the UK fundamentally 
objected to the idea of a federal Europe from the outset, the other member nations aimed to 
create a federal Europe in the new treaty.67 Federalism for the UK resembled the constitutional 
arrangements of the USA, Canada or Australia and the UK was strongly opposed to the idea.68 
The UK did not want to be party to such a relationship but equally was not able to propose an 
alternative. The solution for the UK was simple and one that would be the UK approach 
throughout the rest of its membership: the opt out. The UK insisted that Maastricht Treaty did 
not refer to the creation of a federal Europe explicitly, though the treaty envisaged developing 
the European Union ever closer with cooperation moving beyond a purely economic focus.69 
The UK’s ‘one foot in – one foot out’ approach seemed to rely on its diplomatic prestige, which 
wore thin eventually, as the following example will show. Partners were left feeling like too 
many favours had been called in and to little benefit was gained in return. One painful example 
is the UK’s short-lived participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) leading to Black 
Wednesday, effectively preventing the UK from joining the European Monetary Union (EMU).70 
While this impacted the UK’s and European Communities alike, Lyon provides insight into the 
domestic tensions behind the UK’s joining of the ERM, sharing how Prime Minister “Thatcher 
reacted angrily” at the prospect of “accelerated plans for further monetary integration” shortly 
after having just joined the ERM with reluctancy.71 Senior ministers openly pointed out how 
the UK’s economic struggles were precisely because of the hesitancy to get involved in the 
first place.72 Aykens, while comparing the reactions to struggles in Italy and Germany at the 
same time, shows how “there was so little real sympathy for the British after all these years of 
the kind of tack they had taken. They were on their own”.73 Stephens concludes “when the 
crisis hit in 1992 Britain had no real allies”.74 
 
63 One example used by Alex Barker relates to Cameron in 2011: “Cameron later said he had ‘exercised my veto’ 
on treaty change, but he never actually used those words in the room. The rest of the EU agreed to do a side 
deal without him, breaking with the convention that the European Council moved as one” in Alex Barker, 
‘Goodbye Brussels: What I Learnt in Eight Years Covering the EU’ Financial Times Magazine Online (London, 29 
August 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/1955d464-c926-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0> accessed 10 October 
2020. 
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65 Ibid. 
66 Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK 422. 
67 ibid 424. 
68 ibid 423. 
69 Ibid 424. 
70 ibid; Peter Aykens, ‘Conflicting Authorities: States, Currency Markets and the ERM Crisis of 1992–93’ (2002) 
28 Review of International Studies 359. 
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Reputation and diplomatic gravitas are never static, but it is evident how the UK’s drive around 
Europe with the brakes on was exhausting its partners on multiple occasions.75 The 
negotiation rounds before and since the referendum 2016 serve as another exemplar, where 
the UK often overestimated its own influence and was not reading the room, if indeed anybody 
was there to be read.76 Those working on the ground in Brussels, not politicians focussing on 
short term goals for party and individual, but civil servants interested in a functioning 
relationship, were the true heroes of UK diplomacy in the EU, managing carefully the balancing 
act between whoever was in No 10 and the Brussels machinery.77 It is a UK tradition after all, 
that politicians are not, as one might expect at the forefront of policy making but “rather less 
gets pushed up to the top” and “much policy is made without having to intrude”.78 In that it 
stands almost directly opposite to the EU which, despite all the claims to be “bureaucrat’s 
paradise” most fundamental decisions are left to government representatives in Council.79 
While it suits the UK to argue that it lacks influence on the EU level, it is its self-centred back 
and forth approach that in the end serves as self-fulfilling prophecy when the EU relations 
disappoint.  
5. Falling Out with Neighbours 
 
“No. No. No.” 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher80 
 
Neither of the main UK political parties ever managed to be wholeheartedly convinced that the 
UK’s future would lie within the European Union and not outside, despite “demand for British 
leadership of a united Europe”.81 In that they truly represent the divide in the electorate and 
wider public which since at least the early 1990s “remains critical of the EU” always showing 
sympathy for the option of withdrawal.82 Baimbridge et al ask provocatively: “Why does Britain 
not appear to share the vision of the other member states? Why does the UK so often resist 
common policies? Why is it that it always seems to be Britain that wants special treatment? 
Why in spite of its size and international influence is the British government perceived as trying 
to block or dilute the impact of initiatives from Brussels?”83 When discussing these questions 
Baimbridge et al do not provide comprehensive answers but manage to touch upon a series 
of challenges showing that, rather than the UK suddenly falling out with the more passionate 
Europeans they have also been the rather awkward self-conscious neighbours, eagerly eyeing 
the blooming roses but with real aversion to any attempt of tackling the thorns. What 
Baimbridge et al are overlooking are the UK’s internal constitutional and political differences 
in structure and opinion. Just as it is impossible to claim one party represents one particular 
view on the UK – EU relationship, we cannot claim that Westminster politicians speak for the 
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public view across the country or indeed for the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
While the 2016 referendum on membership seems to suggest that the most successful claims 
made by the Leave campaign were those relating to immigration, it is the argument of loss of 
sovereignty that is as old as the UK – EU relationship.84 This does not mean to say that 
immigration was not a hot topic influencing the UK’s view of the EU and its predecessor 
communities. After all Enoch Powell’s infamous Rivers of Blood speech in 1968 coincided with 
preparations of the UK’s accession to the EEC.85 However, the issue of perceived immigration 
versus actual immigration and the complex societal concerns arising for future generations, 
the Windrush generation being one particular example, provide enough ground for a whole 
other discourse. Here, the issue of immigration as raised by the referendum campaign, is one 
feeding into the fear of a weakened UK sovereignty. 
Lyon argues “had Britain chosen to join the EEC at its inception, it would have been in a strong 
position to dictate the form of the organisation and the detailed terms of the Treaty of Rome, 
and to deal expressly with issues relating to sovereignty which have caused so much difficulty 
since.”86 The two entities would have been able to adjust their constitutional settings from the 
outset, growing together more through subtle reforms than seemingly forced means such as 
direct effect. Arguably, the lack of a referendum on the UK’s accession was another historic 
misjudgement, showing underestimation of the public’s fear of ‘foreign rule’ and ‘loss of 
sovereignty’, consciously put into them during the Second World War.87 Baimbridge et al argue 
that “the notion of an unbroken history”, “the lack of invasion, absence of revolution and being 
an ‘old’ state in a ‘new’ world” are all part of the UK’s identity.88 They go on to explore how 
“the legacy of empire and the pretence of global influence” are used as explanations for the 
UK’s “non-alignment with the rest of Europe.”89 Lastly, the “development of a distinctive legal 
system”, very different “compared to other EU nations” will always require the UK “to make 
major adjustments” in comparison to its neighbours.90 This goes beyond “the adversarial 
system of justice” being “alien to the European inquisitorial tradition” but to a continental 
European comfort in “general enabling legislation”, whereas the UK “relies on common law”.91 
The way Baimbridge et al pull on the UK’s unique identity has its appeal, but does not fully 
explain why the UK deserves to be treated favourably in its inward looking approach to pan 
European cooperation, compared to other nations. After all, every member state arguably 
surrendered some of its identity to be reborn as part of a Union of states.  
More crucially perhaps, Baimbridge et al argue that “the contrasting legal systems” also 
present “different rights of citizenship”.92 While “citizens’ rights are granted and safeguarded 
by the state because it is enshrined in a constitutional document “ in most continental 
European countries, in the UK “by contrast, it has been assumed that individuals have the 
right to do whatever they choose provided law does not explicitly prohibit it.” 93 Whether the 
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UK’s public really has this conscious self-perception is impossible to tell, the issue of 
citizenship, however, became a prominent topic in the aftermath of the referendum and 
subsequent withdrawal procedures where significant numbers of public representatives made 
it known that they had no intention to surrender their EU citizenship lightly.94  
It is convincing that many, if not all, of the factors above, significantly define the “unique 
interrelationship” between the UK and the EU and as such arguably always set any attempt of 
an ever closer Union between both up to fail.95 
6. Friends with Benefits 
 
“As we leave the European Union, we will forge a bold new positive role for ourselves in the 
world”. 
Prime Minister Theresa May96 
 
While the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was received with mixed reviews, particularly after its older sister 
treaty failed the ratification in domestic parliaments, it served to lay the question of withdrawal 
from the EU to rest by introducing Article 50 TEU.97 
The question of EU membership was not openly questioned then but the history of the UK – 
EU relationship, in hindsight, seems to have inevitably led to break-up ten years after Article 
50 was introduced. Like every relationship that ended, one can retrospectively argue: ‘It was 
not meant to be! More kept them apart than united them’.98 Indeed, Baimbridge et al argue the 
case for a solitary journey for the UK in Europe, not isolated but linked to the EU where it suits 
the fundamentally different economic systems.99 Arguably, these fundamental differences go 
beyond economics to the core of the two political, legal and societal systems.100 
This is also reflected in the way the UK and the EU have approached the former’s departure. 
The process of withdrawal was promised to be complex and difficult and most observers were 
still surprised by just how painful it seems.101 The UK is on its third Prime Minister since the 
result of the 2016 referendum and while Prime Minister Johnson ‘got Brexit done’, the future 
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relationship of the two divorcees remains unclear. At the time of writing EU law will cease to 
apply in the UK in under ten weeks’ time and benefits of these laws will dry up102  
Prime Minister Cameron wanted to negotiate a ‘better deal’ for the UK with the EU before the 
referendum in 2016 but did not convince enough to further a remain vote in the referendum.103 
May spent her term as Prime Minister negotiating the non-negotiable behind closed glass 
doors and triggered the UK’s withdrawal process from the EU under Article 50 TEU.104 Prime 
Minister Johnson got a version of Brexit done and has spent the transition period in 2020 
treading water responding to a global pandemic and managing demands in the negotiation of 
a new relationship with the EU.105  
Promising the oxymoron of ‘having the cake and eating it’ became habit in UK politics since 
the referendum vote and stands as symbol for the UK’s self-imposed but impossible balancing 
act: The electorate needs to be calmed an appeased on the one side, while uncharted territory 
of negotiation and then future relationship with the EU awaits on the other.106 It does not help 
that public opining on the EU remains diverse within UK opinion polls, making it impossible for 
any government to feel confident in their policy making and governance.107 It is striking how 
little in this process is certain. The Department for Exiting the European Union, specifically 
formed under May’s government, lost eight ministers in under three years, showing how well 
the diverse public opinion is also represented in politics.108 The UK’s internal conflicts 
regarding constitutional, political or economic priorities in negotiations of the withdrawal 
process, and now in relation to a future agreement, are hindering its own success. It cannot 
go in one direction if its parts are heading separate ways.109 The referendum vote in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland differs significantly from that in Wales and England, making it impossible 
for the UK government to follow one clear political agenda. The UK is continuously forced to 
engage with painful core questions of its own constitutional identity and legal framework as 
well as economic structures, hiding the struggles behind claims others are hindering UK 
progress and preventing this great nation from prospering.110 The UK has not outgrown this 
version of self-centredness, despite realisations that proactive approaches can be to its 
benefit, and therefore continues to bring challenges upon itself through self-fulfilling 
prophecies. 
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In the end “perceptible rise in Euroscepticism” and the “public disenchantment with the EU” 
are the result of political mismanagement more than economic, political or legal truths.111 
Without really understanding how its own internal conflicts impact on any future relationship 
with the EU, the UK attempts to further new relations. In doing so it is looking to receive the 
same benefits without any of the obligations it evaded to sell to the public domestically in the 
first place. It seems to have learned half a lesson, in that it is not seeking to hide these 
obligations from its people. Rather than addressing the fact that an agreement reached 
between the EU and the UK will of course need to benefit both sides, the UK continues to 
seek the impossible: An international agreement benefitting itself, while forcing obligations 
only on the EU. The present back and forth between UK and EU could continue ad infinitum, 
if it were not for economic crisis and general elections to intervene. 
7. The year 2070 
 
“The UK's commitment to Europe cannot be measured simply 
by its relationship with the EEC.”112 
 
Maybe Churchill was right back in 1930 when he proclaimed the UK was “with Europe but not 
of it.”113 Throughout its history, the UK considered itself unconcerned by the crises that shook 
the continent, unless they came knocking on their door. They had to cross the channel first, 
after all. 
The UK had mastered being a global conquer, grew an empire and still morns its loss in many 
respects. This Union of European States was simply not falling for the UK’s grandeur and it 
could have all been such a wonderful ‘European Commonwealth’ under UK leadership.114 The 
UK is an extraordinary partner when a crisis does not directly concern them, providing support 
at arm’s length, or leadership from the top, depending on the perspective taken. It does, 
however, get complicated when it is asked to give something for when it takes, not out of 
malice, but habit. 
This chapter has shown how the starting points of the founding EC member states and the UK 
differ so dramatically; they could hardly have been further away from one another. Those 
joining the founding European Coal and Steel community did not choose to do so for the 
greater good; there was no common market to benefit from, no sovereignty to lose, no 
constitutional tradition challenged. The continent literally lay in ruins, was governed by the 
Allies and it was clear who were the bigger and the smaller spoons at the table, as the new 
borders were drawn. In order to prevent nations ever choosing the option of conflict over the 
option of cooperation, they had to be connected where it hurt them most in a crisis: their 
wallets. Creating interdependencies would intertwine the fate of these nations, never to be 
separated again.  
The stabilising effect to these economies through cooperation was what the UK was really 
interested in, so long as it fitted the UK’s ‘gentleman approach’.115 It did not want to be forced 
but prided itself in being forceful. Thatcher’s confrontational method’s won small victories and 
“cashed in a lot of chips, in a game where every player has only a limited number and can’t 
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acquire more by simply shouting.116 It is a record, “not of triumph, but [bewilderment]” as it 
seemed impossible for the UK to “truly accept that its modern destiny was to be a European 
country.”117 Saunders therefore concludes that the UK “features less as a rational actor on the 
world stage than as a trauma victim, strapped to the analyst's couch.”118 
There is evidence that nothing much has changed since those founding years. May’s 
“discursive construction of Brexit” is said to have contributed to “political paralysis”.119 The jury 
is still out on Johnson, while he continues applying comparable rhetoric.120 It seems 
“differences in history, culture and political traditions” are insurmountable and will continue to 
make “for ill at ease bedfellows.”121 
The UK’s “unbroken history” and “legacy of empire” cannot be overcome by political 
compromise of sorts.122 Politics is short-lived compared to world history and while the idiom 
promises it will repeat itself we only ever really know with the benefit of hindsight whether it 
truly has. It is easy to blame the UK for its self-centredness, but the same needs to be said for 
the EU. Fortress Europe cannot afford to surrender its identity of unity and complex diplomacy 
in the face of member state self-interests either, or it will risk their smaller entities bit by bit 
chipping away until the fundamental core, the single market and its four freedoms, is a 
meaningless shell.123 
Stalemate.  
Arguably, but there is no reason why a reboot would be indefensible. Neither UK nor EU can 
escape their individual contexts but can ground their future relationship in a clearly defined 
and carefully chosen unique setting belonging to them only. Joining the early European 
Communities would have allowed the UK to shape the EU in a way that would have suited 
itself, there is no doubt. That does not mean, however, that a newly founded co-operation 
cannot grow into a firm and stable co-operation in which both parties prosper. In a way, the 
withdrawal process laid bare many of the hidden constitutional, political and societal 
challenges. Now in the open, these can be addressed directly and purposefully.  
Any future co-operation needs to acknowledge the other parties starting point, if it wants to 
ever be a serious and valuable endeavour. The UK needs to fully accept that the single market 
cannot be undermined through any attempt of ‘cherry picking’; It either is committed to full 
access including all its advantages and constraints, or it accepts it will have to pay extra for 
the privilege of limited access and limited risk.124 The EU on the other hand has to understand 
the UK’s constitutional and political framework has not grown and matured through forced 
revolution, war and reform but is the result of centuries of slow reactionary change in common 
law with its identity firmly rooted in parliamentary sovereignty.125 It is therefore not as amenable 
to EU law mechanisms such as regulations and ECJ case law as the legal frameworks of the 
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founding member states. The EU has created unique legal mechanisms in its founding years 
and there is no reason why a new partnership with the UK would not lead to the same. 
This new fundamental understanding on both sides is essential to then appropriately 
contextualise the negotiations as the new relationship is defined and structured. The UK has 
to stop looking for versions of existing deals, longing for a Swiss approach yesterday only to 
be discussing a confusing version of Canada + + the next.126 The EU has to overcome its 
internal diplomatic slow motion and the urge to fit agreements in a pre-set box to ensure 
approval in all member states. The seemingly impossible task of a compromise that leaves 
every participant thinking they have won needs to be abandoned for the benefit of a 
compromise that leaves all feeling they have not been short-changed. 
The EU was founded in the aftermath of the second world war and took decades to develop 
into its current format, through a mix of gentle diplomacy in the establishment of 
intergovernmental structures or sledgehammer decisions by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. It is challenged by environmental threats, refugee movements and global 
events such as struggling economies facing a pandemic. Judging by the previous 50 years, 
the EU is likely to push for more cooperation closer to its citizenry. This approach can suit a 
UK that honestly seeks a demos governed Union, applying powerful representation and 
therefore delivering strongly legitimised legal mechanisms. 
The UK on the other hand is priding itself in its uninterrupted history and Brexit is pulling at the 
seams of the Union between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 50 years from 
now, we may well see a united Ireland, an independent Scotland and an empowered Wales, 
leaving England to maybe consider the establishment of its own assembly.127 The UK’s history 
shows, however, that fundamental change is rare and subtle reforms over time more likely. 
The way the UK will be able to engage with the EU will depend enormously on its internal 
structures and the distraction these pose. 
While the pandemic challenges our globalised approach to economies, politics and citizenry, 
the interconnectivities and dependencies have only become more visible. As some of these 
have grown slowly as part of the UK’s EU membership, it remains to be seen how much of 
this almost organic development the UK chooses to explicitly reject as it develops the post-
EU version of itself. As the global challenges remain, it is likely that as EU and UK respond to 
these a renewed cooperation feeds into the formation of a new version of EU – UK relations.  
The UK and the EU can grow to become effective partners, furthering economic integration 
without intense constitutional intervention, so long as they accept how far the other party is 
willing to go. Then maybe, as the EU undergoes its long overdue reforms with the UK watching 
from the outside, and while the UK tests the cold water of globalised economies without the 
backing of an empire, both sides will realise that context matters, but can be overcome for a 
an agreed version of a greater good. It may take another 50 years; let’s put a holder in our 
diaries for 2069 and see. 
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From the Greek Case to the Present: 50 Years of Article 3 




This chapter will look at the development of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which concerns the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, from the first finding that it had been breached in 1969 in the Greek case, to the 
current time. It will focus on how the Article came to be treated as prohibiting different 
categories of harm in the Greek case and Ireland v UK, of torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment, or degrading treatment or punishment. It will assess when the European Court 
has been willing to find a breach of the provision, with respect of these categorisations over a 
50-year period. The chapter will argue that the Court has been willing to find the provision 
breached in a wide range of cases, beyond much more than what one imagines its drafters 
had envisaged. At the same time, the Court has sought to set parameters for the reach of the 
Article. This chapter will finish by considering some of the potentialities for Article 3 by 
considering the plight of migrants trying to make their way to Europe, while recognising its 
failures to protect these people. 
  
1. Introduction 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states:  
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.1  
Applying to all human beings, it has been said to be absolute – that is, it cannot be derogated 
from, qualified or limited in any way.2 The brevity and prima facie simplicity of the text of the 
Article belie its complexity. In the Greek case,3 where a violation of Article 3 was found for the 
first time, the Article was understood as encompassing different component parts, all of which 
are defined, and conceptually limited by the practice of the Court. In the seminal case of Tyrer 
v United Kingdom4 the European Court of Human Rights (‘the European Court’) stated that 
the ECHR was a ‘living instrument which… must be interpreted in light of present-day 
conditions’.5 The mission of the human rights programme is embodied within this statement. 
Human rights should respond to social change but do so in a way which is progressively 
moving towards better protection. Although we may be living in times which regrettably have 
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witnessed the regression of human rights standards with regards to, for example, responding 
to terrorism, migration or economic inequality, the aspirational nature of the human rights 
programme has been evident in the case law of Article 3 of the Convention, even if sometimes 
it falls short.  
It would be difficult to argue that the Article has been applied in anything other than a wider 
range of forms of ill-treatment, with applications in fields including within crime prevention, 
asylum cases, extradition, police interviewing, corporal punishment, penal environments, 
amongst others. It may also have been applied to much lesser forms of ill-treatment than was 
originally envisaged. Yet the last 50 years have shown it cannot protect everyone from harmful 
ill-treatment by the state. The provision has its limitations, and the Court has set parameters 
as to when the prohibition applies or not. The aim of this review article is to survey 50 years 
of Article 3, from the Greek case in 1969, through to 2019. In doing so, it will look at the drafting 
of Article 3, early cases before the Commission and Court, as well as some key areas where 
we can see the development of the case law of the provision. It will spend some time looking 
at the early seminal cases of the Court – the Greek case and Ireland v UK,6 and it will also 
assess the recent revised judgment of Ireland v UK.7 It will consider the definitions of ‘torture’, 
‘inhuman treatment or punishment’ and ‘degrading treatment or punishment’, with additional 
attention paid to the line between acceptable and unacceptable harms committed against 
persons. It will examine how the concept of human dignity has been used to expand the ambit 
of the prohibition and argue, contrary to the view of theorists who consider ‘dignity’ to be too 
intangible to form the basis of legal obligation, that it is a concept with aspirational qualities 
which has use for modern jurists. ‘The last section regarding how Article 3 has been applied 
with regards to migration allows a short exploration of the limits of the Article, as well as its 
potentialities. Given the potential breadth of a review article on 50 years of Article 3, it should 
be noted from the outset that this cannot be a comprehensive exploration. This is too short a 
publication to give this study justice, and some important cases may be omitted from 
discussion. Nevertheless, the cases included have been carefully chosen to trace the 
development and shaping of Article 3. 
2. The Early Judgments – the Greek Case and Ireland v UK 
The drafting of Article 3 ECHR appeared not to provoke controversy, but there was little light 
shed on how the provision was to be used, and no indication given to what it would become. 
Before arriving at the final wording of the Article, several different suggestions were made, 
including by the UK delegate, Seymour Cocks, who argued that the provision should mention 
mutilation, sterilisation, beating, torture, as well as imprisonment with excess of light, 
darkness, noise as to cause mental suffering.8 Although not adopted, these suggestions help 
to inform our understanding of the range of harms Article 3 was originally intended  to 
encompass.  
The final text which was adopted was very similar to that within the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), but there is no indication from the travaux préparatoires as to whether 
they had considered the suitability of the terms ‘torture’ ‘inhuman’ and degrading’ within the 
provision, or what they meant. The UDHR text itself was passed without unanimous 
agreement on the inclusion of the terms ‘inhuman’ or ‘degrading’, and with no guidance as to 
their scope or applicability. The UK delegate to the drafting of the instrument, for example, 
found the term ‘inhuman’ to be too subjective.9 In addition, the UDHR was never supposed to 
be a source of legal obligation. Later, during the drafting of Article 7 of the International 
 
6 Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25. 
7 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application no 5310/71, Judgment (revision) of 20 March 2018. 
8 European Consultative Assembly Deb., 1st Session (Part II) 596 (Sept 8, 1949); Klayman, ‘The Definition of Torture in 
International Law’ (1978) 51 Temple L Q 472. 
9 E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.30.  
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)10 delegates also expressed misgivings 
about the content of the wording of the prohibition and spoke of the need for greater 
specificity.11 In particular, the word ‘degrading’ was deemed to be vague.12  
It seems unlikely that the architects of Article 3 would have been aware that the provision 
would be held applicable in such a broad range of circumstances.  However, divining the 
original intention of the drafters of the Article is insufficient for a proper understanding of its 
meaning in contemporary international human rights law, as human rights protections are 
conceived as living instruments. Focusing on the purpose of the drafters wrongly assumes 
that drafters have clearly defined ideas of the all the intentions and potential interpretations of 
a provision. We know that is not the case.13 Article 3, thankfully, has developed to encompass 
a wide-range of circumstances, providing protection from many forms of harm. In common 
with the other provisions in the ECHR, the evolving case law of the European Court has 
informed our understanding of what Article 3 is meant to prohibit. Given a relatively blank 
canvas to develop Article 3, the early cases have been particularly influential in shaping how 
the Article is applied by the Court.  
The first breach of Article 3 was found by the European Commission in 1969. In the Spring of 
that year a military coup d’état brought Colonel George Papadopoulos to power in Greece. 
Throughout the next seven years Greece was subject to military rule and the security forces 
used torture extensively. Amnesty International conducted investigations into reports of torture 
which led to the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark to claim violations of 
seven separate Articles of the ECHR, including Article 3, against the Greek state. In the Greek 
case, it was reported that a large variety of methods of torture had been used, including 
falanga,14 sexual abuse, near suffocation, strappado,15 beating with sandbags or knotted 
wires, jumping on the stomach, pulling of hair, extraction of finger and toe nails, burning, and 
electric shocks. It was not surprising in this case that a breach of Article 3 was found. In finding 
a breach, the European Commission introduced what would become the core constituents in 
our understanding of Article 3. Since this case, Article 3 has been understood to split into 
different parts, with a hierarchical progression between torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment and degrading treatment or punishment (although this may not be borne out in 
practice with regards to degradation, as described in the section below): 
The word ‘torture’ is often used to describe inhuman treatment which has a 
purpose such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of 
punishment and is generally an aggravated form of inhuman and degrading 
treatment.16  
The view that torture was inhuman treatment with a purpose was subsequently amended in 
Ireland v UK (1978), another early seminal case in developing our understanding of the 
provision. During the period known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland, the UK government 
arrested hundreds of men as part of Operation Demetrius in 1971. Of these, fourteen men 
were taken to an additional interrogation centre and were subjected to ill-treatment by the 
security forces. Five techniques were used against the individuals, including making them 
 
10 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 999 171.  
11 Klayman ‘The Definition of Torture in International Law’ 462.  
12 E/CN.4/SR.141, 3. 
13 For more on issues such as this see: M Davies, Law Unlimited (Routledge 2017) 46.  
14 Repeated action of blunt trauma to the feet.  
15 The victim’s hands are tied behind his or her back and suspended by a rope.  
16 The Greek case.  
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stand in stress positions,17 placing hoods over their heads (they became known thereafter as 
the ‘hooded men’), subjecting them to loud noise, depriving them of sleep, and depriving them 
of food and drink.18 In this case it was found that the five techniques amounted to inhuman 
treatment. In doing so, the Court disregarded the distinction made in the Greek case that 
torture was inhuman treatment with a purpose and argued that it was severity of suffering 
which was the distinction between torture and inhuman treatment. Following this case, it would 
be considered by many that there was a hierarchical progression of severity of suffering within 
Article 3 of the Convention with torture at the top of the hierarchy and degrading treatment at 
the bottom:19  
‘…it was the intention that the Convention, with its distinction between "torture" 
and "inhuman or degrading treatment", should by the first of these terms attach 
a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering’.20 
Recently, scholars have called into question the notion of a hierarchical progression of severity 
of suffering. Mavronicola argues, ‘the terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ encompass acts with 
distinct qualities, with potentially distinct effects on the victim’,21 therefore arguing that 
degradation is a different form of ill-treatment to inhuman treatment rather than one separated 
by severity of suffering. Similarly, Webster argues that ‘Article 3 is constituted by forms of harm 
that are connected yet distinctive. They are connected because they make up one holistic 
legal standard and presumably share some common conceptual ground, and they are 
distinctive because the text of the Convention uses several terms within this single right…’22 
This indicates that the different constituent parts of Article 3 have different conceptual 
meanings, rather than being strictly separated by severity of suffering. Under this view, it may 
be the case, for example, that we might find something which is degrading to engender greater 
suffering than something which is found to be inhuman treatment. Given that suffering is 
subjective, it would seem difficult to argue that all degrading treatment, for example, causes 
less severe suffering than inhuman treatment. We may find cases where we could imagine 
that this does not hold up to scrutiny. We can also see certain concepts used frequently to 
describe specific types of ill-treatment. For example. surveying cases of the Court, it can be 
observed that detention conditions are always held to be degrading treatment, inhuman 
treatment, or inhuman or degrading treatment, but never torture.23 Nevertheless, it does 
appear prima facie that severity of suffering still has its place in distinguishing between the 
different concepts – degradation still often appears as a gateway into the provision, and torture 
describes what we might imagine to be the most severe types of suffering.  
The Ireland v UK case was widely criticised due to the narrowness of the interpretation of what 
constituted torture.24 It was felt that the five techniques were torture, and not inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Possibly the European Court may have been responding to the situation 
in Northern Ireland where a state of emergency had been declared, and the decision was a 
political one. The case was re-opened in 2018 to reconsider whether torture had taken place.25 
 
17 The men were described as having to stand ‘spread-eagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head 
against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body 
mainly on the finger’. 
18 The Greek case, para 96.  
19 M Evans and R Morgan, Preventing Torture (OUP 2001) 289. 
20 Ibid, para 167.  
21 N Mavronicola ‘Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal 
Context’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 721, 725.  
22 E. Webster, Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture in Human Rights Law (Routledge 2018), 21.   
23 Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 261. 
24 M O'Boyle, ‘Torture and Emergency Powers Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v United Kingdom’ 
(1977) 71 American Journal of International Law 674, 684-88.  
25 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application no 5310/71, Judgment (revision) of 20 March 2018.  
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It is worth considering this recent case as in some famous examples the narrow interpretation 
of torture held in Ireland v UK has been used to justify the ill-treatment of detainees. For 
example, this happened in Israel under the Landau Commission,26 or in the United States (and 
Guantanamo Bay) through the Bybee Memorandum.27 In the revised judgment, the Court 
decided not to revisit their decision. However, this was not on the basis that it considered that 
the five techniques did not amount to torture. Rather a decision to revise a case is based on 
a technical process undertaken pursuant to Rule 80 of the Rules of that Court. This allows 
reconsideration of a judgment should new facts emerge which would have had a decisive 
influence on the Court. The focus under the review procedure was not whether the five 
techniques could be viewed to be torture nowadays. The review procedure seeks to ascertain 
whether the Court in 1978, when the judgment was made, would have decided the case 
differently and held the treatment to be torture if they had the documents which have recently 
been uncovered. The Court in the revised judgment did not consider that the emergence of 
the documents would have had a decisive influence on the Court’s findings and therefore 
dismissed the case.28  
If the decision by the Irish government to apply to revisit Ireland v UK had the aim of righting 
an historic wrong, it was ill-conceived. First, if we consider the influence that the case had in 
Israel and the US, there were a multitude of arguments presented by both the Landau 
Commission and in the Bybee memorandum, many of which were considered by the human 
rights commentariat as entirely wrong, illegal, or politically motivated. The inclusion of the 
judgment in Ireland v UK was presented as only one of several (sometimes perverse) 
reasonings for permitting ill-treatment. Second, a revision request under Rule 80 is not an 
opportunity to fix the Court’s past mistakes but is a technical process which allows a case to 
be reconsidered should new decisively influential evidence be presented. As the Court stated 
it is ‘…not for the Court… to apply retrospectively Article 3 case-law on what is now considered 
to constitute torture’.29 Should the Court do that, apart from breaching its own rules, it would 
lead to uncertainty and could add to the increasing backlog of cases for the already 
overburdened Court.30 Although Ireland v UK is an influential case, if we consider that there 
have been 2404 breaches under the substantive head of Article 3 from 1959 to the time of the 
writing of this article, we could see the potential for chaos.31  
Third, the European Court had already decided that the decision in Ireland v UK would not 
hold up, considering that the case included an overly narrow interpretation of torture when it 
was decided. In the case of Selmouni v France32 the applicant was beaten in police custody, 
called on to perform oral sex on a police officer, and when he refused to do so, had been 
urinated upon and threatened with a blow torch and a syringe. The Court, dismissing the 
Government’s argument that the ill-treatment did not amount to torture, which relied on the 
fact that the judgment of Ireland v UK, stated that ‘certain acts which were classified in the 
past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified 
differently in future’.33 This case is quoted in the revised Ireland judgment, where it additionally 
states that the case-law on the notion of torture has evolved.34 Should the same facts come 
before the Court nowadays there undoubtedly would be a finding of torture. The jurisprudence 
 
26 B’TSelem, ‘Legislation Allowing the Use of Physical and Mental Coercion in Interrogations by the Genera Security Service’ 
(2000), available at: <www.btselem.org> accessed 10 July 2019.  
27 August 1st, 2002 Department of Justice Memorandum Regarding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340 – 2340A Assistant Attorney-General for the Office of Legal Counsel at the US Department of Justice, Jay S. Bybee, to 
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President of the United States.  
28 Ibid, para 137.  
29 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application no 5310/71, Judgment (revision) of 20 March 2018, para 10.  
30 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights Annual Report 2018, (COE 2018) 13.  
31 Ibid, 179.  
32 Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403.  
33 Ibid, para 101.  
34 Ireland v United Kingdom, Application no 5310/71, Judgment (revision) of 20 March 2018, para 60. 
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of the Court had already evolved, as indicated in the case of Selmouni, demonstrating the 
progressively shifting reach of the prohibition, thereby not necessitating that the case should 
be revisited.  
3. Torture 
It took the European Court until Aksoy v Turkey in 1996 to find a state had committed torture.35 
In this case, the applicant’s arms were paralysed after he had been stripped naked and 
suspended by his arms, which had been tied behind his back. Since 1996, 152 further 
breaches of Article 3 amounting to torture have been found. Given the fact that all findings of 
torture have been made in the last 23 years, this might show a greater willingness of the Court 
to find torture has taken place, as opposed to a lesser finding such as inhuman treatment. 
This may be correct, although it is notable that the Russian Federation – who have been found 
to have tortured in 63 cases – did not ratify the ECHR until 1998. Further analysis of the cases 
may be required to ascertain whether the line between inhuman treatment and torture has 
moved, so that acts previously considered to fall under the former heading are now considered 
to amount to torture.  
Torture has been found in a variety of contexts, mostly in cases where multiple types of ill-
treatment have been inflicted to the applicants. For example, a regime of solitary confinement 
and severe abuse can amount to torture. In the case of Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and 
Russia,36 the applicant was savagely beaten in a Russian prison. He was threatened with 
death, denied food for two days, and light for three. The applicant was also subjected to four 
mock executions. In this case, the Court found that there was a breach of Article 3 amounting 
to torture. However, in an early torture case, in 1997, it was found in Aydin v Turkey37 that a 
single act of rape can constitute torture.  
The Court has also held that the infliction of mental suffering can form part of a claim of a 
breach of Article 3, but to date has not found that mental suffering on its own amounts to 
torture.38 This may seem surprising given the aims and effects of some types of mental harm 
illegally inflicted on individuals. For example, the deprivation or bombardment of noise and 
light to the senses, for example, has been known to cause aggression, anxiety, stress and 
hallucinations increasing the risk of heart disease or attack,39 yet there is no judgment which 
says on its own that this amounts to torture. It may be the case that the European Court does 
not view these types of behaviours to be sufficiently severe to amount to torture. On the other 
hand, cases where one method aimed at inducing mental suffering has been used on its own 
are a rarity, so it may be that the Court has not had the chance to pronounce judgment on the 
form of ill-treatment. This is a limitation of Article 3, and of human rights courts (and courts) in 
general – they principally work on a reactive basis where they can only pronounce judgments 
on the infringement of laws when cases are before them (although persuasive comments can 
be made obiter). The Court, for example, has not had to adjudicate upon a case where sensory 
deprivation is the only factor under consideration. Therefore, for human rights jurists trying to 
ascertain what might fall under each heading, it can be part guesswork and part analyses of 
cases where one attempts to imagine comparable levels of harm, suffering or wrongdoing.   
 
35 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 553. 
36 Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia (2005) 40 EHRR 46. 
37 Aydin v Turkey (1997) 25 EHRR 251. 
38 Harris, M O’Boyle, E Bates and C Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 2009) 75.  
39 J Mendelson, P Kubzansky, PH Leiderman, D Wexler, C DuToit and P Solomon, ‘Catecholamine Excretion and Behaviour 
During Sensory Deprivation’ (1960) 2(2) AMA Arch Gen Psychiatry 147; Z J Lipowski, ‘Sensory and Information Inputs 
Overload: Behavioural Effects’ (1975) 16 Comprehensive Psychiatry 199; Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First, 
Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights First, 2007). 
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4. Inhuman Treatment or Punishment 
For ill-treatment to be ‘inhuman’ it must ‘attain a minimum level of severity’.40 The category of 
‘inhuman treatment or punishment’ has not found itself to be subject of conceptual deliberation 
in the same way that, for example, degrading treatment or punishment has. Evans and Morgan 
discuss inhuman treatment as a ‘residual category’41 – somewhere between torture and 
degrading treatment with no formal characteristics of its own. It is differentiated from torture 
by the severity of suffering of an individual. One can ascertain the parameters of both inhuman 
treatment and punishment by looking at the practice of the Court. Often a finding of ‘inhuman 
and degrading’ treatment may be found, or a finding of ‘inhuman treatment’ may be found on 
its own. The Court does not indicate why it has found that degradation is a component in a 
finding of ‘inhuman and degrading’ treatment. 
In the 50 years since the Greek case, a wide-ranging amount of cases have been held to 
amount to inhuman treatment. Unlike torture, mental suffering on its own has been found to 
amount to inhuman treatment.42 Some notable cases include Jalloh v Germany43 where it was 
held that the insertion of a tube into a person’s throat, as well as the administering of an emetic 
fluid, to force that person to vomit a suspected package of drugs amounted to a breach of 
Article 3. In Selçuk and Asker v Turkey,44 there was inhuman treatment when, as part of a 
security operation, an elderly person’s home was destroyed in their presence without regard 
to their safety, livelihood or shelter. In Gäfgen v Germany45 there was inhuman treatment when 
the applicant was threatened with ‘intolerable pain’ unless he revealed the whereabouts of a 
kidnapped boy. The concept of ‘inhuman punishment’ is otherwise relatively underdeveloped. 
Often the Court will find ‘inhuman treatment and punishment’ but there is no clear indication 
given as to why that might be the case.46 Cases involving corporal punishment usually are 
considered to amount to degrading punishment, but often do not reach the threshold to be 
‘inhuman’.47 
5. Degrading Treatment and Punishment 
Treatment is degrading if it ‘is such as to arouse in the victims, feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them’.48 The Court has also said of degrading 
treatment that it ‘humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or 
diminishing, their human dignity, or when it arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority 
capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance’.49 The assessment of what 
constitutes degradation, like breaches of Article 3 in general, is relative – it depends on the 
circumstances of the case.50 Degradation is a slippery concept, and the general relativeness 
of the provision has the potential to call into question the absoluteness of Article 3 (this will be 
discussed below).51  
 
40 Ireland v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 25, para 16.  
41 Evans and Morgan, Preventing Torture, 93.  
42 Selcuk and Asker v Turkey (1996) 26 EHRR 477.  
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Many of the early cases concerned degrading punishment, as opposed to treatment. For 
example, in Tyrer v UK52 the Court held that a sentence of three strokes of the birch to a 
juvenile, to be conducted publicly, was degrading punishment. The Court found in Costello-
Roberts v UK53 that a 7-year-old boy being, in private, whacked on the bottom, over his 
trousers, with a shoe did not amount to degrading punishment. Degrading treatment has been 
found in cases conditions to detention, including, for example poor sanitary conditions, 
overcrowding, and small cells,54 a lack or refusal of medical treatment,55 severe solitary 
confinement regimes,56 and in the use of handcuffs or other restraints.57 As I have argued 
elsewhere,58 there are a variety of moral and policy-based reasons why we allow ill-treatment 
to happen to individuals in specific circumstances.59 The line between what is acceptable and 
unacceptable not only relies on whether ill-treatment can be considered to fulfil the definition 
of degradation, but whether ill-treatment is deemed acceptable or not given the circumstances 
of its use. For example, ill-treatment known to cause significant mental health problems, like 
solitary confinement, has not been considered to reach the threshold of Article 3 unless there 
are aggravating factors,60 even though it is known to be ‘characterised by severe confusional, 
paranoid and hallucinatory features, and by intense agitation and random, impulsive, often 
self-directed violence’.61  
The suffering of individuals is difficult to quantify, and so arguing that a specific case provides 
an example of the widening of the provision leaves one open to criticism for making arbitrary 
comparisons which fail to consider the subjective experiences of ill-treatment. Nevertheless, 
it might appear that the scope is widening (this can be viewed in some cases which will be 
presented below). It is easier to argue that the provision is now being applied to a much wider 
range of cases than ever before. It is worth highlighting a few more cases where the ambit of 
Article 3, at least on its surface, appears to have been expanded. In the recent case of Muršić 
v Croatia62 the Grand Chamber of the European Court found that there had been a breach of 
Article 3 amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment when the application was confined 
in a cell measuring 2.62 square metres for 27 consecutive days. Although the Court in this 
case did not find that confinement in less than three square metres would always amount to a 
breach of Article 3 ‘the starting point for the Court’s assessment is a strong presumption of a 
violation of Article 3.63 This case prima facie appears to strengthen the Court’s view on 
conditions of detention, proscriptively delimiting the amount of space a prisoner should have. 
The Court has appeared to expand the remit of Article 3 so that passive smoking in detention 
could amount to a breach of Article 3. In Florea v Romania64 it was held that the applicant, 
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who was suffering from chronic hepatitis and arterial hypertension, was subjected to a breach 
of Article 3 as a result of being subjected to passive smoking.  
6. Human Dignity in Article 3 
In the last 20 years the Court has been increasingly willing to utilise the concept of human 
dignity to expand the remit of cases which fall within the ambit of degradation (and Article 3 in 
a more general sense).65 We can see ‘human dignity’ used in early cases concerning 
degradation such as the East Africans case66 where the Commission considered that the 
‘general purpose of the provision is to prevent interferences with the dignity of man of a 
particularly serious nature’,67 but it seems to be used increasingly by the Court. We can see 
human dignity used in the case of Kudła v Poland68 where the Court held: 
[T]he State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with 
respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure 
do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of 
suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his 
health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the 
requisite medical assistance.69  
In Yankov v Bulgaria70 the Court stated that the forced shaving of someone’s hair could 
amount to degrading treatment, whilst drawing on the concept of human dignity: 
The Court thus considers that the forced shaving off of detainees' hair is in 
principle an act which may have the effect of diminishing their human dignity 
or may arouse in them feelings of inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing them. Whether or not the minimum threshold of severity is reached 
and, consequently, whether or not the treatment complained of constitutes 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention will depend on the 
particular facts of the case, including the victim's personal circumstances, the 
context in which the impugned act was carried out and its aim.71 
In the case of Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia,72 where the Grand Chamber of the Court 
found that the practice of keeping prisoners in metal cages during court hearings amounted to 
degrading treatment, a violation of human dignity is cited for the finding of a breach. In another 
case which appears to expand the remit of Article 3 - Slyusarev v Russia73 - the applicant 
alleged that taking his glasses after his arrest, then making the detainee wait five months 
before returning them to him, and another two months for new glasses, amounted to degrading 
treatment. The Court considered that if the glasses had been returned to the applicant quickly 
no issue under Article 3 would have arisen,74 but:  
[U]nder Article 3 of the Convention the States must ensure that a person is 
detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, 
and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-
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being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the 
requisite medical assistance. Taking the applicant's glasses could not be 
explained in terms of the “practical demands of imprisonment”, and, even more 
so, was unlawful in domestic terms….75 
In Bouyid v Belgium76 the Grand Chamber of the European Court was called to consider 
whether single slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody amounted to a breach 
of Article 3. The Grand Chamber, overruling the Chamber judgment in this case, ruled by 14 
votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3. The Grand Chamber 
unanimously found that there had also been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3. 
The case of Bouyid was particularly interesting for the Court, as much of the disagreement 
within the Grand Chamber lay in the understanding of the ‘minimum level of severity’ required 
for ill-treatment to be considered to fall within the threshold of Article 3. The Chamber in this 
case had considered that:  
Even supposing that the slapping took place, in both cases it was an isolated slap inflicted 
thoughtlessly by a police officer who was exasperated by the applicants’ disrespectful or 
provocative conduct, without seeking to make them confess. Moreover, there was apparently 
an atmosphere of tension between the members of the applicants’ family and police officers 
in their neighbourhood. In those circumstances, even though one of the applicants was only 
17 at the time and whilst it is comprehensible that, if the events really took place as the 
applicants described, they must have felt deep resentment, the Court cannot ignore the fact 
that these were one-off occurrences in a situation of nervous tension and without any serious 
or long-term effect. It takes the view that acts of this type, though unacceptable, cannot be 
regarded as generating a sufficient degree of humiliation or debasement for a breach of Article 
3 of the Convention to be established. In other words, in any event, the above-mentioned 
threshold of severity has not been reached in the present case, such that no question of a 
violation of that provision, under either its substantive or its procedural head, arises.77 
The Grand Chamber overturned this decision, placing emphasis on the concept of human 
dignity and finding that there was a breach of Article 3 amounting to degrading treatment. It 
suggested, again, that ‘respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the 
Convention’.78 Whereas some lawyers caution against the use of dignity in underpinning 
human rights judgments because of its intangibility,79 Webster places human dignity as a key 
component in our understanding of degradation and argues that ‘respect for human dignity is 
a fundamental value that guides interpretation at different levels of abstraction’.80 The term is 
useful due to its aspirational nature. It can provide a benchmark, however intangible that might 
be, for the betterment of the protection of humans by other humans, because people intuitively 
render a meaning to it. In addition, as will be argued below, all language has its limitations and 
if we are to pick apart ‘dignity’ as a concept, we can pick apart the inadequacies of all human 
rights language. 
7. The Limitations of Language in Encapsulating Article 3 
For this section, this chapter will focus on the concepts of degradation (and by inference 
dignity) for the purposes of illustration. Webster outlines various ‘benchmarks’ which derive 
from the definitions provided by the European Court as encompassing what degradation 
means: ‘feelings of fear, anguish, inferiority capable of causing humiliation or debasement; the 
 
75 Ibid, para 43 [emphasis added].  
76 Bouyid v Belgium, Application no 23380/09, Judgment of 28 September 2015.  
77 Bouyid v Belgium (Application no 23380/09), Judgment of 21 November 2013 [Fifth Section].   
78 Bouyid, para 89.  
79 See, for example: R. O’Connell ‘The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa’ (2008) 6(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 267, 267-286.  
80 E. Webster, Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture in Human Rights Law (Routledge 2018) 48.  
62 
 
breaking of one’s will or conscience; and suffering, contempt or lack of respect for one’s 
personality’.81 These are found in the many definitions of degradation the Court uses; we might 
add human dignity to the list. Webster argues that degradation is a sort of ‘outline’ into which 
the benchmarks fit.82 Elsewhere, Webster points out the epistemological dimension of the 
provision, outlining that the ‘every day uses of terms may accord within one each other, or 
they may diverge. Interpretation involves deciding which of the semantic meanings constitute 
the proper legal meaning’.83 However, finding proper legal meaning may be an impossible 
task. This could be why the Court has employed so many benchmarks – to cast the net wide 
and capture within the many definitions, different harms, effects and wrongs which we want 
Article 3 to prohibit. Often these benchmarks are unable to get to the crux of why a form of ill-
treatment is acceptable or not, because they cannot define ill-treatment while at the same time 
set parameters for the provision. For example, in relation to the benchmark of humiliation, it 
could be argued that not all grossly humiliating treatment will be something that leads to an 
Article 3 breach84 - the imposition of a standard prison sentence could be grossly humiliating 
for many but, of course, this does not mean it is a human rights violation. We can see other 
examples of this, where the Court uses definitions which although might be evident in the form 
of ill-treatment present, could be apparent in a seemingly acceptable form of treatment.  
A textual analysis to deciphering what amounts to a breach of Article 3, and what does not, 
will never be enough – language always has limitations in its signifying processes. The 
benchmarks used by the Court will never fully cover what the Article seeks to protect, whilst 
delimiting the provision at the same time. The Court needs to be cognisant (as I believe it 
generally is) of wider moral and policy arguments when considering what breaches the 
provision, and even justifications for some forms of harms (e.g. solitary confinement) being 
permitted. How we decipher what degradation is can rather be achieved by looking at the 
cases as they are practised. As argued by Wittgenstein, recognising the limitations of 
language, ‘for a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’—though not for 
all—this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’,85 
or in other words, the meaning of the word is in its use.  
Language is, of course, still of upmost value. It provides signals to effects, harms or emotions, 
for example, which as humans we understand as embodying specific qualities, however 
differently these might be felt. Some words may also be more intangible than others. ‘Dignity’, 
for example, is a more ethereal concept than ‘humiliation’, an emotion we might experience 
many times within our lifetime and can identity more readily through its mental and physical 
effects. Nevertheless, this is not to say ‘dignity’ is a useless concept for the court to hinge its 
decisions upon, because it accords a status to individuals, creating an inviolable bubble 
around them against infringement from certain harms. It has meaning, however intangible that 
might be, but more importantly use.  
7. Limits, Evolutions, and Potentialities of Article 3 with Respect to Migrants 
Article 3, as demonstrated so far in this article, has been used in a wide-ranging array of cases. 
In relation to migration, Article 3 has been deployed in numerous ways to prevent harm to 
individuals. For example, it has been used to prevent extradition of migrants where they might 
be subjected to a breach of Article 3 on being returned to their home country. In the leading 
case of Soering v UK86, which dates to 1989, the applicant was a German national who had 
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moved to the United States. It was alleged that the applicant and his girlfriend had co-
conspired to murder his girlfriend’s parents. The two then fled to Europe, where they were 
arrested in England. The United States requested extradition of the pair, but the applicant 
argued there was a risk of the death penalty being imposed which could breach Article 3. The 
Court considered that it was not the risk of the death penalty which breached Article 3, but 
‘death row phenomenon’, referring to the emotional distress facing prisoners on death row. 
Consideration was given to the applicant’s young age and the mental state he was in at the 
time of the offence. This was the first time an individual was refused extradition based on the 
potential for a breach of Article 3.  
In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece,87 Belgium was found to be in breach of Article 3 when, under 
the EU Dublin Regulation, it removed an asylum claimant to Greece where there was a real 
risk that the living conditions the person would be made to live under would breach Article 3. 
This case highlighted that the Court would be willing to refuse extradition to a country which 
was a member of the Council of Europe, and signatory to the ECHR. In the case of Hirsi Jamaa 
and others v Italy88 the applicants challenged Italy’s push-back policy of intercepting asylum 
claimants at sea and returning them to Libya. This was not a new phenomenon, but this case 
allowed the Court to make a judgment on its compliance with relevant human rights standards. 
In respect of Article 3, the Court found a breach of Article 3 because the applicants were 
exposed to the risk of repatriation to Eritrea and Somalia.  
The Court has sometimes changed previous decisions to lead to the better protection of 
individuals. This can be seen in a series of cases involving challenges to extradition based on 
ill-health. In D v UK89 the applicant, who had AIDS, was ordered to be returned to St Kitts for 
committing a criminal offence. The European Court held here that the ‘abrupt withdrawal’ of 
the applicant to a state where he would not have access to adequate medical treatment, or 
family or support networks, could amount to inhuman treatment. The Court held here that ‘very 
exceptional circumstances’ compelled them to make this decision. In N v UK90 it was 
considered that a Ugandan citizen with HIV/AIDS could be returned to their home country, 
even though the medication she required to keep her alive beyond one year was expensive in 
Uganda and was not available in her hometown. However, in the 2016 of Paposhvili v 
Belgium91 the Grand Chamber reshaped its case law on Article 3. The applicant was seriously 
ill and expulsion to Georgia would put him at risk of inhuman treatment and an earlier death. 
The Grand Chamber lowered the threshold of ‘very exceptional circumstances’, which had 
appeared to require an imminent risk of dying. The Court noted that the applicant was not in 
an imminent danger of dying but ‘very exceptional circumstances’ should include instances 
where a person ‘would face a real risk, on the account of the absence of appropriate treatment 
in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment of being exposed to a serious, 
rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a 
significant reduction of life expectancy’.92  
Article 3, however, has its limitations in protecting individuals from harm, some of these arising 
from the Article itself, and others relating to how human rights law operates. There is a carefully 
crafted body of jurisprudence which delimits the scope of the Article.93 Whereas all conduct 
falling within its ambit is absolutely prohibited, harmful conduct can take place which is not 
deemed to reach the threshold of the provision and therefore is permitted under human rights 
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law. For example, we can see the Court set parameters on the protection of individuals in the 
case of Rahimi v Greece,94 where the Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR regarding the 
detention of foreign children, but not for adults. The Court pointed out the applicant’s ‘extreme 
vulnerability’ as an unaccompanied minor, yet the camp was noted to be ‘filthy beyond 
description’ and ‘a health hazard for staff and detainees alike’, due to overcrowding and 
extremely poor sanitary conditions. In cases where harms have been committed, but do not 
reach the threshold of Article 3, it is very regrettable that defendant states are, in a sense, 
exonerated – this is a further drawback to the operation of the Article.  
Furthermore, given the scale of human rights issues facing migrants and refugees, we can 
say with certainty that human rights law has failed them. In a wider sense, migrants face daily 
human rights issues and abuses in detention, and in the journeys that they make. Given that 
human rights law is supposed to protect the most vulnerable, this illustrates its clear failure as 
a body of law. When the Court has got involved, it has fallen short. This was no more evident 
when the ECtHR were asked to allow migrants who had been travelling from Libya but had 
been rescued by the search and rescue vessel SeaWatch 3, to disembark in Italy. At that time 
there were serious concerns for the health of the migrants, some of whom including minors.95 
In its decision,96 the ECtHR did not grant the applicant’s requests to be disembarked, but 
rather asked Italy ‘to take all necessary measures, as soon as possible, to provide all the 
applicants with adequate medical care, food, water and basic supplies as necessary’ and to 
provide legal guardianship for minors. Therefore, while it was clear that the migrants needed 
to disembark on safe and dry land, that they could not stay at sea continually and Italy was 
where they were seeking safe refuge, the Court upheld the state’s request to prevent 
disembarkation. Later the captain of SeaWatch 3 was exonerated after she was arrested for 
disembarking the ship at Lampedusa.97 
From an operational perspective, Article 3 is also limited in its ability to protect individuals by 
how it is applied by the Court. Traditionally Article 3 has operated on a largely ‘declaratory’ 
basis where breaches of the Article are found, published in the Court’s reports, and States are 
named and shamed into compliance.98 Although compensation is awarded under Article 41 of 
the Convention, monies awarded are designed to cover pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages, therefore the amounts awarded are unlikely to have any deterrent effect on the 
conduct of States.99 The Court can also only operate when cases, or more recently, advisory 
opinions, are brought to it, although it should be noted that positive obligations arising from 
some of the Articles provide means through which some issues can be addressed on a less 
reactive basis. For example, it has been established that there is a duty to investigate under 
the procedural head of Article 3, which creates positive obligations for the state to create 
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sanctions and provide mechanisms through which individuals can be prosecuted with the view 
to the potential for punishment.100  
Human rights law also has the potential, as many critical legal scholars point out, of crowding 
out other means of addressing harms, whether these might be political methods or otherwise. 
David Kennedy, for example, argues that human rights law occupies too large a space in 
advancing freedoms, to the detriment of other emancipatory strategies.101 Sometimes other 
strategies will be much more effective. The Court is cognisant of its limitations. For example, 
in the case of J.R. v Greece102 it noted in mitigation to finding no violation to Article 3 (in 
addition to a lack of evidence that the conditions of detention were poor, as well as the brevity 
of the detention) the exceptional and sharp increase in migratory flows in Greece which had 
created organisational, logistical and structural difficulties for the State. Under these 
conditions, it might be inferred, finding a breach of Article 3 was unlikely to have any effect on 
the state being able to respond to improving conditions of detention. Therefore, other 
strategies were required.  
One relatively recent, and potentially radical, addition to the armoury of the European Court is 
the pilot judgment procedure. This procedure was developed as a technique of identifying 
structural problems underlying repetitive cases against many countries and imposing an 
obligation on states to address those problems. If the Court receives several applications with 
the same root cause it can select one of these for a pilot judgment to seek to remedy the 
underlying issue.103 The process has been codified in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Court,104 and 
has been used to address issues with conditions of inhuman and degrading conditions of 
detention in Ananyev and others v Russia105 and Torreggiani and others v Italy.106 Once a pilot 
judgment decision has been made, where a breach has been found, it is up to the Committee 
of Ministers to oversee the execution of the judgment – should that mean supervising the 
amelioration of conditions of detention, for example, or a change in the law. Therefore, the 
pilot judgment procedure can be used as a means of creating obligations to improve human 
rights.  
In respect to the protection of migrants, a pilot judgment could be made aimed at improving 
conditions in detention camps, such as Moria, in Lesvos in Greece. However, as outlined 
previously, the ability of the Court to respond to harms rests on cases being brought before it 
– in respect of the pilot judgment procedure it rests on many cases being brought by different 
individuals – and it rests on the willingness and ability of the State in question to comply with 
the judgment. Therefore, while the procedure has potentialities for the protection of migrants, 
it carries with it many of the limitations of the Court itself. Nevertheless, there is the potential 
that the pilot judgment procedure could be utilised to more effective means. This is an area 
where the Court could attempt to find more radical and innovative ways of protecting people 
from harm.  
9. Conclusion 
In the 50 years since the Greek case Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
has evolved in a variety of ways. Its remit has expanded, and it is now being utilised in an 
increasingly wide range of cases. It has also set its parameters, giving us some guidance as 
to the threshold between acceptable and unacceptable conduct and delimiting cases where it 
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can be applied. The Court has also provided examples of forms of harmful conduct which 
might be acceptable under Article 3, for instance, solitary confinement in a regulated 
environment. The European Court is now able to deploy a potentially radical new power, 
through the pilot procedure, which can enable the supervision of changes to systemic issues. 
This could allow the Court to supervise the amelioration of the protection of individuals, such 
as the improvement of conditions of detention for migrants.  
This chapter has provided a snapshot of 50 years of judgments under the provision. It has 
traced some of its developments and its limitations, including how the concept of ‘dignity’ is 
now being used by the Court. It has also discussed the different definitions under the provision, 
regarding torture, inhumanity and degradation, seeking to argue that debates concerning how 
harms are defined under the article will always be inadequate. These judgments have 
undoubtedly led to the improvement of human rights standards. Nevertheless, torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment are still widespread in the Council of 
Europe, particularly in the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe faces an uncertain future 
as the human rights of individuals are under increasing attack – particularly those of migrants 
fleeing war and persecution. This chapter finishes in the hope that Article 3 can be continued 
to be deployed in new and more innovative ways to prevent harms committed against the 







The Triumph of International Law: The Clash of Ideas That 




International law has never been more relevant. It touches every corner of the globe and it 
even extends beyond Earth’s atmosphere and into space. It regulates relations between 
states, between states and their populations, between states and international organization, 
and between any combination of these actors. The international system is a multi-level 
juggernaut juggling multiple communities, multiple loyalties and multiple legitimacies.  
In this Chapter, I will talk about the two broad intellectual ideas that have shaped the 
international order since World War II. They have also brought it at a tipping point, where these 
two ideas are trying to force a change that they cannot fully accomplish. The result of this 
could be a long-term status quo, an impulse for renewed regionalisation of international 
relations and a decline in transregional relations.  
 
1. Introduction 
International law has never been more relevant, but it is also at a tipping point. After the firm 
conviction that a liberal world order1 was coming into existence in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
things stalled by the end of the 2010s. Freedom House, a USA-based NGO, has tracked the 
state of freedom in the world for the past 40 years. In its 2020 report2 it marked the fourteenth 
year in which more countries declined in their freedom rankings than improved. It is not just 
the ‘usual suspects’ of Russia, China or Saudi Arabia contributing to this state of affairs. 
Countries that were previously thought of as having completed their liberal democratic 
transformation, like Hungary or Poland, are experimenting with a system of illiberal 
democracy3 where, while there may be regular and somewhat free elections, the system can 
certainly not be described in any sense as liberal. They cannot be considered liberal because 
they have purposefully eroded the foundations of a liberal state, such as certain equality rights, 
like gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, or minority rights, as well as the systemic guarantees 
usually found in liberal democracies, like independent media or courts.  
 
1 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’ (1999) 25 Review 
of International Studies 179; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of Liberal International Order?’ (2018) 94 International 
Affairs 7. 
2 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy’, (Freedom House 2020), 
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf> accessed 02 
October 2020.  
3 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 22.  
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But this essay is not about the domestic changes4 that have happened across the globe, 
although they are connected. This essay is about the changes that occurred in the 
international system, to which the rise of populism and illiberal democracies are partially a 
reaction. It is about three possible scenarios: the first where the international system will revert 
to a system of great power politics, something akin to the 19 Century post-Congress of Vienna 
system5 with modern style governance attached. The second scenario is a truly liberal 
international order, where the status of the individual, their liberty, rights and the satisfaction 
of their needs, will be a guiding principle of a global public order. Finally, there is a third 
scenario where the current state of ‘neither here nor there’ may continue for some time, but 
the structural legitimacy problems in the international system for liberal democracies will 
persist and continue to create problems for the domestic balance of powers set up by liberal 
constitutions.  
So, what are these legitimacy problems? In short, the current system of global governance 
gives the executive branch of national governments mechanisms to circumvent domestic 
deliberation and accountability. It alters the balance of liberal constitutional protections in 
favour of the executive.6 For illiberal democracies and outright authoritarian regimes this is not 
a problem, they are not really concerned with accountability, representation and voice. But for 
liberal democracies, it is. In order for liberal democratic countries to safeguard their domestic 
constitutional balance, they will need either to make the international order reflect liberal 
democratic values, or re-shape it so that they have veto power if not control, over the 
governance of world affairs. This is not an easy thing to accomplish given the urgent need to 
tackle existential threats to humanity such as climate change or nuclear proliferation.  
Unfortunately, liberal democracies may no longer have the hard or soft power to bring either 
of those scenarios into being and, consequently, we may be headed for a longer status quo: 
a situation where things continue as they are, and where neither vision of the international 
system has enough support to become the new international order. A frozen international law 
if you will. By this I do not mean that substantive norms will not change, they will, but rather I 
mean that the norms that create the fundamental shape of the system, the basic rules of the 
game, will not change simply because no one side has enough power to change them. In this 
prolonged status quo, things continue to function much as they do now, albeit with less focus 
on issues such as rights and democracy, and more focus on issues such as security, free 
trade and possibly climate change. There will be incentives to maintain and deepen regional 
political and economic organizations. However, there will be a difference of the types of 
regional arrangements that will be created or strengthened. The European Union/European 
Community as well as the Council of Europe models will fall out of favour, and the Association 
of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) centred around China or the new Eurasian Economic Union 
centred around Russia will be the blueprints of this new regionalism. There will still be ongoing 
trade relations or security cooperation between the regions – there will not be a return to a 
Cold War type of scenario. Nevertheless, it will be a far cry from the liberal world order that 
early liberal scholars advocated for7 and what liberal democracies need.  
 
4 For more on the current challenges that democratic systems face see: Jamie Bartlett, The People Vs Tech: How 
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5 For one account of the Congress of Vienna (Concert of Europe) system see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon 
& Schuster 1994) 78 – 103. 
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Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ 
(2006) 44 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 533.  
7 For an example of this line of thought see Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2009); Jack Goldsmith 




That said, to get to where we are and chart a course of where we are going, it is useful to 
know where we started. The current affairs are a result of the push and pull of two strands of 
thought, classicist ideal and a liberal ideal of international law. Simpson has called these 
strands the ‘two liberalisms’, as they are both a version of liberalism, one 
procedural/formal/neutral, the other one substantive.8 Consequently, I will first write about the 
classic international law master narrative – the short, simple story that we tell ourselves about 
how the system works. I will then describe how this narrative fails to account for the mounting 
changes through the words of those who have been alarmed by the changes, lamented its 
change, or rebelled against the new upstart order in the last 50 years. I will then present the 
narratives that pushed for creating a substantive liberal world order, intensifying after the end 
of the Cold War. It is these two forces, the classical and the progressive, that have shaped the 
current system. In closing, I will give an outline of the possible ways in which the current 
dilemma can be resolved. 
There is one more caveat: in writing about these issues I have had to paint these narratives 
and events in broad brush strokes. They span decades and some of the things that the voices 
I present here have said would happen did not happen nor, with hindsight, were likely to 
happen. What I try to present here are broad examples of schools of thought that have shaped 
the current system. Consequently, the arguments presented lose their nuance, or they seem 
obvious. But they are, the justifications, fears or arguments of their generation, at times 
repeating the arguments from a different generation, trying to make them succeed when the 
conditions for that success have long passed or were yet to emerge.  
2. The Master-narrative of the international system 
So, what is a master-narrative? It is a short simple story about how the system works. All legal 
systems have a master-narrative and it produces the self-conception of what the actors do in 
the system – what their role and purpose is. It is a story about the system itself; ‘a governing 
underlying narrative that each legal system tells itself – more and less openly – about why it 
is constructed the way it is, why it operates as it does, and why this makes good sense.’9 It 
paints the system in broad and simple brush strokes (the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty; the 
USA’s balance of power with checks and balances; Germany’s cooperative federalism) and 
mostly it is unaware of the paradoxes contained within it – or chooses to ignore them. After 
all, human beings can live with quite a lot of cognitive dissonance.10 
Klabbers calls this master-narrative the theory under which international lawyers operate, 
regardless of whether they see the international system as ‘a tool for states[persons]’, as the 
‘handmaiden of global capitalism’, or a ‘hope for the poor and oppressed’.11 It is a set of ‘ideas 
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and assumptions about what the function of international law is.’12 When it comes to the 
international system, the key assumption is the centrality of states. International law is 
generally thought of as a bundle of norms governing international relations – and not all 
international relations, but the relations between states. The buying and selling of goods by 
private entities that cross borders is an example of international relations, but it is not governed 
by public international law, because it does not have a public component. 
Probably the most obvious place where we can find the master-narrative of international law 
is in the story of its sources, where the assumption about the centrality of states is key to their 
structure and validity. The international system is seen as a system of anarchy, as opposed 
to hierarchy – there is no central legislator and no central authority that can perform the law-
making and law application functions typically found in national legal systems. Consequently, 
all sources of international law must be traced back to the consent of the states. Therefore 
treaties, custom, and general principles of law are sources of law; judicial decisions and the 
writings of scholars, on the other hand, are subsidiary means for determining the rules of law.13 
The feature that divides them is that the former are created by states, while the latter are 
reports of the existence of law already created by states. An international court cannot be a 
source of law – cannot create law, merely discover it in the actions of states.  
International courts and commentators go out of their way to show that an international norm 
is a product of state consent. The traditional account says that international treaties are 
negotiated and drafted by state representatives, and states are the only legal actors that can 
be parties to them, whether by signature or ratification.14 International treaties are where state 
consent is most clearly visible, as the process to their conclusion is a lengthy one and the final 
instruments of consent quite formalised. The situation is similar with international custom, 
which represents consistent general practice (of states) coupled with opinio juris, the belief (of 
states) that the practice is accepted or required as a matter of law.15 Since the creation of 
custom is a gradual process, international law has built in a safety valve, the persistent 
objector rule, whereby a state that observes the creation of a custom can object to the 
custom’s application to itself and can thus ‘block the formation of rights [and obligations] vis-
à-vis others’.16 
Consequently, international law has created a convenient rule of thumb regarding the freedom 
of states to act, first underlined in the PCIJ’s Lotus case,17 a dispute about whether Turkey 
could extend its jurisdiction to cover crimes committed against its nationals abroad. The PCIJ, 
by the deciding vote of the president of the court, said that international law  
leaves them … a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain 
cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.18 
In essence, the Lotus principle is a handy heuristic device: states are free to act unless there 
is a prohibitive rule preventing states from taking that action or a mandatory rule that they must 
follow requiring a specific action in a specific situation. In the case of the SS Lotus, Turkey 
was entitled to prescribe extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction in its criminal code; however, it 
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was prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction on another state’s territory without that state’s 
permission.19 
3. The Fear of a Changing World 
3.1 Lamenting Change in International Law  
International lawyers are, or were, by nature a bit traditionalist. It should not come as a surprise 
for a profession that collates decades, sometimes centuries of examples of state practice in 
order to determine what the law is. This is to say not that international lawyers were not at the 
forefront of radical change in thinking about the nature of the international system, either in 
the past20 or in the present,21 but that our praxis has not changed much when wearing the 
international lawyer’s hat.22  
Nevertheless, change we do, and much of the argument in this Chapter is about the current 
situation that is the result of the struggle between the two main thoughts in international law. 
The first line of thought sees international law as law created by states and for the purpose of 
regulating their relations, while the second sees it as an extension of liberal law and politics, 
constraining power while allowing the individual to live free. This section will outline some of 
the arguments for the first view by presenting the protagonists’ fear of the second.   
3.2 The Fear from the Bench  
The Lotus principle might be the high-water mark of the classical account of international law, 
and the last 50 years have seen changes that have upended this classical account of the 
centrality of states. An early indication of the change that was to come to international law, as 
well as the reasons why it needed to change, was the ICJ’s 1951 Advisory Opinion on 
reservations to the Genocide Convention.23 The Genocide Convention was the brainchild of 
Raphael Lemkin, who started advocating for the criminalisation of the destruction of an entire 
group while WWII was still raging.24 With the conclusion of the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention and the final vote in the UN General Assembly, his vision was at the cusp of being 
realised, when several states attached reservations during its signing and ratification, to which 
other states objected. The UN General Assembly asked the ICJ a number of questions on the 
consequence of the reservations and objections to the Genocide Convention’s membership. 
The case was argued at the time when the UN was coming into its own, getting increasingly 
involved into issues of peace and security, having established its functional subjectivity with 
the ICJ’s Reparations for Injuries25 advisory opinion. It was also a time when what came to be 
known as the Iron Curtain26 was beginning to take shape across Europe. There was a sense 
of great hope for a peaceful future, as well as gathering clouds imperilling that future.  
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Given this context the majority tried to take the middle line. The ICJ said that the nature of the 
convention in question, as well as the goal of ‘extensive participation of conventions of this 
type has given rise to a greater flexibility’27 in treaty making. The universal principle that the 
Genocide Convention protected, the fact that the ‘Convection was manifestly adopted for 
purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose’, that the ‘contracting States do not have any 
interests of their own’28 led the ICJ to conclude that ‘[i]t is inconceivable that the contracting 
parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation’29 should result with the 
diminished membership of the Convention. It also concluded that the states did not intend ‘to 
sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of a vain desire to secure as many 
participants as possible.’30 Consequently, ‘[t]he object and purpose of the Convention thus 
limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them.’31  
The dissenting judges did not agree with the ICJ’s assessment, either on the ambiguity or the 
trajectory of recent treaty making rules and practice, or on the reason for changing them. They 
restated the law then in place, namely that ‘[t]he consent of the parties is the basis of treaty 
obligations.’32 This applies regardless of the nature of the convention or the number of its 
participants. Should a state make a reservation, that state is not considered to be a party to 
the convention until all of the other parties at the time agree to that reservation. Otherwise, the 
treaty loses its integrity and devolves into a bundle of bilateral relations depending on which 
states accept which reservations. Should states wish to make a more flexible arrangement 
regarding the reservations regime, they can specify it in the convention itself during the 
negotiating period.33  
The way that the dissenting judges argued for their conclusion is very telling - they relied 
heavily on international law’s basic assumptions and put the consent of states centre-stage. 
For example, they looked at past treaty-making practice, giving example after example34 of 
the centrality of state consent to treaty obligations and to the integrity of the treaty, especially 
in the practice of the League of Nations. Furthermore, they consistently referred to the 
intentions of the parties, refusing to entertain that as a World Court they might have a different 
role than as vehicles for the parties intentions, refusing to entertain arguments regarding the 
speciality of the Genocide Convention or the specific moment in time of post WWII world re-
construction.35  
On the law and practice of treaty-making they were right. Moreover, they were right on the 
consequences of the opinion when they said that they have a  
difficulty in finding a criterion which will establish the uniqueness of this 
Convention and will differentiate it from the other humanitarian conventions 
which have been, or will be, negotiated under the auspices of the United 
Nations.36 
Yet, the Genocide Convention’s treaty making process became the norm for the way that most 
of the important multilateral conventions were drafted in the last 50 years.37 While being right 
on the law, the dissenting judges were wrong regarding their timing because they could not 
 
27 ibid 21. 
28 ibid 23. 
29 ibid 24. 
30 ibid.  
31 ibid.  
32 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo, Reservations to the Convention on 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, 15, 31 – 32. 
33 ibid 37. 
34 ibid, 32 – 42.  
35 ibid, 46 – 47. 
36 ibid, 47. 
37 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press 2005). 
73 
 
see an international order beyond an international regime which had states as its central 
actors.  
In 1975 another quiet revolution was taking place at the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). For Europe, 1975 saw the finalisation of a two-year process of negotiation between 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO members regarding peace, security, and cooperation in Europe. 
This resulted in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act 1975, a mostly political document which 
proved to be ‘a turning point in the Cold War.’38 Crucially, it confirmed the obligation of states 
to respect human rights as inherent of a person’s human dignity and especially ‘the right […] 
to know and act upon [ones] rights and duties’.39 This provision was used by dissident 
movements in the Warsaw Pact countries to resist communist oppression, such as the network 
of national Helsinki Committees and the Solidarity movement in Poland. The 1970s was also 
the period when the enthusiasm for rights litigation and rights discourse was maturing and 
where the examples of the Warren Court’s bold decisions were becoming more accepted in 
the public’s mind. 
This is the background against which the case of Golder v UK40 was argued. The ECtHR was 
asked to decide, among other things, whether Article 6 protected the right of access to courts. 
The problem for the ECtHR was that even though the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) had several provisions dealing with what happened once one managed to get to a 
court,41 the right to go to court was never specified by a single provision. Consequently, the 
ECtHR had to improvise and said that  
It would be inconceivable … that Article 6 para. 1 should describe in detail the 
procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not 
first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such 
guarantees, that is, access to a court. The fair, public and expeditious 
characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are no judicial 
proceedings.42 
While it might have been inconceivable to the majority, the dissenting minority certainly could 
conceive of such a thing, and this is largely due to the way that they saw their place and 
function in the international system. Judge Fitzmaurice was the most open in the explanation 
of his motives. He said that  
There is a considerable difference between the case of ‘law-giver’s law’ edicted 
in the exercise of sovereign power, and law based on convention, itself the 
outcome of a process of agreement, and limited to what has been agreed, or 
can properly be assumed to have been agreed.43 
For him, in the latter instances a greater ‘interpretational restraint’ was required where a 
‘convention should not be construed as providing for more than it contains’.44 Consequently, 
the only inferences that could be made as to rights or norms outside of what was expressly 
provided in the convention were inferences that were necessary for the operation of those 
rights or norms. Therefore, ‘the necessary, and the only necessary inferential element lies in 
the assumption […] that legal proceedings of some kind have been started and are in 
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progress,’45 and not that there is a wholesale guarantee of the right to access to court. 
Moreover, when speaking for the proper function of the ECtHR in the Convention system he 
said that  
it is for the States upon whose consent the Convention rests, and from which 
consent alone it derives its obligatory force, to close the gap or put the defect 
right by an amendment, - not for a judicial tribunal to substitute itself for the 
convention-makers, to do their work for them … [otherwise] freedom of action 
will have been impaired.46 
It is not that Judge Fitzmaurice was a pejorative legal formalist strictly wanting to adhere to 
the letter of the Convention – if anything, his reasoning was motivated by a sense of protecting 
the continued existence of the ECtHR when it was just starting to gain acceptance. At the time, 
most member states had a time-limited declaration accepting the individual complaints 
mechanism, which was usually renewed every three years. Fitzmaurice made his concerns 
plain in his dissent, saying that it was necessary ‘to bear in mind not only that [Article 6] is a 
provision embodied in an instrument depending for its force upon the agreement - and indeed 
the continuing support - of governments’.47 In addition, it was also ‘an instrument of a very 
special kind’48 – a human rights convention that only had the American Convention on Human 
Rights, as a companion. Moreover, Fitzmaurice argued that human rights conventions ‘have 
broken entirely new ground internationally, making heavy inroads on some of the most 
cherished preserves of governments in the sphere of their domestic jurisdiction or domaine 
réservé’.49 What Fitzmaurice was talking about was the possibility to lodge individual 
complaints and ‘(in effect) sue [one’s] own governments before an international commission 
or tribunal, - something that, even as recently as thirty years ago, would have been regarded 
as internationally inconceivable.’50 Judge Fitzmaurice was writing in 1975, referring to the 
period of shortly after WWII, regarding something that is so ubiquitous in liberal democracies 
today the we do not pay too much attention to its existence.  
Consequently, these and similar considerations ‘could justify even a somewhat restrictive 
interpretation of the Convention’, but nevertheless, they ‘positively do demand, a cautious and 
conservative interpretation’51 of the ECHR. For Fitzmaurice, this is especially true of unclear 
or uncertain provisions ‘where extensive constructions might have the effect of imposing upon 
the contracting States obligations they had not really meant to assume, or would not have 
understood themselves to be assuming’.52 Therefore ‘[a]ny serious doubt must … be resolved 
in favour of, rather than against, the government concerned.’53  
Judge Fizmaurice’s fears that expansive interpretation would alienate states did not come to 
pass. States continued to engage with the ECtHR and to renew their declarations accepting 
individual petition before the court. Should the majority have heeded his advice, the 
international system would have looked quite different than it does today. Unlike the dissenting 
judges in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention, the dissenting judges in the 
Golder case were aware of, even astonished at, the changing nature of international law. 
Verdross for example, another dissenting judge in Golder, was an early champion of the notion 
of peremptory norms in international law and the idea of an international community, and in 
his writings on ius cogens, included basic human rights as one them.54 It was not that the 
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dissenting judges were sceptical of the need for states to observe and protect human rights, 
it is more that they were, in some way, classicist in their view of the fundamental assumptions 
of international law, and they saw the change happening before their eyes as too rapid. It is 
for this reason that they did  
not consider it permissible to extend, by means of an interpretation depending on 
clues, the framework of the clearly stated rights and freedoms. Considerations of 
legal certainty too make this conclusion mandatory: the States which have 
submitted to supervision by the Commission and Court in respect of ‘certain’ 
rights and freedoms ‘defined’ (définis) in the Convention ought to be sure that 
those bounds will be strictly observed.55 
Ultimately, their decision meant that it was states, their intentions and rights that were at stake 
here, and states are thought to be jealous in guarding their prerogatives. If individuals were to 
participate in this space, they need to be patient and wait a bit longer, at least that’s what they 
though. 
3.3 The Fear of Change in the Eyes of Scholars  
Judges were not the only ones who recognised and protested at the changing nature of 
international law. Scholars also bemoaned the messiness that the new approaches to 
international law brought to the issues of the validity of norms – the boundary between law 
and non-law. Prosper Weil’s seminal argument warning about the growing ‘relative normativity 
in international law’56 exemplifies this lament.  
Weil, writing at the beginning of the 1980’s, and mindful of the sharp ideological divides that 
exist between the capitalist West and the communist East, starts his argument by giving an 
account of the nature of international law. In this account he described international law as ‘an 
aggregate of legal norms that dictate what its subjects must do (prescriptive norms), must not 
do (prohibitive norms), or may do (permissive norms)’,57 and its functions – ‘governing 
international relations’.58 The nature and functions of international law are ‘interdependent’ – 
the ‘emergence of international law as a “normative order” is said to be due to the need to fulfil 
certain functions’  and it will not be able to fulfil these functions unless ‘it constitutes a 
normative order of good quality.’59 That is the crux of the matter for Weil since ‘without norms 
of good quality international law would become a defective tool.’60 His prime targets in the 
paper are soft law and jus cogens, which through their operation blur the normative threshold61 
between law and non-law. 
He explains that soft law can take the form of reports, resolutions or other similar documents 
created by international organizations. Some soft laws are a product of inputs by states via 
voting mechanisms by state representatives, resolutions, and this sociologically can be ‘an 
expression of trends, intentions, wishes, [and] may well constitute an important stage in the 
process of elaborating international norms; … However, such mechanisms do not constitute 
the formal source of new norms.’62 Just because certain prescriptions are repeated in multiple 
resolutions, they cannot become hard law any more than ‘thrice nothing [can] make 
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something.’63 This matters because it undermines what international law is for which is: ‘to 
ensure the coexistence – in peace, if possible; in war, if necessary – and the cooperation of’ 
different entities in a pluralistic society which live in a system of anarchy.64 International law, 
according to Weil, has two functions in this system: to ‘reduce anarchy through the elaboration 
of norms of conduct enabling orderly relations to be established among sovereign and equal 
states’, and, in tension to the first, ‘to serve the common aims of the members of the 
international community.’65 
Moreover, for Weil, the necessity for international law to fulfil these functions did not change 
or diminish after WWII and ‘there could be no grater error than to contrast ‘modern’ […] with 
‘classic’ international law.’66 In that sense, international law’s functions continue to be as they 
ever were, ‘an instrument for the regulation of pluralistic, heterogeneous society.’67 
Consequently, if international law was to maintain its double function it wold have to remain 
neutral and positivistic. Neutral because it needed to be impartial in a pluralistic international 
order. Consequently, it was ‘necessary for that system [of norms] to be perceived as a self-
contained, self-sufficient world’68, separate from a specific system of normativity, such as 
religious morality, or a specific ideology (at the time when Weil was writing the dominant 
ideologies were communism and capitalism). And it needed to be positivistic because it 
required to maintain the distinction between lex lata (the law as it exists) and lex ferenda 
(future law/law that should be) if it wanted to remain a ‘neutral coordinator between equal, but 
disparate, entities’69. And for Weil, positivistic meant keeping the centrality of voluntarism, of 
basing international norms on the consent of the states. Especially  
[a]t a time when international society needs more than ever a normative order 
capable of ensuring the peaceful coexistence, and cooperation in diversity, of 
equal and equally sovereign entities, the waning of voluntarism in favour of the 
ascendancy of some, neutrality in favour of ideology, positivity in favour of ill-
defined values might well destabilize the whole international normative system 
and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose.70  
Weil was writing in July1983, adapting a previous version written in the French language in 
1982. When Weil was writing, the USSR had invaded Afghanistan three years prior, and the 
United States was starting to increase its assistance to the Mujahedeen fighting them. In 
March of that same year US President Ronald Regan announced the Star Wars program, a 
proposed missile defence system that would, if successful, jeopardise the perceived stability 
of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine for a nuclear war. It was a time of 
heightened tensions between the two dominant nuclear-armed blocs, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact, ‘a time when international society [needed] more than ever a normative order capable 
of ensuring the peaceful coexistence, and cooperation in diversity, of equal and equally 
sovereign entities’.71 He saw the rise of instruments that had no tangible norms to them but 
were strewn with aspirational political language that did not allow for easy, or even difficult, 
understanding of what norms they were trying to create or specify. This language of politics, 
of aspiration, found in documents that did not embody norms, but were somehow legal at the 
same time, was not the language of law as he knew it and if it took over it would jeopardise 
international law’s purpose – to maintain coexistence in a plural society. He was fearful that 
‘the waning of voluntarism in favour of the ascendancy of some, neutrality in favour of ideology, 
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positivity in favour of ill-defined values might well destabilize the whole international normative 
system’.72 It is just that this plural society was a society of states, and he could not distance 
himself far enough to see beyond the intellectual trope of statehood, the inside/outside divide, 
rather than, for example, imagine a more cosmopolitan system where statehood is but one 
factor in global relations and just one criteria in participating in rule-making. 
3.4 The Fear by National Governments  
The wish for a return to days gone by of classical thinking about the international system did 
not end in the 1980s nor with the coming of the new millennium. On March 13, 2012 an unusual 
event occurred. The President of the ECtHR, Sir Nicholas Bratza, gave evidence before the 
UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights on the topic of human rights judgments.73 
Between the time that Weil published his fears and when this session of the Joint Committee 
convened, both Weil’s fears of blurring the normative threshold and Judge Fitzmaurice’s 
apprehension of the expansion of power and reach of the ECtHR were realised. Judges made 
law and resolutions and other soft law became instrumental in creating international norms 
and institutions. The UN Security Council created no less than three international criminal 
tribunals which accelerated the creation of international criminal norms and more than twenty 
international tribunals were in operation, their dockets and influence increasing daily.74 Sir 
Nicholas was asked to give testimony regarding the controversy over the UK’s commitment to 
upholding ECtHR judgments following the prisoners’ voting rights cases75 and in the 
preparation of the coming Brighton declaration on the future role of the court.  
The committee began with a soft question: whether Sir Nicholas, as the President of the 
ECtHR, saw much benefit to be gained by the continuation of dialogue between the court and 
the different parliaments of the member states of the ECHR. Sir Nicholas, whilst being 
supportive  of dialogue between the court and national parliaments, admitted that ‘when one 
speaks of dialogue, one more naturally refers to exchanges of views and ideas between the 
Strasbourg Court and judges of the national courts.’76 With his opening answers Sir Nicholas 
established one of his prime defences against most of the objections that the ECtHR’s 
detractors in the UK Parliament would pose – we are no different in the way that we use law, 
the way that we interpret, and the way that we reason from any other national high court. The 
reason for this was that ‘national judges are natural partners in the sense that their role is […] 
essentially the same as ours—namely to interpret and apply the Convention rights.’77  
For the detractors, this was the main issue since for them the ECtHR is quite different from a 
national high court – it is an international court. Echoing the concerns of Judges Fitzmourice 
and Verdross, Dominic Raab (currently the Foreign Secretary) asked: since ‘Article 32 of the 
Convention mandates the Court to “interpret” and “apply” rights set out in the Convention 
[w]hich article mandates the Court to update those rights to reflect its view of societal 
changes?’78  Follow-up questions did not go any better, after Sir Nicholas’ explanation on the 
similarity between national courts and the ECtHR. Mr Raab again asked that if Sir Nicholas 
‘accept[s] there is a creative function [of the ECtHR then] can I put it to you that there is a 
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fundamental difference with the common law?’79 In another question Mr Virendra Sharma (MP) 
asked ‘[d]o you accept that there are serious questions about the separation of powers and 
democratic accountability raised by the doctrine of the living instrument?80’   
To all and more of these questions, Sir Nicholas’s answers were similar: ‘just like the 
development of the common law, our development has equally been incremental’;81 the living 
instrument doctrine ‘means simply that when interpreting Convention rights you accept that 
those rights evolve with a change in time and with a change in social conditions’;82 or that ‘[i]t 
does not seem to me that the interpretive exercise that we carry out is different in substance 
from the role of national courts, either in developing the common law or indeed in updating 
statutes, …, to make them fit modern conditions’;83 and that ‘safeguards are there to prevent 
any rapid and arbitrary development of the Convention rights.’84 
It was not a discussion destined to convince either side, for they were talking from two different 
assumptions about the changing nature of the Convention, of the ECtHR, and of international 
law. This is well demonstrated in Letsas’ paper Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation.85 
When talking about the margin of appreciation doctrine as adopted by the ECtHR, Letsas 
differentiates between two concepts of the doctrine: the substantive and the structural. The 
former encapsulates some form of a formal or substantive rights theory which includes a notion 
of conditional deference to other co-equal branches of the system, while the latter understands 
it as a ‘feature of a supranational judicial system, designed to balance the sovereignty of the 
Contracting States with the need to secure protection of the rights embodied in the 
Convention.’86  
In the former case, the methodologies that the ECtHR uses are constitutional rights 
methodologies, the most obvious being the proportionality test, a doctrine developed in 
Germany and a staple of the German Constitutional Court,87 and its main use is as a tool for 
balancing public interest with individual rights. In the latter case, the structural approach, a 
decision of an international court is a zero sum game: any extension in the norms that the 
international court can interpret and apply is a sovereignty loss, (while it would be a power gain 
in the international institutions’ ledger), one that has to be justified using the original consent 
of the states to be bound by such a system and especially by such rules of the game. 
Consequently, Raab’s question as to ‘[w]hich article mandates the Court to update those rights 
to reflect its view of societal changes?’88 None or all of the articles depending on your starting 
assumptions. For the former, the substantive argument, this is all part of the background 
assumptions of what a court does – especially an apex court conducting constitutional or rights 
review. For the structural approach, the living instrument doctrine is an overreach and an over 
ambitious use of power by an unaccountable international institution, disregarding the original 
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argument in 2012 as the ones Fitzmaurice and Verdross made in 1975, more than 37 years 
ago.  
Before I go on to describing the present situation of the international system and the 
predicament in which international law finds itself, I will first outline another, also somewhat 
unsuccessful, intellectual thought that drove the change in the international system. The 
system finds itself in its present predicament because two intellectual forces pushed it in 
opposite directions: one, reactionary, hoping to freeze international law in its classical form, 
and the other trying to transform it into a version of ‘humanity’s law’.89 
4. The Hope of Humanity’s Law 
It was not long after WWII started that the hope for humanizing the international system 
emerged. Raphael Lemkin and Herch Lauterpacht were writing their treatises on post-war 
visions of international law, and Lemkin’s vision of a special international crime of Genocide90 
became a reality, when the UN opened the Genocide convention for ratification in 1948. Which 
brings us to the other dissenting opinion91 in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on reservations to the 
Genocide Convention. The first group of dissenters saw the majority opinion as an extension 
of judicial power and an impermissible abandonment of the centrality of state consent to the 
creation of new international law. On the other hand, Judge Alvarez saw it as an unsatisfactory 
and timid half-step. He did not mince words about his vision of the future of international law, 
the proper role of the UN and the ICJ in this new environment, and the place of conventions 
and state consent in this new law-making dynamic.  
After summarising the majority’s opinion he went on to say that ‘in the future, we shall be forced 
to abandon traditional criteria, because we are now confronted with an international situation 
very different from that which existed before the last social cataclysm.’92 Consequently, ‘it is 
necessary that the Court should determine the present state of law in each case which is 
brought before it and, when needed, act constructively in this respect’;93 ‘constructively’ in this 
sense means law-making when necessary. He explains that doing otherwise would ‘fail to 
understand the nature of international law, which must always reflect the international life of 
which it is born, if it is not to be discredited’94, a living law if not a living instrument. Furthermore, 
the proper method or mode of thinking for the ICJ was that of ‘domestic constitutional law’.95 
Therefore, when ‘upon a revolution, a new republican political régime establishes itself in the 
place of a monarchy, it is obvious that both old and new institutions must at once be applied 
and interpreted in conformity with the new régime.’96 
Moreover,  
There are stronger reasons why the same course should be followed in regard 
to international law. After the social cataclysm which we have just passed 
through, a new order has arisen and, with it, a new international law. We must 
therefore apply and interpret both old and new institutions in conformity with 
both this new order and this new law.97 
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Judge Alvarez was of course talking about WWII when he referred to a social cataclysm, the 
first time that nuclear weapons were used against other human beings. He goes on to limit his 
approach and argues that not all international conventions should be subject to this approach, 
only ‘multilateral conventions of a special character’98 such as those that establish international 
organizations, those that are deemed to establish public order like conventions that determine 
the territorial status of states, those ‘which seek to establish new and important principles of 
international law’, and those that ‘regulate matters of a social or humanitarian interest with a 
view to improving the position of individuals.’99 The difference between these types of 
conventions and ‘normal’ ones is that ‘they have a universal character; they are, in a sense, 
the Constitution of international society, the new international constitutional law.’100 Moreover 
unlike other conventions which are more reciprocal in nature, ‘[t]hey are not established for the 
benefit of private interests but for that of the general interest; they impose obligations upon 
States without granting them rights’101.  
Judge Alvarez also saw a crucial symbolic meaning behind the way that these new types of 
conventions were negotiated and concluded, by a majority vote in the UN General Assembly, 
compared to other ‘normal’ conventions. He saw this as the embodiment of the ideas of 
‘international organization, of the interdependence of States and of the general interest’.102 
Equivalent to a parliament but on a global scale, he saw this principle as a vehicle for a global 
democracy, where the votes in the General Assembly would represent a sort of general will in 
the spirit of Rousseau – ‘national sovereignty has to bow before the will of the majority by which 
this general interest is represented.’103 The General Assembly was, for Judge Alvarez, simply 
fulfilling a legislative function when voting on these types of conventions. Consequently,  
These conventions must be interpreted without regard to the past, and only with 
regard to the future. Nor must they be interpreted in the light of arguments drawn 
from domestic contract law, as their nature is entirely different.104 
For Judge Alvarez, their nature was to become the constitution of international law.  
Judge Alvarez’s vision did not fully come to pass, but the next forty years saw gradual 
developmental milestones towards that future. As Judge Fitzmaurice noted, slowly 
international human rights conventions, some under the UN auspices and some under regional 
arrangements, came into existence. More and more states signed up to them, and a large 
number also accepted the optional individual complaints mechanisms that Judge Fitzmaurice 
tried to preserve with his dissent. The International Law Commission worked on preparing a 
statute of an international court dealing with international crimes,105 work that later fed into the 
drafting of the International Criminal Court (ICC). No less important, the world decolonized, at 
least legally if not economically, expanding the number of states that made up the international 
system. Where once was a small club of 51 states pre-1945, there are now more than 193. A 
world of 51 states can run on interpersonal diplomacy, a world of 193 runs on rules and 
bureaucracy. Or it breaks down. 
It was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall that hopes of a new international system picked up full 
steam again. For example, in 1992 Fukuyama published his book The End of History,106 where 
he explored a possible future world order which, because of the end of humanity’s last 
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ideological struggle between liberal capitalism and communism, would be largely liberal 
capitalist, with a few holdovers; major ideological conflicts wold be very unlikely, while there 
still might be small conflicts or trade wars.107 For him, the struggle to define what it is to be 
modern was over.108 At the time when Fukuyama wrote his book, there was a general sense 
that this was the period when the world would become more open, more secure and more 
democratic, and there was some evidence to support this enthusiasm in the Freedom House 
annual reports, which showed large increases in freedom across the world in the 80’s and 
90’s.109 
For instance, in the same year, 1992, Thomas Franck published ‘The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance’, arguing that a new emerging law was ‘rapidly becoming […] a 
normative rule of the international system’.110 He argued that governments were increasingly 
coming to the recognition ‘that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative expectation 
of the community of states’, and that that expectation was that ‘those who seek the validation 
of the empowerment patently govern with the consent of the governed.’111 Franck believed that 
in the changing order of the post-Cold War world, democracy was ‘becoming a global 
entitlement’ of individuals, one that ‘will be promoted and protected by collective international 
processes.’112 He envisaged that the right to democratic governance (within states) would 
become a ‘requirement of international law, applicable to all and implemented through global 
standards’.113 
Franck was talking about the trend of international efforts in spreading democracy after a 
period of fierce ideological contestation over the proper form of political and economic systems. 
These efforts were not only championed by powerful democratic nations, but by international 
organizations like the UN, as part of their transitioning mechanisms from conflict or crisis to 
peace and stability.114 Moreover, as Franck saw, these norms were gradually being cemented 
into international treaty or customary norms through human rights treaties and courts, as well 
as activities on the part of the UN in peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions. Where 
Weil saw the rise of soft-law instruments as a threat to international law, Franck saw those 
same instruments ushering a new way of domestic governance, one that had the potential to 
bring about a stable and long-lasting democratic peace.115 In essence, he envisaged the 
reversal of the 1944-45 Dumbarton Oaks compromise on membership in the UN and the global 
community as dependent only on the peaceful intentions of a state, irrespective of its choice 
of economic and political system.116 Soon, only a democratic system would be an acceptable 
system of national governance and the UN would not be so ambiguous as to a state’s domestic 
make up. He was not that far off the mark. For instance, states declared in the 2005 World 
Summit’s final resolution that they ‘reaffirm[ed] that democracy is a universal value based on 
the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and 
cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives’ and also affirmed their 
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‘commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the 
principles and practices of democracy’.117  
The decade and a half following Franck’s article saw major developments towards his vision: 
the number of signatories of human rights conventions grew, as well as the number of 
democracies. The ICC was negotiated and established in 1998, following a slew of several ad 
hoc or hybrid international criminal tribunals. Universal jurisdiction was seen as more readily 
acceptable, albeit still politically sensitive.118 States were more willing to recognise the concept 
of humanitarian intervention into another state(s) territory under certain circumstances.  
I will take the example of humanitarian intervention, or more specifically the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) principle to illustrate this point. Following NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 
a debate about its legality started to gain traction. The Independent International Commission 
called it ‘illegal, but legitimate’:119 a necessary violation of state sovereignty for the purposes 
of preserving life and preventing international crimes. While armed intervention was nothing 
new in international relations,120 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter specifically prohibited member 
states from using in their international relations ‘the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the UN’.121 While this prohibition was one of the cornerstones of the post-Second 
World War consensus, the rise in non-international conflicts and in the capability of certain 
states to respond quickly to mass human rights violations put a strain on that consensus.  
As a response, Canada hosted an International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty whose report, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’,122 outlined the possibility of an 
emerging exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition. The report was not universally welcomed, 
especially by countries in the global South.123 Nevertheless, the UN picked up the report and, 
in the lead to the UN World Summit 2005, the Secretary General made an effort to make states 
accept some of the principles of R2P. While in the summit outcomes the states did not accept 
intervention as a principle, they did affirm the obligation of states to protect their populations 
from mass atrocities.124  
This was enough for the Secretary General to continue working on the issue, and in 2008 the 
Secretary General issued a Report on implementing R2P which constructed the obligations of 
states towards individuals in three pillars: ‘[p]illar one is the enduring responsibility of the State 
to protect its populations, … [p]illar two is the commitment of the international community to 
assist States in meeting those obligations, and [p]illar three is the responsibility of Member 
States to respond collectively’125 in cases where states do not meet the responsibilities of pillar 
one. Of course, the Secretary General also made it clear that the proper procedure for carrying 
out R2P was through the UN and especially the Security Council.126 
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This brings us to Humanity’s Law, the phrase that Ruti Teitel coined to describe the direction 
in which she saw international law move in the 1990s and 2000s. She argued that because of 
the developments in international human rights and their enforcement through international 
courts through individual petitions, the developments in humanitarian and international criminal 
law, and the rise of transitional justice as a peacebuilding mechanism, international law is 
moving away from the standard account of what the subject that it is supposed to regulate is, 
and who is it actually designed for. She observed that there was a ‘growing interconnection 
without integration’ in a world where ‘power is exceptionally fragmented and disorganized – 
[… or put differently] very complexly diffused.’127 In this structure, humanity’s law ‘affords a 
language and a framework that [is] capable of recognizing the claims and interests of multiple 
actors in preservation and security, both individual and collective.’128 It strives for ‘a basis for 
legitimacy that is derived from humanitarian values and concepts of humanity rights and human 
security.’129  
Unfortunately, it was not to be. In the previous two sections, I portrayed the two broad forces 
that have dominated the development of international law and the international system since 
WWII. While it was becoming obvious that the international system would no longer be the 
small club of European or Western states, for the classicists, there was no reason to believe 
that international law could not continue to strive towards its classicist ideal, a system of states 
with a clear inside/outside division where it is up to the state how it organises its domestic 
affairs. Coexistence, ‘in peace, if possible; in war, if necessary’130 in a pluralistic society was 
the aim; normatively neutral law was the means to achieving that aim (regardless of how 
impossible it might be to have actually ‘neutral’ international law).  
For reformers, the classical inside/outside division was exactly the problem for it meant that 
the full extent of the Holocaust committed against German Jews and other German groups 
Germany’s territory would not be a crime, while a war of aggression (a breach of sovereignty) 
would. The London Charter setting out the International Military Tribunal is the perfect example 
of this tug of war between the two: Article 7 lists the crimes as: a) Crimes against peace, b) 
War Crimes, and c) Crimes against Humanity where the a) and b) were regarding the ‘war of 
aggression’, and c) were ‘committed against any civilian population’ including one’s own. The 
Judge Alvarezes of the world gradually eroded the ‘inside’, created normative systems where 
human beings became the centre of protection, and gradually wanted to displace the power of 
the state governments, by diffusing power outside and inside. Their idea was to reform the 
world towards a more broadly liberal model.131 The classicists resisted it all the way, believing 
that there was something worthy in a system that prioritised artificially constructed entities over 
human beings. It is this tension between reformers and detractors that created the current 
international system. So, what does it look like now? 
5. Where We Are Now - the Rise of Global Governance 
Weil’s lament regarding the blurring of normative thresholds in international law was largely 
correct and, if anything, has accelerated in the new millennium. The openness, the rising 
interconnectedness and interdependence of the world, the breadth and depth of cross-border 
and international regulation merely accelerated that process by creating the need for less 
formal, more expedient law-making (or more properly, norm-making) processes. In their 
seminal piece Kingsburry, Krisch and Stewart talked about the rise of what they termed Global 
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Administrative Law (GAL).132 GAL is a response to a new phenomenon, global governance: a 
messy and chaotic stew of actors, norms, and pathways of law-making and law application.  
So, what is global governance? Unlike the clean story of the international system and 
international law, global governance does not start with the state as being the main or even at 
times the most powerful actor. It actually sees a multiplicity of actors, whom Kingsburry et al 
call subjects – they are both the addressees of legal norms and their creators.133 These actors 
operate in different formal or informal arrangements. These can take the form of outright 
international administration such as the UN Security Council or it its ancillary bodies and 
affiliated organizations, or they can also take the form of transnational networks based on 
informal communication and cooperation around common issues such as the Basle 
Committee, which coordinates monetary policy or banking regulation across the global 
economy. Another model of governing a specific area are the distributed administration 
networks, usually taking the form of a network of regulators that create and enforce regulation 
transnationally using a formal framework as a basis for their operation, a good example being 
environmental agencies working under the framework of different environmental target setting 
treaties. The forms of governance does not end there, we also have intergovernmental-private 
administration, which are hybrid bodies that ‘combine private and governmental actors’134 to 
regulate a certain aspect of transborder activity, for e.g. the internet address protocol and the 
assigning of internet names, which is handled by a non-governmental body135 that includes 
government representatives. Finally, and not least importantly there are outright private bodies 
that regulate transborder economic activity such as the International Standardisation 
Organization or the Anti-Doping Agency which regulate certain aspects of global activities but 
whose governing members are mostly private organizations impacting mostly private 
companies or individuals such as athletes.136 
This increase in actors as subjects of international law requires a shift into the way that we 
analyse states and their actions in the increasingly complex international system. In 2004, 
Anne Marie-Slaughter pioneered the term disaggregated states,137 urging us to ‘[s]top 
imagining the international system as a system of states – unitary entities like billiard balls or 
black boxes—subject to rules created by international institutions that are apart from, ‘above’ 
these states.’138 Rather we should be thinking about the world as a ‘world of governments’ with 
legislative, adjudicatory and implementation branches that interact both ‘with each other 
domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.’139 States are still 
‘crucial actors, [b]ut they are ‘disaggregated’140 and they interact with each other not only 
through their foreign affairs ministries but also through ‘regulatory, judicial, and legislative 
channels.’141 
However, it is not just that the different layers of this disaggregated state interact with the layers 
of other states or international institutions (e.g. international courts, or international 
organizations). Entities that in the classical narrative of international law had no place or 
standing suddenly become powerful actors on the international stage. It also represents the 
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‘breakdown of the classical separation model for dealing with international affairs.’142 In the 
classical narrative, states were able, at least legally, to close off their internal order from the 
international. States’ gatekeeping tools allowed them to close their internal legal and political 
system from direct interaction with the proverbial ‘outside’, a strict binary of internal and 
external.  
But that is no longer the case; in the same way as international subjects have changed – there 
are more entities that can create norms transnationally than the standard account allows – so 
have the pathways through which the ‘outside’ can pierce the bubble of national sovereignty.143 
International human rights courts like the ECtHR are early examples of this. In his testimony, 
Sir Nicholas was quite open regarding this when he specified that national courts are the 
natural partners of the ECtHR. The ECtHR over decades of work (that in most cases did not 
require a systemic legislative overhaul) had created a network of courts where its judgments 
were implemented by national courts, bypassing the traditional gatekeepers of Foreign Office 
ministers, ambassadors or parliaments.144 
This has altered the traditional calculation regarding the legitimacy of law-making. In the 
classical system, all international law rested on the presumption of – tacit if not explicit – state 
consent. This worked well for democratic states with substantive rule of law because they could 
legitimize what came from the international system through their constitutional mechanisms. 
But once states were no longer the only or even the main norm creators, democratically 
legitimizing those norms became increasingly difficult. This does not represent such a big 
problem for the executive branch (although the prisoner vote controversy in the UK offers a 
counter example), since they mostly gained power vis-à-vis the other branches of 
government,145 but it certainly presents problems for individuals. As an example, following the 
September 11 attacks on the US and the responses to it, individuals could be put on a terrorist 
sanctions list created at the UN Security Council level (in which only 15 states sit) and 
implemented through global regulatory networks without the possibility for review, judicial or 
otherwise.146 
There have been many proposals to fix the perceived legitimacy deficit of international law, 
that we can broadly put into three main categories: GAL, global constitutionalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Most of them draw inspiration from domestic legal institutions of democratic 
rule of law states. GAL borrows from administrative law concepts like transparency, procedural 
participation, reasoned decisions, possibility for review with substantive standards in place like 
proportionality, means-ends rational basis tests, and legitimate expectations.147 Global 
constitutionalist scholars, on the other hand, borrow from substantive constitutional concepts 
like rule of law, human rights, subsidiarity and complementarity, and checks and balances,148 
making public autonomy the main ordering principle of a plural international system.149 Some 
even call for the modelling of international law on the fundamental concepts of national public 
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law.150 Cosmopolitanism is less institution-focused and does not deal with suggestions for 
institutional change as such, but rather seeks a change in how we view the basis of the 
international system, centring more on individuals and their universal moral worth as human 
beings. Its emphasis on the universality of human rights means that cosmopolitans strive to 
reduce the differences between citizenship, residency and statelessness and work globally 
and nationally towards institutions that reflect those ideas.151   
While all of these strains of thought offer, more or less, workable solutions to the international 
system’s legitimacy problem, they do not have broad support. They represent an answer to 
the problems that global governance poses to functioning or aspiring liberal democracies, not 
to authoritarian or illiberal democratic regimes that do not put the rule of law, human rights, 
and widening participation of individuals in high esteem. Simply put, why would China or 
Russia want to embrace or even encourage global institutions and procedures that could be 
used to empower liberal groups domestically?  
And this is the crux of the problem for liberal democracies: we are currently in an international 
system of global governance where the standard legitimization tools are no longer fit for 
purpose. The current system of global governance alters the domestic balance of powers 
towards the executive branch or towards private transnational actors, to the detriment of 
individuals. Even if all countries were democratic, it would still not resolve the tension since 
global problems will require global institutions to tackle them. At the moment, global institutions 
can bypass the traditional gatekeeping mechanisms found in constitutional systems and are 
overwhelmingly designed for participation by the executive branch. This can lead to the 
executive being able to: use this position to smuggle through unpopular, undemocratic, illiberal 
norms and policies from the international to the national system; be captured by private 
multinational corporations or other non-state actors to promote their interest; or a combination 
of the two. Global problems require global institutions to tackle them, but if constitutional liberal 
democracy is to thrive, global institutions will need to be open to global politics fought over a 
global polity. How this will look is yet unclear but there are a number of proposals on the 
table.152 
The same does not apply to authoritarian or illiberal regimes – they do not have the same 
commitment to the rule of law, accountability, or human rights as liberal democracies. For 
them, empowering the executive vis-à-vis the courts or parliament is regarded as a useful 
feature, not a problem of the international system, certainly not one that needs fixing. Similarly, 
there are not private actors in illiberal democracies or outright authoritarian regimes in the 
same way that there are in liberal democracies, either legally or politically speaking. A 
multinational Chinese company is not really separate from the Chinese state in the way that 
Google or Apple are in liberal democracies. Google and Apple are regulated but separate from 
the US government, that is not so clear about the Chinese tech giant Huawei. Consequently, 
autocracies and illiberal democracies see the proposed changes as something to be resisted, 
something that could alter the power balance domestically, and they are unwilling to commit 
to changing the current makeup of global governance in a way that empowers individuals. So, 
what are the ways forward for liberal democracies?  
 
150 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication 
(Oxford University Press 2014).  
151 Garrett W. Brown and David Held (eds), The Cosmopolitanism Reader, (Polity 2010).  
152 See for instance Anne Peters’ contribution in the book Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization 
of International Law; but also see the writings of Bogdandy and Venzke eg A. von;  Bogdandy et al (eds), The 
Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer 2010); 
or Bogdandy and Venzke, In Whose Name. 
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6. The Long-Term Status Quo? 
In his 2019 Hersch Lauterpacht memorial lecture,153 Tom Ginsburg talked about the 
consequences of the economic rise of China and other authoritarian regimes around the world 
for international law and global governance. He envisioned that, due to their growing economic 
importance, China and other illiberal or authoritarian countries will have an increasing influence 
in the way that international governance operates. Namely, these types of states have an 
outsized preference towards governance structures that rely less on hard rules and more on 
flexible, and consequently more political, ways of handling international issues. Therefore, the 
wonderful web of international courts that has sprung up in the last three decades, especially 
those with constitutional and administrative type features,154 will slowly be eroded by these 
actors. These countries will still have a need for hard rules in regulating economic matters like 
trade and foreign investment; but in most other areas, especially in humanitarian and human 
rights matters, they will slowly attempt to erode them. Therefore, human rights and 
humanitarian issues will be gradually relegated to regional governance arrangements that 
have a longer commitment to those values, such as the Council of Europe or the Organization 
of American States, which have the European and American Conventions on Human Rights 
respectively. The Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the new Eurasian Economic 
Union would be the model regional organizations of the future, rather than the European Union.  
Ginsburg offers a sobering view of the future developments in global governance, but misses 
a couple of counterpoints. While China’s GDP has surpassed the US and EU’s individually,155 
it is still slightly more than half of them combined, let alone in combination with other liberal 
democracies like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. While China’s GDP is projected to grow 
at a sustained above average pace, it is likely that it will slow down in the not-so-distant future. 
It is hard to see why liberal democracies would easily give up their benefits and protections, 
like an international order based on law, rules and rights, and accept a governance structure 
that erodes existing protections. Consequently, we might go into an era of a prolonged status 
quo, provided that liberal democracies manage to survive the current populist wave.  
However, rather than having a liberal, open, and integrated international order, something that 
the humanity’s law proponents argued for, we might end up with a more regionalized world, 
where regional organizations become the centres of organization and politics for that region. 
Global institutions like the UN will still matter, but they will matter in different ways: rather than 
promoting human rights and human security, they will promote stability, national security, and 
cooperation, but cooperation in trade or climate change, but may not emphasise climate 
justice. Liberal democratic states will try to insulate themselves from the effects of such 
institutions where they do not have the same or similar guarantees of voice, accountability, or 
review. Moreover, they might also try to re-balance the domestic constitutional mechanisms, 
thereby bringing more checks on the executive branch’s foreign affairs powers, such as judicial 
review of concrete executive claims or actions.156 
 
153 Tom Ginsburg, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture 2019: 'Democracies and International Law: The Trials of 
Liberalism (Part 3)', (Lauterpacht Centre for International Law 14 March 2019), 
<https://upload.sms.csx.cam.ac.uk/media/2939251> accessed 02 October 2020.  
154 Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton University Press 2014), 
where she categorises the 4 types roles that international courts can take: dispute settlement, administrative 
review, enforcement, and constitutional review, 3 – 31.   
155 OECD data as of 2016 available at <https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm> accessed 12 
June19. 
156 In the UK, the Miller case curtailed the power of the UK Government to unilaterally withdraw from international 
treaties that affect human rights, which include the EU treaties - R (on the application of Miller and another) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5; while in Law Society of South Africa and Others 
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, [2018] ZACC 51, the Constitutional Court of South Africa 




But on the whole, the current global order of governance without a government will continue – 
dragging along its legitimacy problems, since liberal democracies who see them as problems 
rather than benefits will not have the power to reform the world to their liking. Consequently, 
we might be headed towards a mid to long-term status quo in the global order. It will be different 
from the post-Second World War balance of powers between two powerful blocs, since the 
powerful actors will still have substantial interconnectedness, mostly in free trade, finance, 
migration and tackling human-made climate change. There will be much greater openness 
between nations than there ever has been in human history, but it will not be on liberal 
democratic terms. Sadly, Fukuyama’s prediction of a future world order populated with liberal 
democracies will not come to pass. The opportunity for it was squandered by foreign 
adventures in the 2000s by the major liberal democracies. Although for while there might not 
be a great ideological struggle over what is the best political/economic order for humanity, 
there will be a struggle in liberal democracies over what is the best political/constitutional order 




Community (SADC) to strip the SADC court of its human rights jurisdiction – as ‘unconstitutional, unlawful and 













Desire lines occur wherever we find human and animal movement.  Desire lines dissect the planned 
spaces of Milton Keynes and have done since its creation 50 years ago, and they will continue to show 
us how people use, abuse, and manipulate the spaces of Milton Keynes long into the future.  
Accompanying Robert Herian’s chapter is a short video installation1 bringing together local council 
planning documentation, bureaucratic theory, personal accounts, storytelling, photography, and music 
to describe the nature and power of desire lines in our lives and imaginations. 
 
1. First impressions 
You will probably use a desire line in your life or 
already rely on one to make a habitual journey 
on foot or bicycle just that bit quicker.  At the 
very least you will have seen these lines criss-
crossing the grass of a local park between 
‘formal’ pathways or bisecting a verge by the 
side of a main road to give the user a more 
direct route to the other side.  A desire line is an 
informal path that enables a direct journey, what 
we might also call a short-cut or in some 
circumstances a detour.  As well-trodden 
pathways, desire lines imply a wish for 
straightforwardness and greater efficiency than 
planned spaces provide. However, desire lines 
are more sophisticated and nuanced than this, 
and calling them “short-cuts” or a more efficient means of getting from A to B does not fully explain what 
they are or how, why and when they appear as they do in the landscapes.   
 
* This Chapter came out of the project, Desire Lines, by Dr Robert Herian and the artist Lucy Atherton.  For more 
information on Lucy’s work see: <www.lucyatherton.com>.  
1 To see the short video installation please visit: http://www.open.ac.uk/blogs/50YearsOfLaw/?p=73. This page is 
part of our 50 Years of Law blog, where we showcase this and other research from the Law School. Please visit 
the page http://www.open.ac.uk/blogs/50YearsOfLaw/ to find out more and join the discussion.. 
Figure 1: Just that bit quicker! Image by Robert Herian 
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Pathways are physical impressions left on a landscape by moving bodies, someone walking, riding a 
bike or horse for example.  We can equally interpret desire lines as social, political, cultural, ecological, 
psychological, legal and economic forms, expressions or representations made by individuals and 
communities.  Often, they are a combination of these. This makes desire lines complex phenomena 
capable of showing us something not only about the way we (individuals or communities) leave our mark 
on landscapes, but how we experience and belong (live, work, enjoy leisure time) in a landscape both 
consciously and unconsciously. What we think of as our desire is unknown to us, as Sigmund Freud 
described, because it is beyond conscious knowledge and understanding. When we apply Freud’s 
reasoning to the “desire” in “desire lines”, therefore, we find veiled meaning and hidden truths in the 
pathways we use.   
The aim of this Chapter is to critically evaluate the phenomena of desire lines from a variety of 
perspectives. By exploring what lies behind or beneath desire lines, the aim is to reveal meanings that 
all too often go unseen in the landscape, and in communities, societies, even the world, in which we live. 
As a lawyer, I’m keen to explore the way desire lines embody but also resist and disregard laws and 
social norms.  Law does not exist in a vacuum, and we should always see it in context. As Baroness 
Hale famously declared: ‘In law, “context is everything”’2. To appreciate the relationship between law and 
desire lines means appreciating the dialogue between law and the contexts in which law operates. 
Understanding law in this way shows us something’s ultimate legal character, even a humble pathway. 
There’s a lot of ground to cover, so let’s get started.  
2. (In)formal Pathways 
As “informal” pathways, desire lines offer alternatives to existing ways within normative and usually highly 
planned spaces such as housing estates, town centres, or public parks. The distinction may seem 
straightforward, but it is important to understand, precisely, what makes a pathway either “formal” or 
“informal”. There are two obvious examples of formal pathways, both of which are defined by the 
Highways Act 1980: footways (pavements or sidewalks) and footpaths3. We find both in urban and rural 
landscapes and make up the wider highway network.   
 
2 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, 69. 
3 Highways Act 1980, s 329(1): “footpath” means a highway over which the public have a right of way on foot only, 
not being a footway; “footway” means a way comprised in a highway which also comprises a carriageway, being a 




Figure 2: Footpath & Footway. Images by Robert Herian 
Of the two perhaps public footpaths, especially in the countryside, seem less planned than their asphalt 
counterparts, pavements. Yet, both show human ingenuity in planning routes and journeys that inscribe 
the physical landscape, while creating rights of way that describe legal character within the landscape. 
For good or ill, and like writing on a page, pathways tell stories of movement through traces that begin 
tentatively (informally) but inevitably become fixed and formal. The formalization of pathways is described 
in law by the establishment of rights of way:  
The most common way that rights of way come into existence is by presumed dedication. There 
is a long established principle that extensive use by the public without challenge can provide 
evidence that the landowner intended to dedicate the used route as a public right of way. 
Presumed dedication can take place by common law or statute law. Statute law requires a period 
of use of 20 years from the point the use of the path is questioned. Common law dedication may 
require less time4. 
 
 
4 Emma Downing. ‘Establishing in a Right of Way’ (House of Commons Library 2011) 
<https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06026/SN06026.pdf> accessed 13 May 2019. 
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Establishing and importantly also formally recording 
rights of way, on an Ordnance Survey map, for 
example, has long been important to ramblers and 
those who enjoy walking in the countryside. Accurate 
knowledge of rights of way opens the countryside for 
exploration. It would be too much of a distraction to 
talk in depth here about property law. But, worth briefly 
noting is that, whilst we might commonly think of 
“property” as a physical thing such as a car or a piece 
of land, the law regards it instead as a bundle of rights. 
Among these rights is the right to exclude, which, in 
land, means the right to stop people from entering 
(trespassing) or crossing privately owned land. One 
reason a right of way is significant, therefore, is 
because it represents a compromise between owners 
and non-owners within the context of a broader private property regime. While the right to exclude 
absolutely might be preferable economically (it can secure and maintain land value for example, e.g. in 
cases of so-called “land-banking”), from the point of view of social and what we might also call spatial 
justice, including giving people a reasonable opportunity to explore and enjoy their environment, rights of 
way are a precious if limited sharing of space.   
Wherever we turn in towns, cities and the 
countryside, we must negotiate planned 
spaces that, even when thought of as “public” 
like a canal path for example, are in fact shaped 
by private ownership and the rights that 
ownership entail. Formal pathways are just one 
example of how planning rules and norms 
overseen by private property law and a variety 
of other regulations govern and discipline 
movement. Signs and defensive architecture, 
like the barriers and fences in figure 4, with 
pathways, channel movement and ensure 
walkers and other users of the pathways stay 
on the right path, so to speak. Formal paths, in 
this sense, are thick with metaphor but also 
reflect contemporary bureaucratic concerns to 
manage demands for efficiency and mitigate 
risk. The aim is to ensure, as far as possible, control over and predictability of individual and collective 
movement. Whilst the likelihood of injury or death to occur if the mix between cars and pedestrians is not 
planned for or managed properly suggests some bureaucracy is a good thing, the notion that one is not 
fully in control of where or how one moves through the landscape (the essence of being governed and 
disciplined) is more jarring to our sense of self. For Michel Foucault, for example, the governance and 
discipline of movement is one element that produces ‘docile bodies’.  The individual body becomes an 
element that others may place, move, or articulate: ‘Its bravery or its strength are no longer the principal 
variables that define it; but the place it occupies, the interval it covers, the regularity, the good order 
according to which it operates its movements’5.          
 
5 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan trn, Penguin 1991) 164. 
Figure 3: Enjoy the land! Image by Robert Herian 
Figure 4: Disciplining movement. Image by Lucy Atherton 
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It is often useful to be told which way to go. A well-
worn path and clear signs that point the way make 
life easier, require less self-planning or initiative, 
and make the experience of a journey less 
stressful. Many of us probably accepted long ago, 
without even really noticing, complacency towards 
planned space that makes us easily annoyed when 
we lose the path. Re-tracing your steps is time 
consuming and can take you in the wrong direction 
after all. Through a bureaucratic lens, losing the 
pathway has a negative impact on efficiency, so we 
must require more planning.   
The idea of stepping off or leaving the beaten track 
may be romantic or fill us with a gratifying sense of 
mischief. As alternatives to the norm, desire lines are manifestations of a type of rejection of formality and 
thus also an attempt to reject the discipline that accompanies it. Yet we all eventually fall back into line, 
return to the paths we should be on, don’t we? Desire lines exist only to bring points of formality closer 
together, not to undo or destroy 
formality, or postpone it indefinitely. 
When we stop to think about this, 
of course, the very idea of leaving 
the beaten track, romantic or not, 
means nothing without having a 
beaten track to begin with. Law 
clearly makes distinctions between 
formal and informal pathways, but 
as the title of this section implies, 
what is formal is always already 
(in)formal. Informality breeds 
formality, and informal ways, in 
turn, are re-found in formal, 
planned spaces. All pathways 
intertwine to produce what Michel 
de Certeau calls ‘a rhetoric of 
walking’: 
Walking affirms, suspects, tries out, transgresses, respects, etc., the trajectories it 
“speaks”. All the modalities sing a part in this chorus, changing from step to step, 
stepping in through proportions, sequences, and intensities which vary according to the 
time, the path taken and the walker. These enunciatory operations are of an unlimited 
diversity. They therefore cannot be reduced to their graphic trail6.  
Well-known sayings such “off the beaten track” or “off-piste” describe something like the 
deviation from the normal way of doing things (the formal path) that desire lines culturally 
represent. “Cutting corners” is another well-known saying usually used to describe someone who has 
performed a job or task poorly or cheaply, perhaps also with a lack of attention to detail or even illegally. 
To cut corners is a pejorative term not used to describe a person who has been well meaning in striving 
for efficiency but excessive in their stinginess, perhaps even reckless or negligent. Yet, a desire line that 
“cuts corners” is the best and, perhaps, the only authentic kind of desire line there is.  
 
6 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Steven Rendall trn, University of California Press 1984) 99. 
Figure 4: The "Official Route". Image by Robert Herian 
Figure 5: The Efficient Route. Image by Robert Herian 
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3. Auditing a Landscape: The Public Park 
How do law and legal norms shape space and the way bodies experience and move through it? Bodies 
can respect, defy and resist laws, but never disregard them. As a strategy for the coming day, we 
intertwine the political with law in accounts of property, spatial justice, and the negotiations of socialized 
bodies, each with desires, demands, anxieties and frustrations. Recognizing points in which law and 
bodies meet in space in subservience to (or the creation of) norms is difficult, however. Law, all too often, 
is invisible, unconscious, missed. A desire line across a local park represents combinations of forms and 
expressions. Using an image of a typical park, like the one in figure 7, we can audit the space for its 
material and symbolic content to examine these forms and expressions.   
 
 
Figure 6: "Desire line" by Eric Fischer is licensed under CC BY 2.0 
Based on the line of sight in figure 7, we see the desire line cutting straight-though into the distance, along 
a path that deliberately bisects and rejects the planned order. Just because it rejects the planned order 
does not mean those who use it will avoid the discipline imposed by the space (the park) as a whole, 
however. We can assume the goal for most users is to proceed more directly and quickly than 
meandering around the formal path and this use of space, even in its relative informality, describes 
discipline. We can, for example, imagine users of the park who may choose to walk the desire line, some 
to increase their efficiency in terms of time, energy and so on, but for others this may only be a second-
order consideration:   
 Someone rushing through the park to reach the station for the morning train to work: if 
he misses the train today, he may lose his job.   
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 Someone jogging to get fit after a long period of recuperation following a hip operation: 
she knows the more exercise she does, the quicker her recovery will be, but the shorter route is 
just that bit easier.  
 Someone walking their dog: they use the desire line out of habit because the dog always 
goes that way. 
 Someone taking their child to school: they wouldn’t normally walk through the park, but 
it’s a sunny day and they like to spot birds. 
 Someone working as a bicycle courier: she isn’t meant to ride through the park but will 
get a bonus if the delivery is quicker than promised.    
Parks are public spaces in the sense that anyone is free to use one for recreation or, perhaps, as a more 
pleasant route to avoid pedestrian traffic and busy roads. Because we call a park “public”, however, does 
not mean people can do as they please there day or night. This might mean, for example, closing park 
gates each evening to prevent entry after a set time. Locking the gates on a park touches on several 
social policy issues, including those relating to rough sleepers and the homeless prevented from using 
the space after it is "closed to the public”.   
Section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, for example, describes as an offence an ‘idle and disorderly person’ 
‘wandering abroad, or placing himself or herself in any public place, street, highway, court, or passage, 
to beg or gather alms’. More recently the government Rough Sleeping Strategy describes people 
sleeping rough as: ‘People sleeping, about to bed down (sitting on/in or standing next to their 
bedding) or actually bedded down in the open air (such as on the streets, in tents, doorways, 
parks, bus shelters or encampments)’7.   
Based on this single example, we can see that, while parks are public the space is governed, regulated, 
and managed under the direct control of a council (county, district or borough) or some other authority 
that has a legal power to exclude and prevent entry. The first element of our audit, therefore, identifies 
the park as public yet not an entirely open or free space. It is a qualified space, meaning public movement 
and occupation are limited and constrained. Parks are highly planned spaces with boundaries defined 
by a wall or fence. Within the boundary the landscape is designed or shaped over time to satisfy 
community welfare and health concerns (we may refer to a park as ‘the lungs of a city’), and broader 
philosophical and aesthetic ideals of nature, beauty, and escape. The planned landscape also provides 
and guarantees access, and, importantly, manage how people move around and (temporarily) stop and 
spend time in the park.   
As figure 7 shows, park planning includes benches for stopping and resting, and for contemplation of the 
surroundings (trees, flowers, birds etc.). Bench design such as those with fixed armrests explicitly prevent 
repose (lying down), however, thus discouraging rough sleepers from using them. This is one example 
of how planned spaces, such as parks, are governed, regulated, and managed spaces that make use 
of defensive architecture and obstacles to discipline those who inhabit them, often using subtle but 
effective methods. As Naomi Smith and Peter Walters suggest: ‘defensive architecture seeks to 
discipline ‘undesirables’ by designing against alternative uses […] with the explicit purpose of excluding 
from public space those engaged in unsanctioned or undesired behaviours’8.  
 
7 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Rough Sleeping Strategy, (2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/733421/Roug
h-Sleeping-Strategy_WEB.pdf> accessed 11 May 2019. 
8 Naomi Smith and Peter Walters ‘Desire Lines and Defensive Architecture in Modern Urban Environments’ (2018) 
55(13) Urban Studies, 2982. 
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Other than benches, the planned park in figure 7 has well-tended green spaces around which 
wrap a uniform network of pathways that lead the walker in a defined and ‘disciplined’ manner. 
It doesn’t appear to be the case in our present example, but some planned spaces with green 
space, such as a well-manicured lawn for example, will request walkers stay on the path by 
asking, often politely, to “please keep off the grass”. This raises a further interesting point 
about the role of discipline in the governance of public spaces. While the sign politely states 
“please keep off the grass”, the likelihood of receiving a formal legal sanction or punishment 
as imprisonment or a fine should you decide to ignore the sign is very unlikely. Instead, the 
sign relies on extra-legal principles and rules of conduct such as common sense and good 
manners. The aim, simply, is to ask politely and expect this to be respected.    
We find many signs in a park, not just ones telling us 
to keep off the grass, and each plays a role in directing 
both movement and behaviour.  To protect themselves 
against liability for accidents and claims of negligence, 
park authorities often deploy signs warning of hazards 
such as hidden steps or steep slopes. In most cases 
signs have no legal force, nor are they supposed or 
intended to. For instance, there is nothing overtly legal 
about a sign telling you where the public toilets are. 
Yet, where the toilets are in the park (whether there are 
toilets at all) and how you are directed to them is part 
of the planning and has a disciplinary effect. Park 
planning may deliberately lead people to key points of 
cultural or economic interest and consumption, 
including strategically placed sculptures or a café and 
shop. This form of discipline has no obvious legal 
character. Instead, the design encourages park users 
to consume what the park offers, so to speak, to linger 
in the space for longer, enjoy the opportunity to relax 
and to do so, preferably, with a drink purchased from 
the café.   
Increasingly parks, especially those in cities, have CCTV to monitor activity, including who 
comes and goes and at what time of the day (or night). Along with signage, CCTV and other 
more traditional means of surveillance including park wardens, gardeners or groundskeepers, 
further reveal that the implied freedom and openness of parks as public space is always 
qualified. To use or move through the park is to find oneself disciplined into meeting certain 
agreed standards of behaviour, and increasingly to be watched to ensure that we meet these 
standards. We should remember that discipline of this sort is not necessarily a bad thing, 
however. We might argue, for instance, that being part of a community requires a person to 
accept agreed norms and values of conduct and behaviour. Adherence to a social contract 
ensures, to a large extent at least, that everyone has an equal opportunity to enjoy the park, 
and the price of safeguarding this enjoyment is accepting some discipline and surveillance. 
I have already described how design steers people through the park in a manner planned for 
using signs and other disciplinary and defensive architecture such as a pond or lake, fencing 
or bollards. Formal pathways, such as the tarmacked one’s in figure 7, are channels that carry 
a person either through the park (from an entrance to an exit), or to a defined destination within 
it, the café for example. They encourage staying on formal pathways, as the “please keep off 
the grass” signs attest. But park users always try to bend the space to meet their wishes and 
demands. Discipline, therefore, acts to contain and shape desire between park planners, 
authorities and users.   
Figure 7: "welcome" by Laura Billings is licensed 
under CC BY-NC 2.0 
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 The materiality of the 
pathway plays an important 
role in encouraging us to use 
it rather than not.  Walking on 
an asphalt or tarmac pathway 
is arguably preferable to the 
mud of an informal pathway or 
the wet grass. This isn’t only a 
question of a discipline as we 
have described it so far, 
therefore, but concerns a 
whole array of other 
“civilizing” criteria adopted by 
societies in which 
bureaucratic efficiency and 
maintaining economic viability 
in all walks of life is the 
absolute aim. As Tim Ingold 
says, ‘In modern societies, it 
seems, straightness has come to 
epitomize not only rational thought and disputation but also values of civility and moral rectitude’9  On 
Ingold’s terms, therefore, the use of informal paths is a means of bending the straightness of rational or 
bureaucratic thought.  Informal paths do queer planned space by challenging what we call “traditional” 
both in terms of property and space, or exclusive terrain10.   
The decision not to use pathways provided but seek alternative (queer) routes brings us back 
to the subject of desire lines. Figure 9 illustrates the basic and practical function of a desire 
line: to enable a journey that is direct. To achieve this goal requires the creation, usually by 
the erosion of the land under many footsteps, of a pathway that bisects an existing planned 
route. The direct nature of desire lines means they do most times improve efficiency. In figures 7 and 9 
we see common types of desire line that cut the corners of planned space and provide a more efficient 
route. If two people were to set off at the same time and at the same speed, one using the formal path, 
the other the desire line, the person using the desire line would (presumably) arrive first having covered 
the least distance to get there. It would also save energy for the one who used the desire line because 
of the marginal gain in distance leading to less effort, therefore, providing greater efficiency.   
If we consider a person whose income is based on getting from point A to point B in the shortest time 
possible, a bicycle courier for instance, then desire lines quickly reveal the economics in their use. 
Similarly, a person crossing not a busy junction to the shop where they buy their lunch every day may 
well habitually take a more direct line to get there to maximise the amount of break time they have. This 
latter example may not result in the formation of a physical line in the landscape, but is the essence of a 
desire line as pure demand for efficiency. 
 
9 Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History (Routledge 2016) 5. 
10 Margaret Davies, ‘Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond’ (1999) 8 Social and Legal 
Studies 330. 
Figure 8: Desire Line in Manchester. Image by Robert Herian 
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So, whilst the lure of the smooth tarmac may be enough to encourage some people to stay on the formal, 
planned pathway, there are several plausible efficiency gains from choosing the desire line, even if this 
means suffering some inconvenience (muddy shoes) or discomfort (a bumpy ride on a bike). Desire lines 
can also carry risk associated with their use, which takes a variety of forms. For example, the terrain that 
the desire line crosses may be significantly more hazardous than the route of the formal path, this may 
be because of a steep incline for example, or because it leads to a road crossing away from a formal 
pedestrian crossing. In both cases the person using the desire line may save time, energy and perhaps 
even money, but they also risk injury or death.  
Some desire lines are longer than others, yet all achieve the same basic goal of conjoining 
formal routes within planned space. Desire lines are often “straighter” than what they offer an 
alternative to, and to construe them as a rejection of straightness, as Ingold describes it, is not 
entirely accurate. What might have first appeared as the queering of space is in fact the 
opposite: the collective effort of individuals to improve the efficiency of planned space. This 
makes desire lines channels of hyper efficiency, and to use them is an act of demanding 
greater efficiency from oneself, to self-discipline and self-govern under socioeconomic norms 
and values.     
Roads made using tarmac provide comfortable, safer, and above all more efficient journeys 
in terms of fuel (energy expenditure) and speed (time, money). We could argue, all movement 
involves the need to improve (economic) efficiencies. To be complicit in this is not always to 
recognise oneself as an economic subject shaped for better economic efficiency. This truth 
escapes many people day-to-day. Instead, we act out unconsciously movements that take us 
in that same direction, along the same pathways and highways every day.      
 Looking at the path in figure 7 we might say that all 
these efficiency gains we have discussed would be 
modest. The distance isn’t far, and the savings made 
not all that great. And yet, its well-worn appearance 
tells us that people continue to use it regularly, almost 
to where we can say it is now the de facto formal path 
rather than an alternative or detour. As we saw in the 
earlier section, looking at the transition of informal 
pathways to formal pathways, we can see that how 
desire lines end up shaping the planned landscape is 
not new. Instead, it holds a firm place in planning 
orthodoxy, especially concerned with demands to 
increase efficiency.  As at Ohio State University, 
where the transformation of the landscape by desire 
lines is obvious, and incorporating them into the 
planned space was the only realistic option.  In our 
park the desire line may eventually be formalized, 
may become another of the planned routes. Albeit a 
formal path that memorializes the failure of planning either to predict user behaviour or maintain disciple.      




4. Two Legal Impressions 
The two legal cases that follow describe the law’s approach to and interpretation of desire lines and 
informal pathways predominately in terms of negligence11. There is no need to offer a great deal of 
commentary around the two cases as the facts speak for themselves, and will reflect upon, I hope, the 
discussion so far.  Significant in both cases is that the informal pathways described intertwine with effects. 
Both cases offer an intimate glimpse into the relationship, as a point of traumatic recognition, between a 
path and its user.   
If desire lines show a user’s commitment to efficiency, a matter that both cases touch on, it can equally 
be said that in creating and adding to desire lines a user who leaves their mark on the landscape is 
seeking recognition from others by doing so; a simple statement that “I was here”. Recognition is the 
foundation of Hegel’s understanding of desire, as Alexander Kojève explains:  
Desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to 
an object which is ‘perfectly useless from the biological point of view … Desire is human only if 
the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other…that is to say, if he wants to be ‘desired’ 
or ‘loved’, or, rather, ‘recognised’ in his human value … In other words, all human, 
anthropogenetic Desire…is, finally, a function of the desire for ‘recognition’12.    
In the following two cases, recognition is not expressly apparent in using informal paths by the claimants 
(the injured parties), but comes later in court, from a judge whom claimants hope will award 
compensation for negligence. Yet this type of recognition remains a desire tied to the recognition of 
others. It follows the same path.     
4.1 Case I: Slopes & Moats – Taylor v English Heritage13 
Mr Taylor, in his 60s, was visiting Carisbrooke 
Castle in the Isle of Wight with his wife and 
grandchild. He had been on an elevated cannon 
firing platform. Below the platform was a grass 
pathway at the base of a steep slope. There was 
also an informal path down the slope from the 
platform to the pathway and at the other side, 
beyond a wall, was a moat. He set off down the 
informal path but fell across the pathway, over 
the wall and into the moat suffering a serious 
head injury. He claimed English Heritage were in 
breach of their duties under s.2 Occupiers 
Liability Act 1957 for failing to take reasonable 
steps to ensure his safety. 
 
11 For present purposes, Halsbury’s Law of England describe negligence as a “notional duty to take care” and: a 
specific tort and in any given circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. 
What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do 
something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or 
not at all. 
12 Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (Allan Bloom ed., James H. Nichols, Jr trs., Basic Books 
1969) 6.  
13 [2016] EWCA Civ 448. 
Figure 10: Carisbrooke Castle.  Image by Steve Gascoigne, 
Available Light Photography 
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In the case the Recorder dealt with a key issue of causation, in which it was stated that: “Being the person 
that he is, a man who has engaged in responsible, rational and methodical activities all his life, I consider 
it unlikely that Mr Taylor would have stood up on that slope as he went down the informal path if he had 
known of the existence of the sheer drop. I conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not, and 
hence that the defendant's breach of duty in failing to provide adequate warning of the sheer drop was 
causative of his accident.” [emphasis added]14 
The Recorder also dealt with the matter of contributory negligence: “As the bank is sufficiently steep for 
there to be a risk of injury, even if the sheer drop had not been there, had any person attempted to 
negotiate the informal path, or part of it, whilst standing, I consider that there is a considerable degree of 
contributory negligence in this case. Mr Taylor, even if he was not aware of the sheer drop (as I have 
found he was not) must have been aware as he stood on the artillery platform and looked down, just how 
steep the bank was, and, accordingly, the appropriate assessment of contributory negligence is that he 
was fifty per cent to blame for his accident”15. 
In his case study examining the incident, Mark Daniels concluded that: 
‘The steep ‘desire line’ path is a key element in this. If descending by this route, it would 
be difficult to control the rate of descent, and the overrun at the bottom could easily take 
a person across the grass pathway and over the edge into the moat. There were other 
informal and less steep pathways off the bastion, and one solution would be to manage 
visitor access by making one of these a more obvious route for descent to the grass 
pathway, and blocking off the steep desire line until grass could regrow.  A person 
making a controlled descent on a gently inclined path would arrive on the grass pathway 
and have time to appreciate the hazard of the vertical drop into the moat’16.  
4.2 Case II: Louise Byrne’s Ankle - Byrne v Ardenheath Company Ltd17 
On 25th February 2016 the Irish 
Times reported the following 
story: 
A woman has been awarded 
€75,000 damages at the High 
Court after she slipped and broke 
her ankle when crossing a grassy 
embankment to leave a shopping 
centre car park. Louise 
Byrne (48), Parslickstown 
Avenue, Mulhuddart, Dublin, 
sued Ardenheath Company and 
Ardenheath Management 
Company, owners and operators of the Mountview Shopping Centre, Blanchardstown, Dublin. The 
accident happened on December 20th, 2012, after Ms Byrne, an information officer, had parked her car 
and was crossing the embankment which she claimed was slippery and dangerous18.  
 
14 [2016] EWCA Civ 448 41. 
15 [2016] EWCA Civ 448 42. 
16 Mark Daniels, ‘Case Study: English Heritage v Taylor – Court of Appeal’ (25th April 2016) 
<https://www.historichouses.org/uploads/assets/uploaded/daddadfe-7375-4868-918108d2cea8a1fb.pdf> 
accessed 13 May 2019. 
17 [2017] IECA 293 
18 ‘Court awards woman who broke ankle in fall €75,000’ (Irish Times, 25 February 2016) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/court-awards-woman-who-broke-ankle-in-fall-
75-000-1.2548462> accessed 13 May 2019.  
Figure 11: Mountview Shopping Centre.  Source: Google Maps 
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The judge at trial in the High Court stated the following concerning the location of the accident: 
The only designated exit, as I have said, in this instance was a shared vehicular 
entrance. There was a cutaway as one entered or exited the entrance which could 
physically accommodate pedestrians, I suppose, but it wasn't marked out, it wasn't 
indicated as such, and there was no way really of saying that pedestrians were to use 
that or not. A pedestrian, if one were to be very strict about it, would have to wander 
down past the entrance and carry on to one of the two pedestrian entrances in the other 
half, as it were, of the car parking area and then carry on up again. Very often, as we 
know, people don't do that, people will take shortcuts, as is evident from the 
photographs. People were taking shortcuts all over the place in this area because that's 
what people do and that's why people have to be given the choice. But were they given 
an appropriate choice in this case? 
When Louise Byrne’s case came to Appeal, however, the Court saw the matter very differently, as the 
Irish Independent reported: 
A €75,000 damages award to a woman who slipped and broke her ankle when walking 
down a wet grassy slope to leave a Dublin shopping centre car park has been 
overturned by the Court of Appeal (COA).  Ms Justice Mary Irvine ruled the companies 
which own and operate Mountview Shopping Centre, Blanchardstown, Dublin, had not 
breached their statutory duty to take reasonable care for the safety of Louise Byrne. A 
visitor is expected to take reasonable care for their own safety and if they decide to go 
down a wet grassy slope in unsuitable footwear instead of using a nearby safe 
tarmacadam surfaced entrance, "they will take responsibility for the consequences of 
that decision", she said.  If an occupier had to provide the type of preventative measures 
suggested by Ms Byrne's engineer to meet "reasonable care" obligations under the 
Occupiers Liability Act, such as installing a step with barriers either side of the slope, that 
would have "potentially significant adverse repercussions" for all who occupy land open 
to visitors, such as local authorities responsible for many "wonderful open spaces and 
parks"19. [emphasis added] 
4.3 Last Impressions 
We make desire lines on land by our movement, migration, and conveyance through space and time. 
Invariably, they are deviations from prescribed highways or formal paths. But, as the name suggests, 
they reflect and embody more than geospatial cuts and erosions linked to a need or demand for speed 
and efficiency. Desire lines are epistemic, ontological, and imaginary phenomena. Perhaps above all, 
they are psycho-political imprimaturs: modes of resistance, acts of defiance, means of escape. Whether 
desire lines succeed on these terms is hard to judge, however. My instinct is they don’t, because we all 
return to the formal pathway. The shift in perspective of the planned world that momentary glimpse the 
desire line offers lives only for as long as the (short) cut allows.  
A: Are people always concerned with getting to their destination as quickly as possible? 
H: Not necessarily. Although you are in principle looking for abbreviations, they do not 
always choose the shortest link between the starting point and the destination. 
Sometimes they also make detours. 
A: Because they get lost? 
 
19 Tim Healy, ‘Judge Overturns €75k Award to Woman Who Slipped on Grassy Slope Outside Dublin Shopping 
Centre’ (Independent.ie 10 November 2017) <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/judge-overturns-75k-




H: No, for a much more interesting reason: trails have to be entertained as normal ways; 
if used too seldom, they disappear again under grass and scrub. Therefore, it may be 
useful if people who start in the same place, but want to [sic] different goals, share a part 
of the way 
A: ‘This is inevitably at the expense of a group’. 
H: ‘Surprisingly no. Trampling trails tend to be fair and all have the same relative detour 
… This creates amazing mini-shortcuts, as you can see them in parks, where people 
prefer to walk four steps through the meadow rather than take a slightly longer path’20.  
Private, public and criminal laws inform our relationship to the land and environments in which we live, 
upon which we build and grow, and across or through which we journey, march, wander, and move. 
Desire lines are manifestations of a heterogenous and contingent social imaginary at play in these 
simple acts, translocations, and flows consciously and unconsciously inscribed on the landscapes we 
inhabit.   
In human effort, the only source of energy is desire. It is not in a person’s nature to desire 
what he already has. Desire is a tendency, the start of a movement towards something, 
towards a point from which one is absent. If, at the very outset, this movement doubles 
back on itself towards its point of departure, a person turns round and round like a 
squirrel in a cage or a prisoner in a condemned cell. Constant turning soon produces 
revulsion21.  
Discussing the Land Art Movement in the latter half of the 20th Century, Francesco Careri suggests that: 
‘All this seems like a desire to start all over again from the beginning of the history of the world, to go back 
to point zero in order to find unitary discipline, in which the art of the Earth was the only means available 
with which to come to grips with natural space and infinite time’22 [emphasis added].  Whether users of 
desire lines consciously appreciate this sense of fundamental being or raw philosophical insight is open 
to question. I rather fear the economic reason so prevalent in contemporary societies destroys such 
utopias. Instead, utopias of a different kind and measure are installed, and “unitary discipline” transformed 
into something bureaucratic and economic. Desire lines today are poetics of longing in bureaucracy, 
maps of productivity and efficiency, configurations of advancing and overbearing economic motion that 
no fence can stop.  
 
20 Part of a dialogue between Dr Christian Ankowitsch and Professor Dirk Helbing 
<http://www.ankowitsch.de/2010/08/trampelpfade/> accessed 13 May 2019. 
21 Simone Weil, ‘Prerequisite to Dignity in Labour’ in Siân Miles (ed), An Anthology (Penguin Classics 2005) 265. 




















50 years ago, in Pettitt v Pettitt, Lord Diplock famously confirmed the emergence of a ‘property-
owning, particularly a real-property-mortgaged-to-a-building-society-owning, democracy’ 
(824) in post-war Britain. This chapter takes this statement as the departure point for 
demonstrating how ownership rhetoric and the ideological commitment to private home-
ownership has informed decades of development in housing policy. After providing an 
overview of the approach successive governments have taken to housing policy, which 
combined to create quite a problematic outlook for the public provision of homes, the chapter 
turns its attention to the recent case of Z v Hackney LBC and Anor. That case exemplifies the 
difficulties wrought by the public housing environment, compounded as they are by a rights 
framework which gives little weight to the matter of considerable, but perhaps more nebulous, 
socio-economic rights. The chapter argues that this presents problems for geographical and 





It has been 50 years since Pettitt v Pettitt1 and, more specifically, since Lord Diplock famously 
confirmed the emergence of a ‘property-owning, particularly a real-property-mortgaged-to-a-
building-society-owning, democracy’ (824) in post-war Britain. Given that this chapter sits in a 
collection of essays reflecting on ‘50 years of law’, Lord Diplock’s statement seems a suitable 
starting point for reflection. The rhetorical stress placed on ownership will be interrogated with 
particular consideration given to the effect on senses of belonging. More specifically, what 
does the rhetorical emphasis on the importance of owning real property as a condition of 
political participation mean in relation to belonging within a community? Additionally, what 
effect has the symbolic value of property ownership had on the law within the last 50 years 
and, correspondingly, what role can and should law play in committing to upholding senses of 
belonging? The context in which these questions are asked is housing law and policy; hence 
it was mentioned above that the phrase is worth reflecting on, rather than the judgment itself, 
as it neatly encapsulates shifts in attitudes towards council housing, redefinitions of ‘the social’, 
and the increasing individualisation and privatisation of responsibility within this realm. 
 
In other words, this chapter explores the effect the emphasis on the value of property 
ownership has had on social policy, legal frameworks, and the belonging of people within a 
political community. In order to do this, section one establishes a brief account of certain 
developments in housing law and related policy within the last 50 years. Section two builds on 
this by considering how such developments inevitably traverse questions relating to precarity, 
necessity, and belonging. Moreover, the current climate of public housing provision means 
that the discharge of local authority duties to house people often cuts across people’s senses 
of place, familiarity, and home. The rhetorical focus on property ownership, and on the value 
 
1 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777. 
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of aspiring to own, is woven into this issue. Indeed, the division between haves and have-nots 
in this regard has become much more apparent, with wealth disparity more dramatically 
symbolised in, and affected by, access to real property. Moreover, it could be argued that 
insecure relationships to housing are racialised and xenophobic, given that housing precarity 
is more likely to lead to exposure to other ideologically driven policy initiatives which 
disproportionately affect BAME and migrant persons within communities.2 
 
As such, housing precarity becomes one means by which exclusions from political 
communities are demarcated, and law is bound up in this process. Indeed, this chapter 
demonstrates, in section three, that housing precarity is cemented by other legal provisions 
and exhibits the distinct lack of importance within the liberal rights paradigm of textured and 
relational socio-economic conditions for inclusion. In making this argument the focus is on a 
consideration of R (Z & Anor) v Hackney LBC and Anor (Z v Hackney and AIHA),3 
subsequently confirmed in the Court of Appeal, which concerned a mother and her children in 
need of housing within the London Borough of Hackney and the question of reasonable 
exceptions to the duty not to discriminate when deciding who can and should be housed. 
Housing precarity was substantiated in the process by which the material need to be housed 
was made, in effect, peripheral to the justiciable issues at hand.  
 
With a focus on various provisions of the Equality Act 2010, the central argument for this 
chapter is that the rights framework that it relies upon can compound the diminished senses 
of belonging felt by those experiencing housing precarity. As an aspect of this argument, I 
suggest Z v Hackney and AIHA exemplifies the need for a duty to consider socio-economic 
rights to be introduced and factored into legal decision making, including committing to 
considering belonging as an important as an important objective of law.4 Within the challenging 
climate for public housing provision, such a duty to recognise and consider socio-economic 
rights is, it is argued, a very modest but significant step in satisfying both geographical and 
political senses of belonging. 
 
2. Ideological and legislative backdrop 
 
The story of housing provision, policy, and need is one of fluctuation, tension, and contingency 
on political and economic pressures.5 For instance, the speed and quantity of local authority 
housing built in the post-war era was also characterised by high-volume tower blocks which 
were poorly received. As such, council housing was widely disparaged, and the 1970s 
heralded the unpopularity and negative image of housing provided by the council.6 Whilst it is 
true that the provision of housing could be characterised by problems long before the 1970s, 
just as the desire for a property owning democracy was extant long before Pettitt,7 rapid and 
fundamental changes in relation to housing ideology and policy have occurred within the last 
50 years and invite particular attention. 
 
 
2 Sarah Keenan (2018) ‘A prison around your ankle and a border in every street: theorising law, space, and the 
subject’ in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, A (ed) Routledge handbook of law and theory. Abingdon: Routledge; 
Smith, D (2019) ‘The Immigration Act 2014 and the Right to Rent’ in Prabhat, D (ed) Citizenship in times of 
turmoil?: theory, practice and policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
3 R (Z & Anor) v Hackney LBC and Anor [2019] EWHC 139. 
4 A public sector duty to consider socio-economic rights is provided for in section 1 of the Equality Act 2010. 
However, successive governments have refused to bring this provision into force, as required by section 216(3). 
5 David Cowan and Morag McDermont (2006) Regulating social housing: governing decline. Abingdon: 
Cavendish. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ben Jackson (2012) ‘Property owning democracy: a short history’ in O’Neill, M, and Williamson, T (eds) 
Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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One early milestone was the enactment of the Housing Act 1974.8 This provided for Housing 
Association Grants, financing any gap between the cost of a scheme and the income housing 
associations received in rental income. This, alongside income grants which were available 
should a scheme subsequently have a revenue deficit, effectively meant housing associations 
were state guaranteed.9 The effect of Housing Association Grants was the reduction of direct 
public sector participation in the provision of housing,10 notwithstanding the financial 
guarantees the scheme provided. 
 
By the late 1970s, identifying owner-occupation as a desirable policy objective had taken hold 
in the Labour Party11 drawing it into closer convergence with the values held, perhaps less 
surprisingly, by the Conservative Party.12 When the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher, 
came to power in 1979, they brought with them an ideology of reduced state involvement in 
the provision of social services, the rhetoric of individualised and privatised responsibility, and 
a conceptualisation of inequality as a necessity for a functioning economy. A commitment to 
the ‘re-commodification of housing’13 followed. As a result, The Housing Act 1980 provided for 
the right of secure tenants to acquire the freehold of houses, or long-lease of flats, at an 
exceptionally discounted rate. The immediate effect of this policy was that it enabled those 
who were in a position to afford to purchase their council homes to do so. It also left those 
unable to afford to purchase their homes continuing to pay rent, and rent which no longer 
needed to satisfy the “no-profit rule” provided by the Housing Rents and Subsidies Act 1975, 
as this was repealed by the Housing Act 1980; local authorities were effectively then 
pressurised to increase rents to offset parallel reductions in funding from central government.14 
In other words, the Housing Act 1980 exemplified the inequality necessary to satisfy the 
commitment to a smaller state and privatisation. Furthermore, the longer-term implication of 
the right to buy policy was the significant reduction in local authority-controlled housing units.  
 
Moreover, the concern of Thatcher’s conservative government with reducing state expenditure 
on the provision of public services, whether provided directly or indirectly by the state, led to 
a curtailment of the level of funding made available via the Housing Association Grant. This 
created an unfavourable environment15 for many housing associations16 and demonstrated 
that, whilst not a ‘political football’,17 housing policy was fundamentally affected by the whims 
of changing governments and ideologies.18 Because, since 1979, the ideology of a radically 
smaller state has guided successive governments into a particular direction of travel and a 
general consensus over housing policy,19 we can look back on the Housing Association Grant 
 
8 Peter Malpass (2000), Housing Associations and housing policy: a historical perspective. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
9 David Cowan (2011) Housing law and policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Nick Gallent (1998) ‘Local housing agencies in rural Wales’ 13(1) Housing studies 59. 
11 Anne Power (1993) Hovels to highrise: state housing in Europe since 1950. London: Routledge. 
12 The 1970s also heralded a growing consensus about the approach that needed to be taken in relation to 
housing policy, and a desire held by both Labour and Conservatives to diversify housing provision away from 
reliance on local authorities (Malpass 2000). 
13 Ray Hudson (2013) ‘Thatcherism and its geographical legacies: the new map of socio-spatial inequality in the 
Divided Kingdom’ 179(4) The geographical journal 377, 379. 
14 See Elizabeth Roistacher (1984) ‘A tale of two conservatives: housing policy under Reagan and Thatcher’ 
50(4) Journal of the American planning association 485. 
15 An environment which, in subsequent years, would become incrementally more unfavourable (Jacqueline 
Smith and Michael Oxley (1997) ‘Housing investment and social housing: European comparisons’ 12(4) Housing 
studies 489; Michael Oxley (1999) ‘Institutional structure of social housing finance in the UK: recent 
developments’ 36(4) Urban studies 673). 
16 Gallent (n 10). 
17 Malpass (n 8), 157 et seq. 
18 Though, arguably, Labour and Conservative were not, historically, dogmatic about ideologies and attitudes to 
government and avoided extreme shifts from an albeit fairly value laden idea of ‘traditional orthodoxy and market 
forces’ (see eg Ian Gilmour (1992) Dancing with dogma: Britain under Thatcherism. London: Simon & Schuster, 
9). 




and the practical effects it had on the provision of housing with renewed understanding of its 
significance. In other words, the function of the Housing Association Grant was to ensure that 
local authorities were encouraged to rely upon housing associations for the provision of social 
housing. Following the election of a government determined to cut public expenditure on the 
provision of social service in 1979, the Housing Association Grant also functioned to put 
housing associations in the firing line.  
 
2.1 1979 and beyond 
 
While the section above demonstrates a convergence of approaches between the two main 
parties in the 1970s in relation to housing, and touches upon the effects of the Housing Act 
1980, this section’s distinction between pre-1979 and post-1979 is made on the basis of a 
sharp ideological difference between these political eras. From 1979, there has been an 
accelerated effort to reduce public expenditure, encourage private investment in the provision 
of public services, and the exposure of public service providers to market risk.20  Alongside 
this, there was a significant shift in rhetoric surrounding the expectations citizens could, and 
should, have of the provision of public services; a change in how ‘good’ citizenry was 
characterised; a mobilisation of rhetoric suggesting public services were a contributory factor 
to social ills;21 and a desire to limilitical strength and opposition at local government level. Each 
of these features of a particular ideology, in one way or another, has contributed to the housing 
context in which this chapter’s analysis of Z v Hackney and AIHA sits. The Housing Acts of 
1980, 1988, and 1996, and the Housing and Planning Act 2016 each contribute to the story of 
tenant acquisition of council housing, transfers of social housing stock from local authorities 
to housing associations, and compelling housing associations to seek private finance, thus 
exposing them to increased risk while also providing for a greater ability to acquire council 
housing stock. 
 
In the short-term, the immediate impact of the Housing Act 1980 was that it ensured that the 
majority of tenants in council houses had a right to buy their homes. This provision was 
reinforced by ministerial pressure being put on local authorities who refused to cooperate with 
the statutory right to buy;22 before this point, the right of tenants to buy their council properties 
had been something that councils could freely disregard. The result was an extraordinary 
acceleration of the sale of council housing. Between 1980 and 1985, 643,000 homes were 
sold, tripling the sales of council housing that had occurred throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s combined.23 While popular, ‘ideology obstructed common sense’24 and the combination 
of the right to buy with the ideological commitment to market reliance for the provision of public 
services, alongside reducing the capacity and powers of local authorities, prevented any 
reinvestment of the proceeds of right-to-buy sales in the building of more council housing 
stock.  
 
As such, the percentage of housing provided by local authorities fell from 32 percent in 1979 
to less than 25 percent within less than 10 years.25 Indeed, in the longer term, owner 
occupation rose considerably, and local authority housing provision in Great Britain has now 
fallen to just over a quarter of what it was in 1981.26 While conservative authors might identify 
this as significant statistical support for the argument that the right to buy policy is a success,27 
it undeniably contributed to the weakening of the capacity of local authorities to respond to 
 
20 See eg David Harvey (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
21 Paul Garrett (2015) ‘Words matter: deconstructing “welfare dependency” in the UK’ 3(3) Critical and radical 
social work 389. 
22 Gilmour (n 18). 
23 David Mullins and Alan Murie (2006) Housing policy in the UK. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 95. 
24 Gilmour (n 18), 144. 
25 Malpass (n 8). 
26 Mark Stephens et al (2019) UK housing review. Coventry: Chartered Institute of Housing. 
27 Peter King (2010) Housing policy transformed: the right to buy and the desire to own. Bristol: Policy Press. 
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housing needs. Perhaps more significant, particularly in relation to the later focus of this 
chapter, is the substantial rise in the proportion of housing association dwellings in Great 
Britain; there are over four and a half times more now than there were in 1981.28 This rise is a 
result of steady increases in property acquisition and building across the last 40 years. Within 
that time, there have been a number of key policies and legislative enactments that have 
needed to be responded to. The most significant of these are the provision for stock transfers 
and the Housing Act 1988. 
 
The Housing Act 1988 is perhaps the piece of legislation which best symbolises the Thatcher 
government’s approach to housing. This chapter has already touched upon the reduction in 
direct local authority provision of housing in favour of housing association provision, in 
response to the Housing Act 1974 and the benefits of the government grants that could be 
awarded to encourage housing association development. However, the expansion of housing 
associations in the 1980s was also matched by an increased anxiety among housing 
associations that the regime of Housing Association Grants to fund the costs of housing 
association builds ‘could not survive the assaults on public spending of the Thatcher 
administration. [Indeed], during the mid-1980s, associations and the Housing Corporation 
could see that public funding to associations would not continue at the level they had become 
used to’.29 The 1988 Housing Act was the legislative realisation of these concerns. It 
introduced the need for housing associations to shoulder the risk of more autonomy and more 
exposure to private finance and the housing market as opposed to being guaranteed by state 
support (Bramley 1993).30  
 
The effect of this shift in emphasis was that housing associations were not constrained by 
public finance spending rules; a larger proportion of their funding now came from private 
investment. This meant housing associations were less restricted in terms of spending power, 
meaning that more money could be spent on acquiring housing stock. This accelerated Large-
Scale Voluntary Transfers, the means by which local authorities could divest themselves of 
council housing stock, with some divesting themselves of nearly all, or sometimes all, of their 
stock. Moreover, the Housing Act 1996 provided for an additional diversity of bodies—
including companies which were not registered societies or charities31—who were eligible to 
register as social landlords and access Social Housing Grants (replacing Housing Association 
Grants). In relation to non-local authority sources of housing, the 1988 Act set in motion fewer 
constraints on how housing associations managed dwellings within their portfolios, including 
enabling the sale, lease, or shared-ownership sale of dwellings. This continued under the 1996 
Act, demonstrating that the new funding environment for housing associations was also 
coupled with a continued commitment to basing housing policy on the core value of 
homeownership, or at least simulations thereof.32 
 
Within such a public housing context—emphasising as it does the importance of diversification 
of housing providers, the diminishing stock of local authority housing, and the emphasis on 
enabling social housing tenants to eventually own their own homes33—it is important to stress 
the impact this inevitably has on a local authority’s ability to adequately and directly discharge 
any obligations to accommodate. The local authority’s duty to accommodate is provided for in 
 
28 Stephens et al (n 26). 
29 Cowan and McDermont (n 5), 91. See also McDermont (n 19). 
30 Glen Bramley (1993) ‘Quasi-markets and social housing’ in Le Grand, J, and Bartlett, W (eds) Quasi-markets 
and social policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
31 They still needed to satisfy a non-profit making criterion in order to be eligible for registration, a condition which 
was removed by the last Labour government via s.115 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. 
32 While not the focus of this chapter, it is important to emphasise the implications of the 1988 Act for rent 
controls and affordability: the increased risk placed on housing associations, and the increased autonomy they 
enjoyed was also coupled with the fact that new tenancies granted by providers of social housing would be free 
from statutory control over rents being charged. 




the Housing Act 1996, as amended, as being discharged through nominations of persons to 
be assured tenants to accommodation held by private registered providers of social housing 
or registered social landlords.34 Such nominations must be made on the basis of local authority 
allocation schemes which outline how priorities are defined and the process by which 
accommodation is allocated.35 However, the local authority management of allocations, and 
the discretion local authorities possess in the course of making allocations,36 have been 
hampered by the continual depletion of available housing during the last 40 years. Moreover, 
local authorities have little access to resources, financial or otherwise, to replenish stock and 
are compelled to sell off additional stock to fund the widening of the right to buy for housing 
association tenants.37 
 
3. Housing and precarity 
 
Within this legislative and policy context, a key question to reflect on is: what does this legal 
context mean for people? The above plotting of housing legislation milestones within the last 
50 years confirms that the focus of post-1979 governments was to diminish the role of local 
authorities in relation to housing as much as possible. Such an aim originates from the same 
place as the value placed on homeownership. Indeed, Thatcher’s ‘program of politico-
ideological war against . . . general notions of social democracy and corporatist or civic 
belonging’, continued by successive governments, ‘drove her to transform the world into a 
place where . . . “there is no society, only individuals”’.38 The policy shift from society to 
individuals can readily be brought back to the idea of the privatisation of responsibility, where 
homeownership is rhetorically framed as an economic necessity and a source of security, and 
where non-ownership is cast into the rhetorical framing of responsibility for overcoming need 
and securing provision as being one’s own.  
 
Law is a means through which to achieve this; the manifestation of, for instance, the statutory 
right to buy satisfies a yearning to promote ownership and also becomes the basis on which 
non-owners are exteriorised. The legislative provision of the right to buy, and the unequivocal 
value placed on ownership as ‘the goal of UK housing policy’,39 can be pointed to as the 
methods by which the ‘good’ homeownership can be extended to others. In parallel, it 
contributes to the mobilisation of an equivalent suggestion that the precarity people experience 
as non-owners is just deserts for not conforming to the self-reliance ostensibly enabled by 
ownership. This resonates with the common refrain of neoliberal governments that 
dependency on welfare and other public services designed to relieve poverty have the effect 
of maintaining it.40 In other words, housing policy both reasserts a supposed ‘psychological 
and social superiority of homeownership’41 and rationalises the abdication of state 
responsibility for housing provision in moralistic rhetoric about the ills of reliance on public 
services. 
 
None of the above disregards the fact that the rhetorical stress on homeownership has also 




36 See Emma Laurie (2011) ‘Filling the accountability gap in housing allocations decision making’ 31(3) Legal 
studies 442. 
37 Chris Bevan and Emma Laurie (2017) ‘The housing and planning act 2016: rewarding the aspiration of 
homeownership?’ 80(4) Modern law review 661. 
38 Anthony Marcus (2006) Where have all the homeless gone?: the making and unmaking of a crisis. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 140. 
39 David Cowan, Helen Carr, and Alison Wallace (2018) Ownership, narrative, things. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 8. 
40 See eg Kesia Reeve (2015) ‘Criminalising the poor: squatting, homelessness and social welfare’ in Fox 
O’Mahony, L, O’Mahony, D, and Hickey, R (eds) Moral rhetoric and the criminalisation of squatting: vulnerable 
Demons? Abingdon: Routledge. 
41 David Madden and Peter Marcuse (2016) In defense of housing. London: Verso, 41. 
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promotion and promise of property ownership often translates to the reality of debt secured 
against property and consequential financial precarity, with the rhetoric of personal 
responsibility personified by the practice of high personal risk. In other words, ‘ownership is 
no guarantee of stability . . . [but] a route to catastrophe’.42 This potential is encapsulated in 
Lord Diplock’s significant caveat of not just a property-owning democracy but a ‘real-property-
mortgaged-to-a-building-society-owning democracy’.43 Moreover, the emphasis on 
diminishing the state provision of housing, encapsulated in the ‘right to buy’ policy and in stock 
transfers of council housing to housing associations, creates a complex picture for those in 
blocks of flats as their desire to own their own local authority home may be bound by 
contingency and precarity as their status is as leaseholders rather than freeholders.44 
 
Notwithstanding this, there is a particular insecurity experienced by non-owners,45 and it is an 
insecurity brought on by the rhetorical insistence on ownership which draws privatisation into 
line with civic virtue and citizenship.46 The significant changes to the housing market and policy 
relating to public housing provision invite us to think through questions of precarity and 
belonging, particularly given the subject matter of Z v Hackney and AIHA discussed in the 
following section. We have seen that the stress on ownership as the ideal way in which people 
relate to their homes and communities has created an overriding focus on housing and 
economic policies which encourage homeownership47 while also diminishing the effectiveness 
and availability of affordable social housing options. This has, ultimately, been compounded 
by the deregulation of the private rental sector.48 The stress on ownership, then, precipitates 
a stress on people who are unable to own and are, thus, left either facing a private rental 
sector which is ‘liberalised’ from various forms of tenant protection or navigating social housing 
options which have gone through an accelerated period of decoupling from direct and 
democratic local authority control. 
 
3.1 Home, place, and belonging 
 
The stress identified above in relation to housing need is an aspect of ontological insecurity,49 
in which feelings of safety, of degrees of isolation or alienation, and of financial security are 
entangled with the housing market and gradations of housing tenure. In other words, security 
is rooted in suitable housing, while housing inadequacy and/or inaccessibility precipitates 
insecurity. Given that shelter, and security thereof, is a basic need, and that the sustained 
ideological shift in housing which casts ownership as responsible and an indication of good 
citizenship, this idea of insecurity can be encapsulated in Hannah Arendt’s idea that ‘necessity 
is primarily a prepolitical phenomenon’,50 where matters relating to the maintenance of life 
come before the capacity for political participation. Of course, as has been addressed above, 
homeownership does not immediately and automatically correspond to security. However, the 
commitment to the privatisation and individualisation of responsibility in relation to housing has 
been at the expense of those unable to own, and especially those in need of state support. 
 
42 Id., 77. 
43 Although, of course, it is now more accurately ‘mortgaged-to-a-bank’ because most building societies have 
demutualised. 
44 See Helen Carr (2011) ‘The right to buy, the leaseholder, and the impoverishment of ownership’ 38(4) Journal 
of law and society 519. See also Cowan, Carr, and Wallace (n 39) for an indication of how an illusion of 
‘ownership’ can also elide the complexity and potential insecurity of shared ownership as a housing option. 
45 Indeed, the principle underlined in Pettitt is that, short of establishing intentions to the contrary, non-proprietors 
within the family home can find it difficult to establish a beneficial interest in the property, notwithstanding 
contributions they may have made. As such, even in the idealised context of the privately-owned family home, 
the precarity of non-ownership is also evident. 
46 Lennart Lundqvist (1998) ‘Property owning and democracy—do the twain ever meet?’ 13(2) Housing studies 
217. 
47 Madden and Marcuse (n 41). 
48 Mullins and Murie (n 23). 
49 See Madden and Marcuse (n 41). 
50 Hannah Arendt (1998) The human condition. London: University of Chicago Press, 31. 
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Arendt’s idea resonates here not only because it suggests that a preoccupation with need is 
politically incapacitating, but one could also say it unintentionally and ironically captures the 
moralistic notion, which has been established as central to the neoliberal ideology, that those 
in need are political pariahs, too. 
 
While Arendt’s understanding of necessity limiting political capability and the capacity to 
participate within public life is primarily exemplified by political organisation in Ancient Greece, 
the tenor of this idea is equally applicable to contemporary questions relating to the 
entanglement of socio-economic status, material need, and political consciousness in Britain. 
In other words, while her consideration of political freedom afforded to those who liberated 
themselves from necessity by ruling over slaves is not wholly relevant, the idea of the tension 
between need and political freedom is. Moreover, expressly in relation to the home, Arendt 
contends that, ‘without owning a house, a man could not participate in the affairs of the world 
because he had no location in which it was properly his own’;51 it could be argued that not 
much has changed. Such a point about the importance of rootedness and a sense of place for 
political inclusion is echoed by Louise Du Toit, who argues that ‘home, belonging, having a 
sense of identity, is a prerequisite for participation (speaking and being heard) and for 
occupying a place in the public-political domain’.52 The importance of establishing ‘home’ for 
realising a sense of self is far more substantive than the importance of shelter. It includes what 
is encapsulated in ‘home’—boundedness, security, and ‘access to a time that accommodates 
a rhythm for one’s becoming’53—is still necessary. 
 
If home is a prepolitical necessity, then the limitation of conditions in which the home is 
accessible, are limitations of inclusion within the political realm which are reinforced by law. 
Such a limitation also emerges in the narrative distinction made between private and public 
housing where, for instance, there is an the emphasis on private homeownership and the less 
emotive language to describe other tenures.54 In the context of necessity as a prepolitical 
phenomenon, the liberal rights and equalities framework is insufficient to tackle the social and 
political imperative of attachments and belongings. Furthermore, the neoliberal acceleration 
of liberal individualism (ie individualisation of responsibility and associated moralisation about 
failures to take responsibility so defined) means that the rights, freedoms, and equalities 
deemed important for access to political security are conditioned by, and subsequently 
entrench, an overarching liberal paradigm. 
 
Indeed, the very notion of a property-owning democracy commits us to imagining political 
engagement being conditional on responsible private ownership. The story of housing law 
being the commitment to offering the ‘right to buy’ elides the importance of a ‘right’ to be(-long 
and -come). The following sections give an indication of where the direction of travel in housing 
law and policy traverses a rights framework which is not textured, responsive, or appreciative 
of relationality.55 They seek to, first, demonstrate this intersection through a consideration of 
Z v Hackney and AIHA. Second, the capacity for a modest move towards incorporating more 
location- and belonging-responsive considerations into housing policy and judgments is 
reflected upon, whereby access to the public-political domain is not contingent on narrow 
 
51 Id., 29-30. 
52 Louise Du Toit (2007) ‘Feminism and the ethics of reconciliation’ in Veitch, S (ed) Law and the Politics of 
Reconciliation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 211. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Craig Gurney (1999) ‘Pride and prejudice: discourses of normalisation in public and private accounts of home 
ownership’ 14(2) Housing studies 163. 
55 Bal Sokhi-Bulley (2019) ‘Rights as a distraction from “belonging”: a response to the Shamima Begum ruling’. 
28 May 2019. Critical Legal Thinking. http://criticallegalthinking.com/2019/05/28/rights-as-a-distraction-from-
belonging-a-response-to-the-shamima-begum-ruling/. Accessed 28 February 2020. Sokhi-Bulley writes, here, in 
response to questions of citizenship, rights, and belonging surrounding the revocation of Shamima Begum’s 
British citizenship. However, this work critiques the limiting and limited nature of rights, and invites us to consider 
an ethic of more substantive ‘rights’ as a condition of belonging and response-ability. 
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definitions of ‘home’ but is brought into conversation with the right to ‘home’ and the right to 
belong. 
 
4. Z, competing needs, and the question of equality 
 
In the first section of this chapter, a brief overview of the policy and legislative context 
surrounding housing law was given. This section now turns to demonstrating how various 
policy objectives and implementations have manifested themselves in relation to local 
authority housing obligations. The case of Z v Hackney and AIHA56 offers a good example of 
the accumulated effect of housing policy over the last few decades, in that the contribution of 
Hackney London Borough Council to this case is determined by the reliance on housing 
association provision, by the reduction of local authority controlled housing stock, and by the 
continual lack of (re)investment of funds in council housing stock since the 1980s. This case 
also epitomises how developments in housing policy have led to a change in people’s access 
to senses of place and belonging within a local community. Furthermore, it is argued that this 
case exemplifies the importance of establishing a rights paradigm which incorporates socio-
economic rights in the pursuit of preserving the rights of people to belong. 
 
This case concerns the housing needs of a mother (Z) and her four children. In 2017, Hackney 
LBC was ordered to house Z and her children in a property in a safe and risk-free environment, 
taking into account her specific housing needs relating to her two sons’ autism. Indeed, the 
judgment of Lord Justice Lindblom and Sir Kenneth Parker acknowledge that an appropriate 
property, in response to Z’s children’s needs, would be defined by the satisfaction of a number 
of material criteria, including separate bedrooms for the children, single-level ground floor 
accommodation with an enclosed outdoor space, and access to reserved parking. Moreover, 
appropriateness was also defined in relation to proximity to the vital familial support offered by 
Z’s mother who lived locally.57 Additionally, Z’s familiarity with the area, having lived in 
Stamford Hill her whole life, means that the need for appropriate housing to support her family 
dovetailed with her sense of being at home in the local community.  
 
The issue at hand in this case arose from the fact that all properties suitable for Z and her 
family within Stamford Hill were owned by Agudas Israel Housing Association (AIHA). 
Established in 1981, the AIHA is a housing association whose principal objective is to provide 
affordable housing for the Orthodox Jewish community. Moreover, the nature and location of 
the accommodation provided for by AIHA responds to the religious and community 
requirements of observant Haredim which cannot satisfactorily be met through other housing 
provision. The focus of AIHA provision in the Stamford Hill area of Hackney corresponds with 
the large Hasidic Haredi Jewish community in the area. Z and her family are not Haredi Jews 
and, as such, Hackney LBC did not nominate Z for allocation to any of the six AIHA properties 
which fitted Z’s criteria. The decision in Z v Hackney and AIHA had to contend, therefore, with 
both the needs of Z and her family as well as the community imperative of Haredi Jews.  
 
The judgment considered ‘the commitment and need of members of the Orthodox Jewish 
community to remain geographically proximate to that community, even if that means 
foregoing improved living conditions, bigger houses, or proper housing at all’ and that ‘the 
attachment to specific locations is not a question of convenience but effectively reflective of a 
way of life and community.’58 As such, the strength of place and community belonging 
necessitates the provision of social housing to mitigate the social disadvantages faced by 
those in the Orthodox Jewish community. While this is understandable, it is also 
 
56 This chapter primarily examines the Divisional Court case and decision, as the Court of Appeal confirms the 
judgment (with expansion on the related question of proportionality). As such, paragraph references in the 
following text relate to the Divisional Court judgment unless otherwise stated. 
57 See [38]. 
58 From Micah Gold, in reference to a focus group representing various Jewish communities in response to a 
report on the housing needs of the Jewish population in London. Quoted at [34]. 
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understandable that Z and her family felt equally strong familial, social, and practical ties with 
Stamford Hill and they too had profound material needs in relation to housing. On the one 
hand, material need is elicited by the strength of community attachment and, on the other 
hand, community attachment is contingent on material need, such is the manifold texture of 
the relationship of home and belonging. 
 
The legislative and policy context runs through this case and, indeed, the judgment itself 
confirms that ‘social housing is under severe pressure in Hackney, as elsewhere in the 
country. There has been a rise in the private sector, a decline in owner occupation, increasing 
demand for social housing as well as dramatic cuts in central government funding’.59 The fact 
that this rueful passage precedes, obviously, the judgment in favour of one of two parties 
encapsulates the precarity of non-homeowners. The ideological commitment to the 
privatisation of housing, and the corresponding limitations on appropriate levels of council 
housing, lead to indeterminacy in relation to the local authority, too. The social housing 
environments find local authorities in positions where they must rely upon registered social 
landlords when discharging their housing obligations60 with ‘no legal right or power, even if 
[they] were so minded, to insist that [a registered social landlord] jettison its lawful 
arrangements and to make allocation decisions without regard to those arrangements’.61 The 
uncertainty faced by concerned parties within the context of housing allocation is perfectly 
exhibited in Z v Hackney and AIHA, where the determinations on questions of housing need, 
and of the lawfulness of the conduct of a registered social landlord, are deferred to the realm 
of the Equality Act 2010. 
 
4.1 The matter of discrimination 
 
Perhaps the most widely understood aspect of the Equality Act 2010 is the consolidation of 
numerous pieces of anti-discrimination law, revolving around protected characteristics. 
Alongside, for example, age, race, sex, and sexual orientation, section 4 of the Equality Act 
2010 provides that religion and belief are to be considered protected characteristics. Following 
this outline the Equality Act 2010 establishes how and when discrimination based on protected 
characteristics is unlawful; section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 defines discrimination as any 
instance where, ‘because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably that A treats 
or would treat others.’ Importantly, in the context of Z v Hackney and AIHA, this also captures 
favourable treatment of parties because of their protected characteristic(s). As such, the 
argument presented by Z’s counsel was that AIHA had discriminated against Z and her family 
on the basis that they were not members of the Haredi community. 
 
Furthermore, section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that anyone ‘concerned with the 
provision of a service to the public or a section of the public . . . must not discriminate [on the 
basis of protected characteristics] against a person requiring the service by not providing the 
person with the service.’ As the local authority responsible for managing housing allocations 
for those eligible for assistance, under a scheme which relies upon agreements with registered 
social landlords in order for it to make nominations to them in lieu of its own properties, 
Hackney was providing a service within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. As such, its 
unwillingness to nominate Z for a suitable AIHA property was argued by Z’s counsel to 
contravene section 29, as was AIHA’s positive discrimination in favour of the Orthodox Jewish 
community as an organisation exercising a public function. 
 
The counterarguments of Hackney and AIHA depended upon exceptions included in the 
Equality Act 2010 which have the effect of rendering some discrimination lawful. Section 
158(2) provides that the Equality Act 2010 does not prohibit a person or organisation from 
 
59 See [19]. 
60 Provided for by s.159(c) Housing Act 1996. 
61 Quoted at [114]. 
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taking action which seeks to overcome or minimise a disadvantage connected to protected 
characteristics. Moreover, section 193 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that, so long as 
restricting benefits to persons who share a protected characteristic is a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim, then a charity is not in contravention of the Act. As such, AIHA 
argued both that the positive action they were taking in relation to the provision of housing 
was necessary in relation to the disadvantages faced by members of the Orthodox Jewish 
community, and that, as a charity, AIHA’s principal purpose to provide housing for Orthodox 
Jews was, in any case, permissible under section 193. 
 
The Divisional Court agreed with AIHA, deciding that they were not in contravention of the 
Equality Act 2010 and, because their policy was determined to be lawful, neither were 
Hackney as they could not compel a co-operating housing association to dismiss their own 
lawful arrangements. The Court acknowledged the substantial challenges faced by members 
of the Orthodox Jewish community both in the observance of their faith, and also in relation to 
antisemitic violence and the very real senses of unbelonging felt by Orthodox Jews when living 
within mixed communities.62 As such, the preferential treatment of a group on the basis of a 
protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 was not a sufficient ground for Z to seek 
a review of the housing decision concerning her and her children. This was confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal. Notwithstanding an outstanding appeal to the Supreme Court, this case 
raises a number of points relating to the context in which housing decisions are made, the 
extent to which certain rights are protected over others, and questions about the importance 
of community and placeness bound up in a speculative right to belong. 
 
4.2 Extending the rights landscape 
 
The preceding text, journeying through various legislative milestones, was an essential part of 
setting a particular scene. Similarly, the use of Z v Hackney and AIHA has exemplified the 
tensions which can arise when vulnerable people have to navigate a housing system 
characterised by the distribution of responsibilities to housing associations which might each 
have their own distinct pressures and purposes that conflict with the needs of those who 
require accommodation. Each of the sections above is effectively preamble to a wish which is 
unlikely to come true anytime soon: that wider questions of socio-economic rights are more 
vigorously bound up in decisions relating to, among other things, housing. 
 
The question for this section is, however, not necessarily what effect any enactment of the 
duty to have regard to socio-economic inequalities would have on a decision such as Z v 
Hackney and AIHA. Rather, it is to establish how questions relating to belonging, geographical 
attachment, and familiarity would feature in various decision-making processes relating to the 
provision of services, while also underlining the fundamental problems with the public housing 
climate. In other words, this chapter does not suggest that the enactment of section 1 of the 
Equality Act 2010 would have led to a successful claim for judicial review in Z v Hackney and 
AIHA. Indeed, such a decision, grounded in the legislative and principled imperative to act 
positively to alleviate disadvantages faced by certain groups, is sound. However, a public duty 
to give due regard to reducing socio-economic disadvantage would mean that a local 
authority’s approach to, for instance, housing would be justiciable. 
 
Scotland, as the only nation within the United Kingdom to have introduced such a public sector 
duty,63 gives an example of how the duty to give due regard to reducing socio-economic 
disadvantage can be defined. Guidance produced in advance of the April 2018 introduction of 
the duty obligates public bodies to ‘actively consider, at an appropriate level, what more they 
can do to reduce the inequalities of outcome, caused by socio-economic disadvantage, in any 
 
62 See [33]. 
63 The Welsh Government have recently (in January 2020) closed a consultation on how to deliver a socio-
economic duty in relation to Wales. 
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strategic decision-making or policy development context’.64 While there is, of course, every 
possibility that such phrasing leaves scope to think of such duty as an empty gesture, the 
commitment both to assessing policy proposals for socio-economic impact and the broadness 
of the definition of socio-economic disadvantage to include various community and locality 
considerations is worth reflecting on. 
 
Indeed, in relation to the planning and provision of housing, the case study modelled by the 
Scottish Government guidance incorporates the importance of addressing the location of 
housing in addition to volume, and explains that consideration of adequate access to public 
services is a vital part of community creation. As such, it demonstrates an understanding of 
the link between community, locatedness, and socio-economic need. Given that Z v Hackney 
and AIHA turns on competing needs and senses of home within a community, this is an 
important point to reflect upon. This contest was resolved on the basis that the court accepted 
that the socio-economic disadvantages and requirements (such as the importance of close 
community), alongside the antisemitic abuse faced by Haredim, tied to a protected 
characteristic was sufficient justification for the positive discriminatory policy of AIHA to only 
offer accommodation to Orthodox Jews. 
 
Of interest here is the submission on behalf of Z that, while many members of the Orthodox 
Jewish community have acute housing needs (which, ultimately, led to the court determining 
that AIHA’s policy was permitted by s.158(2) of the Equality Act 2010), ‘members of the 
Orthodox Jewish community did not suffer any relevant disadvantage, or have any relevant 
need, that was not also shared generally by applicants for social housing in Hackney’.65 
Indeed, it was additionally pointed out that other applicants to Hackney’s allocation scheme 
may have needs which surpassed these of the Orthodox Jewish community. As such, the 
question which can be asked is whether, in a world where s.1 of the Equality Act 2010 was 
enacted, the questions related to socio-economic disadvantage, need, and importance of 
community, would be justiciable issues in their own right and not only in relation to protected 
characteristics? If so, against whom? 
 
As mentioned above, this case introduced competing entanglements of material need, on the 
one hand, and questions of home, belonging, and community attachment, on the other hand. 
As such, it is insufficient to suggest that the material need of one party outweighed the material 
need to which the other party was responding to in its discriminating policy. Use of s.1 would 
circumvent questions relating to s.13, and the need to determine whether or not a co-operating 
housing association had a justifiable exception to the law, enabling it to discriminate on the 
basis of a protected characteristic. Rather, at issue would be Hackney’s strategic approach to 
housing. For instance, the stress on a definition of socio-economic disadvantage which 
includes lack of access to basic goods and services, as well as notions of social exclusion, 
corresponds with the compound necessity of ‘belonging’ as a socio-economic right introduced 
above in the consideration of Arendt and Du Toit and in the indications given by the Fairer 
Scotland Duty guidance. 
 
Of course, one hindrance to any would-be enactment of a socio-economic duty which took in 
the importance of locatedness and access to services is a housing environment characterised 
over the last forty years by diminishment of local authority housing stock and by the sustained 
socio-economic and housing pressures being faced by people requiring support of public 
services. Indeed, in relation to Hackney, the position is stark: 
 
About 13,000 households are currently registered under Hackney's scheme for the 
allocation of social housing. In 2016, Hackney allocated only 1,229 properties for social 
 
64 Scottish Government (2018) The fairer Scotland duty. 27 March 2018. https://www.gov.scot/publications/fairer-
scotland-duty-interim-guidance-public-bodies/. Accessed 18 February 2020, 17. 
65 Quoted at [60]. 
117 
 
housing. Again, there is no evidence that the imbalance is likely to decrease markedly 
in the foreseeable future.66 
 
It would also be impossible to expect that a commitment to a socio-economic duty would 
comprehensively and adequately tackle the ideological incursion into social housing which 
encourages (simulations of) private homeownership and motivates chronic underfunding. 
However, within this context, and within the context of reliance on co-operating housing 
associations for service provision, it seems important to ascertain what effects a justiciable 
socio-economic duty could have on housing and planning. In order to do so, we can take 
Hackney, and the situation in Z v Hackney and AIHA, as an example. 
 
It is important to note that Stamford Hill is a large district of Hackney and, as has already been 
mentioned, all properties which would have been suitable for Z and her family within the area 
were managed by AIHA. Moreover, in the years relevant to Z v Hackney and AIHA, AIHA let 
50% of all four-bedroom properties across the borough of Hackney. In light of any potential 
enactment of a duty to ‘when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its 
functions, have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to 
reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage,’67 a lack 
of strategy to establish a diversity of stock from providers whose charitable function is to 
provide for particular groups within a local community could be challenged. Of course, this 
would only result in a very modest adjustment to housing outcomes and, given the decades 
of radical shifts in the capacities of local authorities in relation to housing, would be unlikely to 
result in sharp enhancements in allocations. However, it would gesture towards factoring in 
the importance of community attachment and social location—the right to belong—more 
generally, and not just within the confines of establishing legitimate exceptions for those with 




It is impossible to offer an adequate summary of nearly 50 years of housing law bound up in 
significant changes in policy and attitude. What the above account of changes does is to 
develop a story of the challenging housing climate, and the severely reduced capacity for local 
authorities to provide housing to those in need of public support. This account reflects on how 
much the ideological insistences about privatising and individualising responsibility, and the 
preoccupation with ownership, are weaved into this legislation. One consequence of both the 
ideological emphasis on ownership and the increasingly limited capacity of local authorities to 
satisfy the continued (and, in many cases, growing) demand to support accommodation for 
those in need is displacement. In relation to the former, this displacement is from the approved 
political and rhetorical community, and this community is buttressed by legislative enactments. 
The displacement experienced in relation to the latter is socio-geographical; as demand for 
housing outweighs available homes, people are prohibited from locations to which they are 
tied, by family, friends, support, and indefinable senses of attachment. Both displacements 
are demonstrated in Z v Hackney and AIHA. The case turned on the lack of appropriate 
housing for Z and her family, who are not Haredim, and the contested practice of a co-
operating housing association to primarily provide housing only to Haredim.  
 
The resulting decision in favour of Hackney and AIHA meant, of course, that Z was not 
accommodated in an AIHA home in her local area or near her familial support network. 
Furthermore, the decision rested on the consideration of a rights framework which does not—
yet, or may never—provide for a duty to consider substantial issues of socio-economic 
disadvantage (including lack of access to services and social exclusions). The case of Z v 
Hackney and AIHA demonstrates that the Equality Act 2010 delimits concessions and 
 
66 Quoted at [73]. 
67 s.1 Equality Act 2010, c.15 
118 
 
considerations, which are certainly justifiable, for particular groups on the basis of socio-
economic need, but this is not universal. As such, the precarity felt by those displaced from a 
community which emphasises home ownership as the expression of ‘good’ citizenship is 
manifested in the fact that the question of housing obligations and need is referred to the 
domain of liberal rights and equalities law. In reflecting on the pressing needs of people to 
have both shelter and a sense of community attachment, and on the demanding funding and 
policy context for local authorities in relation to housing, this paper concludes with a modest 
argument that the enactment of a socio-economic duty would, in the very least, ensure that 
locatedness and belonging are given regard to in strategic decisions about housing 








How much do you need to know? Perspectives on strict 




In 1969 the House of Lords were asked to consider whether the wording of a statute created 
an “absolute offence”. Stephanie Lavinia Sweet was a schoolteacher who rented out rooms in 
a farmhouse to students. It was accepted that she only visited the farmhouse occasionally and 
that she kept a room in the farmhouse for her own use. The appeal concerned three points of 
law: 
(i) Whether section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 creates an absolute offence 
(ii) What, if any, mental element is involved in the offence; and … (iii) Whether on the 
facts found a reasonable bench of Magistrates, properly directing their minds as to the 
law, could have convicted the Appellant. 
Stephanie Sweet had been convicted of being concerned in the management of premises and 
permitting those premises to be used for the smoking of cannabis. The House of Lords had to 
consider whether the junior courts had erred in their interpretation of the law. 
This case is seminal because it considers the minimal fault elements required for criminal 
responsibility. The thread that connects many of the cases that acknowledge Sweet v Parsley 
as a precedent is that they are central to the debates surrounding criminal responsibility in the 
last fifty years. It is possible from the cases to gain a perspective of the view taken by the 
senior courts of criminal responsibility; and on occasion the politics and the policies that 
underpin the definition of responsibility. This chapter will examine and critique the reasoning 
adopted by the courts in interpreting and developing the criminal law. 
1. Introduction 
It is sometimes difficult to write a chapter which precisely fits the brief of the book of which it 
will form a part. But not so in this instance: two cases almost fifty years apart dealt very 
differently with the meaning of words in statutes. The issue, in both cases, was what mens rea 
elements should be read into a criminal law statute by a court interpreting and applying the 
law? Sweet v Parsley1 was a landmark decision of the House of Lords given in January 1969. 
Nearly fifty years later in 2018, the interpretation of words in a statute was once more before 
the UK Supreme Court in Lane and Letts.2  
The issues considered in Sweet v Parsley raise many questions that are still pertinent. Should 
mens rea always be part of the offence definition in serious crimes? Is what the accused 
thought in relation to the criminal act relevant or, alternatively, should the judgement of 
whether their act is criminal be made objectively, after the event?  Should someone be 
convicted of a serious criminal offence when they could not prevent the outcome as they have 
 
1 Sweet v Parsley [1969] 1 All ER, 347, [1969] 2 WLR 470. 
2 R v Sally Lane and John Letts [2018] UKSC 36, [2018] 1 WLR, 3647. 
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no knowledge of relevant events? How should a statute that is drafted to catch a large class 
of people as potential criminals be interpreted and applied by the courts? These questions are 
even more pertinent when the outcome that is criminalised is only one of a number of possible 
outcomes that could happen as a result of the accused person’s action. That is, what is 
criminalised is not an actual harm but rather engaging in behaviour that might bring about a 
harm; a task made more complex when that harm is not clearly defined in the criminal statute. 
The precise nature of this problem will become clearer as the facts of Sweet v Parsley and 
Lane and Letts are considered. 
Analysing the reasoning in these two cases enables us to obtain an understanding of the 
perspective taken by members of the senior courts on criminal responsibility; and to see that 
on occasion government policy, parliamentary politics and social pressures affect the 
definition of criminal responsibility. This chapter will examine these issues and critique the 
reasoning adopted in legislating, interpreting, and developing criminal law.  
2. Starting at the beginning. 
In 1968 the House of Lords were asked to consider whether the wording of a statute created 
an ‘absolute offence’. Stephanie Sweet, a schoolteacher, rented out rooms in a farmhouse 
near Oxford to university students. Sweet was convicted of being concerned in the 
management of premises and permitting those premises to be used for the smoking of 
cannabis. At her trial it was acknowledged that Sweet only visited the farm occasionally to 
collect rents and that, very occasionally, she stayed overnight in a room that she kept for her 
own use. At her trial it was stated that: 
she did not enter the rooms of the tenants except by invitation, and she had no reason 
to go into their rooms. … She had no knowledge whatever the house was being used 
for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin.3 
Sweet lost her job as a schoolteacher as a result of the conviction.4 
The House of Lords was asked to consider whether the junior courts had erred in their 
interpretation of the law. In particular, they had to decide whether for the conviction to stand, 
it should have been demonstrated that Sweet knew that drugs were being used by those living 
at the farmhouse.  
The case report makes it clear that the Law Lords had concerns about any legislation that 
created a serious criminal offence and imposed criminal sanctions without need for proof of 
mens rea. Lord Reid had no doubt that the offence, being concerned in the management of 
premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis contrary to s 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1965,5 was a serious offence. The issue before the House of Lords was whether the Act 
created an absolute offence.6 
 
3 [1969] 1 All ER, 347, 349. 
4 The Court’s Sympathy with Miss Sweet, The Times, 24th April 1968 15. 
5 s 5 Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 stated:  
If a person – (a) being the occupier of any premises, permits those premises to be used for the purposes of 
smoking cannabis or cannabis resin or dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin (whether by sale or otherwise): or 
(b) is concerned in the management of premises used for any such purpose aforesaid; he shall be guilty of an 
offence against this Act. 
6 Absolute liability has no precise definition. Ormerod, D and Laird, K, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal 
Law (15th edn, Oxford, OUP, 2018) 146 gives the following explanation: ‘The label “absolute offence” is best 
reserved for those rare situations where the offence criminalizes D whose conduct has caused an actus reus 
with no mens rea and who is precluded from relying on defences.’ 
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There was a relevant legal precedent. The House of Lords had the previous year, in Warner,7 
considered the issue of mens rea in relation to another drugs offence.8 The appellant, Warner, 
picked up two packages from a café, and a subsequent police search of his van revealed that 
one of the packages contained perfume and the other contained amphetamine sulphate, a 
prohibited drug. At his trial Warner claimed that he had expected both packages to contain 
perfume. The case was appealed to the House of Lords. The issue before the court was 
whether the trial judge had erred when he directed the jury that this alleged lack of knowledge 
could only go to mitigation of sentence. In his opinion Lord Reid said: 
I understand that this is the first case in which this House has had to consider whether 
a statutory offence is an absolute offence in the sense that the belief, intention, or state 
of mind of the accused is immaterial and irrelevant. It appears from the authorities that 
the law on this matter is in some confusion, there being at least two schools of thought.9 
The first of these two schools of thought was that mens rea was an element of every common 
law crime. Thus, even when Parliament chose to replace the common law offence by statute, 
the new offence should be interpreted as recognising the importance of mens rea in 
establishing guilt or innocence. The second school of thought was that new statutory offences 
regulating business practice could impose absolute liability. Regulatory offences of this type 
are referred to by Lord Reid as ‘less serious offences.’10 
The House of Lords upheld Warner’s conviction. They found that he was liable by virtue of his 
possession of the prohibited drugs. However, the Law Lords’ opinions on the matter of 
absolute liability were divided. Lord Reid, who was to give the leading opinion in Sweet was 
firm. He argued that there was, in the case of more serious offences, no reason to expect that 
the wording of a statute excluded mens rea. He accepted that for some considerable time, in 
the case of minor offences of a regulatory nature, it had been the practice of Parliament to use 
absolute liability to protect the public. He described these lesser offences as not attracting the 
‘disgrace of criminality’.11 
Reid in Warner referred to the line of cases that accept the right of Parliament to legislate to 
impose absolute liability saying: 
The presumption is, that mens rea, an evil intention or a knowledge of the wrongfulness 
of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to 
be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-
matter with which it deals, and both must be considered.12 
Reid went on to say that the appellate committee had heard no evidence in the appeal of a 
‘truly criminal offence where absence of mens rea was not a defence’.13  
Something of the meaning of ‘truly criminal’ can be gleaned from Reid’s reference to R v 
Tolson and to a mention in that case of the offence entailing severe and degrading 
punishment.14 The reasoning Reid employed is that unfair convictions for serious criminal 
 
7 R v Warner [1969] 2 AC 256, [1968] 2 All ER, 356. 
8 The Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964, s 1(1), provides that ‘it shall not be lawful for a person to have in 
his possession’ any of the specified substances unless in specified circumstances.’ 
9 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 360. 
10 Ibid. 
11 ibid 
12 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 361 citing Wright J in Sherass v de Rutzen [1895–99] All ER, 169.  
13 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 363. 




offences taint a person’s reputation, have a stigmatizing effect and may adversely affect 
employment opportunities. For this reason, Reid was of the view that Parliament could not 
have intended the creation of an absolute offence in terms of possessing a prohibited drug.15 
Reid did not accept that the use of discretion not to prosecute such an offence would cure the 
ill of imposing absolute liability for a serious criminal offence: - 
I dissent emphatically from the view that Parliament can be supposed to have been of 
the opinion that it could be left to the discretion of the police not to prosecute, or that if 
there was a prosecution justice would be served by only a nominal penalty being 
imposed.16 
Nonetheless, Reid upheld Warner’s conviction, on the grounds the conviction was not unsafe. 
This is because, according to Reid, the error in the trial judge’s explanation of the law had no 
effect: ‘Taking into account the prevarications of the appellant before he produced his final 
story and the whole circumstances, I cannot believe that any reasonable jury would accept 
that story.’17 Reid’s conclusion is fairly understandable given that the trial judge had asked the 
jury to indicate whether they found that Warner knew that there were amphetamines in the 
parcel. The trial jury found that Warner did know. Reid’s opinion dissented from the majority 
in that he found that the direction given by the trial judge was flawed. In his view the offence 
was not one of absolute liability and therefore, the trial judge’s instruction to the jury was in 
error. 
3. How much mens rea is needed to secure a conviction? 
Given his statements in Warner it is not surprising that Lord Reid in his opinion in Sweet was 
sympathetic to Sweet’s predicament. 
Her appeal posed three questions on points of law: 
(i) Whether section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 creates an absolute offence 
(ii) What, if any, mental element is involved in the offence; and … (iii) Whether on the 
facts found a reasonable bench of Magistrates, properly directing their minds as to the 
law, could have convicted the Appellant. 
Reid viewed the conviction as unsafe. In Warner he commented on pressure on Parliament to 
formulate laws that would, by requiring little mens rea in relation to the act proscribed by law, 
make it easier to gain convictions. Reid found such an approach abhorrent for more serious 
crimes:  
One or other House of Parliament has been asked on more than one occasion in recent 
years to approve of some change in the law which would increase the chance of 
convicting offenders, but has refused because it would or might also imperil the 
innocent. Although I would not entirely agree, I think that the general view still is that it 
 
there is nothing in the mere form of words used in the enactment now under consideration to 
prevent the application of what is certainly the normal rule of construction in the case of a statute 
constituting an offence entailing severe and degrading punishment. If the words are not conclusive in 
themselves, the reasonableness or otherwise of the construction contended for has always been 
recognised as a matter fairly to be taken into account. 
15 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 365. 
16 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 366 
17 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 370 
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is better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be 
convicted.18 
Press coverage and the social reaction to Sweet’s conviction 
Miss Sweet won her appeal but not before she had had a considerable fight to gain a hearing 
in the House of Lords. The biography of Rose Heilbron QC, who acted for Sweet, gives the 
background to Sweet’s appeal to the House of Lords.19 The Divisional Court initially refused 
Sweet leave to appeal to the House of Lords, ‘on the grounds that the charge was one of strict 
liability and knowledge and intent were not relevant’.20 But Sweet was not without influential 
friends, most notably Robert Graves, the famous novelist and poet.21 Graves wrote an article 
published on the front page of the Sunday Times arguing that the imposition of absolute liability 
in such cases was profoundly unjust. The Sunday Times leader on the same day, 14th April 
1968, argued that the real issue was the drafting of Section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act:  
The case has serious implications at a time when many more people must be in danger 
of prosecution on the same grounds as Miss Sweet, and with as little culpability. They 
should not be branded as criminals before the Law Lords have had a chance to make 
sense out of bad drafting.22  
The fuss did not stop there; four MPs saw the Lord Chancellor and another MP, Emlyn Hooson 
QC, pressed for the law to be urgently reviewed by the Attorney General.  Miss Sweet said: ‘I 
am determined to take this as far as I can. I can’t teach in England and I would find it extremely 
difficult to get a visa for the US, where I’d planned to go in about a year.’23 Robert Graves lent 
money to fund Sweet’s appeal. Graves approached Rose Heilbron, a leading QC, to ask her 
to represent Sweet in her appeal against conviction. Unsurprisingly the Divisional Court bowed 
to the pressure and the appeal to the House of Lords was permitted. On the 23rd January 
1969, the House of Lords unanimously allowed Miss Sweet’s appeal. 
4. Attitudes to legislating criminal offences. 
What should or should not be criminalised and how the law framing culpability should be stated 
in legislation is a matter of dispute. In terms of regulatory offences, from parking to pollution 
offences, there exists a body of legislation silent as to the need for mens rea to be proved for 
guilt to be established. The focus of the arguments concerning mens rea and criminalisation 
tends to be on the more serious criminal offences. This is for the simple and obvious reason 
that conviction of a more serious criminal offence has huge implications for personal wellbeing. 
Conviction of a serious criminal offence entails, in all likelihood, loss of freedom, livelihood, 
reputation, and home, and the stigmatising effect of a guilty verdict. 
Therefore, one argument made by jurists is that the law, whilst being normative in identifying 
and criminalising serious harms to society, must also provide justice by allowing those who 
are not culpable to escape liability. The issue in Miss Sweet’s case was that the law was 
framed in a manner that meant, as interpreted by the Woodstock Magistrates, she was guilty 
of a crime that she could not have avoided committing. 
 
18 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 366. 
19 Heibron, H, Rose Heilbron: Legal Pioneer of the 20th Century (Oxford, Hart 2018). 
20 Ibid 275-6. 
21 Robert Graves 1895 – 1985 for more information see Seymour, M, Robert Graves, Life on the Edge, (London: 
Doubleday 1995). 
22 Ibid 277. 
23 Ibid 278. 
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In Sweet v Parsley Lord Reid criticised the manner of framing the legislation because it risked 
overcriminalisation.24 The question then becomes, what should be the limits of the criminal 
law? This will become a particularly pertinent question when addressing the issues raised by 
the case of Letts and Lane. It is worth considering the facts prior to further considering the 
issue of criminalisation. The meaning attributed to the wording of the statute would have great 
significance to Sally Lane and John Letts. If an objective meaning was attributed to them, they 
might be liable under section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for sending money to their son who 
had been nicknamed by the press ‘Jihadi Jack’, and who had travelled to Syria in 2014.25 
5. The meaning to be attributed to reasonable cause to suspect. 
R v Lane and Letts reached the Supreme Court because Sally Lane and John Letts challenged 
the Crown Court’s interpretation of the meaning of the words ‘has reasonable cause to 
suspect’ in s 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000.26 Was the meaning to be attributed to these words 
a subjective or objective meaning? That is, did Lane and Letts have to actually suspect that 
the money might be used to fund terrorism, or was the assessment of reasonable cause for 
suspicion to be assessed objectively by the jury on the basis of the information available to 
Lane and Letts? 
The appeal was based, inter alia, on the presumption expressed in Sweet v Parsley that in 
serious crimes ‘the offence-creating provision ought to be construed as requiring an element 
of a guilty mind (mens rea) … meaning that an accused must actually suspect the money may 
be put to terrorist use’.27 Moreover, it was argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in 
interpreting the Act by looking at the context in which it was passed, placing too much 
emphasis on the fact that ‘the statute was designed to protect the public against the grave 
threat of terrorism’. The argument put was that despite this being the purpose of the Act, it 
was not a reason ‘to dilute the presumption.’ The presumption being that ‘an offence-creating 
provision ought to be construed as requiring an element of a guilty mind’. 28 
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court was given by Lord Hughes who firmly asserted 
that the role of the court in interpreting the provision was to give expression to the will of 
Parliament in passing the legislation. If Parliament decided that the ‘gravity of the threat of 
terrorism justified attaching criminal responsibility’ 29 then that was the will of Parliament. 
Degrees of blameworthiness could be reflected in sentencing. Hughes denied that this 
interpretation resulted in an offence of strict liability, though he admitted that ‘an accused can 
commit this offence without knowledge or actual suspicion that that the money might be used 
for terrorist purposes.’30  
Hughes assertion would seem questionable, his interpretation of statute law would seem pretty 
close to the definition of strict liability in previous case law and in legal textbooks: ‘Crimes 
which do not require mens rea or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus 
 
24 For a fuller argument in terms of overcriminalisation see Husak, D, Overcriminalisation, (Oxford, OUP 2008). 
25‘Jihadi Jack’ parents funded terrorism: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-oxfordshire-48676894>.   
26 s17. Funding Arrangements.  
 A person commits an offence if – 
(a) he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other 
property is made available or is to be made available to another, and 
(b) he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of 
terrorism. 
27 [2018] UKSC 36 [7], [2018] 1 WLR 3647[7]. 
28 Ibid all quotations. 




reus are known as offences of strict liability.’31 Certainly, this definition would appear to impose 
strict liability, as the term was previously interpreted in Warner and in Sweet v Parsley. The 
decision in Lane and Letts raises many questions about the ambit of criminal offences and 
about how statute law should be interpreted, and criminal liability imposed. 
6. Press Coverage  
The press coverage surrounding the subsequent trial of Lane and Letts in 2019, at the Old 
Bailey, is not unsympathetic. The Telegraph reported the comments of the trial judge Nicholas 
Hilliard QC to Lane and Letts: ‘It is one thing for parents to be optimistic about their children’ 
but ‘you did lose sight of the realities.’ Two different perspectives are covered in the Telegraph 
report: those of the police, citing the comments of Detective Chief Superintendent Kath Barnes 
that ‘It is not for us to choose which laws to follow’, although she believed that the accused 
‘were not bad people’, who would be going through agonies because of the choices made by 
their son. The other perspective was given by Letts’ barrister, Henry Blaxland QC, who is 
reported to have told the court that the prosecution of John Letts was ‘inhumane to the point 
of being cruel.’32 Sky News reported that Letts and Lane had ‘turned a blind eye to warnings 
by police and charity workers that the money could inadvertently fund terrorism.’ Sky reported 
that the couple had been desperate to persuade their son to return home and had attempted 
to send money to achieve that end.33 
Following their conviction BBC News reported that a statement was read by the solicitor acting 
for Lane and Letts. In the statement it was made clear that their primary aim was to get their 
son home. They had tried to work with the police to achieve this aim – but were prosecuted. 
The BBC reported that ‘Letts and Lane criticised the government for their lack of action in 
helping Jack and others, return to the UK from Syria.’34 One judge is reported as commenting 
that Lane and Letts were ‘two perfectly decent people … in custody because of the love of 
their child.’35 
Public opinion did not seem to support Lane and Letts’ view of government inaction. In late 
2017 Opinion ran an online poll that showed 77% of respondents felt that jihadist fighters 
should be prevented from returning to the UK; 42% believing that such fighters should be 
stripped of British citizenship. The survey showed that 77% of respondents believed that the 
fighters could never be reintegrated into British society. This antipathy in the country was 
echoed by politicians. Rory Stewart, then Foreign Office and International Development 
Minister, was quoted as saying ‘We have to be serious about the fact these people are a 
serious danger to us, and unfortunately the only way of dealing with them will be, in almost 
every case, to kill them.’36 
This does not suggest that society would be sympathetic to the plight of the parents of ‘Jihadi 
Jack’ or to their fight to repatriate him. Nor does the reaction to the request for repatriation of 
the teenager Shamima Begum who is referred to in the media as an IS bride.37 Begum was 
 
31 Ormerod, D and Laird, K (2018) 143. 
32 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/21/jihadi-jacks-parents-found-guilty-funding-terrorism/ >. 
33 <https://news.sky.com/story/jihadi-jack-parents-john-letts-and-sally-lane-guilty-of-funding-terrorism-
11744699>. 






stripped of her British citizenship for her actions in travelling to Syria and marrying a terrorist.38 
39 
Such reactions raise questions about how a jury would reach an objective view of criminal 
liability when applying the statute’s wording ‘has reasonable cause to suspect that it … may 
be used for the purposes of terrorism’ to the facts of a case. Juries are specifically chosen for 
the role of finders of fact as part of society and therefore taken to reflect its views. If society is 
not sympathetic to repatriation then a jury may objectively interpret the phrase, ‘he knows or 
has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism’, in 
a different manner to that of the parent desperate to bring their son home. 
7. Thinking about knowledge and reasonable cause to suspect as a culpability 
requirement 
Most criminal law textbooks focus on two mens rea states: intention and recklessness, which 
are used to describe blameworthy states of mind. The requirements of knowledge are usually 
given less prominence.40 It is worth stressing that the discussion of knowledge as a mens rea 
state differs between Sweet v Parsley and R v Lane and Letts. In Sweet it relates to 
circumstances that existed at the time of the crime. Whereas in Lane and Letts the ‘knowledge’ 
is surmise as to circumstances that may have occurred had all the money reached their son.  
The press reports of the trial of Lane and Letts describe the view of the court and of the  
prosecutors as being that the parents lost sight of reality or, at worst, turned a blind eye to the 
possibility that (a reasonable person might suspect) the money that they sent, and planned to 
send, to their son might be used for the purposes of terrorism. Such a suggestion is a long 
way from actual knowledge that a set of circumstances will occur. Furthermore, their actions 
are not linked to any known outcome but rather to a possible outcome – ‘might be used’.  
In Lane and Letts, it seems clear that for the accused funding terrorism was not their aim. 
Their primary aim is acknowledged by the court: and it is to get their son home safely. The 
outcomes of their action, if all their payments had reached their son successfully, is in the 
realms of speculation. Speculating on circumstances that might have occurred is very 
imprecise as a way of determining criminal responsibility: a range of things might have 
happened had their son received the money they wished to send.  
8. Broadening the base of potential criminal liability. 
How far should the government, though Parliament, proceed with broadening the base of 
criminal liability? How far should prosecutors, defenders and the courts be able to speculate 
upon the possible outcome of a person’s behaviour when no actual harm has to have resulted?  
Letts and Lane were convicted of a terrorism offence. Terrorism legislation is often introduced 
in response to horrific events. A reading of Hansard reveals that the Counter Terrorism Bill in 
2018 was introduced in the House of Lords using emotive rhetoric reminding Parliament of the 




39 Begum’s appeal against the order removing her British citizenship was heard by SIAC (Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission) and was rejected see Appeal No: SC/163/2019, 7 February 2020. 
40 Though two exceptions are worth mentioning: Ormerod, D and Laird, K (2018) 154-120 and Wilson W., 
Criminal Law, (6th edn, Pearson 2017) 148-50. 
41 Lords Hansard vol 793 3.17pm 9th October 2018 per Baroness Williams of Trafford: 




offences created by the Bill, which as enacted criminalises the sharing of certain photographs, 
where there is a reasonable suspicion that the ‘person is a supporter of a proscribed 
organisation’. Baroness Warsi questioned the need for the new legislation when existing laws 
were, in her view, sufficient to protect society. She was particularly concerned about the lack 
of consultation regarding the creation of the new offence. The offence has now been enacted 
as s 2(3) of the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.42 Baroness Warsi particularly 
deplored the failure to engage with groups most likely to be at risk of criminalisation, journalists 
and those who worked for human rights organisations.43 Once again, no actual suspicion is 
required, just evidence that from an objective viewpoint, and with hindsight, there could have 
been a reasonable suspicion that the person, or item of clothing in the photograph supports a 
proscribed organisation. This new criminal offence potentially criminalises journalists or 
bloggers who retweet or share photographs. 
The problem created by the Supreme Court decision in Lane and Letts is not only that the 
objective definition based upon the views of the reasonable person may unfairly criminalise 
individuals, but that it creates an unfortunate legal precedent. It creates an interpretation of a 
statutory provision that potentially could criminalise broad swathes of the British population. In 
part this is because of the legal definition of terrorism.44  
 
March 2017; as of June, there were some 3,000 subjects of interest known to the police and 
intelligence agencies, and 412 arrests for terrorism-related offences in 2017. But dry statistics can 
never bring home the pain and sorrow suffered by individual victims of terrorism. Over recent weeks, 
we have heard the harrowing testimony at the inquest into the deaths of the five victims of last year’s 
terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge and at the gates of this very building. In this and the four 
subsequent attacks in 2017, in Manchester, London Bridge, Finsbury Park and Parsons Green, a 
further 31 innocent victims lost their lives, and in total over 200 others were injured. The family and 
friends of those who lost their lives will have to live with this painful loss for the rest of their lives, 
while the victims who survive have to deal with the ongoing mental anguish and, in some cases, life-
changing physical injuries.’ 
42 2 Publication of images and seizure of articles 
(1) Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (uniform) is amended as follows.  
(2) In the heading, after “Uniform” insert “and publication of images”.  
(3) After subsection (1) insert—  
(1A) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—  
(a) an item of clothing, or  
(b) any other article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the  
person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. 
43  Lords Hansard vol 793 5.32pm 
44 s1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 As amended interprets the offence of terrorism: 
1.— Terrorism: interpretation. 
(1)  In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where–  
(a)  the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b)   the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an international governmental 
organisation] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and  
(c)   the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious [, racial]2 or ideological 
cause.  
(2)  Action falls within this subsection if it– 
(a)  involves serious violence against a person, 
(b)  involves serious damage to property, 
(c)  endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
(d)  creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or 
(e)  is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. 
(3)  The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or 




The Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism to include in s 1(1) use or threat of action designed 
to influence the government or ‘intimidate a section of the public’ for ‘advancing a political, 
religious, racial, or ideological cause’. Many protest groups may have this purpose. Even 
though they would not generally be thought of by the public as terrorist organisations.  
Additionally, s1(5) includes within the term action for the purposes of the section – ‘action 
taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.’ Potentially therefore it is possible for the 
state to designate protest groups as proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act and this 
may bring those groups, or members of those groups within the definition of terrorism for 
certain offences.45  
The Guardian reported in January 2020 that the non-violent protest group Extinction Rebellion 
had been placed, by anti-terrorism police, on the register of organisations who are extremist 
and should be reported under the Prevent Programme.46 The same paper also reported that 
this action was supported by the Home Secretary Priti Patel. This action and the Home 
Secretary’s support for this action drew widespread criticism and Extinction Rebellion were 
removed from the list.47 Deputy Chief Superintendent Kath Barnes, who featured in press 
reports of the conviction of Lane and Letts, is quoted as saying: 
I would like to make it quite clear that we do not classify Extinction Rebellion as an 
extremist organisation. The inclusion of Extremist Rebellion in this document was an 
error of judgment and we will now be reviewing all of its contents as a result.48 
This statement seems to imply that the designation of organisations as extremist, or not, is a 
matter for the police. But they will only review the list of organisations included as extremist 
when there is a significant public outcry – not before. This then opens the possibility that taking 
this cue such organisations may over time become proscribed organisations.49 This must be 
 
(4)  In this section– 
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, 
(b)  a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever 
situated, 
(c)  a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United 
Kingdom, and 
(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a part of the United Kingdom 
or of a country other than the United Kingdom. 
(5)  In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action 
taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. 
45 Reasoning in relation to the definition of terrorism can be quite labyrinthine - See Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v LG and others [2017] EWHC 1529 (Admin) a case in which the court reviewed the 
operation of s1(5) of the 2000 Act in relation to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigatory Measures Act 2011 
and concluded ‘Reference has been made to several proscribed organisations in these proceedings, as I shall 
explain. However, I am asked to note that TA 2000 s.1(5) is not incorporated into the definition of terrorism for 
the purposes of the TIPMA 2011 by s.30(1). However, rather confusingly, the term 'act of terrorism' does 
include anything constituting an action taken for the purposes of terrorism within the meaning of TA 2000 






49 Indeed at the time of writing, eco-central, a group who support claims made in denial of climate change,  
https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.141120/data/9725131/index.html  have 
a petition out for signature. The petition requests that the Home Secretary add extinction rebellion to the list 




a matter of concern. Particularly, where legislation is being worded so as to catch classes of 
actors, then the wording of clauses that contain the rubric “reasonable suspicion” of loosely 
defined outcomes may potentially criminalise a wide range of behaviours previously viewed 
as not criminal. The line between criminal regulatory offences controlling business activities 
and offences that criminalise acts in the personal sphere risks becoming ever more blurred.  
9. Is too much criminalisation a bad thing? 
On the one hand it can be argued that the prosecution of members of society like Lane and 
Letts has some utility. They had been co-operating with the police and had formed a different 
view from the authorities of the necessity of sending money to their son. They failed to take 
advice from the police and their prosecution may discourage others from acting in the same 
way. Such an argument might run that if everyone who had a close relative involved with a 
group that might contravene s17 of the Terrorism Act 2000 - was free to send money to aid 
their relative, then the world would be a less safe place. Whether such a view might be 
supported by evidence is more debatable. In relation to the section of the Act that criminalised 
Lane and Letts, that argument does not really hold true. The scope of the activity that is 
criminalised is so ill defined, the criminal act exists in the realm of things that might happen, 
not in the failure to take police advice. Thus, the possibility of an increase in public safety has 
to be balanced against by the risk of arbitrary conviction and detention of those who did not 
think the outcome perceived by the prosecuting authorities would be a possible result of their 
action.  
A further problem is that the accused, on the wording of the statute as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, not only does not have to perceive the risk; she does not have to realise that 
the organisation could be deemed to be terrorist. As has already been canvassed, the 
definition of terrorism is very broad indeed and does not just include groups that are 
unarguably terrorist in their aim. Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion have attracted the 
attention of the police and been considered at times to be extremist groups that should be 
ranked alongside terrorist organisations in terms of Prevent Strategies.50 Moreover, the views 
of the jury as to the existence of a reasonable cause for suspicion that money may be used to 
support terrorism will suffice for a conviction, even though it may never have occurred to the 
accused. 
Another argument might be that the legislators in Parliament will protect the democratic 
interests of the individual and that therefore, law as made by Parliament should be respected. 
Baroness Helena Kennedy, a member of the House of Lords, commented on the pressure put 
upon her when she voted against the Labour whip in order to oppose legislation. Describing 
the views expressed by the whip, she writes that he suggested that she was ‘completely out 
of touch with the concerns of voters for whom it was ‘“just law”’, not as important as ‘“health 
or education or the economy”.’51 Kennedy argues this approach leads to a failure to protect 
minorities and protect civil liberties. Kennedy points out that this is nothing new, and neither is 
the argument that supports the erosion of civil liberties, that ‘new restrictions are designed to 
convict the guilty and decent citizens have nothing to fear.’52 She concludes that, ‘Law matters. 
And … it is certainly too important to be left to politicians, whose desire for short term gains 
makes them cavalier with long term interests.’53 Care therefore needs to be taken when 









or by the passing of legislation. An example of the desire for short term gains are two Bills 
before Parliament. Both as presented in Parliament seem to abrogate the rule of law.54 
10. Changes in the past 50 years. 
Looking back over the last 50 years there are a number of changes to the criminal law and 
criminal justice system that are remarkable. One major change is the acceptance that a crime 
that has serious consequences for those convicted can be an offence that imposes something 
close to absolute liability as defined by Lord Reid in Warner.55  
Reid, in his two opinions in Warner and Sweet, accepted the imposition of absolute liability 
where the purpose of a less serious criminal offence is regulatory. However, Reid was 
concerned about the liberty of the subject and, whilst he expressed no view as to how 
Parliament should legislate, he did express a view about the need for transparency in making 
legislative changes. ‘I would hold without hesitation that it would be wrong to impute to 
Parliament an intention to depart from its known desire to prevent innocent persons from being 
convicted.’56 He suggested that Parliament should make clear any change of policy with regard 
to criminalisation and, when enacting legislation, should give reasons for any approach that 
did not respect established legal principles. This would highlight changes to the development 
of the criminal law. 
Reid traced the roots of absolute liability in the criminal law to business regulation and argued 
that in terms of liability for business the imposition of absolute liability could be necessary. His 
reasoning was that regulatory offences were ‘the original type of absolute offence’ and the 
conviction for such an offence was punished by a fine. In this type of offence, he surmised that 
‘a right to prove absence of mens rea would sometimes go too far.’57 
Reid did speculate that there might need to be some sort of half-way house between subjective 
and absolute liability. He considered precisely the type of liability that was imposed in Lane 
and Letts, rejecting the idea that such criminal liability should be extended beyond the 
regulation of business - 
If, however, there is to be a halfway house between the common law doctrine and 
absolute liability, there could be an objective test: not whether the accused knew, but 
 
54 The two Bills are the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill that would permit the pre-
authorisation of criminal acts in certain defined circumstances and the UK Internal Market Bill which if enacted 
as published would contravene existing treaty arrangements and thereby breach international law. 
55  These regulations purport to make any ordinary member of the public guilty of a very serious offence if a 
drug within the meaning of the Act is “in his actual custody”. Any person may, and most people do, from time 
to time take into their custody an apparently innocent package without ascertaining what it contains, without 
having the slightest reason to suspect that it may contain anything out of the ordinary, and indeed without 
having any right to open the package and see what is in it. If every person who takes such a package into his 
custody must do so at his peril, then this goes immensely farther than any enactment imposing absolute 
liability has yet been held to go, and I refuse to believe that Parliament can ever have intended such an 
oppressive result.” [1968] 2 All ER 356, 366 
56 The full quotation is: 
Members of both Houses are particularly interested in the liberty of the subject, and if it were 
intended by those promoting a Bill to extend the old but limited class of cases in which absence of 
mens rea is no defence I would certainly expect Parliament to be so informed. Then, if Parliament 
acquiesced, those who dislike this kind of legislation would know whom to blame. If, however, the 
words of the Act are not crystal clear and Parliament has not been told of this intention, I would hold 
without hesitation that it would be wrong to impute to Parliament an intention to depart from its 
known desire to prevent innocent persons from being convicted.” [1968] 2 All ER 356, 366 
57 [1968] 2 All ER 356, 367 
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whether a reasonable man in his shoes would have known or have had reason to 
suspect that there was something wrong. I would not support an objective test where 
the ordinary member of the public is concerned, but it is not unreasonable to say that 
if a person engages in some particular business he must behave as, and have the 
capacity of, the ordinary reasonable man.58  
Clearly times and views of liability have changed. Lord Hughes and the rest of the Supreme 
Court in Lane and Letts did not object to the extension of such a test to an ordinary member 
of the public for an offence where the punishment was not limited to a fine, the stigma attached 
to conviction was great, the offence was a serious crime, and the act required by the offence 
was not clearly defined.  
The act that Lord Reid was talking about in Warner is clearly defined. It is possession of a 
prohibited substance. Even for a defined act Reid concluded there was a need to avoid 
convicting innocent members of the public. Why the difference in the approach of the highest 
court in the land to two cases separated by fifty years? Why the assimilation of legislative and 
interpretive approaches necessary for the regulation of business to the regulation of individual 
liberty? 
11. Protecting individual liberty- respecting the limits of criminalisation. 
One major change in the past fifty years has been the establishment of the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) as the public authority that prosecutes crime. When Sweet was charged, she 
was prosecuted by Sergeant Parsley of the local police force. A report published in 1981, by 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure,59 recommended that it was inappropriate for 
the police to both investigate and prosecute crimes. The CPS receives prosecution files from 
the police after the accused is charged with an offence and then makes a decision with regard 
to prosecution of that charge. The exercise of this discretion is informed by the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors.60 The Code requires prosecution to proceed where there is a realistic chance of 
conviction and the prosecution is in the public interest.61 Had the CPS existed in the 1960s it 
is possible that, taking a dispassionate view, they might not have prosecuted Stephanie 
Sweet. 
But the difficulty of creating a law that is very widely framed and therefore potentially 
criminalises a wide number of people is not really cured by removing prosecution decisions 
from the police. The concerns that attached to Sweet’s conviction and the creation of liability 
of the type enacted by the anti-terrorist legislation discussed above have more to do with the 
idea of liberty of the individual subject. The issue is the need to balance the political pressures 
to protect society from harm with the need to respect individual autonomy.  
12. Conclusion 
There is a strong argument for vigilance in terms of the use of the criminal law to restrict the 
liberty of individuals, especially where it limits their ability to interact with others; and the act 
that is criminalised imposes a duty of care on ordinary people in the manner described by Lord 
Reid as unacceptable. There is some agreement as to this amongst criminal law 
commentators. Husak suggests that there is a need for a workable criminal law theory to limit 
the tendency of governments to pass too many criminal laws. He suggests that the failure to 
identify a strong basis to argue against new laws is problematic and leaves those who argue 
 
58 Ibid 
59 Cmnd. 8092. 
60 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors>. 
61 See the code for full details of how the tests should be applied. 
132 
 
against extensions to the criminal law: ‘vulnerable to the politically powerful complaint that 
they oppose such legislation because they are “soft on crime”.’62  
Helena Kennedy argues that the process by which it becomes acceptable to frame terrorism 
laws to have a broad reach, is itself corrosive of society’s views of liberty and its respect for 
the liberty of individuals.  She also points out that by carving out a separate category of 
terrorists, it is easier for those ‘who bomb and maim to claim to be political prisoners rather 
than criminals.’63 Arguably one way in which terrorism offences have become corrosive of 
liberty is that they have taken the clothes of regulatory offences. These regulatory offences 
had traditionally been seen as less serious offences often punishable by fines. But terrorism 
offences are serious criminal offences.  
Lord Diplock considered in Sweet the limits of criminalisation. He concluded offences that 
regulate ‘a particular activity involving potential danger to public health, safety or morals in 
which citizens have a choice as to whether they participate or not,’64 were appropriate for 
regulation by the criminal law; and that they imposed a ‘higher duty of care’ on those in 
business. Diplock stressed an inference that a statute imposed such liability was not to be 
lightly drawn.65 People who have chosen to engage in business pursuits that put others at risk 
must, in Diplock’s view, be prepared to shoulder the higher duty of care. Nonetheless his 
opinion supported allowing Sweet’s appeal.  
12.1 What are the proper limits of the criminal law?  
That question can only be answered briefly here. Lords Reid and Diplock were certain that the 
ordinary person’s liberty should be protected by the courts. The extension of a higher duty of 
care to business operations and the imposition of a criminal penalty based on a half-way house 
to absolute liability was only acceptable, to Reid, if enacted as such by Parliament and flagged 
up by the legislature as a novel act. Furthermore, the reasoning behind the creation of criminal 
liability had to be specified. He was certain in his view that such liability should not be imposed 
on the ordinary individual but was acceptable as an expansion of the duty of care owed by the 
business community to society. This has not been the recent practice of the legislature. 
Duff suggests that the problem when considering the need for new criminal offences is not 
whether the crime is serious or minor, but whether the law is needed at all. This argument has 
its attractions in that he distinguishes between the creation of the law and its implementation. 
He does this in a manner not dissimilar to Reid in Sweet. What Duff suggests is that the 
legislature ought to consider a number of questions prior to legislating. 
First there is the question of valid need – is there really a reason to protect society from such 
conduct? Second, how should such protection be framed: should it be enforced by the civil 
law and subject to civil law remedies or criminalised – enforced by punishment, by deprivation 
of liberty, or some sort of financial penalty?66  
One could add to these a requirement that the law should not go further than it need to in 
criminalising conduct. This would ensure that the response to the perceived threat is 
 
62 Husak, D, The Philosophy of the Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 118. 
63 Kennedy, H (2004) 32. 
64 [1969] AC 132, 163. 
65 Ibid. What Diplock argues next shows how modern legislation may have pushed at this boundary in an 
unacceptable manner. For Diplock a characteristic of regulatory legislation is that it should be possible for 
those citizens in positions of authority to ‘directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement 
of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control’ to ‘promote 
the observance of the obligation.’ 
66 Duff, A R  Answering for Crime, (Oxford, Hart 2009) 91-92 
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proportionate to the aim of protecting society. Proportionality is part of a principled approach 
to the criminal law. It suggests that the interference of the criminal law in the lives of individuals 
should be kept to a minimum. Horder describes this principle, of minimal criminalisation, as 
based on humane values that he sees as important in protecting the human rights of people 
subject to the criminal law. Examining the regulatory criminal law, Horder also sees its proper 
domain as business related. ‘Companies may be found to be at fault in criminal law, but they 
are incapable of emotional suffering.’ The distinction for Horder in the regulation of companies 
by the criminal law is that ‘they can legitimately be created and destroyed at will, and hence 
cannot enjoy the same status as human beings.’67  
12.2 What about public opinion? 
In Sweet there was sufficient precedent for the court to interpret the law in accordance with 
traditional mens rea principles. The House of Lords was not likely to be criticised by the media 
or the government following the successful media campaign initiated by Rupert Graves. But 
in Lane and Letts the court did not apply traditional principles to the interpretation of the 
criminal law as they might have done. The societal and political view of British citizens who 
are labelled ‘jihadist’ has been set out above.68 It seems likely that in such circumstances the 
Court might feel pressure to be respectful of parliamentary legislation. Clearly where there is 
ambiguity, there is in Husak’s words a possible risk of being ‘vulnerable to the politically 
powerful complaint that they oppose such legislation because they are “soft on crime”’.69 It is 
possible that the courts may feel bound in such circumstances to apply the reasoning in 
regulatory criminal cases to the interpretation of statutes that limit the freedom of the ‘ordinary 
man’.  
In such a political environment the individual liberty of the subject may be undermined and 
even subjectively innocent activities, such as the sharing of photographs, objectively 
criminalised. How does this happen when the constitution requires Parliament to scrutinise 
legislation? In 1996, slightly more than halfway through the fifty-year period, Klug, Starmer 
and Weir published an analysis of political rights and freedoms in the UK, The Three Pillars of 
Liberty.70 Their conclusions are fairly damming as to the success of the three pillars in 
protecting the subject’s liberty. They identify the pillars as parliamentary sovereignty, a public 
culture of liberty and the Rule of Law. They argue these are the means that could be used in 
British democracy to protect political rights and freedoms. In terms of parliamentary 
sovereignty, they identify as problematic and undermining, ‘official complacency’. They argue 
such complacency is ‘compounded by the informality’ of the British constitution. The flexibility 
of this constitution enables, on occasion, ‘careless conduct at all levels of government.’71  
In terms of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, they comment that the executive drives 
through legislation, is not amenable to amendments because of the drive to get government 
business done, and particularly ignores amendments if they are from opposition members. 
They also argue that the House of Lords, as an unelected body, lacks credibility and that, too 
often, committees who should do much of the work of scrutinising Bills before Parliament fall 
prey to politically entrenched positions. They find that the role of expert opinion on the 
appropriateness of new legislation is often overlooked or lost in these processes.72 
 
67 Horder, J, Ashworth’s Principles of the Criminal Law, (9th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2019) 73. 
Horder goes on to modify this statement by pointing out that millions of people’s welfare and happiness 
depends upon the flourishing of business enterprises. 
68 See n36 above and accompanying text. 
69 See n 59 above. 
70 Klug, F, Starmer, K and Weir, S The Three Pillars of Liberty, (New York, Routledge 1996). 




In 2002, in her lecture series Legal Conundrums in our Brave New World,73 Helena Kennedy 
argued that the case for civil liberties is complex and ‘needs more than a soundbite.’74 She 
provides the evidence in the book that leads to two questions that are relevant and need to be 
addressed in terms of the manner in which legislation is carried out in the twenty first century. 
They are questions that require society to be open in addressing the needs of those who are 
disadvantaged and disempowered. The first is whether our historic memory of our own 
experience of oppression is retreating? The second is: Are memories of the conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and the terrifying oppression of whole sections of communities by the Nazi 
regime becoming dim memories, no longer considered relevant by the majority of the 
population?  
Kennedy argued in the lectures that there is a fundamental disconnect between the experience 
of the majority of British people and the experience of asylum seekers and refugees. This, in 
her view, contributed to an acceptance of new legislation that could erode individual liberty. 
She argued that prosperous parts of the community lack knowledge of what it feels like to be 
on the wrong end of the criminal law – ‘to be powerless and marginalised, at risk of being 
caught in a backlash where the law may be your only shield.’75   
But is Kennedy correct? Examining the case of Lane and Letts, public opinion as expressed 
through the media seemed to support criminalisation because of a real fear of victimisation by 
returning terrorists. There is little discussion of the actual concept of liberty in the media, and 
therefore evidence to support a thesis of disinterest is hard to find. However, there is evidence, 
from polling, that ignorance of pending new legislation that will curtail liberty may be 
widespread. A COMRES poll in 2016 found that of those polled 72% were not aware of new 
provisions in the Investigatory Powers Bill before Parliament. The Bill proposed legislation 
enabling an expansion to the legal interception of private communications. Once made aware 
of the provisions of the Bill, 90% of respondents thought the powers as framed unacceptable.76 
This suggests that, at least in terms of personal privacy, there is quite a strong concept of 
individual liberty. 
12.3 Care in the framing of and interpretation of legislation is required.  
To conclude, whilst it is accepted that laws may need to be passed to protect populations from 
terrorist attacks, it is important for Government to consider who it labels as terrorist and by the 
creation of new laws subjects to criminal punishment. The potential criminalisation of parents 
trying to exercise what they perceive as their parental responsibility, or those who have real 
concerns about the environment and wish to express them through peaceful protest, will not 
increase national security. Miss Sweet may well have captured the sympathy of the media and 
judges in 1969; and “Jihadi John” have deserved the condemnation of his actions by the 
media. But government responses to terrorism in criminalising those whose purpose is to bring 
their son home, or journalists who do not interpret an image as terrorist, is a step too far. It is 
not proportionate to the risk created. 
Confident, mature democracies have to accept a measure of risk in order to function 
effectively. How much risk should be a matter for informed public debate. Factionalised, 
politicised debate confined within the legislature is unlikely to be helpful. Society needs to 
understand what proposed legislation will mean for individual liberties. It needs to be shown 
that unintended consequences of legislation have been considered and that meaningful 
consultation has taken place. Such an approach could prevent the easy acceptance of the 
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need to restrict individual liberty, without proof of a real necessity, becoming a defining feature 
of the legislative process. The argument that needs to be made regarding individual liberty is 
that legislative responses should be necessary, considered, proportionate and measured. 
Governments must understand and listen to expert opinion as to the effect and effectiveness 
of new legislative proposals. Additionally, that opinion should be considered and appropriately 
challenged to establish a real need for legislative action.  
There needs to be a further proviso before the creation of new criminal laws of the type that 
have been considered in this chapter. Those laws that regulate behaviour by criminalising the 
conduct of the ordinary person, conduct that would not otherwise be viewed as wrong or 
criminal, should be clear and precise in their ambit. The reason for the existence of such laws 
must be clearly articulated. Furthermore, the ambit of the law should be as limited as it can 
be, to effectively achieve its end. The question of whether the use of the criminal law is 
necessary to achieve the end desired by the government should be central to executive 
reasoning when introducing legislation. The reason for the introduction of the measure needs 
to be clearly set out in a manner that engages scrutiny and public debate of the issues. The 
problems that confronted the House of Lords in Sweet v Parsley are as relevant today as they 









Consenting to Sexual Activity 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores how legal understandings of sexual consent have developed over fifty 
years. It begins with the immediate aftermath of DPP v Morgan,1 which controversially placed 
the defendant’s subjective perspective at the centre of criminal liability. Subsequent legal 
developments, leading up to and extending beyond the Sexual Offences Act are evaluated. 
The chapter asks why, despite a new, statutory definition of consent, the law on sexual 
consent remains highly contentious today. It explores possible answers through consideration 
of two particularly problematic areas – intoxicated consent and consent obtained by fraud – 
and asks whether the concept consent is adequate at all. Having examined the problems 
around the law on sexual consent, the chapter concludes by considering what the next steps 
might be.  
 
1. Introduction 
The last half-century has seen an important shift in legal understandings of consent to sexual 
activity, largely prompted by feminist campaigns and critiques. Fifty years ago, violence 
against women had become a central issue for the women’s liberation movement: Chiswick 
Women’s Aid opened the first women’s refuge from domestic violence in 1971, and the first 
Rape Crisis Centre opened in London in 1976.2 Practical experiences combined with feminist 
theories informed calls for legal change, as when London Rape Crisis Centre submitted 
evidence to subsequent committees and commissions through the 1970s.3 Sexual offences 
are an area of law where feminist critiques have had particular impact, but reforming the law 
has not resulted in straightforward progress.  
While the legal definition of consent started to move away from a rigid requirement of 'force, 
fear or fraud' as early as the nineteenth century, fifty years ago it remained firmly focused upon 
the defendant's subjective view. The House of Lords decision in DPP v Morgan confirmed that 
a defendant's honest belief in consent, however unreasonable, would absolve him of criminal 
liability. Critical reaction to this case gave impetus to efforts to reform both the law and its 
application. These ultimately led to a new definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 which aimed to transform understandings of consent in sexual relations. Nonetheless, 
shortcomings persist both in the legal provisions and in their implementation by the criminal 
justice system. Above all, the wider social and cultural context within which sexual activities 
are negotiated means that defining the boundaries of lawful consent remains highly 
 
1 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 
2 Felicity Kaganas, ‘First Women’s Refuge, 1971’ in Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmuty (eds), Women’s 
Legal Landmarks: Celebrating the History of Women and Law in the UK and Ireland (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2019); Alison Diduck, ‘First Rape Crisis Centre, 1976’ in Rackley and Auchmuty, Women’s Legal Landmarks. 
3 Diduck, ‘First Rape Crisis Centre, 1976’ 323. 
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contentious. This chapter examines how legal understandings of consent to sexual activity 
have developed, and the difficulties which persist.  
2. The significance of consent 
Sexual activity can be one of life’s more enjoyable experiences, or one which causes physical 
and psychological injury, trauma, and distress. Between the extremes of joyful mutual consent 
and violent coercion are a vast and complex range of reasons for engaging in sex: a few 
examples include a sense of obligation, affection, curiosity, an attempt to become pregnant, 
coercion through threats, reluctant agreement to avoid provoking anger, altruism, hope of 
gaining some benefit from the other person, or an attempt to achieve popularity or self-worth. 
Its legal meaning is equally variable: a certain sexual act (penile penetration of the vagina) is 
a requirement for the validity of a marriage between a man and a woman.4 Yet that same act 
can form the actus reus of rape: one of the most serious criminal offences carrying a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment.5 If similar physical acts can carry such very different personal, 
social, and legal meanings then how does the law differentiate between them?  
It does so primarily through the notion of consent.6 However, this chapter explores the ways 
in which consent is a surprisingly complicated concept dependent as much or more upon 
social and cultural norms as upon legal definitions. In England and Wales, the last half-century 
has seen an important shift in the law’s understandings of consent to sexual activity, largely 
prompted by feminist campaigns and critiques. The criminal law’s definition of consent has 
undergone profound change, although we will see that its implementation has not. Nor is the 
definition itself clear or straightforward, and the courts are still struggling to define its limits. To 
understand why consent continues to be such a complex and contested concept, we will 
explore these developments and their wider social context. We will end with a consideration 
of the key areas of difficulty and dispute today, including the question of whether the concept 
of consent itself is adequate.  
It will be helpful to explain at the outset that consent underpins not one but two elements of 
most sexual offences. The absence of actual consent is necessary but not sufficient to make 
otherwise-lawful sexual activity a criminal act. There must also be an absence of belief in 
consent. A person who sexually touches someone who does not consent has committed the 
actus reus of an offence but will only be guilty if they also have mens rea, i.e. they did not 
believe the other person was consenting. Whether that mens rea should be subjective 
(dependent upon the defendant’s own state of mind) rather than objective (requiring them to 
take reasonable care to ascertain consent) has been an important area of debate and 
development in the law and is considered in this chapter.  
3. The rise in concern 
Before 1994, rape was a wholly gender-specific offence: it could be committed only by males 
and only against females. It still requires penile penetration, but since the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 it has been gender-neutral as to victim.7 Until 2003, there were two 
separate offences of indecent assault differentiated by the victim’s sex,8 but under sections 2 
and 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 both sexual assault by penetration and sexual assault 
are now gender-neutral offences. Nonetheless, the law’s highly gendered history as well as 
 
4 Section 12(1), Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. There is no equivalent requirement for marriage between people 
of the same sex (Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013; section 12(2), Matrimonial Causes Act 1973).  
5 Section 1, Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
6 This chapter discusses consent in the context of sexual activity between adults. There are separate offences 
criminalising sexual activity with or between children, which are outside the scope of the chapter.  
7 Section 142(1) provided, ‘It is an offence for a man to rape a woman or another man.’ The actus reus was 
expanded to include penile penetration of the anus as well as the vagina. 
8 Sections 14 and 15, Sexual Offences Act 1956. 
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the fact that these offences are overwhelmingly committed by males, with females the majority 
of victims, mean that understandings of consent are profoundly gendered.9  
Fifty years ago, the criminal law’s understanding of rape away had already moved away from 
its origins as a property crime against husbands or fathers. A corresponding legal shift from a 
requirement of force to one of non-consent was already a century old;10 although we will see 
that the shift was partial at best until the 1980s.11 However, although sexual offences were 
now understood as a crime against women themselves, the law’s approach remained rooted 
in notions of honour and marital value rather than sexual autonomy. Society, though, was 
changing drastically: the 1960s had seen the rise of both the sexual revolution and the 
women’s liberation movement. While the two differed in fundamental ways about many 
aspects of women’s sexuality, both challenged the notion that it should only be expressed 
within marriage and that women’s value was intimately connected to their chastity. When 
feminists shared their experiences of sexual violence, they identified it as a large and hidden 
problem. Speaking out about it, campaigning and protesting, and establishing support services 
were crucial, but Morgan focused feminist attention on the need for better legal responses as 
well.  
A culture of disbelief in the legal system was recognised as one of the key issues facing 
women who had experienced sexual violence. It was rooted not only in myths about women’s 
sexuality but also in the law’s focus upon men’s experiences and subjectivities. The priority 
given to these in the substantive law on consent, particularly the question of a defendant’s 
belief in consent, came under severe scrutiny following the House of Lords decision in Morgan. 
Their Lordships held that an honest belief that the victim had consented would lead to 
acquittal, no matter how unreasonable that honest belief might be. While those defendants’ 
convictions were upheld on the basis that they could not have had an honest belief, the facts 
involved considerable exercise of force against the complainant as well as her verbal and 
physical resistance. Notions that absence of consent only existed where there was ‘force, fear 
or fraud’ still lingered, with Lord Hailsham accepting ‘force’ as a requirement of the actus 
reus.12 Thus the feminist response to Morgan extended to scrutiny of the law’s myths about 
consent as a whole, and their effect upon all aspects of the criminal justice system’s response 
to sexual offences, from police treatment of initial reports to judges’ sentencing remarks. It 
encompassed not only cultural attitudes about ‘real rape’13 but also those myths given the 
status of law.14 Thus the outrage which greeted the House of Lords decision in DPP v Morgan 
was not simply at the ratio decidendi, problematic as that was, but also at the wider legal and 
social cultures which informed it.  
The reactions to this decision prompted the Home Secretary to establish the Heilbron 
Committee; its chair, Rose Heilbron QC, was the first woman judge. However, while the 
Heilbron Report led to important changes in other areas, it did not advocate a change in the 
 
9 For example, in the year ending March 2016, 90% of victims of rape and 84% of victims of other sexual 
offences recorded by police were women: Office for National Statistics, ‘Experimental statistics: Victims of police 
recorded violent and sexual offences’, 2017, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcrimeandse
xualoffences/yearendingmarch2016/experimentalstatisticsvictimsofpolicerecordedviolentandsexualoffences#how-
are-victims-and-suspects-of-violent-offences-related (accessed 26 November 2019).  
10 R v Camplin (1845) 1 Cox CC 220. 
11 Sjolin cites the 38th (1973) edition of Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice, for example, as still 
including reference to this requirement (Catarina Sjolin, ‘Ten Years on - Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 
2003’ [2015] Journal of Criminal Law 20, 20.) 
12 See Lord Hailsham in DPP v Morgan, p 210. 
13 Jennifer Temkin, ‘’And Always Keep A-hold of Nurse, For Fear of Finding Something Worse’: Challenging 
Rape Myths in the Courtroom’ (2010) 13(4) New Criminal Law Review 710; Joanne Conaghan and Yvette 
Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: ‘Myths about myths’?’ (2014) 22 Feminist Legal Studies 25. 
14 For example, the legal fiction that a woman gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband 
on her wedding day, and therefore could not in law be raped by him, survived until 1991: R v R [1991] UKHL 12. 
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legal tests for belief in consent.15 Nor did it spend a lot of time on the actus reus of consent, 
but it did review the then-current law and emphasise that there was no longer a requirement 
of physical force.16 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 gave effect to some of the 
Report’s recommendations, including that there should be a statutory definition of rape for the 
first time, emphasising lack of consent rather than violence.17 Section 1 defined the offence 
as sexual intercourse ‘without consent’ where the defendant had been ‘reckless’ as to consent: 
in line with the Report’s comments, there was no reference to the requirement of ‘force, fear 
or fraud’.  
The need for force was finally explicitly rejected in Olugboja.18 In response to defence 
arguments that force or the threat of force was required to vitiate consent, Dunn LJ asserted 
that ‘every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission 
involves consent.’19 Yet this was a partial and problematic advance in the law. The equation 
of ‘reluctant acquiescence’ with consent was very far from a model of positive consent.20 
Instead, it drew explicitly upon the model of men’s sexuality as active and dominant, women’s 
as passive and requiring ‘seduction’ into ‘submission’. It blurred the lines between persuasion 
and coercion, cast women who actively sought or encouraged sexual activity as abnormal, 
and implicitly represented same-sex activity as deviant. In other words, it reaffirmed many of 
the problematic elements of legal understandings of consent.  
4. The Sexual Offences Act 2003: continuing controversies 
The development of sexual offences law to this point could be characterised as evolution or, 
less generously but perhaps more accurately, as a series of piecemeal reforms. On either 
view, it lacked consistency and clarity not only between offences but also as to its underlying 
principles. The liberal principles which informed many changes from the Sexual Offences Act 
1967 onwards sat uneasily alongside the moralistic elements of the law. Feminist pressure for 
law reform had not decreased in the years since Morgan: on the contrary, both the law and 
the legal process had come under systematic criticism.21 Some feminist MPs who supported 
reforms had become government ministers following the Labour victory in the 1997 general 
election.22 Further impetus for systematic reform came from the European Convention of 
Human Rights. This Convention was incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 
1998, but the European Court of Human Rights had made it clear that the UK’s discriminatory 
laws on sex between men breached the Article 8 right to private life.23  
In response to these varied pressures, the government launched a major review of sexual 
offences, Setting the Boundaries.24 The review set out its basic, liberal principles as non-
discrimination, non-interference with consensual conduct, and personal autonomy, subject to 
the need to protect children and the vulnerable from coercion.25 However, it left some key 
 
15 Great Britain Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, and Rose Heilbron. Report of the Advisory Group on the 
Law of Rape. 1975. 
16 At paras 18-21. 
17 At para 81. 
18 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 323. 
19 At p 332. 
20 At p 331. For a summary of ‘affirmative consent’ models see Wendy Larcombe, ‘Falling Rape Conviction 
Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Law’ (2011) 19 Feminist Legal Studies 27, 30. 
21 Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984); Zsuzsanna Adler, Rape on 
Trial (London, Routledge, 1987); Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London, Penguin, 1996). 
22 For example, the post of Minister for Women created in 1997 was held by Harriet Harman (also Social Security 
Secretary, and later Solicitor General), Lady Jay (also Leader of the House of Lords), and Patricia Hewitt (also 
Trade and Industry Secretary) in the period 1997-2003.  
23 ADT v UK [2000] ECHR 402, which challenged the criminalisation of acts between men which were not ‘in 
private’, narrowly defined as where only two people were present.  
24 Sexual Offences Review, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences, Vol 1 (London, HMSO, 
2000). 
25 ibid 1.3. 
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feminist concerns unaddressed. For example, it equated non-discrimination with gender 
neutrality, an approach with which not all feminists would agree in this highly gendered 
context.26 For offences whose mens rea included a lack of belief in consent, it recommended 
that the subjective test of honest belief should remain.27 However, it was to be limited by a 
requirement that the defendant ‘take all reasonable steps in the circumstances to ascertain 
free agreement’.28  The government, in its White Paper, proposed a test of ‘reasonable belief’ 
instead.29 Despite this proving controversial in Parliament, where some legislators continued 
to favour the subjective test, the more objective approach was adopted in the final Act.30 It 
avoids the awkward hybrid approach of Setting the Boundaries in favour of a simple mens rea 
requirement of lack of reasonable belief in consent.  
The 2003 Act therefore abandoned the Morgan test. The mens rea for sexual offences 
including rape (section 1), sexual assault by penetration (section 2), and sexual assault 
(section 3) is now absence of a reasonable belief in consent.31 In other words, it is more 
objective and requires the defendant to have taken appropriate steps to ascertain whether the 
complainant was consenting. While that contradicts the wider trend in criminal law for mens 
rea to be subjective, it is surely justified in situations where the means of ascertaining consent 
are so easily available: the other person can simply be asked.32 However, it still leaves the 
courts to determine what is reasonable ‘in all the circumstances’, including which 
‘circumstances’33 are relevant: a formulation which allows the courts to import subjective 
elements, a focus on the complainant’s behaviour, and wider social attitudes into the test.  
Consent as an element of actus reus also underwent significant reform. For the first time, 
consent now has a statutory definition. According to section 74, it is ‘agreement by choice’; 
the person must have ‘freedom and capacity’ to make that choice. This definition aimed to 
remove all lingering assumptions that consent was present unless ‘force, fear or fraud’ could 
be demonstrated. Instead, it was supposed to be a positive (if not necessarily enthusiastic) 
agreement to the specific act. As Setting the Boundaries explained, ‘One of the messages that 
had come to us in consultation was that consent was something that could be seen as being 
sought by the stronger and given by the weaker. In today’s world it is important to recognise 
that sexual partners are each responsible for their own actions and that there should be parity 
of status.’34 Yet even this is a rather negative approach to consent, in which partners bear an 
equal burden rather than sharing equal, positive desire.  
Superficially at least, the law on sexual consent has come a long way since Morgan. The 
introduction of a statutory definition of consent as a gender-neutral, positive act rather than a 
woman’s passive submission is a significant advance. However, the definition is broad and 
the key terms within it were not defined; as Ashworth and Temkin commented, ‘’freedom’ and 
‘choice’ are ideas which raise philosophical issues of such complexity as to be ill-suited to the 
needs of criminal justice’.35 Munro has pointed out that ‘we all operate with relative rather than 
 
26 See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, ‘Beset by Boundaries’ [2000] Criminal Law Review 3; Mary Heath and Ngaire Naffine, 
‘Men’s Needs and Women’s Desires: Feminist Dilemmas About Rape Law “Reform”’ (1994) 3 Australian Feminist 
Law Journal 30 at 39-40, 51. 
27 Sexual Offences Review, Setting the Boundaries 2.13. 
28 ibid 0.11. 
29 Home Office, Protecting the Public - Strengthening Protection against Sex Offenders and Reforming the Law 
on Sexual Offences (London, HMSO, 2002) paras 33–34. 
30 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Sexual Offences Bill: Fifth Report of Session 2002-03’ (2003) 8. 
For an overview of the legislative process, see Jennifer Temkin and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 
2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 328, 332–334. 
31 Offences against children are now separate (e.g. sections 9 to 15A), with absence of consent not part of their 
definition.  
32 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 354-5. 
33 Temkin and Ashworth, 'The Sexual Offences Act 2003' 341. 
34 Sexual Offences Review, Setting the Boundaries 2.10.3. 
35 Andrew Ashworth and Jennifer Temkin, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (1): Rape, Sexual Assaults and the 
Problems of Consent’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 328 at p 336.  
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complete sexual freedom’, and section 74 tells us little about what level of freedom will 
suffice.36 That has left a lot of room for interpretation not only by the courts, but also by the 
police and prosecutors who make decisions about whether an offence has occurred and, if it 
has, whether a criminal prosecution should be brought. Allowing such room for interpretation 
need not inevitably be a bad thing; after all, we now recognise that consent may be given or 
refused in a very wide range of situations. As Katerina Sjolin suggests, the courts value the 
flexibility it brings in ‘an area of infinite variety and choice’.37 Unfortunately, that flexibility 
comes at a cost since this is a field where the impact of cultural myths on all levels of the 
criminal justice system is profound, pervasive, and well-documented.38  
In that context, misinterpretation is probable if not inevitable. ‘Agreement’, for example, had 
been suggested in Setting the Boundaries to recognise that ‘sexual partners are each 
responsible for their own actions and that there should be parity of status.’ Yet the report had 
immediately qualified this assertion by suggesting that the definition of ‘consent’ extended 
from ‘enthusiastic agreement to reluctant acquiescence’.39 In courtrooms, the latter suggestion 
has been seized upon so that ‘agreement’ is interpreted not as an equal meeting of minds but 
as a passive concession by one party to the other’s active desire. Indeed, that is the approach 
suggested by the model direction for judges, which advises them to tell juries that ‘[c]onsent 
in some situations … is given with reluctance, but it is still consent.’40 It has been elaborated 
on in courtrooms: in Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804, Judge P said that consent ‘extends from 
passionate enthusiasm to reluctant or bored acquiescence’. Pitchford LJ in Doyle drew a 
distinction between: 
 . . . reluctant but free exercise of choice on the one hand, especially in the context of 
a long term and loving relationship, and unwilling submission to demand in fear of more 
adverse consequences from refusal on the other.41 
Such an approach is not only a dilution of the model of free and active choice. It is also 
inherently gendered: there is a long history of the law understanding men as sexually-active 
seducers, women as the sexually-passive seduced. Women’s own desires are downplayed or 
denied, while men are given considerable licence in their ‘pursuit’ and ‘persuasion’ of women 
into sexual activity. (And if this gendered understanding seems to render same-sex activity 
aberrant or invisible, that is because it does precisely that.) As Vanessa Munro has argued, 
the Act fails to recognise how ‘entrenched power disparities, material inequalities, relational 
dynamics, and socio-sexual norms’ constrain women’s ability to freely say yes, as well as no, 
to sexual activity with men.42 
The further provisions in sections 75 and 76 have done little to help courts in understanding 
what consent requires. Section 75 sets out a list of circumstances in which consent and 
reasonable belief in consent are presumed to be absent, although the defendant can put 
forward evidence that either or both were in fact present. While detailed consideration of these 
situations is outside the scope of this chapter, it is notable that they generally relate to 
circumstances where confusion around consent is unlikely in any event: for example, where 
 
36 Vanessa E Munro, ‘An Unholy Trinity? Non-Consent, Coercion and Exploitation in Contemporary Legal 
Responses to Sexual Violence in England and Wales’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 45, 52. 
37 Catarina Sjolin, ‘Ten years on: consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ [2015] Journal of Criminal Law 20 
at 27. 
38 For recent discussions see Jennifer Temkin, Jacqueline M Gray and Jastine Barrett, ‘Different Functions of 
Rape Myth Use in Court: Findings From a Trial Observation Study’ (2016) Feminist Criminology 1; Katrin Hohl 
and Elisabeth Stanko, ‘Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: Fresh evidence on the attrition 
problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324.  
39 Sexual Offences Review, Setting the Boundaries, 2.10.3. 
40 Judicial College, The Crown Court Compendium, vol 1 (London, Judicial College, 2017) 20-17. 
41 R v Doyle [2010] EWCA Crim 119. 
42 Vanessa E Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in the Expression 
of Sexual Autonomy’ (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 923, 925. 
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there has been use of stupefying drugs, violence or threats of violence, or where the 
complainant was unconscious. Section 76 states that there is no consent or reasonable belief 
in consent where there has been deception either as to the defendant’s identity or as to the 
nature or purpose of the act. It is narrow in scope (for example, the identity provision applies 
only where the defendant impersonated someone personally known to the complainant) and 
the courts have preferred to deal with most cases under section 74’s general test instead. 
Combined with procedural issues in using these presumptions, they raise the question of 
whether there is now implicitly a hierarchy of consent, with cases outside the statutory 
scenarios somehow more borderline or less serious than those within.43  
The superficial appeal of a simple statutory definition is thrown into question when it is applied 
to difficult cases. Before considering two situations which have generated controversial 
caselaw and important policy questions, it is worth considering a third type of scenario which 
has not been tested in the appeal courts. What if A does not want to engage in sexual activity 
with B, but agrees to do so in order to gain some benefit or avoid some disadvantage? For 
example, A performs fellatio on her husband B to avoid an argument in which he will get angry 
and verbally abusive. Or A performs fellatio on her manager B in order to gain a promotion. 
Or A performs fellatio on her manager B in order not to lose her job. Has A consented in any 
or all of these situations?44 She has certainly not given enthusiastic consent; but that is not 
what the law requires. She did agree by choice in the most literal sense, but did she have 
‘freedom’ in all three cases to make that choice? Which, if any, should be criminalised and 
why? It is not just that the dividing line between free consent and non-consent is difficult to 
draw precisely; there is not even agreement as to the broad neighbourhood within which that 
line should be drawn.  
4.1 Capacity and intoxication 
While the courts have only considered whether there is ‘freedom’ in such scenarios briefly and 
hypothetically, they have had to engage in practice with the question of ‘capacity’ in the context 
of drunken consent. Since section 74 defines consent as requiring the capacity to make a 
choice, at what point will voluntary alcohol (or drug) consumption take away that capacity? If 
the complainant were wholly unconscious, then clearly there could be no consent (and indeed 
a section 75 presumption would apply). However, as the leading case of Bree acknowledged, 
‘capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious’.45 Yet 
determining when that point is reached has posed considerable difficulties. The practical 
problem of distinguishing between drunk-but-competent and conscious-but-incompetent is 
further complicated by two underlying ideas. One is that drunk complainants are contributorily 
negligent, an attitude now disavowed by the courts but still enjoying cultural currency.46 The 
other is that criminalising sex with drunk women would be a paternalistic restriction of their 
sexual agency. The court in Bree expressed the latter point as a concern about ‘patronising 
interference with the right of autonomous adults to make personal decisions for themselves’.47 
Unfortunately, in sidestepping the question of when intoxication undermines that autonomy, it 
left legal space for juries to draw upon the former idea.  
 
43 Temkin and Ashworth, 'The Sexual Offences Act 2003' 336. 
44 Setting the Boundaries suggested that there was no consent in the third situation but not the second (2.10.9). 
For further discussion of similar scenarios, see Susan Leahy, ‘“No Means No”, But Where’s the Force? 
Addressing the Challenges of Formally Recognising Non-Violent Sexual Coercion as a Serious Criminal Offence’ 
(2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 309. 
45 R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804 para 34. See further Phil Rumney and Rebecca Fenton, ‘Intoxicated Consent 
in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making’ (2008) 71 MLR 279. 
46 Including among police officers: Kayleigh A Parratt and Afroditi Pina, ‘From “Real Rape” to Real Justice: A 
Systematic Review of Police Officers’ Rape Myth Beliefs’ (2017) 34 Aggression and Violent Behavior 68. More 
generally, see Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room’ 
(2006) 26 Legal Studies 303.  
47 At paragraph 35.  
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The courts have responded to the uncertainty by setting the bar for capacity surprisingly low, 
on somewhat questionable grounds. In an unreported 2005 case, a student so drunk that bar 
staff asked a security guard to escort her to her room remembered lying in the corridor while 
he had sex with her; her evidence was that she had not consented but could not remember 
the whole incident. However, the judge directed an acquittal without considering whether she 
had capacity, stating that ‘drunken consent is still consent.’48 The teenage complainant in H 
was very intoxicated but, as Clare McGlynn has pointed out, prosecution witnesses and 
defence counsel suggested that she retained capacity to consent because she was still 
speaking and walking.49   In Bree itself, the accused had looked after the complainant while 
she was repeatedly sick in the shower and sometimes unconscious. She woke up later to find 
he was having sex with her. Because the trial judge offered no specific guidance on the effect 
of intoxication upon consent, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. Nonetheless, rather 
than offering its own guidelines, the appeal court insisted that section 74 ‘sufficiently 
addresses the issue of consent in the context of voluntary consumption of alcohol by the 
complainant’ through its reference to capacity .50 Jury guidance is to depend upon the facts of 
the case, offering a level of discretion to judges which may cause concern. The Court of Appeal 
itself worryingly suggested that consent encompasses ‘reluctant or bored acquiescence’.51 It 
also drew an analogy between intoxicated complainants and intoxicated defendants which 
ignored that consent can, as we have seen, be passive while intention is an active state of 
mind related to physical actions. The comparison also appears to reintroduce the inappropriate 
notion of defendants’ responsibility for their actions being mitigated by victims’ ‘contributory 
negligence’.52  
4.2 Freedom, fraud, and common sense 
In the subsequent case of Kamki, the Court of Appeal approved the trial judge’s direction 
inviting the jury to use ‘common sense’.53 Common sense might seem a sensible basis for a 
jury decision: it is something which the courts assume that jurors understand and are able to 
apply. However, common sense is in reality far from neutral, and at its worst can be a 
euphemism for bias or prejudice. More generally, it involves an implicit appeal to gender 
norms; in many of the reported cases, it is grounded in stereotypical expectations of young 
women’s behaviour. It is therefore both unsurprising and of great concern that this term is also 
central to the courts’ approach to fraudulent consent. Acknowledging the difficulties this area 
raises, Leveson LJ nonetheless asserted in McNally that ‘the route through the dilemma’ was 
to approach it in ‘a broad commonsense way’.54 The results are profoundly problematic. Put 
simply, if I mislead someone into thinking I have male genitals when I do not, then their consent 
to sexual activity (even if it does not involve my genitals) is likely to be legally void; but if I am 
an undercover state agent who lies about my job, politics, age, personal and marital situation, 
and motives for associating with the complainant, their consent is nonetheless valid.  
In the latter situation, prosecutors have not even brought the cases before the criminal courts. 
That is despite some of the relationships lasting for a number of years and resulting in the 
 
48 R v Dougal (Swansea Crown Court, unreported; Guardian, 24 November 2005).  
49 R v H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056; Clare McGlynn, ‘Feminist Activism and Rape Law Reform in England and 
Wales: A Sisyphean Struggle?’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: international 
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50 Paragraph 36.  
51 Paragraph 22. 
52 Shlomit Wallerstein, ‘”A drunken consent is still consent” – or is it? A critical analysis of the law on a drunken 
consent to sex following Bree’ [2009] Journal of Criminal Law 318, 323-329; Temkin and Ashworth, ‘The Sexual 
Offences Act 2003’. 
53 R v Kamki [2013] EWCA Crim 2335. For juror ‘common sense’ and capacity, see E. Finch and V. E. Munro, 
'Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room' (2006) 26 Legal Studies 303, 314-315.  
54 McNally v R [2013] EWCA Crim 1051. 
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birth of children;55 one allegedly ended only when the woman escaped to a refuge.56 However, 
a judicial review of the decision not to prosecute the police officer concerned was brought by 
one of the deceived women.57 Known as ‘Monica’, she was one of a number of women political 
activists who had relationships with men they subsequently discovered to be undercover 
police officers. In 1997 Monica, an environmental activist, had had a six-month relationship 
with a fellow member of ‘Reclaim the Streets’ and hunt saboteur, Jim Sutton. Only in 2011 did 
she find out that he was in fact DC Andrew Boyling. Monica emphasised that had she been 
aware of that, she would not have entered into the relationship. Nonetheless, the High Court 
accepted that there was valid consent since the deception was not sufficiently ‘closely 
connected to the performance of the sexual act’.58  
Other situations have been recognised as criminal only where highly coercive in nature. Thus 
in Jheeta, the court distinguished the defendant’s elaborate deception from ‘common or 
garden lies’59 primarily because it involved a threat of criminal prosecution if the complainant 
did not have sex with the defendant. A later case, Devonald,60 suggested a broader approach, 
but was disapproved in Bingham.61 Devonald had impersonated a young woman online in 
order to get his daughter’s ex-boyfriend to masturbate in front of a webcam; the Court of 
Appeal accepted that there had been deception as to the purpose of the act (revenge rather 
than sexual gratification). Bingham undertook a similar kind of deception, impersonating other 
men online in order to get his girlfriend to pose topless, then using the recordings to blackmail 
her into performing sexual acts on webcam. However, the Court of Appeal now held that it did 
not fall within section 76 as sexual gratification might also have been one of the purposes, 
even if not the main one. Hallet LJ was concerned to limit the scope of section 76 because, 
as it conclusively presumed a lack both of consent and of reasonable belief in consent, it 
‘removes from an accused his only line of defence’.62 The issue of consent was therefore to 
be considered under the general definition in section 74.  
By contrast, where there has been deception as to gender, prosecutions and convictions have 
followed.63 The Court of Appeal considered the legal issues in McNally and concluded that it 
was clearly ‘common sense’ that deception as to gender must vitiate consent while other 
identity deceptions would not.64 By labelling it a matter of common sense, the court ensured 
that this reasoning did not have to be explained. They might have found some difficulty in 
doing so. For example, why was it obvious that gender fraud vitiated consent to digital 
penetration (as occurred in McNally)? Why are female fingers so fundamentally different to 
male fingers that an extremely serious offence is committed, while the fingers of a deceptive 
police officer are so similar to those of an honest activist and political comrade that no offence 
occurs at all? In either case, the physical act is the same and uses the same body parts; the 
difference is the person to whom those body parts are attached. The emotional effects upon 
the complainant is similar in each case, although compounded in the latter by state collusion.  
 
55 Carole McCartney and Natalie Wortley, ‘Under the Covers: Covert Policing and Intimate Relationships’ [2018] 
Criminal Law Review 137. 
56 McCartney and Wortley, 'Under the Covers' 150. 
57 R (on the application of ‘Monica’) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] EWHC 3469 (QB) 
58 At para 80. Although the pre-2003 law applied to Monica, the Court of Appeal also considered what the 
position would be under the current law. The use of undercover policing, including the issues raised by these 
relationships, is at the time of writing the subject of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (https://www.ucpi.org.uk/).  
59 R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699, paras 23-24. 
60 R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527. 
61 R v Bingham [2013] EWCA Crim 823.  
62 Para 20.  
63 As well as McNally (below) and Gayle Newland [2016] All ER (D) 85, there were gender deception convictions 
in the unreported cases of Gemma Barker (5 March 2012, Guildford Crown Court), Kyran Lee (Mason) (16 
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64 R v McNally (Justine) [2013] EWCA Crim 1051.  
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Monica and McNally mean that someone who engaged in sexual activity with a ‘man’ who was 
anatomically a woman is likely to be considered the victim of a crime, yet someone who 
engaged in sexual activity with a fellow activist who was actually a police spy will not. To reach 
this result, the courts import a number of gendered assumptions into their ‘common sense’ 
interpretation of the facts. These assumptions include that normative heterosexual sex is 
intrinsically more desirable than sex with a trans person or someone of the same sex: kissing 
a woman whom one believes is a man is unthinkable to the courts, yet kissing a poor man 
who has lied thoroughly enough about enough aspects of their life to convince their partner 
that they are wealthy is not. Belying the apparent gender neutrality of current sexual offences 
law, this approach also assumes that there is a male prerogative – not acquired by trans men 
– to enjoy considerable latitude in ‘seduction’, which can encompass serious lies about their 
identity and beliefs.  
A shift of perspective would profoundly alter the legal outcomes. It would not gloss over men’s 
culpability in favour of requiring women to establish that they suffered coercion exceeding 
those prerogatives. What happens if we do not take masculine deception as a given in sexual 
relationships, but instead ask whether there is justification for the deceit? As Amanda Clough 
points out, ‘[i]t is for the accused’s gain, and only their gain, if the reason for non-disclosure is 
that they are fully aware that the victim would be unlikely to consent if they knew the truth.’65 
That would mean there would be no legally valid consent in many undercover policing cases,66 
but would prompt more nuanced considerations in those gender fraud cases where the 
defendant was confused or conflicted about their gender or was trans. In other words, it could 
significantly shift the current legal ‘common sense’.  
Finally, the mens rea requirement of a lack of ‘reasonable belief’ in consent allows a further 
opportunity for bias, norms and assumptions to be imported into the process of determining 
guilt. The jury is allowed a wide margin of discretion not only in assessing what is ‘reasonable’, 
but also through the statute’s invitation to do so in ‘all the circumstances’. Rape myths continue 
to influence jurors, and that poses dangers which begin long before a case reaches the 
courtroom. In assessing its credibility and prospects of success, the police and Crown 
Prosecution Service attempt to predict the reactions of jurors to the evidence. In doing so, they 
are likely to draw upon not only the likely biases of jurors but also their own. Common sense 
and resort to the reasonable person, then, work hand in hand with the other flaws in the 
criminal justice system to ensure that rates of prosecution and conviction for sexual offences 
remain troublingly low.67  
5. Is consent adequate at all? 
Underlying these issues is the question of whether consent is an adequate or appropriate 
concept for establishing the borderline between lawful and criminal sexual acts. For some 
commentators including Jonathan Herring it could be, but we need ‘a rich sense’ of what it 
means.68 He argues that a person mistaken about a fact who would not have consented had 
she known the truth does not in fact consent. If the accused knew or ought to have known that 
 
65 Amanda Clough, ‘Conditional Consent and Purposeful Deception’ (2018) 82 Journal of Criminal Law 178, 186. 
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would allow intelligence sources including police officers to be authorised to commit crimes including sexual 
offences. Thus, this issue may at first glance appear potentially redundant; on the contrary, it will be equally if not 
more important should the Bill become law in order to ensure that proper scrutiny and formal authorisation are 
required before such sexual conduct can take place.  
67 There is an extensive literature on the shortcomings of the criminal justice system in relation to sexual 
offences: for a comprehensive examination, most of which remains sadly pertinent, see Liz Kelly, J Lovett and L 
Regan, ‘A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases’ (2005). For mock jury research showing the 
continuing expectation of violent force, resistance, and physical injuries, see Louise Ellison and Vanessa E 
Munro, ‘Better the Devil You Know? “Real Rape” Stereotypes and the Relevance of a Previous Relationship in 
(Mock) Juror Deliberations’ (2013) 17 Evidence & Proof 299. 
68 J. Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Crim LR 511.  
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she did not consent, then an offence has been committed. The latter element makes Herring’s 
interpretation less drastic than some critics have argued, since the (perhaps idiosyncratic) 
priorities of the complainant do not alone determine liability. The accused must either have 
actually known, or ought to have known, that consent depended upon the particular issue, but 
chosen to deceive her anyway. That objective standard is unlikely to be reached if a condition 
was both undisclosed and unusual. However, while it gives greater protection to people’s 
autonomy, it does not fully resolve the issues around fraudulent consent. In particular, the 
assumption that an accused ought to have known their genital sex was determinative of 
consent is already at the heart of cases such as McNally. A richer understanding could, 
though, return attention to the deceptions which arguably most concerned the complainants 
in the gender fraud cases: not the gender of their partner so much as the prolonged deceptions 
about their identity or identities and the many details of their lives and personalities which were 
deliberately misrepresented. In another gender fraud case, for example, the accused was 
originally reported to police not because of deception as to gender (which had not yet been 
discovered) but because they had pretended to be three or more different people including 
the boyfriends of both her and her best friend.69  
Others suggest that consent is not wrongly defined but fundamentally inadequate.70 In terms 
of its practical operation, it is criticised for focusing attention upon the behaviour of the 
complainant rather than the accused. Did she act in ways which might have implied that she 
did consent? Did she adequately convey her lack of consent? While the semi-objective mens 
rea now limits the assumptions a defendant can legitimately make, it by no means eliminates 
them. He can still rely upon a mistaken belief as long as it is deemed to be reasonable in all 
the circumstances – and those circumstances presumably include the conduct of the 
complainant.71  
However, the issues are also more fundamental. For Catherine MacKinnon, consent-based 
offences falsely assume a social context in which women have equality of power and free 
exercise of choice, when in reality there is an ‘underlying structure of constraint and 
disparity’.72  Its equation of apparent consent with an exercise of autonomy is therefore false: 
too often, women’s apparent consent is rather submission for the sake of survival.73 We have 
seen that impoverished version of consent accepted by the criminal courts as adequate for 
women in cases such as Bree. Given their attachment to this model, would they really be able 
to implement a more radical and demanding model of free agreement?  
John Gardner makes the opposite argument: that consent necessarily presupposes 
asymmetry between the (male) doer and (female) sufferer.74 It therefore does not encompass 
agreement or teamwork as a model for sex. In other words, the notion of consent is 
incompatible with full sexual autonomy for women. Yet, while that is indeed the current model 
of consent, need it be the case? Or is mutual consent a possibility? If so, we return to the 
question: is it one which the law is able to accommodate? We might point to other fields of law 
to suggest that an asymmetrical model is not inevitable: contract law, for example,  requires 
offer and acceptance. Yet the very fact that these are complicated by recognition of counter-
offers, invitations to treat, and so forth shows that the roles of offeror and acceptor are neither 
 
69 Gemma Barker. See further Caroline Derry, Lesbianism and the Criminal Law: Three centuries of regulation in 
England and Wales (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2020) chapter 8.  
70 For an overview of the key challenges to liberal conceptions of consent, see Munro, 'Constructing Consent' pt 
II. 
71 Temkin and Ashworth, 'The Sexual Offences Act 2003' 341. 
72 Catherine Mackinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 
1989) 175. 
73 Mackinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory, 168. 
74 John Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 48. 
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fixed and binary, nor readily mapped onto active and passive roles. Unfortunately, the criminal 
law shows little willingness to discard its binary assumptions in relation to sexual consent.  
Hunter and Cowan summarise critiques of consent’s inability to recognise women’s agency 
from several angles. On one hand, women may be treated as irrational victims: their autonomy 
and decision-making capacity is not recognised so their (non-)consent is not respected. On 
the other, women may be treated as masculine, atomised subjects with no account taken of 
the structural inequalities which limit their autonomy and decision-making capacity: constraints 
on their ability to (not) consent are then not recognised. In other words, liberal notions of 
consent may tie women into the roles of victim or agent, with little space for intermediate 
positions.75 The problem is not simply this imposition of a victim/subject binary. As Louise du 
Toit points out, the underlying issue is liberalism’s model of the self as ‘pre-existent and 
complete’ rather than ‘dynamic and intersubjective’.76 In other words, we form our sense of 
self through time and through our interactions with others: the law both fails to understand that 
when considering consent and does not take seriously the damage rape does to that process 
of forming sexual selfhood. It will remain unable to do so, du Toit argues, since the asymmetry 
between the active male and passive female – and the notion of women’s sexuality as men’s 
property – are so entrenched in criminal law.77  
However, if consent is inadequate, does that mean we should abandon it?78  If so, what should 
take its place? There is no consensus on what an alternative might look like. One ambitious 
possibility is du Toit’s suggestion that we need to resymbolise ‘feminine sexuality as 
inappropriatable, inviolable’.  That would involve, among other measures, reminding judges 
and juries about women’s struggles to maintain sexual agency and ensuring they understand 
the damage rape does to the victim’s dynamic selfhood.79 But are such proposals too utopian 
in a system where even cautious changes have been undermined and resisted by the criminal 
justice system?  
Conversely, other critics of consent move in the opposite direction to suggest that we should 
move back towards a requirement of force. Victor Tadros argued in ‘Rape Without Consent’ 
that the consent requirement fails to mark rape as a crime of violence.80 For him, the answer 
is a differentiated definition which, rather than centring on consent, focuses upon the particular 
wrong done. For example, he suggests that where force is used, it is ‘a significant feature of 
the wrong perpetrated’.81 That would seem to further imply a relatively high degree force would 
be required; while it is not clear what other circumstances would be classed as rape under this 
scheme, there are strong echoes of the Victorian ‘force fear or fraud’ albeit that he also 
mentions some other situations such as unconsciousness and involuntary intoxication. How, 
without a single underpinning concept, is such a scheme to avoid being under-inclusive? In 
other words, removing the difficulties in this area of sexual offences law is unlikely to be as 
simple as removing the element of consent. 
6. Conclusion 
The past half century has seen a transformation in sexual offences law. Both the fact of 
consent and the accused’s belief in consent have been given new statutory definitions which 
aim to address at least the most egregious failings of the old law. To some extent, they have 
 
75 Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan, ‘Introduction’ in Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and 
Consent: Feminist engagements with law and subjectivity (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
76 Louise du Toit, ‘The Conditions of Consent’ in Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and 
Consent: Feminist engagements with law and subjectivity (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
77 du Toit, 'The Conditions of Consent' 68. 
78 Victor Tadros, for example, makes this argument in ‘Rape Without Consent’ (2006) 26(3) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 515. 
79 du Toit, 'The Conditions of Consent' 70–71. 
80 Tadros, ‘Rape Without Consent’ 515–516. 
81 Tadros, 'Rape Without Consent' 539. 
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succeeded in this. The Morgan defence would no longer be arguable; nor would Olugboja’s 
defence argument that failure to physically resist legally equated to consent. Section 74 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 put that changing understanding on a statutory footing. It seems 
evident that in law, consent requires something more than a mere absence of resistance.  
Yet there has been little sign of a corresponding transformation in the implementation of those 
definitions. Successful prosecutions remain more likely where there is evidence of the use of 
force.82 The acceptance that a woman who is vomiting in a shower, or so intoxicated that she 
cannot be allowed to walk through campus alone, can ‘agree by choice’ shows that the courts’ 
understanding of positive consent is a weak and thin one. It is partly for this reason that 
Vanessa Munro has argued that the force requirement has not disappeared; although no 
longer part of the legal definition of rape, its use is important evidence to support a woman’s 
allegation.83 Men’s prerogative to ‘seduce’ extends to police spies who lied about every aspect 
of who and what they were, in the context of long-term relationships; yet the courts have been 
eager to take punitive action against (presumed) women who attempt to exercise similar 
prerogatives. It is difficult, then, to avoid the conclusion that while feminist activism helped to 
inform statutory change, similar transformations of understanding remain elusive in the police 
stations, prosecution offices, and courtrooms of England and Wales.84  
Should feminists disengage from law reform altogether? Rather, Larcombe argues that we 
should work towards qualitative, victim-centred aims. One of these, ‘improving the legal ‘story’ 
of rape’ so that myths and stereotypes are not reinforced by the legal system,85 will require 
the issues around consent considered in this chapter to be addressed in a way which the law 
has not yet achieved. The experience of the last fifty years demonstrates that changing the 
legal story is a slow and difficult process, which cannot be achieved by statutory reform alone. 
Yet it is essential if the law is to truly recognise the sexual agency of all those it governs. At 
present, it only fully recognises the sexual agency of heterosexual men, which leaves the rest 
of us with little role beyond accepting or refusing their demands. In order to transform that, we 
must continue to effect change ‘slowly, and often imperceptibly’,86 until the courts embrace 
‘agreement by choice’ as a mutual agreement between equals rather than the reaction of the 




82 Munro, 'Constructing Consent'. 
83 Munro, ‘An Unholy Trinity?’. 
84 Sjolin (‘Ten Years On’) suggests that to criticise the courts for ‘harking back’ is ‘a lazy criticism’ and that 
instead, they are avoiding interference with the statutory definition and preserving flexibility. However, the cases 
discussed here do not wholly bear out that more generous interpretation: the judicial approach combines with 
police, CPS, and jury attitudes to ensure that older understandings of consent persist.  
85 Larcombe, 'Falling Rape Conviction Rates' 39. 



















This chapter provides a theoretical account of mediation - a process of dispute resolution that 
has grown significantly over the past 50 years. It argues that there are three central theoretical 
models – the pragmatic, the transformative and the narrative, with all other models being 
ultimately iterations of the latter. The chapter then discusses what various theorists argue are 
the fundamental features or qualities of mediation. These features include privacy and 
informality. The chapter concludes by arguing that, in fact, only voluntariness and autonomy, 
bottom-up justice, and plurality are central to a true jurisprudence of mediation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The last 50 years can be seen as telling a story of the slow but steady growth of alternative 
dispute resolution. The birth and subsequent growth of mediation takes place over similar 
timescale both intellectually and in practice.1 It grew from the mid 1960s onwards through a 
series of statutes establishing conciliation schemes operating in the industrial and employment 
sectors.2 This was followed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 which a year 
later set up what became known as Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). 
Conciliation was, and remains for ACAS, what the rest of the legal and dispute resolution world 
usually calls mediation. A process where a neutral third party facilitates the reaching of a 
voluntary agreement or settlement between the parties.  
What follows is a not a history of mediation (there are many useful historical overviews)3 but 
rather a detailed account of the jurisprudence of mediation. This is not a straightforward task. 
Mediation has drawn widely from many disciplines.4 Despite this intellectual borrowing, or 
perhaps because of it, there remain relatively few, if any, clear and consistent foundational 
theories with regards to mediation. Indeed, mapping the conceptual ground of mediation 
appears to be very much a work in progress as there appears to be no agreed schema. For 
 
1 The ‘father’ of mediation, Lon L Fuller’s seminal book The Concept of Law was published in its final, revised 
edition in 1969, his ‘Mediation – Its Forms and Functions’ (1979) 44 Southern California Law Review, 305 
followed in 1973. 
2 For example, the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 and the Industrial Relations Act 1971.  
3 For example, see Marian Liebmann, (ed) Mediation in Context (London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000). 
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mothers and Father of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR’ [2000] 16, 1 Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 1. 
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example, Menkel-Meadow5 derives eight models of mediation from existing literature whilst 
Boulle6 recognises four models and Alexander describes six ‘meta-models’.7  
This chapter will not attempt a complete literature review of works claiming to offer theoretical 
insight into mediation. Partly because this is an unwieldy task but also because a survey will 
leave as many questions unanswered as answered. Rather this chapter will attempt to 
evaluate the principal strands and themes in order to arrive at what is argued to be 
foundational in mediation theory: identifying what separates it conceptually from both litigation 
and other forms of adjudicative alternative dispute resolution (ADR) such as arbitration or 
statutory adjudication.8 It will be argued that there are three key theoretical models – the 
pragmatic, the transformative and the narrative. The chapter will further argue that other so-
called models – like the therapeutic – are more properly classified as versions of one of the 
former. All three predominant models appear to share a number of key features – the privacy 
of the process, the informality of the process, voluntariness, the bottom-up nature of justice 
and finally an appeal to a form of pluralism. The chapter will argue that only the latter three 
aspects – voluntariness and autonomy, bottom-up justice and plurality – are necessary 
features of all models of mediation. Although voluntariness matters only in the more limited 
sense of compulsion within mediation as opposed to compulsion to mediate.9 These key 
aspects of mediation echo many of the cultural and intellectual changes of the past 50 years.  
 
This chapter will begin by outlining the claims of Fuller who considered mediation to be a 
particular form of social ordering ideally suited to polycentric disputes. It will then provide an 
account of the three models of mediation – the pragmatic, the transformative and the narrative. 
Following this, analysis partly drawn from Alberstein,10 will seek to argue that, quite apart from 
any wider cultural or intellectual trends, mediation theory has not developed in a vacuum but 
can be clearly located within the wider contours of litigation and dispute resolution. Having 
established that mediation - irrespective of model - sits intellectually in a relationship with 
formal law, the chapter will consider four questions in relation to each of the three models. The 
first of the four questions focuses on the privacy of mediation. This is often assumed to be 
fundamental to mediation, but it will be argued that this is not a necessary feature of it. This 
will lead to the second question of whether or not mediation is necessarily informal. It will be 
argued that informality is not a core feature of mediation at a theoretical level. The third 
question will consider the need for voluntariness and autonomy for the actual parties to the 
dispute. Fourthly, the concept of justice in mediation will be considered. It will be argued that 
mediation appeals to a ‘bottom up’ justice or a horizontal (as opposed to a vertical) approach 
and that questions of its privacy and informality will be considered but it will be argued that 
neither of those are unique to mediation or essential to the theory as opposed to the practice 
of mediation. This leads to a discussion of the plurality that I argue underpins mediation and 
which sits very comfortably in the diversity of contemporary United Kingdom.  
 
This chapter will argue that mediation appeals to an alternative account of justice and 
ultimately mediation appeals to a pluralistic paradigm, both descriptively and normatively. The 
degree of pluralism can vary between accounts.  Pluralism in mediation embraces - especially 
in its more evaluative form – not just a recognition of overt legal rights but also of other 
 
5 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, 
Paradigms, and Practices’ [1995] The Negotiation Journal, 217, 228-230. 
6 Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (2nd edn, London, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005).  
7 Nadja Alexander, ‘The Mediation Meta-Model: Understanding Practice’ [2008] 26, 1, Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, 97. 
8 For example, construction adjudication under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 or 
deposit protection adjudication under the Housing Act 2004, ss212-215 as amended by the Localism Act 2011, 
s184.  
9 See also Julian Sidoli del Ceno ‘The Problem of Compulsory Mediation: Civil Justice, Human Rights and 
Proportionality’ (2014) 6, 3, International Journal of Law in the Built Environment, 286.  
10 Michal Alberstein, (2009) Forms of Mediation and Law: A Jurisprudence of Mediation, ExpressO, 
http://works.bepress.com/michal_alberstein/1 (accessed 16 December 2020). 
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conceptions of justice and views of ‘the good’ is a strength and not a weakness. Finally, it will 
be argued that the final core element of mediation is based around the argument that litigation 
is harmful generally to most parties and that mediation seeks to limit this - and that whilst talk 
of positive experiences of conflict might be flights of fancy – there is a genuine attempt at 
preserving relationships and, in some sense, healing.  
 
2. Social Ordering and Litigation 
 
Fuller in many important papers during the course of the latter half of the twentieth century 
outlined an account of how functioning society ought to be governed, or perhaps more 
appropriately ordered for there is no necessity for ‘ordering’ always to be ‘top-down’ or 
pyramidal. This project that he called ‘eunomics’ (literally ‘good order’ frequently referred to by 
Summers and others as the ‘principles of social order’)11 did not develop in a systematic way 
and was left incomplete at his death in 1978. Winston gathered these elements of Fuller’s 
work - which have received less critical attention than his more overtly jurisprudential work - 
together for a wider readership12. The basic argument running through this project is that there 
are many ways in which we can and do order society and human interactions. Adjudication is 
one of them but only one of them along with managerial direction, contract, legislation, and 
mediation. Adjudication is appropriate in many arenas but has its limits. Most notably, Fuller 
considered adjudication to be poorly suited to polycentric disputes13 and coordinating 
collective activities. Fuller borrowing the term ‘polycentric’ from Polanyi14 used it to describe 
disputes with not only multiple parties - that the courts clearly can and do deal with (the ‘class 
action’ in the US context for example) - but disputes with a wide variety of participants. 
Participants (or stakeholders) are those with an interest in the dispute not necessarily a legal 
interest or right and who tend to represent numerous different perspectives, values, and 
interests.15 
 
The question of polycentrism is a complex one16 and not fundamental for the present enquiry. 
What is more important and central to the subsequent discussion is that Fuller also argues 
that not all forms of social order require external authority. He states that this tendency is a 
‘modern thought.’17 Fuller regards mediation properly understood not as something that aims 
to achieve conformity with external norms under the aegis of authority – state or otherwise but 
rather ‘toward the creation of the relevant norms themselves’.18 Further, Fuller sees the State 
as being perceived erroneously as the font of all truth, that individuals cannot operate through 
custom, reason and other traditional mechanisms but must instead be subject at every turn to 
the courts or the civic authorities: 
 
Now the tendency is to convert every form of social ordering into an exercise of the 
authority of the state, or, among sociologists, into a projection of “norms” by an abstract 
entity called “society”. Legislation, adjudication, and administrative direction, instead 
of being perceived as distinctive interactional processes, are all seen as unidirectional 
exercises of state power.19 
 
11 Robert Summers, Lon L. Fuller (London, Edward Arnold, 1984) 
12 Lon L Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller Edited, 
with an Introduction by Kenneth I. Winston. (Durham N.C., Duke University Press, 1981). 
13 Polycentrism is a term used to describe an organising principle based around ‘many centres’. In dispute 
resolution its meaning has adapted to mean that there are many participants to the dispute or a dispute with 
many central issues. 
14 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1951). 
15 Lon L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ [1978] 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 394-5.  
16 See, for example, John WF Allinson ‘Fuller’s Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication’ 
[1994] 53, 2, Cambridge Law Journal 367. 
17 Lon L Fuller, n1 above at 315. 
18 ibid at 308 




It is this idea that provides the most useful building block for a jurisprudence of mediation. 
Mediation does not appeal per se to the power of the state or to external legal principles. 
Evaluative mediators may frequently make reference to the ‘law’ or what a tribunal might find 
on the facts but these are arguably not true to the concept of mediation and certainly they are 
not fundamental to the theory of mediation. Rather, mediation provides avenues for disputes 
to be dealt with without reference per se to external sources of authority. Individuals can be 
sources of their own ‘personalised authority’.  
 
However, tensions between ‘mediation as suitable for polycentric disputes’ and ‘mediation as 
personalised authority’ can clearly be seen. Fuller’s work here is – like elsewhere – a rich 
source of ideas but one which has not been fully or systematically developed. There are clear 
implications in Fuller’s work that some disputes are suited to mediation and that litigation is 
not necessarily the most appropriate and certainly not the only form of dispute resolution. 
Implicit in this is that mediation has an internal logic and coherence but that this logic is 
perhaps rather narrow, confined, and separate. Following Fuller many versions and models of 
mediation have developed. Fuller’s contention that there is one logic of mediation is 
questionable. Numerous models of mediation have emerged since Fuller; each attempting to 
provide a different account of the essence of the practice - some placing mediation 
conceptually close, if different in practice, to negotiation and litigation with the aim being an 
outcome. Others have concentrated more on the second aspect of Fuller’s project, that of 
recognising or creating other forms of authority. This is taken to its most extreme, or fullest, in 
narrative mediation where participants are encouraged to create their own account both of the 
dispute and of the resolution through an appreciation of sometimes radical subjectivity.20  What 
follows is a brief account of the prevalent models of mediation focussing solely on their 
theoretical aspects. Each model reveals its jurisprudential commitments at a deeper level of 
theoretical analysis. It will be argued that Fuller’s central contention – that there are a number 
of ways of properly ordering society – remains a valuable insight.  
 
3. Models of mediation 
 
As mentioned earlier there is no agreed conceptual account of mediation. Neither is there an 
agreed account of the type or number of models of mediation. This section will argue that there 
are four principal models of mediation theory. It will not address issues of models of mediation 
in practice although there is some overlap between the theory and practice of the discipline.  
 
3.1 Pragmatic mediation 
 
Pragmatic mediation aims to reach an agreed settlement between the parties without coercion. 
The pragmatic model is concerned with ‘Getting to Yes’ as expressed by Fisher and Ury.21 
Many appear to take the publication of this book as marking a sea-change in attitudes towards 
ADR generally although earlier works such as Smith could possibly lay claim to this title too.22 
What predominantly matters on this model is reaching an agreement, an agreement that is 
‘win-win’ or of a certain quality for both parties but nonetheless an agreement, a settlement. 
Pragmatic mediation can often be seen as a development of negotiation, negotiation with the 
addition of a third party who assists in opening channels of communication. How pragmatic 
mediation is described can vary. Supporters will frequently talk about finding new creative 
solutions to old problems. Opponents will sometimes categorise it as unprincipled bargaining. 
 
20 Subjectivity, or perspectivism, in this context argues for the primacy of the agent’s personal response to a 
matter be that through a particular ethical lens, the reading of a sequence of facts or indeed an appeal to 
alternative set of facts.  
21 Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without giving in (Penguin, 1981). 
22 David Smith, ‘A warmer way of disputing: Mediation and conciliation’ [1978] 26, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 205.  
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Pragmatic mediation can be seen to have two sub-models: the facilitative and the evaluative. 
It will be argued that theoretically whilst both share in a pragmatic concern with settlement 
only the facilitative model is actually mediation properly understood.  
 
The facilitative approach to mediation, described as ‘pure’ by Menkel-Meadow,23 involves no 
adjudicative direction of any kind or any assumption of substantive expertise by the mediator. 
Instead, the mediator is a third-party, who utilising their own skills, works with the disputants 
to solve the issues that present themselves. On this account, the mediator assumes a positive 
attitude towards the disputants. They are sufficiently intelligent and are themselves best 
placed to find a solution. The mediator’s role then is to remove barriers to engagement and 
open channels of communication between the parties thereby allowing the participants to 
reach their own settlement.24 This can be contrasted with evaluative mediation. Brown states 
that: ‘The evaluative mediator’s tasks include finding facts by properly weighing evidence, 
judging credibility and allocating burden of proof, determining and applying relevant law, rules 
or customs and rendering an opinion.’25 
 
Both these predominant models appear to implicitly depend on an ‘outcome’ being achieved. 
Evaluative mediation has become particularly popular in certain commercial areas of the law 
where professional expertise is often central to the dispute, for example construction.26 They 
can therefore, perhaps, be labelled as ‘pragmatic’ forms of mediation. The outcome is either 
the final settlement of the dispute or, at the very least, a partial settlement through a narrowing 
of the issues. Both of these models fail to consider, or at least, appear to ignore other strengths 
or possible advantages of mediation. There appears little reference to enhanced 
communication, empowerment and transformation that appear in other models.  
However, whether evaluative mediation is actually a form of mediation at all is questionable. 
That it is an ‘alternative’ method of dispute resolution is clear, but it perhaps bears more 
similarity to early neutral evaluation or judicial determination. This is because in all these 
methods the third party is not a mere facilitator or perhaps more significantly not primarily a 
facilitator. Rather they act in a vertical relationship to the parties. The evaluative mediator – 
like the expert, the retired judge, or the like, sits in a relationship of supremacy to the 
participants.  It is they who have the specific expertise be they a civil engineer, a quantity 
surveyor, architect or whatever. It is they who make decisions about the facts and, in many 
cases, the law. That the evaluative mediator cannot compel a settlement, or the retired judge 
cannot issue a binding court order means that they are not forms of litigation.  They do however 
operate on an adjudicative paradigm. This paradigm is vertical or top-down and not horizontal 
as in mediation. It is arguable that the degree of evaluation is significant and that a mildly 
evaluative approach may not remove the fundamental, voluntary, and facilitative nature of the 
mediation as a whole. Further, some evaluative direction may assist the aim of ‘settlement’ or 
‘agreement’ – the holy grail of the pragmatic approach.  
3.2 Transformative mediation 
Other models, which are here termed ‘idealist’, attempt to move away from this. 
Transformative mediation is one widely recognised approach that seeks to emphasise the 
value of the process itself and which distances itself from what it sees as narrow results driven 
conceptions discussed above. It claims that the outcome of the particular dispute to which the 
mediation pertains is not an important factor.  Further, it challenges the assumption that the 
 
23 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Lawyer negotiations: theories and realities – what we learn from mediation’ [1993] 56, 
3, Modern Law Review 361. 
24 Leonard Riskin, ‘Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed’ 
[1996] 1 Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 7, 24. 
25 Carole Brown, ‘Facilitative mediation: The Classic Approach retails its appeal’ [2003] 4 Pepperdine Dispute 
Resolution Journal 279, 290. 
26 Penny Brooker & Suzanne Wilkinson (eds) Mediation in the Construction Industry: An International Review. 
(Abingdon, Spon Press, 2010). 
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mediator controls the process. It is associated primarily with the work of Bush and Folger who 
describe it thus: 
“The transformative approach instead defines the objective as improving the 
parties themselves from what they were before. In transformative mediation, 
success is achieved when the parties as persons are changed for the better, to 
some degree, by what has occurred in the mediation process.”27 
Transformative mediation then looks beyond the particular dispute to the person. Originally, 
moral growth was deemed to be the aim or outcome of transformative mediation. Bush and 
Folger duly recognised that by stating this they contradictingly were effectively replacing one 
end goal of mediation for another. In later work, mediation is described as having the “potential 
[of] transformative effects.”28 Recognition and empowerment now became the stated goals for 
Bush and Folger.29 Conflict is not seen as something that is ultimately positive in a way that 
Fiss might.30 It is not cathartic. Conflict is not about establishing a ‘right’ to something or a 
precedent or enacting social change. Rather, conflict ‘de-skills’ individuals, disconnecting 
themselves from others.  
Advocates of transformative mediation have been amongst the most vocal in criticising the 
increasing juridification of mediation.31 Apart from Bush and Folger, others such as Della Noce 
and Antes, have expressed concern about the increasing involvement of both lawyers and the 
courts in mediation.32 They consider this as undesirable as, they argue, that this results in both 
an increasing emphasis on settlement and on evaluation and appeals to external norms by 
the mediator. Indeed, Bush and Folger oppose any attempt at mingling any other model with 
their own.33 
There are numerous critiques of this model. It has been argued that there is little to actually 
support the rather broad assumptions they make and conclusions they draw.34 Much depends 
on transformative mediation providing an underlying theory of human development. This is 
lacking for Seul, for one, who argues that this is seriously under theorised. Neither is an 
existing theory of psychological human development used to support the claims of the theory 
nor is a new one presented.35 Kelly has argued that transformative mediation developed ‘as a 
result of observations rather than systematic analysis of theoretical concepts leading to 
applications.’36 The most compelling criticism however attacks not gaps in the theory but rather 
its heart. Mediation seemingly rests on a plurality of values and the view that the mediator is 
not ‘better’ or more important or more authoritative than the disputants. However, 
transformative mediation seems to suggest that the values of the transformative mediator 
namely empowerment and recognition are ontologically prior to the values of the disputants. 
 
27 Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Promise of Mediation, (2nd Edition, San Francisco, Jossey 
Bass, 1994, 84). 
28 Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush, ‘Transformative Mediation and Third-Party Intervention: Ten 
Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice,’ [1996] 13, 4 Mediation Quarterly 263, 277. Italics present in 
the original. 
29 Ibid at 263. 
30 Owen Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ [1984] 93 Yale Law Journal 1073. 
31 Penny Brooker, Mediation Law: Journey to Juridification and Institutionalism (London, Routledge, 2012). 
32 Robert A. Baruch Bush ‘Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, 
and What It Means for the ADR Field.’ [2002] 3 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 111. 
33 Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush n28 above. 
34 Lisa P. Gaynier, “Transformative mediation: In search of a theory of practice”, [2005] 22 3 Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, 397. 
35 Jeffrey Seul, “How Transformative Is Transformative Mediation? A Constructive-Developmental Assessment.” 
[1999] 15 1 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 135. 
36 Terri Kelly, A Somewhat Critical Analysis of the Transformative Model of Mediation. [2000] Portland, Oregon: 
Department of Conflict Resolution, Portland State University. 
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Bush and Folger naturally attempted to respond to this critique and others.37 They argued that 
the difference lies in the fundamental values and approach of the mediator to the mediation 
rather than in asserting a specific set of values. It could be argued that this view could be 
analogous to King Rex’s eight principles for a working legal system.38 Mediation, arguably all 
mediation, requires certain fundamental attitudes or assumptions. Later it will be sketched in 
more detail what these are and are not. One of them it is argued is that the parties reach their 
own solutions. In doing this it is likely that they are empowered to do so and that by definition 
they have achieved some recognition of their own autonomy.   
3.3 Narrative Mediation 
 
Narrative mediation ultimately traces its intellectual roots to post-modernism. Facts are 
socially constructed, and truth is subjective. There are a wide variety of narratives that could 
possibly deal with the same set of facts. According to narrative mediation, no account has 
priority or ‘more truth.’ There is a strong, possibly, radical subjectivity to narrative mediation.  
It acknowledges cultural context and personal preferences whilst at the same time radically 
ignoring external attempts at objectivity or norm creation. These external norms include the 
actual ‘law’ whether as written in books or generally understood and accepted.  
 
However, narrative mediation is not simply a theory. It has practitioners, albeit far fewer than 
other models. In this respect, the pragmatic model dominates. This is unsurprising. Narrative 
mediation is practiced from a number of centres most notably in Hamilton, New Zealand and 
University of San Diego, USA. Its origins as a practice can be traced to psychological therapy. 
Emerging in the 1980s the views of the therapist were not prioritised over those of the patient. 
In this way narrative mediation utilises a horizontal approach to expertise and norms. There is 
not one ‘objective’ account but rather there are a multiplicity of stories. The patient was 
encouraged to find their own story and to create their own narrative, a narrative that moves 
beyond hurt and rights. ‘It is widely accepted that mediation is a storytelling process...telling 
one's story in mediation serves simultaneously the ethical mandate, “participation,” as well as 
the pragmatic mandate to move “from story to settlement”.’39 
The narrative account seeks to consider the subjectivity of facts and encourages a story-
telling, or a re-story-telling in the light of engagement, trust building and to “deconstruct the 
conflict-saturated story”.40 The story-telling tradition is an important aspect of both the practice 
and theory of narrative mediation. Practically, it seeks to create alternative accounts of the 
dispute and the participants. It aims to move away from the polarities of victim and oppressor. 
In doing so it seeks to ‘destabilize those “theories of responsibility” which simultaneously serve 
to legitimate one's point of view and de-legitimate the point of view of the other party.’41 In 
doing so the participants are enabled and empowered to see new interpretations of the 
dispute.  
This ‘looking afresh’ at the dispute would seem to be a common feature of mediation generally. 
Mediation generally appeals to the creative, personalised solution without recourse to external 
authorities. The narrative approach also maintains the mediator as a third-party in a horizontal 
 
37 Joseph Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, ‘A Response to Gaynier’s “Transformative Mediation”: In Search of a 
Theory of Practice’, [2005] 23 Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 123. 
38 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised ed, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969) 33–38 for his 
description of the eight principles of legality. 
39 Sara Cobb, ‘A Narrative Perspective on Mediation: Toward the Materialization of the Storytelling Metaphor’, in 
Joseph P. Folger & Tricia S. Jones (eds) New Directions in Mediation: Communication Research and 
Perspectives (Sage,1994). 
40 John Winslade & Gerald Monk, Narrative Mediation: A new approach to conflict mediation, (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2000). 




relationship with the participants to the dispute. There are subtle differences however between 
narrative mediation and other models. The former questions more radically the existence of 
external norms whereas for other models they are considered to be simply less useful to the 
wider goals of settlement (for pragmatic mediation) and transformation and personal growth 
(for transformative mediation). Narrative mediation in terms of process and outcome seems to 
sit between the pragmatic and the transformative schools. It places value on the process of 
the mediation by aiming for the participant to better understand the conflict but also seeks to 
reach a resolution where the dispute or conflict is no longer.  
3.4 Therapeutic mediation 
Another so-called model of the ‘idealist’ persuasion seeks to argue that the insights of 
therapeutic jurisprudence can be productively applied to mediation. Therapeutic mediation 
emphasises the healing element of mediation. It is linked to wider trends of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and restorative justice. Daicoff is one who has recognised the link between 
mediation and transformative justice: 
All of the disciplines comprising the comprehensive law movement share at least two 
features in common: (1) a desire to maximize the emotional, psychological, and 
relational wellbeing of the individuals and communities involved in each legal matter; 
and (2) a focus on more than just strict legal rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, 
and entitlements. These two features unify the vectors and distinguish them from more 
traditional approaches to law and lawyering.42 
There is an assumption that bottom-up processes are inherently therapeutic. This is more 
often claimed rather than evidenced. Nevertheless, this approach is often linked to 
“Restorative Justice” in the criminal law. Here the aim is to restore not just the victim and her 
community to its state prior to the breach by the crime, but also to restore the defendant to the 
community. However, there is little in this that separates therapeutic mediation from other 
models. It has no distinct rationale or methodology of its own. Rather it is an attempt to 
emphasise one benefit of mediation. That therapy or healing can be a beneficial aspect of 
mediation is not questioned. It is however simply a quality that is aspirational to all models of 
mediation. It is overt in transformative mediation but present in others. It will be discussed 
further below.  
 
4. Models of mediation and jurisprudential assumptions 
 
There are then a number of different theoretical models of mediation. The three most prevalent 
are, as outlined above, the pragmatic or problem-solving (itself constructed of two distinct 
approaches namely the facilitative and the evaluative), the transformative43 and the 
narrative.44 Both the transformative and narrative accounts of mediation give much more 
weight to the process of the resolution rather than the outcome. The transformative seeks to 
alter perceived power imbalances through perspective taking and the deliberate making of 
choices. At one extreme, transformative mediation claims to be wholly uninterested in the 
outcome itself aiming rather for transformation of the participants and hence onward to the 
transformation of disputes themselves. It is doubtful if this is in practice the case.  
 
 
42 Susan Daicoff, ‘Law as a Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement,’ [2006] 6 Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 1, 11. 
43 Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush n27 above. 
44 Alison Cotter, Gerald Monk, & John Winslade, “A Narrative Approach to the Practice of Mediation” [1998] 14 
Negotiation Journal 21. John Winslade & Gerald Monk, Narrative Mediation: A new approach to conflict 
mediation, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2000). 
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Alberstein has gone further and has identified how different models of mediation display 
different tensions and concerns existing at the boundaries of theory and practice.45 For 
example, the pragmatic model has at its root a practical lawyering or practitioner focus 
whereas in the transformative model a therapeutic concern rises to the surface. Alberstein 
also places the narrative model within an anthropological framework. Probing more deeply in 
a later work Alberstein argues that each of these models displays their jurisprudential 
commitments.46  Alberstein places the pragmatic account with what is a reasonably well-
known account of the emergence of the legal process school47 in the US following the second 
world war.48 For Alberstein the pragmatic model echoes the optimism of the legal process 
school. Things can be done, achieved, overcome. Pragmatic mediation also aims for 
consensus building; again echoing American culture of the 1950s that found expression in 
many US law schools of the period notably Harvard.  
 
Alberstein locates the transformative model of mediation within relational feminism. Alberstein 
is not alone in this assessment although it does run counter to some other critical feminist 
accounts.49 Lichtenstein finds that transformative mediation and feminism both promote self-
determination and deal with the question of power by attempting to find alternative readings. 
Lichtenstein thus locates both transformative mediation and feminism within a ‘colorful 
pluralistic social movement.’ Gilligan is often classified as a ‘second wave’ feminist focusing 
on the relational.50 This relational approach recognises different voices and different 
perspectives that need to be recognised in order to overcome structural differences and 
apparent dichotomies such as individualism versus community.  
 
The narrative model has its roots according to Alberstein in the critical legal studies movement 
originating in the 1970s and 1980s. This movement offered a radical critique of law and its 
structures as betraying its ideological origins.51 Alberstein states: ‘This call to reveal the 
ideology behind formal rules is equivalent to the narrative model’s exposure of the sense of 
entitlement underlying conflict stories.’52 
 
The Critical Legal Studies project seems to end in despair however with little remaining but 
scepticism and resignation. The ‘law and society’ school offers a more optimistic post-modern 
account by developing the view that disputes are socially constructed. Individuals should 
internalise their understanding of law in society and their place within it. By doing this they 
thereby develop a deeper understanding of legal entitlements moving beyond a fixed and 
basic understanding of ‘rights’ as something that happens to you (or the State ‘gives’ to you 
or the lawyer defends ‘for’ you) to a situation where the participants are actively involved in 
creating ‘justice’. This echoes Winslade and Monk, two leading theorists of the narrative 
mediation model, who argue that mediation works by the parties moving beyond the original 
account of injustice and naïve entitlement and instead co-authoring a new account of shared 
participation.  
 
What arguably all three models have is a commitment to justice as something that can be, 
although not necessarily always, discovered between the parties and a sense that conflict in 
itself is not a valuable or useful process for the individuals and therefore there is an element 
 
45 Michal Alberstein, Forms of Mediation and Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution, [2007] 22 Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution, 321. 
46 Michal Alberstein n10 above, 12. 
47 I am unhappy with use of terms like ‘school’ for what are often loosely grouped individuals working in related 
fields especially as many monikers are added later by historians of ideas but they are used here for brevity, a 
degree of clarity and because they are used by Alberstein in her paper.  
48 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, (Oxford, OUP, 1995). 
49 Marsha Lichtenstein, ‘Mediation and feminism: Common values and challenges’, [2000] 18 1 Mediation 
Quarterly, 19. 
50 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982) 
51 Roberto Mangabria Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986) 
52 Michal Alberstein, n10 above. 
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of trying to mitigate the damage caused by the conflict. Each model takes a distinct approach 
to this – by creating a positive outcome, by empowerment or by creating a new perspective 
on the conflict itself – but they share a therapeutic paradigm. Litigation is often seen, arguably 
correctly, as stressful and difficult. Mediation attempts to provide a less painful way of resolving 
the dispute. Therapy or healing is pervasive to mediation. It is for this reason that ‘therapeutic 
mediation’ classified by some as a separate model of mediation is not so here. All models of 
mediation see value to the person. The pragmatic primarily by ending the dispute in a way that 
is at least satisfactory to all parties. The transformative by encouraging human growth and 
change. The narrative by seeing afresh values and norms.  
 
This ‘healing’ aspect was noted by Shaffer and McThenia in their debate with Fiss.53 This 
clearly demonstrates – once you get beyond the rhetorical and not always helpful language 
used by both parties – that very different conceptions of what justice is are held by Fiss from 
Shaffer and McThenia. There may actually be far less difference with the substantive 
outcomes of justice – a broad fairness seems to appeal to both, but for Fiss this must emerge 
in a top-down fashion through the courts whereas for Shaffer and McThenia ‘Justice is not 
usually something that people get from the government. And courts…are not the only or even 
the most important places that dispense justice.’54 It could be argued that those who support 
mediation and those that oppose it - whatever else might separate or unify them – divide over 
this point of whether justice is top-down or whether it is bottom-up and therefore pluralistic in 
some way.  
 
 
5. The core features of a jurisprudence of mediation 
 
Having outlined the main theoretical models of mediation the remainder of this chapter will 
seek to consider what each of them appeal to at a more fundamental level. It will consider 




One of the major criticisms laid at the door of mediation is that it is private. The same is true 
of course of other forms of ADR including arbitration that originally operated outside the formal 
court structure but is now subject to both statute55 and frequent scrutiny by the courts.56 It has 
already been discussed above that in the UK and most comparable common law jurisdictions 
mediation now largely takes place within a framework of civil justice and regulation, but this 
does not seem to satisfy the critics of the practice. What do we mean though by stating that 
mediation is private? Mediation is private in the limited sense of not taking place in public, but 
it is now very often part of a wider dispute that is not truly private. It may be court-annexed or 
on the recommendation of the judge. There are questions on how confidential the mediation 
actually is. 
 
The question of the public or private nature of dispute resolution cannot then be separated 
now from its relationship to civil justice as a whole. Mediation as a practice originates outside 
the domain of civil or family law yet most of the discussion concerning mediation certainly in 
the UK - but also in Europe and other ‘Western’ jurisdictions57 - is now very much centred on 
 
53 Thomas Shaffer and Andrew McThenia, ‘For Reconciliation’ [1985] 94 The Yale Law Journal, 1660. 
54 Ibid 1664-1665. 
55 Arbitration Act 1996. 
56 For example, Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 184 on the question of the 
confidentiality in arbitration and Newfield Construction Ltd v Tomlinson [2005] 97 Con LR 148 on the arbitrator’s 
award for costs based on procedural irregularity.  
57 Paula Young, ‘A Connecticut Mediator in a Kangaroo Court?: Successfully Communicating the ‘Authorized 
Practice of Mediation’ Paradigm to ‘Unauthorized Practice of Law’ Disciplinary Bodies,’ 2008 49 South Texas Law 
Review, 1047.  
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how it relates to and operates within the overarching edifice of the law and the prevailing 
system of civil justice. Genn sees mediation operating within the sphere of civil litigation. 
Without the stick of litigation and the threat of costs she argues parties do not usually mediate. 
The take up of mediation has been disappointingly slow for some members of the judiciary. 
Brooker has argued that mediation in the civil justice context has now become thoroughly 
juridified.58 This seems unquestionable. There is now an extensive and ever growing case law 
on when mediation can be legitimately refused59 and the sanctions that can be imposed for 
unreasonably refusing,60 the confidentiality of the mediation process, the role of the mediator, 
the requirement of good faith,61 the enforceability of any agreed mediation settlement,62 and 
the appropriateness of mediation in various types of disputes63 to name but some of the 
questions that have discussed and decided by the English and Welsh judiciary.  
 
How are we to evaluate this process? Some argue that this juridification removes the genuine 
uniqueness and empowerment from the process.64 That a book entitled ‘Mediation Law’ has 
been recently published is anathema to this group. They perceive mediation as being wholly 
separate from litigation not just in terms of its philosophy but also in terms of its organisation. 
This rather radical position is not the majority position unsurprisingly among lawyers. Indeed, 
it is lawyers who seem to play an ever-increasing role in mediation whether it is by advocating 
it, being sceptical about it, acting as gatekeeper or participating whether as the legal 
representative to a party in mediation or actually as the mediator themselves. The rise of 
evaluative mediation can be linked to the increasing use of lawyer-mediators or others will 
specialist subject specific knowledge, for example, in construction law.65 Many lawyer 
mediators seem to be very evaluative. They seem to have no difficulty in stating that this or 
that is the legal position, ‘I help them reach the right answer… the right answer in accord with 
the legal principles.’66 The question of whether these developments are positive or not is a 
separate question. What is relevant here is what do we mean by privacy in mediation and is 
this fundamental to our theoretical understanding of it?  
 
Privacy in mediation can have three meanings. This is rarely unpacked. It can mean the actual 
process is private i.e. takes place in a private room with the discussions remaining private to 
the parties, the mediators and their legal representatives. This is quite a small claim in reality. 
Many negotiations are private in this sense. Other forms of ADR are also private in this way. 
The presence of a mediator who is a third party neutral and bound in most cases by both 
ethical and practice rules limits the genuine privacy of the process. Frequently, lawyers attend 
mediations along with their clients. They too are bound by professional ethics and guidance. 
It seems then that this use of privacy is simply confidentiality. Highly desirable in many cases 
but not fundamental or unique to mediation.  
 
The next use can apply to the subject matter – law or disputes that only affect the parties 
concerned. Private law is a distinct category in many jurisdictions. In England and Wales, 
private law is not a usual category although it is understandable enough. Typically, one would 
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66 Interview. On file with the author.  
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think of it as including contract, wills, property, and aspects of family law although other areas 
might or might not make the list. Where there is clear public approval or disapproval for a 
certain course of action then the law is ‘public’ in the sense of criminal sanction or public law 
in strictu sensu. Supporters of mediation usually see it operating either exclusively or very 
largely in the private arena – the family being the most common. The rationale being that 
arrangements, say, for the care of children are in most cases a private concern for the parents. 
A background assumption is that most parents love their children, are broadly rational and will 
seek to provide the best care as they see fit. There is clearly a subjective or personal element 
in this, but we don’t usually intervene or feel we should intervene unless there is actual neglect 
or abuse. I may find the thought of parents feeding their children McDonald’s distasteful and 
verging on the obscene, but it remains a private matter. There is a wider sense however that 
all law is in some sense public. Contracts are subject to statutory intervention, case law and 
supervision by the courts. Fiss is one theorist who takes the line that there is no private when 
it comes to law, all is public.  
 
Finally, the other use of private is perhaps the most fundamental. It argues that both the 
process and the outcome of the mediation are private in the sense that they are subjective to 
the participants. Here, we find the appeal sometimes implicit sometimes explicit that parties 
can, do and should find their own solutions and that if the solution is satisfying for them then 
it is not for external, public scrutiny of its validity according to the law or otherwise. (This 
assumes parties being broadly equal and non-coerced). Privacy here then equates to a 
pluralistic conception and a bottom-up understanding of a just outcome. Again, this is 
contentious, but I contend is fundamental to the nature of mediation without which it cannot 
be truly mediation.  
 
5.2 Formal and Informal 
 
Mediation theory sits broadly on the informal axis. It is not usually a hidden negotiation or 
bargain between the parties, the fact that the mediator is a neutral third-party with, for the most 
part, appropriate skills and training avoids bullying or naked bargaining. Further, in many 
jurisdictions as outlined above mediation is in a relationship of varying kinds to the prevailing 
civil or family justice system. The turn to informalism in Western jurisdictions has no agreed 
roots or indeed causes. Some see it as a welcome relief from ever centralising governmental 
bodies, be they national or supranational such as the European Union. Others such as Abel 
argue that the growth of informal dispute resolution bodies has actually increased state 
activity. If one accepts Abel’s arguments, based on the US, then an example in the UK could 
be considered to be early invention instruments in UK housing. For example, selective 
licensing of landlords in the private rented sector alongside tenancy deposit legislation has 
actually increased statutory intervention into areas of residential housing that had previously 
used adjudication through the courts as the primary or often sole form of dispute resolution in 
residential housing matters. In this way, areas that were private at least until a dispute 
requiring adjudication crystallised, have now become subject to scrutiny and intervention.  
 
Roberts and Palmer find a number of ‘impulses’ towards informalism. They discuss a ‘political 
impulse’ that they identify in various co-operative type movements and the like arguing that a 
socialist inclination leant itself to scepticism about the legal system with its perceived class 
and wealth biases. They also identify an ‘ethnic impulse.’67 Here ethnic and religious groups 
retreat into self-regulating enclaves and self-regulate their own communities often outside of 
 
67 Simon Roberts and Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making, (2nd 
edition, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, 25-27) 
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the main stream legal culture.68 This has been noted recently in contemporary Birmingham.69 
This notion appears to link to the more common idea of culture. Not only legal anthropologists 
have found tendencies to informal justice in certain cultures. One of the most widely known 
culturally supported ideas of informal dispute resolution is found in China. There, going to 
court is traditionally seen as shameful and a failure irrespective of the strength of the legal 
claim.70 Further, Roberts and Palmer argue for an ‘occupational impulse’ driven by the 
demands and culture of work and organisations. Certain trades or professions feel that they 
are best placed to regulate themselves including any disputes that may emerge. This may be 
because of a wish for self-governance and independence or because of the sense that only 
people with particular knowledge, skills or experiences can rightly decide in such matters. 
They use the example of the mediaeval guild in both Europe and Imperial China.71 A further 
‘impulse’ is located in the identity of the local community.72  
 
5.3 Voluntariness and autonomy 
 
The voluntary nature of mediation is well-known and well-established. For example, Spencer 
and Brogan describe a five-fold philosophy of mediation73 with voluntariness finding a place 
alongside confidentiality, empowerment, neutrality, and a ‘unique solution.’ Voluntariness can 
be described as the parties both entering the mediation voluntarily and reaching an agreement 
(or not) without any coercion. It can also be seen to be solely that any agreement is voluntary. 
Thus, there is a distinction conceptually between a compulsion to enter the mediation process 
and a compulsion to settle whilst in the mediation, ‘and since compulsion to mediate is 
pressure of the former kind, there should be no objection.’74 Voluntariness is the least 
controversial of the fundamental assumptions outlined here. It has not been seriously 
questioned as a hallmark of mediation by any author. There are questions however concerning 
how one can assess the genuine voluntariness with which a party enters a mediation and what 
safeguards can be in place. There are obvious guidelines in place that seek to prevent those 
with mental health issues from engaging in mediation. Further, mediators are typically trained 
to protect serious power imbalances between the parties. With legal representation 
increasingly common on both sides of a mediated dispute this aspect is lessening in 
significance. More widely though there remains what has been termed ‘informed consent’.75 
This means that the individual party must truly understand what is required of them, what can 
be expected from the mediation, the mediator and the other party. As with any written advice 
from a lawyer to a client there is no guarantee that the party to a mediation will really 
understand what has been told them. Further, many clients may not approach a mediation in 
good faith. Thus, true voluntariness requires not just a lack of coercion but also an adequate 
understanding of the process and a willingness to engage in the process in good faith. There 
are subjective elements to assessing each of these in a given party. That they cannot always 
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Implicit in this view though is that the parties have sufficient autonomy. Autonomy from their 
lawyers, families, and friends to make the decision that they want. Autonomy too from the 
state and the civil justice system in that they have the autonomy to decide what is a suitable 
agreement for them. This requires that the individual has some space to operate in. Space 
that the state must allow them. This space is the private. There are areas of life that are 
regulated by the state – for example, boundaries. Boundaries can be usually accurately 
determined by a combination of the land registry, title deeds, chartered surveyors, and visual 
aids. It is possible then to settle a boundary dispute by using the civil justice system and 
reaching an answer that is determined by an approximation of law and fact. However, most 
boundary disputes are between two individuals over privately owned land. Usually there are 
no wider issues of public interest. Therefore, if the two parties settle this matter between 
themselves through mediation or otherwise then this is private. The parties have acted 
autonomously without a formal reference to the state. That the agreement reached is not what 
the courts might have ordered is of no concern if the parties have reached the agreement 
themselves.76 This is of course an everyday situation. There is no compulsion on a party to 
issue a claim for breach of contract, trespass, occupier’s liability, and a whole host of other 
civil wrongs.  
 
5.4 Mediation as an Alternative Account of Justice 
 
Spencer and Brogan’s ‘five-fold philosophy of mediation’77 mentioned above aims to develop 
some of the core values of mediation by distinguishing it, by its very nature, from adjudication. 
Whilst this ‘five-fold’ model mentioned has some value in examining some of the ‘values’ that 
underpin the typical practice of mediation they do not properly address, nor seek to address, 
the more basic assumptions upon which mediation rest nor the deeper psychological, ethical 
and jurisprudential aspects. The same is true of very many other models that invariably focus 
on the practice of mediation. The purpose of this work as has already been alluded to is to go 
beyond this superficial account and try to ascertain what is foundational for a jurisprudence of 
mediation. One aspect of this is that mediation appeals to a different account of justice – the 
bottom-up rather than the top-down.  
 
Traditional accounts of adjudication and other forms of social order have historically been 
wedded to a top-down or vertical conception with power emerging from a divinity or those that 
claim access to the will of the divinity, a mythical foundational law-giver or a sovereign. Even 
these top-down ‘laws’ are in most cases enforced by command. Some like Aquinian natural 
law make claims for universality whereas Austinian positivism is clearly man-made but both 
are fundamentally top-down. Whether through traditional natural law accounts or positivism 
most models display a ‘legacy of command’.78  Roberts and Palmer find this not only in familiar 
targets such as Hobbes and Austin but argue correctly that Locke, for example, still appeals 
to central authority and Weber talks of the leiter (the leader) and the verband (the following). 
 
These parochial understandings of the ‘modern’ West…potentially distort any broader 
panorama. First, the central conception of ‘order’ as intimately linked to ‘government’ 
– in the sense of a self-consciously exercised steering role working within a separate, 
dominant ‘public’ sphere – fixes too strong an imprint on the way we see the social 
world.79 
 
The top-down approach to law and justice is now no longer universally, indeed widely 
accepted. Adjudication however remains a resolutely top-down process. Indeed, it would 
seem it must be so. The judge, the arbitrator and the adjudicator all operate as adjudicators, 
 
76 Assuming all other necessary conditions are met.  
77 Spencer and Brogan n72 above. 
78 Roberts and Palmer n67 above  
79 ibid at 83.  
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third parties that make decisions based on fact and law. Mediation does not operate in this 
way. The third party does not enforce a decision nor is the law or the facts of the dispute 
fundamental.80 The parties are free to agree or disagree with each other and cannot be 
compelled to settle. This is then a key, perhaps the key distinction between adjudication and 
mediation. The former is top-down, the latter is bottom-up and yet it is with adjudication that 
mediation is in a particular relationship. Mediation is almost always compared to and develops 
in respect of its relationship to adjudication. Whilst there are some who worry about this, the 
majority do not. What is lost, perhaps, in ‘purity’ is gained by safeguards and esteem.  
 
Alberstein argues, correctly it would seem that most models of mediation in some sense reject, 
or at least have some concerns about, what is usually termed ‘legal formalism’, that there is a 
coherent, systematic, external system of law that can provide ‘fair’ adjudicated answers to any 
‘legal’ dispute. Legal formalism emerging as a distinct account displays an optimistic, some 
would argue naïve understanding of the law. What all versions share however is that law is 
‘out there’ and does not emerge in a subjective or relative or personalised way through the 
course of the dispute. This traditional view of justice as adjudicated by the courts essentially 
being top-down and externally enforced has been questioned through legal anthropology. In 
essence, a wide variety of case studies of different ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups has 
demonstrated that Western (and other) norms and assumptions are not universal. We are no 
longer prepared to dismiss otherness as inferiority or backwardness. Further, it has opened-
up systems of order that are in some cases naturally more conciliatory, more bottom-up and 
community driven. Examples abound. An early study still clearly bearing the imprint of Western 
assumptions of superiority, Crime and Custom in Savage Society,81 identified a lack of central 
authority institutionalised or otherwise. Famously, the Yanomani combine very little hierarchy 
or central control with what might be termed by Westerners a strong communitarian and 
egalitarian spirit. Similar aspects have been found in numerous other studies.  
 
Clastres82 goes further and weaves a number of different anthropological and ethnographic 
studies into an account of a genuine, distinct, horizontal form of societal arrangement. Some 
within the wider ADR movement have lauded these studies and have suggested that there is 
no need per se for society to be wedded in all cases to institutionalised law and order issuing 
from a central authority. The anthropological account though is not without critics from within. 
An interesting case is Laura Nader who went from a position that saw at the very least value 
and lessons (for the USA in her case) with alternative dispute resolution to one that viewed 
the ADR movement as ‘a pacification scheme, an attempt on the part of powerful interests in 
law and in economics to stem litigation by the masses, disguised by the rhetoric of an 
imaginary litigation explosion.’83 
 
The criticisms of Fiss, Genn and others all identify however loosely a concern with the bottom-
up element of mediation. The traditional view of adjudication as a top-down enterprise 
underpins the judicial scepticism about mediation in some quarters - and compulsory 
mediation in others (although there are others who are both strongly in favour and who see 
no prima facie objection to compulsory mediation).84 Critics of ADR such as Auerbach and 
Abel however accept that traditional litigation does not necessarily result in ‘justice’ as 
traditionally conceived. There remains a whole range of obstacles to civil justice. These range 
from an inequality of bargaining power to the ability of a truthful witness to appear credible in 
the witness box. There are others. In some jurisdictions there is the ‘plea bargain’ that at one 
 
80 Evaluative mediation makes more use of both law and facts but for this reason is not properly classified as 
mediation.  
81 Bronislaw Malinski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, (Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1926).  
82 Pierre Clastres, Society against the State: essays in political anthropology, (trans R Hurley) (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1977). 
83 Laura Nader, The Life of the Law; Anthopological Projects (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002).  




level is a rational decision on the part of the individual based on pragmatic concerns quite 
separate from any reference to justice. Therefore, it is a false opposition to portray litigation 
as resulting in justice and mediation as merely a compromise agreement that may or may not 
bear any relation to justice.  
 
It is, then, argued that it is important to properly grasp the concept of justice (if indeed ‘justice’ 
is the correct term, loaded as it is with so much meaning) that is applicable not just to the aims 
of mediation but to its process too. For example, Rock describes an alternative view of justice 
favoured by many involved, ‘In mediation, justice can be understood as the justice that the 
parties themselves experience, articulate, and embody in their resolution of dispute’.85 This 
wider and, arguably, ‘softer’ view of justice pervades much thinking on alternative dispute 
resolution. Hyman and Love describe the bottom-up approach to justice as drawing on: 
 
[t]he rules, standards, principles and beliefs that guide the resolution of the dispute . . 
. are those held by the parties. The guiding norms . . . may be legal, moral, religious or 
practical. Parties are free to use whatever standards they wish, not limited to standards 
that have been adopted by the legislature or articulated by the courts.86 
Critics of Hyman and Love characterise this view as ‘whatever’ is agreed upon is justice.87 
This is not a fair account. Rather, a correct account would go – assuming sufficient 
intelligence, autonomy and reasonable advice in a dispute concerning genuinely private law 
then the outcome that the parties arrive at is ‘just’ for them. Many of these qualifications need 
to be separately understood and what is ‘genuinely private’ again needs discussion. It is a 
subjective position but not radically so. Nor is it one without safeguards. Mediators are trained 
to spot clients who fail to understand the process or who lack autonomy. As discussed earlier, 
mediation is now frequently indeed usually part of a wider civil (or family) justice. Lawyers are 
now very much part of the process. This view of justice as being ‘from below’ then represents 
a view that law and dispute resolution can be educative and progressive, that it can encourage 
and empower individuals to resolve their own problems which ultimately results in a more 
mature society less determined to argue and litigate. It argues that there can be different 
solutions and indeed different right answers for different people even when faced with similar 
conflicts. It does not claim that all disputes can or should be mediated. It does not claim that 
mediation will resolve all disputes even where it is an appropriate method. It does not seek to 
displace adjudication within the law but rather act in a complementary way with it.  
 
 
5.5 Mediation as Plurality 
 
The final foundational principle of mediation theory is plurality. We are not referring here to 
legal pluralism. Legal pluralism has many definitions. There seem to be at least two main 
accounts, the descriptive and the normative. The descriptive can be seen in Engle Merry’s 
definition as where ‘two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field.’88 This view is 
shared by others89 and criticised for its vagueness and lack of usefulness by Tamanaha: ‘[t]he 
 
85 Evan Rock, ‘Mindfulness Mediation, The Cultivation of Awareness, Mediator Neutrality and the Possibility of 
Justice’ [2006] 6 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, 347. 
86 Jonathan Hyman & Lela Love, ‘If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation’, [2002] 9 Clinical 
Law Review,157, 160. 
87 See Joseph Stulberg, ‘Mediation and Justice: What standards govern?’ [2005] 2 Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 213. 
88 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ [1988] Law and Society Review, 869, 870. 
89 For example, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Contrast between Hart’s Jurisprudence and Fuller’s’ in 
Peter Crane (ed) The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford, Hart. 2010).  
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legal pluralist attachment of the word ‘law’ to lived systems of normative order adds no more 
information, and generates resistance and confusion.’90 
 
This view then is contrasted with legal monism, that law properly understood consists of one 
system however imperfect. Normative legal pluralism argues that there is and ought to be a 
number of different legal orders. However, what is being argued for here is not legal pluralism 
but rather a pluralism in social ordering. It is in effect appealing to the Fullerian project that 
was outlined above. It is a small claim but one that is intended both descriptively and 
normatively. It is a claim that there are numerous ways that individuals in any given society 
order themselves including resolving disputes. It is also a claim that this is good. This Fullerian 
pluralism avoids the difficulties and debates of ‘legal pluralism.’ It also allows mediation to 
exist in relationship to the formal civil justice system without precluding that in some cases it 
may operate wholly independently of the courts. Community mediation is an example of this. 
Frequently, a legal dispute has not crystallised and in many cases it may do so. For example, 
people parking lawfully in streets during the school run is not a matter that can be litigated. It 
can however cause anger and frustration. That a community mediation scheme can operate 
in such a situation is surely beneficial. It provides an arena for the dispute to be resolved, 
allows views to be aired and potentially stops the matter escalating.  
 
If one accepts bottom-up justice, then one accepts a form of plurality. The claim here is not 
then a radical version of plurality. It does not need to make a claim that there is no higher 
standard or no law. It is not an ontological claim. Rather, it is the plurality of description. It 
emerges from anthropology recognising that just as different tribes, peoples and cultures have 
different ways of settling disputes. It emerges from observing civil litigation in practice in 
England and Wales, the different personalities of the clients and their lawyers, their differing 
needs, the mood and approach of the judge. It can be seen in the vast number of disputes 
that are settled or simply forgotten about that could have been litigated. 
 
 
6. Conclusion: Mediation, Pluralism and Justice 
 
This chapter has provided a critical presentation of the current literature on the jurisprudence 
of mediation. It has argued that there are a number of different approaches and that these 
reveal much about the first order assumptions of those who hold them. Rather than there being 
one correct approach to grounding mediation, there are many. This is not a negative but rather 
should be seen as a positive emerging as it does out of the flexibility and creativity inherent in 
the process.  
 
With all of them perhaps the core assumption is that justice is not always top-down or applied 
by an external authority. Depending on what theory one holds as predominant – and as 
outlined these are not always mutually exclusive – then justice appears in different guises. For 
the pragmatist, justice could be economic – the cheapest resolution, there are no ‘bigger’ ideas 
present. For the transformative theorist, it is the justice of self-discovery and change, for the 
narrative conception it is genuinely a discovery of self-made justice.  
 
Mediation then depends on a bottom-up conception. Bottom-up or horizontal justice 
necessarily involves accepting a wide variety of participants bringing many different norms, 
practices, aspirations, and the like with them. This results in a plurality, a plurality within 
mediation but also places mediation within a plurality of social ordering. Voluntariness and 




90 Brian Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism’ [1993]) 20 Journal of Law and 
Society, 192, 212. 
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The United Kingdom is almost certainly a more plural place now than in 1969. There have 
been vast social, political, and cultural changes and there is, in most areas of debate, a wider 
range of opinion in terms of ethics, politics, aesthetics and the like. There has also been a 
widely noted breakdown in respect for traditional forms of authority. Mediation then with its 
appeal to the personal and the plural, with its recognition of diversity, with its keenness to 
empower and with its implied, gentle scepticism of external ‘top-down’ authority seems very 
much to capture the zeitgeist of the age. Mediation has emerged almost out of the ether during 






Gender identity and prisons in England and Wales: 
The development of rights and rules; checks and balances. 
Keren Lloyd Bright 
Abstract 
Prisons in England and Wales, in common with prisons across the world, segregate prisoners 
according to the gender binary: male and female. Until relatively recently, those who identify 
with or express other gender identities were largely ignored. This chapter traces the 
international developments in the care and management of prisoners with non-binary gender 
identities. It also critically considers developments in England and Wales, including policy, 
statute and prison service instructions. The policy context has been particularly fast moving in 
recent years - often in response to events - and the Prison Service has attempted to strike the 
appropriate balance between addressing the care and management needs of those prisoners 
with non-binary gender identities and the safety and wellbeing of all prisoners. Certainly, much 
progress has been made in prisons in England and Wales over the last two decades and 
certainly challenges remain. The resourcing of the Prison Service, and the inconsistencies 
between the rights and rules and the lived experience of prisoners who disclose non-binary 
gender identities, remain significant issues. 
1. Introduction 
There are many points of difference between human beings, but prisons in England and Wales 
in common with other jurisdictions have divided prisoners on the assumption of the gender 
binary: female and male. Until relatively recently, little account has been taken of those who 
identify with or express other gender identities. While there is much academic literature about 
men and women in prison in England and Wales, there is very little about the gender identity 
and the sexual orientation of prisoners: ‘The academic literature about LGBT prisoners is very 
limited and is dominated by, mainly, North American scholarship focusing on transgender 
prisoners.’ (Dunn, p. 3)   
The Yogyakarta Principles define gender identity as:  
‘… each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may 
or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of 
the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or 
function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, 
including dress, speech and mannerisms’ (The Yogyakarta Principles (2007), p.6). 
The diversity of gender identities include those people who wish to transition to another gender 
(female to male or male to female) and seek legal recognition of this; those who wish to live 
consistently in the gender with which they identify but not seek legal recognition; those who 
are non-binary (and therefore do not identify with a single gender); those who are gender fluid 
(their gender identity varies over time); those who are transvestite (cross dressers); and those 
who are intersex (have variations of sex characteristics or under-developed sex 
169 
 
characteristics) who wish to retain the sex assigned to them at birth1 or alternatively wish to 
identify as intersex. ‘Transgender’ or ‘Trans’ are often used as umbrella terms for people 
whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from their legally recognised birth sex. 
‘Transgender’ or ‘Trans’ may also be used to describe those transitioning to a new gender.2  
The number of trans people in prison in England and Wales is certainly small and it is not 
possible to give anything more than an indication in the hundreds out of a total prison 
population of around 85,000. (Before 2015, statistics were not collected at all on trans 
prisoners in the custodial estate.) The number of trans people in the prison system is always 
in flux due to admission and release. Those prisoners who do not disclose their gender identity 
clearly cannot be counted.3 Those prisoners with a gender recognition certificate are usually 
located in the custodial estate of their legally recognised gender and are therefore not counted 
(BBC, 2018a).4 
In one survey by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 2% of prisoners 
in adult male prisons identified themselves as ‘transgender’ or ‘transsexual’.5 In another 
survey, only those prisoners whose cases had been before a Transgender Case Board6 were 
counted, with the result that 1.6 transgender prisoners were reported per 1,000 prisoners. 139 
transgender prisoners were counted in total in this survey, 42 in women’s prisons (22 identified 
their gender as female, 17 as male, 3 provided no response), 97 in men’s prisons (92 identified 
their gender as female, 2 as male, 3 provided no response). When the 139 transgender 
prisoners were asked to self-identify their gender identity, 27 self-identified as gender fluid, 10 
as intersex and 4 as non-binary.7 Trans women8 prisoners are then very much in the majority 
and have tended to dominate the discourse about gender identity in society and in prisons. As 
a consequence, there is a ‘cycle of invisibility’ (Dunn, 2013). Many people in prison with 
different gender identities, such as non-binary, gender fluid and intersex, as well as trans men, 
are hardly visible and so prison staff are often unlikely to be aware of their needs. Critically, 
various research projects have concluded that people with different gender identities 
experience higher rates of mental health issues, self-harm, and suicide than the wider 
population.9 These are exacerbated by the prison environment. 
While the overall number of trans prisoners may be low, this still matters: human rights are of 
universal application. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects 
the right to respect for private life.10 This is a broad term and judgments have determined that 
 
1 These are the definitions provided by ‘The Care and Management of Individuals who are Transgender’ 
Transgender Policy Framework. The Ministry of Justice and HM Prison and Probation Service (2019). 
2 In this chapter, ‘transgender’ and ‘transsexual’ will be used where a source uses these terms. Otherwise, ‘trans’ 
or ‘trans woman’ or ‘trans man’ or ‘trans people’ will be used. 
3 In inspections of HMP Leeds and HMP Wormwood Scrubs by HM Inspectorate of Prisons in 2019, no 
transgender prisoners were identified at the time of the inspection despite each prison holding over 1000 
prisoners. A recommendation in the HMP Wormwood Scrubs report suggested that ‘The prison should affirm 
LGBT identities in practical ways so that all prisoners feel able to speak openly about their sexuality if they so 
wish.’ (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2020, para. 2.39). The recommendation should ideally have included 
reference to gender identity, in addition to sexuality. 
4 Exceptionally dangerous women prisoners may, however, be located in women’s units in men’s prisons. 
5 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2018-19. 
6 Transgender Case Boards were introduced by Prison Service Instruction 17/2016 ‘The care and management 
of transgender prisoners.’ See the chapter section on this. 
7 MOJ and HMPPS (2019), pp. 5 – 6. 
8 A trans woman is a person who was legally recognised as male at birth but who self-identifies as a woman. 
9 Bashford, J; Hasan, S; Marriott, C and Patel, K ‘Inside Gender Identity: A report on meeting the health and 
social care needs of transgender people in the criminal justice system.’ (2017) Bradford: Community Innovations 
Enterprise, cited in Ministry of Justice and HM Prisons & Probation Service ‘The Care and Management of 
Individuals who are Transgender’. (2019) 
10 ECHR ARTICLE 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 




this covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including their gender 
identification, name and sexual orientation.11 Article 8 ECHR relates to the way a person lives 
and their quality of life and therefore encompasses gender expression and the safeguarding 
of mental health in the custodial estate. The scope of Article 8 as regards gender identity is 
recognised in more recent prison service instructions and policy frameworks.12 Any 
interference with the Article 8 right must be in accordance with the law, have a legitimate aim 
and be necessary in a democratic society. Where the interference is with an intimate part of 
an individual’s life there must be particularly serious reasons to justify the interference.13 
ECHR Article 8 and other human rights provided the foundation for the development and 
formulation of specific rights concerning gender identity and it is to these that we now turn. 
2. International and national developments in gender identity and gender 
rights 
In the 1970s, at the beginning of the fifty-year period considered by this book, the prevailing 
social attitudes and the law of England and Wales barely recognised the diversity of gender 
identities. Further, the judicial decision in the matrimonial case of Corbett v Corbett in 1970 
had a far-reaching effect on the law for decades. The case concerned a marriage between a 
man and a trans woman who had extensive surgery. It was held that a person’s sex was fixed 
at birth (save where a mistake was made about sex assignment) and could not be changed 
by any circumstances – whether by medical and surgical interventions or by the natural 
development of sex organs. The psychological integrity of a person, including their gender 
identification, was deemed irrelevant.14  
In 1975, the Sex Discrimination Act was passed by the UK Parliament. As the title of the statute 
suggests, it was solely concerned with gender binary (male and female) sex discrimination 
and consequently there was no provision for gender identity discrimination.15 It was decades 
before trans activist campaigning began to influence social attitudes, judicial decisions, and 
legislative innovation.  
Since the 1990s, there have been a series of developments in the recognition of gender 
identity rights, including in the prison context. The following sections of this chapter consider 
international developments, legislation in England and Wales, and prison service instructions 
as set out in Figure 1, together with the lived experience of trans prisoners ‘in the “hyper-
gendered” world of prisons’ (Newcomen, 2017).  
 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the Article 8 right including leading judgments, see Pretty v The United Kingdom 
[2002] 2 FLR 45, judgment of 29 April 2002, p.33, para 61. Available at: 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-60448"]} 
12 See for instance para 4.124 in Ministry of Justice and HM Prisons & Probation Service ‘The Care and 
Management of Individuals who are Transgender’ (2019). 
13 Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493 at p.530 para 89. 
14 In Corbett v Corbett, Mrs Corbett was found never to have been female and could not therefore have entered a 
marriage with Mr Corbett. So, their marriage was void. The decision in Corbett v Corbett was given statutory 
effect by the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 and later by the consolidating statute, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
15 This statute was tested in the landmark case of P v S and Cornwall County Council Case C-13/94, [1996] IRLR 
347. The case concerned discrimination in an employment context, where the plaintiff, a trans woman, was 
dismissed for reason of redundancy following disclosure of her proposal to undergo gender reassignment. It was 
held by the tribunal that the Sex Discrimination Act did not apply in these circumstances – the Act was drafted 
more narrowly than the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive. It was however held by the European Court 
of Justice that dismissal for a reason related to gender reassignment was contrary to Article 5(1) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive.  
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Figure 1 Key international and national developments  
Year Development 
1993 International Bill of Gender Rights 
2004 Gender Recognition Act 
2006 Equality Act 
2007 The Yogyakarta Principles 
2009 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Handbook on 
Prisoners with Special Needs’ 
 
2010 Equality Act 
2011 Prison Service Instruction 07/2011 ‘The Care and Management of 
Transsexual Prisoners’ 
 
2016 Prison Service Instruction 17/2016 ‘The Care and Management of 
Transgender Prisoners’ 
 
2019 Ministry of Justice and HM Prison & Probation Service ‘The Care and 
Management of Individuals who are Transgender’ 
 
 
Up until relatively recently, prisoners were located in a prison on the basis of their sex assigned 
at birth. The gender in which they had led their lives was considered entirely irrelevant. The 
thinking and debate about gender identity, in contrast to sex assigned at birth, developed 
during the 1990s and a significant milestone was the International Bill of Gender Rights.  
3. The International Bill of Gender Rights  
Various iterations of this document were drafted by trans activists in the United States between 
1993 and 1996. The International Bill of Gender Rights (IBGR) sets out ten principles, of which 
six are relevant to trans people in the context of imprisonment:  
 The right to define gender identity 
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 The right to free expression of gender identity 
 The right of access to gendered space and participation in gendered activity 
 The right to control and change one's own body 
 The right to competent medical and professional care 
 The right to freedom from psychiatric diagnosis or treatment 
While these gender rights are without legal force, they were intended to validate the decisions 
and actions taken by individuals; frame trans activist discourse; and influence the development 
of policy and legislation internationally. 
‘The IBGR is not a human rights instrument, is not ratified by any States, and its legal 
status is no higher than a wish-list. Nevertheless, it signified a sea change in 
conceptualising ‘gender identity’ as a fundamental human right to be protected by law 
and for individuals who identify as transgender to be entitled to medical care.’ 
(Brunskell-Evans, 2019)   
The echoes of the IBGR loom large in trans activist campaigns, in legislative change and in 
the development of prison rules. The IBGR principles state that: ‘All human beings have the 
right to define their own gender identity regardless of chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned 
birth sex, or initial gender role.’ The principles also support gender fluidity: ‘… individuals have 
the right to define, and to redefine as their lives unfold, their own gender identities’ (IBGR).  
Of particular resonance with the debate about trans prisoners in the custodial estate are those 
principles dealing with the right of access to gendered space and the right to freedom from 
psychiatric diagnosis or treatment. The principle concerning the right of access to gendered 
space supports access by trans women prisoners to women’s prisons and by trans men16 
prisoners to men’s prisons: ‘No individual shall be denied access to a space by virtue of a self-
defined gender identity which is not in accord with chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth 
sex, or initial gender role’ (IBGR). As we shall see in the next section, the procedure required 
to attain a gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 takes a 
different stance to the principle of the right to freedom from psychiatric diagnosis or treatment: 
‘Given the right to define one's own gender identity, individuals should not be subject to 
psychiatric diagnosis or treatment solely on the basis of their gender identity or role’ (IBGR).  
4. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
Before 2004, prisoners were sent to prisons according to the sex recorded on their birth 
certificates (provided at birth) in line with Prison Rule 12(1),17 which provides that ‘Women 
prisoners shall normally be kept separate from male prisoners’. This changed following the 
coming into force of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004).18 This Act provides a 
procedure by which a trans person may legally change their gender, and this is set out in 
Figure 2. A medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria - which is where there is a mismatch 
 
16 A trans man is a person who was legally recognised as female at birth but who self-identifies as a man. 
17 The Prison Rules 1999, SI 1999/728. 
18 The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was introduced following concerns about those who were then described as 
‘transsexual’ people who could not marry as they did not have legal recognition of their gender reassignment. 
Preceding the enactment of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, were judgments by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the cases of Goodwin v The United Kingdom and I v The United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 18 and the 
judgment of the House of Lords in Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21. The European Court of Human Rights 
held that the UK was in breach of ECHR rights under Articles 8 (the right to respect for private life) and 12 (the 
right to marry). 
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between a person’s sex assigned at birth and their deeply felt gender and this mismatch 
causes that person distress - is required. 
Figure 2      Legal procedure for issue of a gender recognition certificate 
 A trans applicant who is aged eighteen and over applies to the Gender Recognition 
Panel for a gender recognition certificate. 
 The Panel issues a certificate when it is satisfied by evidence that the applicant has, 
or has had, gender dysphoria; has lived in the acquired gender for a period of two 
years before the application; and intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until 
death.  
 The applicant should provide diagnostic medical evidence of their gender dysphoria 
from an expert in the field, who is either a psychologist or a general practitioner with 
the requisite expertise.  
 If the applicant has received or is planned to receive hormone treatment or any surgical 
procedures for the purpose of changing sexual characteristics, these must also be 
disclosed as part of the application (ss1-3 Gender Recognition Act 2004 and 
Explanatory Notes to the Act). 
 The fee for the application is £140 and there are additional costs in providing the 
supporting documentation.19  
If all the evidential requirements are met, the eventual outcome is the issue of a gender 
recognition certificate (GRC). The certificate provides ‘transsexuals’ with legal recognition of 
their ‘acquired gender’20 and entitles those whose birth was originally registered in the UK to 
apply for a new birth certificate in their ‘acquired gender’.21 Approximately 300-350 GRCs are 
issued each year across the UK.22  
Section 9 of the GRA 2004 requires that a person who has obtained a GRC must be treated 
in accordance with their acquired gender for all purposes. Accordingly, since 2004, a trans 
woman with a GRC is legally recognised as a woman and can be sent to a women’s prison. 
The same applies to a trans man with a GRC who can be sent to a men’s prison. Trans men 
without a GRC usually prefer to remain in the female custodial estate in any event. This, 
however, leaves the vexed question of where in the custodial estate to place trans women 
without a GRC, as they are particularly vulnerable.  
The procedure to obtain a GRC set out in Figure 2 is quasi-judicial in nature and campaigns 
led by Gendered Intelligence, Stonewall and others condemn the current process as ‘highly 
medicalised, bureaucratic and demeaning’. They instead favour a process of self-identification 
or self-declaration for gender recognition (Stonewall, 2017). As has been noted above, the 
right in theory to define one’s gender identity was set out in the IBGR in 1993. The Government 
Equalities Office does acknowledge that: ‘… many trans people find the current requirements 
overly intrusive and bureaucratic’ (Government Equalities Office, 2018). A public consultation 
on the reform of the GRA 2004 has been undertaken as the Equalities Office wished to 
 
19 For information about the fee, applying for help with the fee if on benefits or on a law income and the 
supporting documents which must be provided, see: https://www.gov.uk/apply-gender-recognition-certificate/how-
to-apply. 
20 The terms ‘transsexual’ and ‘acquired gender’ are used in the Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
21 The Act does not address the circumstances of those who are non-binary, intersex or whose gender has 
fluidity. 




evaluate the effectiveness of the legal gender recognition process for those who experienced 
it.23 However, and pertinently for the subject of this chapter, the Equalities Office has also 
stated that the reform of the GRA ‘… will not change the exceptions under the Equality Act 
2010 that allow provision for single and separate sex spaces’ and that ‘we are not necessarily 
proposing self-declaration of gender.’ (Government Equalities Office, 2018). It should also be 
noted that the GRA 2004 only allows trans people to move between the two binaries and does 
not provide any recognition of other gender identities. 
5. The Equality Act 2006 
The Equality Act 2006 (EA 2006) created the Commission for Equality and Human Rights 
(CEHR)24 whose remit is to support the development of society by working towards the 
outcomes set out in the ‘general duty’ (s.3 EA 2006). The outcomes encompass valuing 
diversity; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; respecting the dignity of every individual; 
protecting human rights; fostering equality of opportunity in participation in society; and 
encouraging good relations between different groups in society (s.3 EA 2006 and Explanatory 
Notes to the Act). Through the lens of these outcomes, the CEHR scrutinises the activities 
and services of public authorities, which include bodies with functions of a public nature. It is 
presumed that the oversight of the custodial estate is included, as there is no definitive list of 
the bodies to which the Act applies. The provisions of the Act do include protection from 
unlawful discrimination or harassment on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation, but there 
is no mention of gender identity, gender recognition, and gender reassignment. This is curious 
given the 1996 decision of the European Court of Justice in P v S and Cornwall County 
Council25 and the enactment of the Gender Recognition Act 2004.   
6. The Yogyakarta Principles 
The long title of the ‘Yogyakarta Principles’ (YP) is this: ‘Principles on the application of 
international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity’. The 
Principles were drafted by an eminent group of human rights experts in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; 
first published in 2007; and reviewed and expanded in 2017 (YP plus 10). The Principles are 
respected as an authoritative interpretation of international law, but they do not have legal 
effect. They are however influential and persuasive – and far more so than their precursor, 
the International Bill of Gender Rights.  
‘The Principles … provide a definitional point for bills, resolutions and other documents. 
This has provided the fertile ground out of which Equality and Human Rights legislation 
in the UK and other European and non-European countries incorporate ‘gender 
identity’ as a component part of legal personhood.’ (Brunskell-Evans, 2019) 
Some of the Principles are of direct relevance to trans prisoners and to those prisoners with 
other gender identities, such as the right to legal recognition and the right to treatment with 
humanity while in detention. According to the Principles, gender identity should be self-
defined. If an individual decides to change their name, legal sex or gender on official identity 
documents such as a passport or driving licence, there should be no requirements as to age, 
medical and psychological diagnosis and interventions.26 Principle 9 (YP 2007) is concerned 
with the right to treatment with humanity and dignity while in detention. This principle makes 
explicit that: ‘Sexual orientation and gender identity are integral to each person’s dignity’.27 YP 
 
23 The consultation was closed in October 2018. 
24 The Commission for Equality and Human Rights is now known as the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
25 See Footnote 13. 
26 Principle 3, YP 2007; Principle 31, YP plus 10 2017. 
27 Principle 9 is based upon Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Everyone is entitled to all the 




plus 10 defines additional state obligations with respect to placement in prisons for policies to 
combat violence, discrimination and other harm concerning sexual orientation, gender identity, 
gender expression and sex characteristics.28 Issues such as body or other searches in prison, 
items to express gender expression, access to gender affirming treatment and medical care 
and ‘protective’ solitary confinement29 are covered.30 
To conclude and to reiterate, YP and YP plus 10 are of no legal force. They are not 
international conventions ratified by signatory states, but the extent of their influence can be 
traced through subsequent international and national developments. 
7. The UNODC Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs 
This Handbook was published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 
2009 and covers special needs such as disability, mental health, terminal illness, ethnicity, 
and those prisoners who are older or LGBT. (The Handbook arguably requires revision to 
include those with other gender identities.) 
The Handbook specifically notes that where trans women prisoners are placed in men’s 
prisons, as their birth sex is male, they are disproportionately subjected to victimisation, 
discrimination, physical, emotional and sexual abuse, including rape.31 The Handbook 
expresses with clarity that states are required to protect all LGBT detainees and prisoners in 
their charge pursuant to a suite of international human rights instruments. 
‘Although there are no special rules that apply to LGBT prisoners, all provisions 
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment apply to all detainees and 
prisoners without discrimination.’ (UNODC, 2009, pp. 109 – 110) 
Furthermore, these international human rights instruments require positive action to be taken, 
via the principle of equal treatment, to eliminate any form of discrimination or risk of harm 
faced by prisoners with vulnerabilities, which includes trans people.32 The argument being that 
punishment by imprisonment is a harsher experience for prisoners with vulnerabilities. 
The Handbook refers to the Yogyakarta Principles and builds upon them at some length. It 
sets out the obligations of states, which include access to hormonal and surgical gender-
reassignment treatment for trans prisoners; training for prison staff; and management 
guidelines for the care and protection of LGBT prisoners. The Handbook states that it is not 
possible to set out categorical guidance on the placement of trans prisoners in the male and 
female custodial estate, since many are at different stages of transition. It suggests instead 
 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.) and Article 
17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.) 
28 YP plus 10, 2017, p.18. 
29 When prisoners presenting with gender identity vulnerabilities are placed for their own safety in ‘protective 
segregation’ (which typically means solitary confinement with limited access to prison facilities), this amounts to 
discrimination and in effect a harsher sentence. There have been cases in Turkey and Israel on these issues. 
30 YP plus 10, p.18.  
 
31 UNODC 2009, pp.105 - 108. 
32 UNODC, 2009, p.110. 
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that placement in prisons be determined on a case by case basis, taking account of both safety 
concerns and the wishes of the trans prisoners.33 
As with the Yogyakarta Principles, the obligations placed upon states in the UNODC 
Handbook are not legally binding, but instead exercise extensive influence. 
8. The Equality Act 2010 
The Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) replaced existing anti-discrimination legislation in England 
and Wales with a single statute.34 It introduced the public sector equality duty, which identified 
eight protected characteristics (s149 EA 2010). Gender reassignment was included for the 
first time as one of these protected characteristics, but gender identity which encompasses a 
wider group of disadvantaged people - non-binary, gender fluid, intersex and transvestite - 
was not. Sex remains a protected characteristic, which covers ‘man’ and ‘woman’. The statute 
requires public authorities to eliminate direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation, and foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and those who do not, when developing policy, dealing with their employees 
and in delivering services.  
There is no direct reference to prisons in EA 2010. Section 150(1) EA 2010 defines a public 
authority as a person who is specified in Schedule 19.  
Schedule 19 provides a detailed and comprehensive list of public authorities which includes 
the Ministry of Justice, the police, court services, and criminal justice public authorities such 
as HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Parole Board. HM Prison Service is responsible for 
109 public sector prisons in England and Wales,35 but is not explicitly included in the Schedule 
19 list. There are 14 prisons in England and Wales which are privately managed by Sodexo 
Justice Services, Serco Custodial Services and G4S Justice Services.36 These appear to be 
brought within the ambit of the Act by s.149(2) which provides that a person who is not a public 
authority but who exercises public functions must, in the exercise of those functions, have due 
regard to the public sector equality duty. The apparent difference in application between 
publicly and privately managed prisons under the Act appears to be an oversight and is clearly 
anomalous. Alternatively, by analogy with public sector prisons, private sector prisons are 
deemed to be outside the reach of the public sector equality duty. 
Notwithstanding the above, HM Prison Service has clearly assumed that the public sector 
equality duty applies to it, as a series of prison service instructions (or their equivalent) have 
been developed in 2011, 2016 and 2019, which have attempted to address trans and other 
gender identity issues.37 Indeed, as will be seen later in the chapter, the prison service 
instructions go beyond what is strictly required by EA 2010 (and GRA 2004).38 Furthermore, 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons, which is one of the public authorities listed in Schedule 19, holds 
all prisons to account in their compliance with prison service instructions. 
Turning now to the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, this is accorded to a 
person under EA 2010 if there is evidence that they are transitioning from their birth sex to 
their chosen gender. This evidence encompasses a wide range of circumstances - from 
planning to completion of a planned change. In the words of the Act, gender assignment takes 
 
33 UNODC,2009, p.115 
34 The EA 2010 replaced the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. 
35 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-prison-service/about 
36 https://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmps/contracted-out 
37 See for instance paras 4.122 and 4.123 in Ministry of Justice and HM Prisons & Probation Service ‘The Care 
and Management of Individuals who are Transgender’. (2019) 
38 Bourne and Derry, p.74 
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place where a person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or 
part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological 
or other attributes of sex (s.7(1) EA 2010). Under the Act, the protected characteristic is 
narrowly defined in terms of gender reassignment rather than a broader concept of gender 
identity. To reiterate, non-binary, gender fluid, intersex and transvestite people are not 
included within this protected characteristic.  
The Code of Practice accompanying the Act makes clear that the reassignment of a person’s 
sex may be proposed but not completed. Those who begin the process of gender 
reassignment but later end it, still have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.39 
The process may include gender reassignment medical interventions such as hormone 
treatment and surgery, but such medical interventions are not mandatory for a person to be 
protected. ‘Part of a process’ includes a person being compelled by their gender identity to 
dress and present themselves in that gender – gender expression, in other words.40 Where a 
person has a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder and these 
have a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out everyday activities, 
they will also be protected under the disability discrimination provisions of the Act.41  The duty 
to make reasonable adjustments for individuals with a disability is set out in s.20 EA 2010. 
The Act makes explicit that it perceives gender reassignment to be a personal process rather 
than a medical process.42 Under the Act, it seems then that gender is in effect self-defined, as 
called for by IBGR and the Yogyakarta Principles. This is a distinctly different approach to that 
adopted by GRA 2004 where the process to obtain a gender recognition certificate was 
described above as overly medicalised and bureaucratic. It is clear that a lower bar is set for 
the protected characteristic of gender reassignment under EA 2010: there is no time limit for 
living in the acquired gender and no requirement for a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria.  
The EA 2010 also contains provisions about separate services for the sexes, which are clearly 
pertinent for the subject of this chapter. Separate services for the sexes are permitted under 
s26 of the Act and do not contravene the statutory provisions as to sex discrimination if ‘the 
limited provision is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. Under s27(5) ‘The 
condition is that the service is provided at a place … for persons requiring special care, 
supervision or attention’. In the Explanatory Notes to the Act, examples are given of the 
exceptions allowed for in ss26-27. These exceptions include male and female hospital wards 
and homeless hostels.43 By analogy, prisons would also appear to be given exceptional status. 
Another of the examples is applicable to group therapeutic interventions in women’s prisons. 
This example concerns group counselling: ‘A group counselling session is provided for female 
victims of sexual assault. The organisers do not allow transsexual people to attend as they 
judge that the clients who attend the group session are unlikely to do so if a male-to-female 
transsexual person was also there. This would be lawful.’44  
In the years following the coming into force of the EA 2010, it has been seen that what may 
be workable in an open society with free movement of people, becomes much more difficult 
to implement in a prison system designed on the premise of the gender binary. The rest of this 
chapter is concerned with this issue. 
 
39 EA 2010 Code of Practice, para. 2.20 
40 EA 2010 Code of Practice, para. 2.24 
41 EA 2010 Code of Practice, para. 2.25 
42 EA 2010 Code of Practice, para.2.19. 
43 EA 2010, Explanatory Notes, Sch.3, Part 7, para 740. 
44 EA 2010, Explanatory Notes, Sch.3, Part 7, para 740.  
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9. Prison Service Instruction 07/2011 ‘The Care and Management of 
Transsexual Prisoners’ 
As noted above, while the Equality Act 2010 makes no explicit reference to publicly managed 
prisons in Schedule 19, it is clearly assumed by prisons and HM Prison Inspectorate (which is 
listed as a public authority in Schedule 19) that the Act’s provisions about the public sector 
equality duty and the protected characteristic of gender reassignment apply to the custodial 
estate. Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 07/2011 ‘The Care and Management of Transsexual 
Prisoners’45, which was introduced after the EA 2010, regulated the ways in which the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS)46 should address the needs of trans prisoners in 
England and Wales. 
PSI 07/2011 set out the legal responsibilities of NOMS to ‘transsexual’ prisoners who were 
without a gender recognition certificate.47 It provided that prisoners who defined themselves 
as trans and who wished to begin or continue the process of gender reassignment while 
serving their prison sentence, could live in their acquired gender - but in the custodial estate 
of their sex assigned at birth. This meant that prisoners were permitted to wear clothes 
appropriate to their acquired gender and access make-up or any other appropriate item to 
maintain their gender appearance. Prisoners could also choose a gender appropriate name 
and expect to be addressed by that name, together with the gender appropriate pronoun, by 
prison staff. PSI 07/2011 also provided guidance about the medical treatment to be made 
available to trans prisoners. However, this is not to say that all those staff in HM Prison Service 
were provided with appropriate training, nor that the provisions of PSI 07/2011 were 
universally applied. 
Even more radically, PSI 07/2011 provided that if a trans prisoner asked to be placed in a 
prison different to their legally recognised birth sex, a case conference should be convened to 
consider all elements of the request. Following this, the case conference made a 
recommendation to a senior manager in the prison service, who made the final decision on 
prison location.  
PSI 07/2011 additionally made certain assumptions. It assumed a trans prisoner would decide 
to opt for medical interventions such as hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery 
and assumed they would wish to be issued with a gender recognition certificate (GRC) in due 
course. However, it came to be understood that not all trans prisoners necessarily desired 
medical interventions or GRCs ‘… and therefore policy in this area needs to evolve and take 
as its starting presumption a wish to respect someone in the gender in which they identify, 
once in the care of the criminal justice system’.48  
In 2015, the Women and Equality Select Committee’s Inquiry into ‘Transgender Equality’ 
recommended that NOMS review the location decision processes for trans offenders.49 NOMS 
subsequently commissioned a review on the care and management of ‘transsexual offenders’ 
in the autumn of 2015 and in the course of this, sought evidence from trans people inside and 
outside prison. Independent oversight of the review was provided by the charities Prison 
Reform Trust and Gendered Intelligence. At the same time as the review was commissioned, 
the suicides of the trans women prisoners Vikki Thompson and Joanne Latham were widely 
reported by the media and these underlined the need for the review to be wide-ranging. The 
terms of reference of the review emphasised the need to find the right balance between 
 
45 ‘Transsexual Prisoners’ follows the terminology of EA 2010. 
46 The National Offender Management Service is now called HM Prison and Probation Service. 
47 At the time of PSI 07/2011, prisoners were usually held in accordance with the legally recognised gender on 
their birth certificate or gender recognition certificate. 
48 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, 2016, p.4.  
 
49 See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmwomeq/390/390.pdf   
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meeting the needs of a trans prisoner and safeguarding the wellbeing of all prisoners.50 The 
need to find the right balance continues to dominate both discourse and subsequent 
developments. 
9.1 Vikki Thompson  
Compelling stories can drive both private opinion and public policy. The suicides of trans 
women in prison are clearly compelling stories and make for sensationalist headlines. 
However, it is important and instructive to examine the complex life histories beneath the 
overly simplistic headlines and, more particularly, within the context of prison conditions and 
operating prison service instructions.  
In November 2015, Vikki Thompson was found hanged in her cell in HMP Leeds, a men’s 
prison. She was twenty-one. Her birth sex was recorded as male, but she had identified as 
female since the age of ten. Thompson had a history of physical and sexual abuse, substance 
abuse, mental illness (bipolar disorder), self-harm, numerous suicide attempts, criminal 
convictions, and custodial sentences. Her death was widely reported in the media, which 
tended to present this tragic event in highly reductive terms: a single cause resulting in a 
catastrophic effect. Thompson, however, presented with extremely complex issues.  
In October 2015, Thompson had been convicted of theft and other offences. She had not 
undergone gender reassignment surgery and did not have a gender recognition certificate. 
Her legal representatives submitted to the court that she was essentially a woman and 
requested that she be placed in a women's prison. This request was not acceded to. 
Thompson was remanded to HMP Leeds before sentence and staff there initiated a 
detoxification programme and suicide and self-harm prevention procedures (known as ACCT: 
Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork). There are differing accounts from prison staff 
(and from her mother and partner) as to whether Thompson wanted to remain in HMP Leeds 
or to be located in a women’s prison: she appears to have said different things at different 
times.51 While Vikki Thompson was recognised as a vulnerable prisoner, she was not initially 
placed in the vulnerable prisoners’ unit because she had worked as a sex worker and many 
of the prisoners on the unit were sex offenders. There was a concern that she would be at 
greater risk on this unit. Thompson was instead placed in Wing E where she experienced 
bullying, harassment, and verbal abuse, which prison staff did little to curtail. Thompson also 
behaved inappropriately by cropping her prison jumper to reveal her midriff and padding a bra 
with socks (Newcomen, 2016a). In the context of a men’s Category B prison, this would have 
been viewed as provocative, even though PSI 07/2011 permitted gender expression. She was 
later moved to the vulnerable prisoners’ unit at her request. While the staff were concerned 
about Thompson’s location within HMP Leeds, they did not utilise the mechanism available in 
PSI 07/2011 and try to locate her instead in a women’s prison which may have been better 
able to meet her needs. Whether this was owing to Thompson’s equivocation, or to a lack of 
knowledge on her part or on the part of prison staff, or for some other reason, is not known. 
The inquest into Thompson’s death highlighted a catalogue of failures within the wider health 
and criminal justice systems beyond HMP Leeds, together with the failures of her own family. 
The inquest also determined that Thompson had not intended to take her own life at that time 
in HMP Leeds (Worley, 2017).  
The independent investigation into the death of Thompson by the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman set out a series of case conferences and reviews, medical and supervisory 
interventions concerning her by staff at HMP Leeds, but it also recorded substantial failings in 
her care. The failings included a lack of mental health support, significant deficiencies in the 
 
50 Review on the Care and Management of Transgender Offenders, 2016, p.3. 
51 See, for instance, Newcomen, 2016a, paras. 34, 36, 78 and 108. 
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operation of ACCT, and an inadequate level of observation given the suicide risk. It was also 
noted by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman that HMP Leeds was under-staffed at the 
time (Newcomen, 2016a). The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s report concluded that:  
‘Although Ms Thompson was not legally regarded as a woman, we consider that 
decisions about the location of transgender prisoners should be taken individually on 
their merits with the primary aim of the safety of the individual and others, rather than 
on blanket policies.’ (Newcomen, 2016a, Findings and recommendations, pp 2-3).  
9.2 Tara Hudson 
At the same time as the events leading to the death of Vikki Thompson, a similar situation was 
playing out in another part of the country with a different and happier outcome. Tara Hudson 
was sentenced to twelve weeks in prison after pleading guilty to assault and battery (she head-
butted a barman). She was twenty-six years old. Hudson was legally recognised as a man but 
had lived as a woman all her adult life. She had had reconstructive surgery and had worked 
as a glamour model. She served seven days of her sentence in the segregation unit of a men’s 
prison, HMP Bristol, before she was transferred to HMP Eastwood Park, a women’s prison. 
This decision was made on the basis that Hudson was considered sufficiently advanced in the 
gender assignment process, even though she was without a gender recognition certificate. 
More than 150,000 people had signed a petition in support of her transfer (BBC, 2015 and 
2016). Arguably, Hudson’s skills in self-publicity and in mobilising media and public support, 
rather than effective implementation of PSI 07/2011, greatly assisted in her transfer to the 
female custodial estate. 
9.3 Joanne Latham  
The death by suicide of Joanne Latham in Woodhill prison in November 2015 was again widely 
reported in the media.52 She was found hanged in her cell at HMP Woodhill, a men’s prison. 
Latham was thirty-eight years old, legally recognised as a man, but in the months before her 
death had asked to be considered as trans and changed her name.53 Latham had a long 
history of self-harm and mental health issues, including anti-social and borderline personality 
disorder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001 following a conviction for attempted 
murder. She was later given additional life sentences for the attempted murders of a prisoner 
at HMP Frankland in 2007 and a patient at Rampton secure hospital in 2011. In 2014, Latham 
was transferred to the close supervision centre at HMP Woodhill. This is one of a few small 
centres across the custodial estate that deal with the most disruptive, violent and dangerous 
prisoners. While held there, Latham requested make-up brushes. There was an unnecessarily 
long delay in the clearance procedures to deal with the request by prison security staff. Latham 
was assessed at high risk of suicide. The close supervision centre did activate the ACCT 
procedures and did monitor her, although not with the frequency of observations that the high 
risk of suicide required. Latham barricaded herself in her cell, seriously self-harmed and did 
not respond to a welfare check. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman determined that 
prison staff took too long to go into her cell – by which time she was found hanged. However, 
it should be noted that in close supervision centres there are rules about the number of prison 
staff required to be present before a prison cell is entered. The Prison and Probation 
Ombudsman report also concluded that Latham had received appropriate mental health 
support at the prison (equivalent to the care she could have expected in the community) and 
mostly appropriate support for trans issues (Newcomen 2016b, para 9). Even if Latham had 
had a GRC or the benefit of the 2016 prison service instruction for the care and management 
 
52 See, for instance, Allison and Pidd, 2015. 




of transgender prisoners, given her history it is not likely that she would ever have been 
transferred to the female custodial estate.54 
10. Prison Service Instruction 17/2016 ‘The care and management of 
transgender prisoners’ 
The media presented the reforms contained in PSI 17/2016 as arising from the deaths of Vikki 
Thompson and Joanne Latham, but the review process was already in motion. The Women 
and Equality Select Committee’s Inquiry into ‘Transgender Equality’ in 2015 was closely 
followed by the NOMS review on ‘The Care and Management of Transsexual Offenders’. 
NOMS described the timing of the suicides as coincidental.  
While the title of PSI 17/2016 specifically referred to transgender prisoners, its ambit went 
beyond trans men and women prisoners and included those of non-binary gender identity, 
fluid gender identity, those identifying as transvestite as well as those who are intersex. PSI 
17/2016 introduced a voluntary agreement to be drawn up between the prisoner and the wing 
manager on behalf of the prison which included such matters as dress code (including make-
up and jewellery), showers and bathing, searching agreement, and cell sharing risk 
assessment.55 
One of the welcome step forwards in this prison service instruction concerned a change in 
terminology. ‘Transsexual’ as used in the GRA 2004, EA 2010 and PSI 07/2011 was replaced 
by ‘transgender’.56 
‘The refreshed policy uses the broader term of ‘transgender’ as this places an 
emphasis on gender identity of the ‘whole person’ rather than sexual functioning. Being 
transgender is independent of sexual orientation. Transgender people may identify as 
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual or may not identify with conventional 
sexual orientation labels.’ (PSI 17/2016, p.3)    
PSI 17/2016 also introduced the preferred term of ‘affirmed gender’ instead of ‘acquired 
gender’ when a GRC was applied for or issued.57 This term clearly had a positive endorsement 
for those who have experienced gender dysphoria. 
PSI 17/2016 set out a more systematic approach than PSI 77/2011 to placing trans prisoners 
in the custodial estate of England and Wales if they were without a GRC but were able to 
provide evidence of living consistently in the gender with which they identified. At either the 
stage of preparing the pre-sentence report or within three working days of reception into 
custody, the view of the offender was sought as to whether they wish to be placed in a men’s 
or women’s prison. At this point, many trans offenders decided on the prison of their legally 
recognised gender as shown on their birth certificate. If they wished to be placed in a prison 
reflecting their preferred gender, then their case went before a local Transgender Case 
 
54  ‘Fair Play for Women,’ which campaigns for the sex-based rights of women and girls, have asked the 
question: ‘Are transgender prison suicides being used as a weapon to promote a political agenda?’. Available at: 
https://fairplayforwomen.com/prison-suicide/ (1 Dec 2017) 
55 PSI 17/2016, Annex D1. 
56 However, this is not to say that the change in terminology was universally welcome. For instance, those who 
consider the critical issue to be the incorrect identification of their sex at birth and who see gender as a social 
construct, may not have welcomed the change. It should also be noted that many prefer the use of the term 
‘trans’ rather than ‘transgender’. 
57 PSI 17/2016, para.5.3. 
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Board.58 Each offender was assessed on a case by case basis59 and all risk factors were 
considered: risk to other offenders; risk from other offenders; risk to self; risk to staff. The 
Board also considered other issues, including the strength of evidence of living in the preferred 
gender.60 As regards counter evidence, the Board examined whether there was any evidence 
that the prisoner’s decision to transition was related to their sentence length; or a way of 
gaining access to future victims; or whether there was evidence that the offender sought to 
test or undermine the policy. Personality disorder diagnosis and/or narcissistic traits, for 
instance, may be indicative of an insincere motive to transition.61  
It should be noted that all those women offenders (sex assigned at birth, together with those 
transgender women with GRCs) who posed an exceptionally high risk to others, would be 
located in women’s units in men’s prisons.62 This would, no doubt, have been the eventual 
outcome for Joanne Latham.63 Female to male transgender prisoners, on the other hand, were 
not refused a transfer to men’s prisons.64 
10.1 Jenny Swift 
While PSI 17/2016 set out more systematic procedures for the placement of trans prisoners, 
this is not to say that a suicide risk will be eliminated even when they are followed, as other 
causal factors may be involved. 
Jenny Swift was remanded to HMP Doncaster, a men’s prison, on a charge of attempted 
murder in November 2016 (as the victim later died, this would no doubt have been replaced 
by a murder charge). She was forty-nine years old and, on her own account, had been in the 
armed forces. Swift had been a psychiatric inpatient and was volatile, aggressive, and 
confrontational during her time at HMP Doncaster. She was legally recognised as male, but 
had been living as a woman in name, dress, and appearance since 2009. Swift had registered 
with Leeds Gender Identity Clinic, had purchased hormone replacement therapy through the 
internet and had not yet had any surgery. She was found hanged in her prison cell at the end 
of December 2016. The report of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman completely 
exonerated prison staff in terms of the operation of ACCT procedures. Furthermore, there had 
been compliance with PSI 17/2016, which was introduced shortly before Swift arrived at HMP 
Doncaster. Swift was asked whether she wanted a transfer to the female custodial estate and 
a local Transgender Case Board was convened to consider her case within 12 days of her 
arrival. She was later informed that there would be a recommendation of a transfer to a 
women’s prison. Where there had been defects in her management as a trans prisoner, these 
had been in her clinical care. The Ombudsman’s report noted staff shortages in the healthcare 
team. During the six weeks Swift had been held in HMP Doncaster, she had no appointment 
 
58 Difficult or complex cases were usually referred to the Complex Case Board. Examples include transgender 
offenders who pose a very high risk of harm to others and those with a severe personality disorder or complex 
mental health problems (PSI 17/2016, Annex C2). 
59 Assessment on a case by case basis is recommended by the UNODC Handbook on Prisoners with Special 
Needs. 
60 PSI 17/2016, Annex C2. 
61 PSI 17/2016, Annex A and Annex C2. 
62 PSI 17/2016, para 6.3. 
63 PSI 17/2016, para 6.3: ‘There may be exceptional cases where it is necessary to refuse a transfer to the 
female estate for a transgender (male to female) prisoner with a GRC. This can only happen if the risk concerns 
surrounding the prisoner are sufficiently high that other women with an equivalent security profile would also be 
held in the male estate. If a transfer is refused, the prisoner will be a female prisoner in the male estate.  She 
must be held separately and according to a female prisoner regime as set out in PSO 4800. This provision exists 
as the male estate has greater capacity to manage prisoners who pose an exceptionally high risk to others.’    
64 PSI 17/2016, para 6.4: ‘A female to male transgender offender with a GRC must not be refused a transfer to 




with a GP and so had been without a prescription for hormone replacement therapy despite 
her frequent requests (Newcomen, 2017). 
10.2 Karen White 
While the provisions of PSI 17/2016 were seemingly thorough, the case of Karen White 
provides a stark example of what can occur when a decision to place a trans woman in the 
female custodial estate proves to be seriously flawed. The case also raises the issue of how 
best to ascertain that an apparently trans woman prisoner is genuinely experiencing gender 
dysphoria, as opposed to a sexual predator assuming the guise of a trans woman.  
In 2018, Karen White, a trans woman aged fifty-two, received a life sentence for sexually 
assaulting two female inmates in prison and raping two other women outside prison. White 
was legally recognised as a man and lived most of her life as Stephen Wood. Before 2017, 
White had previous convictions for violence and dishonesty; indecent assault, indecent 
exposure and gross indecency involving women and children. In 2017, she was charged after 
threatening to kill and stabbing an elderly neighbour. White was held on remand at HMP New 
Hall, a women’s prison, and began a gender reassignment process, which included wearing 
a wig, make-up, and false breasts. While there, she sexually assaulted two female prisoners65 
and wrote to one of her rape victims whom she had met at a psychiatric unit in 2017. The 
investigating police officers additionally found that White had in 2003 allegedly raped another 
woman, but the prosecution had not proceeded. White pleaded guilty to rape and sexual 
assault and was transferred to HMP Leeds, a men’s prison (Parveen, 2018; BBC, 2018b). 
The extent to which White was genuinely committed to gender reassignment was questioned 
during her sentencing hearing at Leeds Crown Court. Before the sentence was handed down, 
the prosecuting barrister submitted that White ‘… is allegedly [emphasis added] a transgender 
female’. The judge as part of his sentencing remarks said that:  
‘The prosecution say allegedly [emphasis added] because there's smatterings of 
evidence in this case that the defendant's approach to transitioning has been less than 
committed ...The prosecution suggest the reason for the lack of commitment towards 
transitioning is so the defendant can use a transgender persona to put herself in 
contact with vulnerable persons she can then abuse.’ (BBC, 2018b; Parveen, 2018) 
The judge as part of his sentencing remarks addressed White in these terms: ‘You are a 
predator and highly manipulative and in my view you are a danger. You represent a significant 
risk of serious harm to children, to women and to the general public.’ After the case was 
concluded, the Ministry of Justice apologised for placing White in a women’s prison and 
admitted that her offending history had not been fully considered (BBC, 2018b; Parveen, 
2018). 
If at some future point White secures a GRC, it is not considered likely that she will be 
transferred from the male custodial estate to the female because of the risk of harm she poses 
to women (BBC, 2018b). A prison service spokesman commented that: ‘While we work to 
manage all prisoners, including those who are transgender, sensitively and in line with the law, 
we are clear that the safety of all prisoners must be our absolute priority.’ (BBC, 2018b). This 
is a policy position that is frequently reiterated. 
 
65 It should perhaps be noted in the interests of fairness that the offences of sexual assault (touching another 
person sexually without their consent) admitted by Karen White were towards the less serious end of the scale. 
She pressed herself against another prisoner while in a queue for medication at HMP New Hall; and while in a 
prison workshop, White made inappropriate comments to another prisoner and then grabbed their hand and put it 
on one of her breasts with the words’ Oh look, they are not real ones.’ The BBC report used the word ‘attacked’, 
which appears to exaggerate the facts (Parveen, 2018; BBC, 2018b). 
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11. Ministry of Justice and HM Prisons & Probation Service ‘The Care and 
Management of Individuals who are Transgender’ 2019 
The case of Karen White prompted a review which resulted in the above-named document. 
This is presented as a ‘Transgender Policy Framework’ and not as a Prison Service Instruction 
(although operationally this will make little difference). It replaces PSI 17/2016 and was 
implemented at the end of October 2019. Importantly, it provides procedures for managing 
prisoners with diverse gender identities.  
Those prisoners who self-identify as non-binary, gender fluid, transvestite, intersex (who wish 
to remain in their sex assigned at birth), and trans but do not seek legal recognition of the 
gender with which they identify, are placed in prisons in accordance with their assigned birth 
sex and their cases are not routinely referred to Transgender Case Boards. (It should be noted 
that recent HMPPS equality data indicates that most trans people in prison do not seek legal 
recognition of the gender with which they identify, nor to be located in a prison which does not 
match their sex assigned at birth.)66   
The Policy Framework (in common with the preceding PSI 17/2016) provides that those 
people self-identifying with different gender identities should be managed on a case by case 
basis through drawing up individual voluntary agreements.67 Clearly voluntary agreements can 
only be drawn up following disclosure by prisoners of their gender identity and many prefer to 
remain invisible to better safeguard their wellbeing.  
All individuals who are trans must initially be located in a prison which matches their legally 
recognised gender (or on the best available evidence where their legal gender is not 
confirmed),68 whether that is their sex assigned at birth or their GRC – save where a decision 
to the contrary has been made by the Complex Case Board.69  
Transgender Case Boards should be convened within fourteen days of arrival into custody 
and are provided mainly for those who seek to live consistently in a different gender to their 
assigned birth sex. Individuals are asked whether they would prefer to be held in a men’s or 
women’s prison. Where they wish to remain in the custodial estate of their birth sex, the 
Transgender Case Board discusses their appropriate management as a trans prisoner and 
produces a care and management plan. Where they wish to be transferred to the custodial 
estate of the gender with which they identify, the Transgender Case Board refers their case to 
the centrally managed Complex Transgender Case Board.70 This referral is a new procedure 
which considerably tightens the pre-existing PSI 17/2016 regime. Neither is it automatic that 
 
66 MOJ and HMPPS (2019), para 2.4. This is due, amongst other reasons, to cost and the bureaucratic nature of 
the process, as described in the section ‘The Gender Recognition Act 2004’ above. See also: Government 
Equalities Office (July 2018) pp. 19 – 20, which discusses the difficulty in accessing gender identity services and 
long waiting lists. 
67 The individual voluntary agreements include such matters as searching arrangements, promotion of well-being 
and expression of gender identity. Gender expression includes hair, make-up, prostheses and clothing, which is 
subject to relevant dress codes. 
68 The Transgender Policy Framework provides that a physical examination must not be conducted for the 
purpose of determining gender. 
69 This reflects Prison Rule 12(1) ‘Women prisoners shall normally be kept separate from male prisoners.’ (SI 
1999 No. 728 Prisons. The Prison Rules 1999.) 
70 Other referrals to the Complex Transgender Case Board include: 
• Where a transgender prisoner may present a risk to others and/or to themselves which requires special 
management.  
• Where a transgender individual is at risk from other people in custody. 
• Where a transgender individual with a GRC presents risks which are deemed to be unmanageable within the 
estate/AP of their legal gender and may need to be held in separate accommodation or in the estate of the 
opposite gender in accordance with Prison Rule 12. 
• Where a person gains legal recognition of their gender during a custodial term or whilst on licence residing at an 
AP. (MOJ and HMPPS, 2019, p.15) 
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a trans prisoner with a GRC will be sent to the custodial estate of their legally recognised 
gender. There is an awareness of the impact this may have on the well-being and mental 
health of trans prisoners who may have lived in their affirmed gender for a considerable period 
of time - as SASH assessments (Suicide and Self-Harm) and ACCT procedures are 
highlighted in the Policy Framework.   
The Transgender Policy Framework demonstrates a great deal of learning from the Karen 
White case. Safeguarding and decision-making processes have been made extremely 
rigorous and thorough. The Policy Framework places emphasis upon ‘… adopting a balanced 
approach which considers the safety and needs of those who are transgender, whilst ensuring 
that decisions do not negatively impact on the well-being and safety of others, particularly in 
custodial settings such as women’s prisons.’ (MOJ and HMPPS, 2019, p.2) 
The template disclosure forms for use by the Case Boards now require far more extensive 
information, evidence, and non-disclosable intelligence about offending history (particularly 
concerning evidence of coercive control within a relationship and sexual and violent offences). 
The risk of harm summary has been extended to include risk to children and the public, as 
well as to the individual, prison staff, and to and from other prisoners. Where the individual is 
seeking to be placed in a women’s prison, information about previous actions which have not 
resulted in convictions, and the risk of sexual or violent assault to women prisoners, is 
required. This includes evidence about an individual’s anatomy, including considerations of 
physical strength and genitalia.71 The disclosure form must be disclosed to the prisoner at 
least four days before the case comes before the Transgender Case Board – save for the non-
disclosable element.72  
The period for the convening of a Transgender Case Board has been extended from three 
(PSI 17/2016) to fourteen days to allow for the extensive information gathering exercise. This 
has caused concern, particularly amongst trans activist groups who see this as a regressive 
step for trans prisoners with vulnerabilities and the potential for them to suffer harassment, 
bullying, sexual assault and violence.73 Some of the evidence required, for instance around 
anatomy (including physical strength and genitalia), has again caused concern about the 
infringement of human rights. While ECHR Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) is 
clearly engaged, following the Karen White case, it would seem that interference with this right 
is justified in the circumstances if it is in accordance with law ‘… for the prevention of disorder 
or crime … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.74 
12. Gender identity and the future of the custodial estate 
As has been emphasised, the Ministry of Justice and HM Prisons & Probation Service have 
had to judge and execute a careful balance in their care and management of all prisoners and 
those expressing different gender identities to the gender binary. However, there remains a 
gap between the theory of technical guidance and the reality of practice in prisons. HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales has recently concluded that: ‘Most individuals 
[with disclosed different gender identities] received support, but some prisons were not aware 
of the full extent of needs of these prisoners and had not yet identified and addressed them.’75 
It is clearly impossible to quantify this gap between theory and practice beyond the spotlight 
 
71 MOJ and HMPPS, 2019, p.12. 
72 That part of the form relating to ‘intelligence’ is non-disclosable if it meets the criteria under the Data Protection 
Act 2018 as to its restricted or sensitive nature. 
73 See, for instance, https://eachother.org.uk/transgender-prisoners-regressive-policy 
74 ECHR ARTICLE 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
75 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019. 
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of reports from the prison inspectorate76 and independent investigations of the prisons’ 
ombudsman following the suicide of a prisoner. Undoubtedly the prison service is experiencing 
a serious shortfall of resources, in common with other parts of the criminal justice system:  
‘… as so often happens, the resources are limited and time is increasingly in short 
supply. Prisons may have policies in place, some training packages for staff delivered, 
but most are unable to realise the practical support that such policies recommend’. 
(Forder (a), p.6) 
Accounts from serving prisoners unsurprisingly indicate highly variable experiences. Sarah 
Jane Baker, a trans woman, served a life sentence of over 30 years for the attempted murder 
of another prisoner, which took place while she was serving a prison sentence for kidnapping 
and torturing her stepmother’s brother. While imprisoned, she wrote a book entitled 
‘Transgender Behind Prison Walls’, which largely provides practical advice and guidance for 
trans women prisoners:  
‘… from my experience, prison Governors [sic] have tended to merely pay lip service 
(or even refused to acknowledge) many PSI recommendations … At present, unless 
a Gender Recognition Certificate is produced by a prisoner, or evidence showing that 
they were being treated for gender dysphoria before coming into prison, a prison 
Governor [sic] may state, unchallenged, that prisoners who identify themselves as 
transgender are making a ‘lifestyle choice’. This label is, in itself, to transgender 
prisoners, demeaning, humiliating and highly offensive, and it allows prison staff to 
avoid any discrimination claims.’ (Baker, 2017, p.17). 
More mixed experiences, including the positive, are recorded in a book entitled ‘Released 
Inside. Conversations with transgender prisoners and the staff that care for them’ (Forder (a)). 
Some prisons are clearly more progressive and PSI-compliant than others - so much depends 
on the ethos of prison management and on the type of prison.77 Additionally, in these prisons, 
more prisoners feel safe in disclosing their gender identity and become visible to the prison 
regime. 
In view of the inconsistencies in approach across the custodial estate, some trans women 
prisoners interviewed for Forder’s book suggest that there should be dedicated units with 
appropriately trained staff for trans women prisoners in selected prisons. Trans women 
prisoners are often placed on the sex offenders’ wing or in solitary confinement in segregation 
units for their own or others’ safety, neither of which may be appropriate, and which may cause 
or exacerbate mental health issues.78  
One academic commentator suggests a vision of a gender-neutral prison system, which is 
perhaps designed to spark debate more than anything else as most would see this as 
 
76 For instance, the report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons following an inspection of HMP Parc, a men’s prison, 
noted that while individual plans were in place for transgender prisoners, they were not always implemented 
effectively. The report recommended that transgender prisoners should be given greater assistance in accessing 
suitable clothes and make-up (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2020, paras. S22, 2.32, 2.34). By contrast, the report 
following an inspection of HMP Eastwood Park, a women’s prison, noted there were two transgender prisoners at 
the time of the inspection and that they received good support  
 (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2020, para. 2.24). 
 
77 There is much more ‘churn’ in local prisons where many prisoners are held on remand before court hearings. 
The prison population in these prisons is more transient and individual prisoners are less likely to disclose their 
gender identity. 




unacceptably radical, as well as increasing the risk of harm to some prisoners, particularly 
women.  
‘Despite our legislative nonexistence, a growing number of us identify outside the 
gender binary … It is becoming increasingly clear that the sex-segregated nature of 
our prison system is incongruous with the gendered realities of a significant minority of 
people. We are witnessing a shift in wider society towards non-gender specific services 
and facilities. Perhaps the future of our prison system is also gender-neutral.’ (Harris, 
2016)  
There remains intense debate about the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and what is considered 
by many to be its over-medicalised and bureaucratic approach to the gaining of a GRC.79 The 
consultation on the reform of the gender identity laws closed in October 2018; a government 
response remains awaited; and the trans activist and feminist campaigns have set out their 
stalls. In 2019, a letter drafted by the LGBT Foundation and signed by over a hundred charities 
and campaigners was sent to Prime Minister Boris Johnson. 
‘We have come together to reiterate how critical these reforms are to removing the 
barriers that trans and non-binary people face every day ... By introducing new 
legislation to allow changes to trans and non-binary people's birth certificates without 
a judgement panel, high fees, doctors letters and evidence, the biggest change is that 
their dignity and rights are respected.’ (Paul Martin, quoted by Hunte, 2019) 
‘Fair Play for Women’ which campaigns for the sex-based rights of women and girls, 
opposes reform. 
‘GRA reform would mean any male could change their birth certificate to say they were 
born female … Women have a lawful right to exclude males from female-only spaces 
when it's necessary for privacy, safety and fairness ... It would make women's existing 
legal rights "unworkable" … advancing rights for one group at the expense of another 
vulnerable group’. (Nicola Williams, quoted by Hunte, 2019) 
It is possible on a theoretical level to have empathy with both standpoints. However, when the 
debate is placed in the context of a gender binary prison system, finding solutions that are fair 
and just to all is exceptionally challenging. A significant number of women in prison have 
vulnerabilities, including previously suffering physical, sexual and psychological abuse, mostly 
at the hands of men. Nearly 60% of women in prison who have had an assessment have 
experienced domestic abuse.80 The true figure is likely to be higher, taking account of both 
those who do not wish to disclose the abuse they have suffered and those who do not 
comprehend that they have suffered psychological abuse. Rhona Hotchkiss, formerly the 
governor of Cornton Vale, a women’s prison in Scotland, has said that in her experience:  
‘… it is always an issue to have trans women in with female prisoners. I think you have 
to think beyond the obvious things like physical or sexual threat which are sometimes 
an issue to the very fact of the presence of a male bodied person in amongst vulnerable 
women causes them distress and consternation.’ (BBC News, 2020a) 
Another issue which can be found in the literature but is not much discussed in the context of 
placing trans people in prisons, is the socialisation of men and women – that is, the adoption 
of behavioural norms that are acceptable to society. A hurdle many trans people face is being 
socialised in the gender with which they were assigned at birth and then transitioning to 
 
79 There is also debate in Scotland on the same issue (Macaskill, M. and Hellen, N., 2020)  
 
80 MOJ, 2018. 
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another gender not just physically, but socially as well.81 The challenges of understanding and 
conforming to another gender socialisation are amplified in prison. 
In the section on the UNODC Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs, it was noted that 
the Handbook states that it is not possible to set out definitive guidance on the placement of 
trans prisoners, since many are at different stages of transition. The Handbook suggests that 
placement in prisons be determined instead on a case by case basis. Suzy Dymond-White, 
the governor of HMP Eastwood Park, a women’s prison, has expressed a view which is very 
much in alignment with the Handbook. 
‘I would prefer to maintain people as individuals and transgender people are at different 
states of transition and they have different backgrounds and they're in different states 
not just physically but emotionally and mentally as well … A basic set of guidelines is 
always useful but actually we should assess the people as individuals and look at what 
their needs are.’ (Dymond-White, BBC News, 2016) 
On this basis, some men and women trans prisoners may be safely integrated into prison 
populations; others would be best placed in specialised units within prisons for their own or 
others’ safety.  
The first prison unit in England and Wales for trans women prisoners opened in March 2019. 
The wing is within HMP Downview, a women's prison in Surrey. The first inmates have GRCs, 
are male bodied and originally it was intended that they should not have access to other 
women prisoners due to safety concerns (Gilligan, 2019; BBC, 2019a). Access is currently 
limited.82 This is an initiative by the MOJ and the prison service following the Karen White case 
to strike the appropriate balance between the rights of trans prisoners and the safety of other 
prisoners. There is no suggestion at the time of writing that specialised units for trans prisoners 
will be established in the male custodial estate or that the initiative at HMP Downview will be 
replicated in other women’s prisons.  
13. Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the key developments internationally and nationally in the 
development of gender identity rights and the rules concerning the care and management of 
prisoners with different gender identities in England and Wales. Certainly, much progress has 
been made over the last two decades in what had been a barely visible issue and certainly 
challenges remain. The resourcing of the prison service, and the inconsistencies between the 
rights and rules and how they are applied to prisoners who disclose different gender identities, 
remain significant issues. 
‘Prisons are always difficult environments … but they have a fundamental 
responsibility to keep prisoners safe and to protect and support those with particular 
vulnerabilities. Transgender prisoners are among the most vulnerable, with evident 
risks of suicide and self-harm, as well as facing bullying and harassment. Undoubtedly, 
managing transgender prisoners safely and fairly poses challenges for prison staff in 
the “hyper-gendered” world of prisons, but law and policy are unequivocal that this is 
what is required.’ (Newcomen, 2017) 
 
81 See, for instance, McBee, T.P. ‘Amateur. A reckoning with gender, identity and masculinity’ (2018) 
82 Owing to boredom and serious levels of self-harm, limited access to women prisoners was permitted. Access 
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Lockdown, Law & the Whirligig of Jurisprudence: The 
Return of a Realist 






This chapter seeks to apply the lessons which can be learned from Karl Llewellyn’s 
jurisprudence to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had a widespread effect on populations 
not only in the UK and the European Union but worldwide. It considers some of the 
jurisprudential aspects which arise from the attempts to deal with the medical and public health 
crisis through the use of legal regulations in the UK context. The questions to which the use 
of legal regulations give rise are many and wide in nature. They extend in scope to matters 
beyond what might be regarded as the notion of the strictly ‘legal’ in its narrower sense. This 
chapter argues that these jurisprudential aspects can most usefully be analysed through 
adopting the framework of Llewellyn’s ‘law-jobs’ theory, and as part of that theory, the single 
institution of what he described as ‘law-government’. The statement in The Bramble Bush that 
‘What … officials do about disputes … is the law itself’ has an important bearing on both. The 
continuing relevance and importance of the ‘law-jobs’ theory and the ‘law-government’ 
institution, we argue, deserve a resurgence in interest in the far-reaching scope and 
applicability of Llewellyn’s jurisprudence and a greater recognition of its significance than is 
commonly displayed today.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Open University was conceived and born in the 1960s. Jurisprudence, of course, has a 
far longer lineage. Socrates, for example, was articulating the reasons why there might be a 
moral obligation to obey an unjust law in 399 BC. Sir Stephen Sedley referred in 2018 to “the 
whirligig of time”1 in comparing the time spans needed to achieve various changes in 
ideologies in the sphere of human rights.  Beyond the sphere of human rights, the image of 
the whirligig (or spinning toy) is even more appropriately invoked in the sphere of 
jurisprudence2 before and after the opening of the Open University. 
 
1  ‘There is a striking and perhaps significant contrast between, on the one hand, the centuries which it took to 
make the transition from largely self-serving ideas and ideologies which underpinned slavery and race 
discrimination to the modern unacceptability of both, and on the other hand, the brief span of years from the 
Stonewall raids and riots of 1969 to the decriminalisation of homosexual acts and the legal recognition of same-
sex marriages …The only thing that that can be treated as certain is that human rights will not stay where they now 
are. The whirligig of time will see to that. Whether they will advance or retreat, and what will cause them to do so, 
we cannot say; but one has to hope in in the present climate that it is not Caliban, rather than Malvolio who is about 
to be revenged upon the whole pack of us.’ (Sir Stephen Sedley, Law and The Whirligig of Time of Time (Oxford, 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018) 50). 
2 We use the term ‘jurisprudence’ here in its wider sense and one which is not confined or restricted in meaning or 
use to ‘legal philosophy’, including the particular branch of ‘analytical legal philosophy’ as exemplified in the works 
of jurists such as HLA Hart and Joseph Raz. Such a restriction would exclude the adoption within a jurisprudential 
context of other important alternative perspectives, such as the historical, sociological, and contextual socio-legal 





This whirligig of jurisprudence has seen theories come and go and return in cycles. The 1960s, 
for example, had seen jurisprudence enjoying a resurgence. The most famous British legal 
theorist of the twentieth century, HLA Hart, published The Concept of Law3 in 1961, which 
provided one of the most significant spring-boards of jurisprudential debate. One of the leading 
American legal thinkers of that century, Karl Llewellyn,4, died a year later, in 1962, just as his 
Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice,5 a collection of papers previously published 
between 1928 and 1960 in relation to the broader aspects of Legal Realism, was about to be 
published. One year before the Open University received its Royal Charter in 1969, the 
American Ronald Dworkin was appointed to the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford in 
succession to Hart.  
 
Open University students began to graduate in the 1970s but not in Law. Jurisprudence 
continued to look backwards and forwards to good effect. In 1973, the twentieth century’s most 
famous Continental legal philosopher, Hans Kelsen, died while William Twining published Karl 
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 6 heralding the beginning of a period in which serious 
consideration began to be devoted to a re-assessment of the significance of Karl Llewellyn 
within American Legal Realism, not least through the Law in Context movement, in which 
Twining has played such a significant role. Like Kelsen, Twining’s writing on law and 
jurisprudence has spanned half a century and that of Llewellyn, Hart and Dworkin over 40 
years. 
 
In the first fifty years of the Open University, many other theoretical approaches to law have 
come to the fore, such as Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Critical Race 
Theory, promoting diverse perspectives on the law from previously marginalized standpoints. 
Over a larger span of time, other legal theories have seemingly risen and fallen. Thus, at the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, Natural Law theory 
appeared to have been eclipsed by Austinian Legal Positivism. Then the rise of totalitarian 
regimes in Germany, Italy and Russia provided the background for a revival of Natural Law 
theory after the Second World War, under the auspices of Radbruch, Fuller and later Finnis 
and, in the form of interpretivism, Dworkin. Some of the Scandinavian Legal Realists were 
thought to be tainted by association with such regimes. In the US, Legal Realism which 
seemingly had its heyday in the late 1920’s and the 1930s and was closely associated with 
the empirical, particularist and behavioural approach of scientific naturalism, also seemed to 
fall away because of the same events. Secular and Thomist Natural Law theorists, proponents 
of philosophical rationalism and others argued that scientific rationalism generally, and Legal 
Realism in particular, failed to reflect ethical, moral and democratic values. 
 
There does not have to be a legal theory, a movement or even a law school for a university to 
contribute to the promotion of social justice in thought and action. The work of Professor Stuart 
Hall at the Open University, for example, had a huge influence in anticipating by decades the 
2020 phenomenon of #BlackLivesMatter. The Open University more generally made a vital 
contribution in Northern Ireland in the education of those interned or imprisoned in the 
Troubles in the 1970s, principally through its pioneering courses on Sociology. Its very 
 
jurisprudence as the theoretical aspect of law-as-a discipline (i.e. academic law) and the important functions it can 
potentially perform: W. Twining, ‘Academic Philosophy and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart’ 
(1979) 95 The Law Quarterly Review 557, 574-5.   
3 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961). 
4 Described as ‘[One] of the most interesting and original figures in in twentieth-century American jurisprudence’ in 
G Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977) 115 footnote 11. 
5 KN Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 2008), originally published 
in 1962. 
6 W Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
149. This second edition contains an Afterword by Twining, which provides a re-assessment of some aspects of 




presence in the different parts of the United Kingdom and in the different parts of the island of 
Ireland anticipated, on the one hand, devolution in the UK and, on the other, closer cooperation 
in pursuit of peace and justice through the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement of 1998.  
 
Then, towards the end of the millennium, the OU Law School had its beginnings. The teaching 
of Law as a degree in its own right has seen it become, in its first twenty years, the biggest 
law school by student numbers in Europe. Its first undergraduates learned about European 
Union jurisprudence as a key source of UK law. The most recent, after 31 January 2020, are 
graduating after the UK has left the European Union. Few could have anticipated this 
development with its immense ramifications for the law in, and the different legal systems of, 
these islands. It has been quickly followed by an even bigger shock as the Covid-19 pandemic 
of 2020 led to an astonishing turn of events, in which many people all over the world were 
confined to their homes. We consider the effects of this and other aspects of the pandemic in 
a jurisprudential context in the Sections which follow.  
 
1.1 ‘What officials do …’  
 
In this chapter, and in contrast, surprisingly, to Twining himself in this context,7 we take 
seriously Karl Llewellyn’s two statements, which appeared in the original edition of The 
Bramble Bush published in 1930,8 that ‘What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, 
the law itself” and that “rules are … important … in so far as they help … see or predict what 
judges will do or so far as they help … get judges to do something. … That is all their 
importance, except as pretty playthings.’ (Llewellyn’s emphasis).9 We refer hereafter to these 
two statements collectively as ‘What officials do …’, since the second of these two statements 
is relevant to Llewellyn’s defence of his first statement. The primary (but not exclusive) 
emphasis in what follows will, however, be placed on the thirteen words contained in the first 
statement in ‘What officials do …’ which we contend contains an important kernel of truth. 
 
As Section 2 describes, ‘What officials do  …’ became the subject of a torrent of criticism which 
began in the 1930s and continued into the 1950s and beyond, not least by HLA Hart. These 
words were subsequently reconsidered by Llewellyn in his Foreword to the subsequent 1951 
edition of The Bramble Bush, under a section entitled ‘Correcting an error: ‘What these officials 
do about disputes …’.10. That correction has wrongly been put forward by some commentators 
(including Twining) as amounting to their retraction or repudiation by Llewellyn. However, 
‘What officials do …’ was left standing by Llewellyn in the main body of the text of the  1951 
edition of The Bramble Bush notwithstanding that correction and was neither retracted nor 
repudiated by him although it was significantly qualified in the Correction.  
 
We consider in some detail in Section 2 the nature of the criticisms which were made of ‘What 
officials do …’ and the terms in which those words were qualified by Llewellyn.  We contend, 
firstly, that those criticisms took those words out of the true context in which they were used 
in Chapter 1 of The Bramble Bush, which was that of judicial decision-making and reasoning 
in court cases and their enforcement by others. Even here, “What officials do …’ reflected the 
 
7 See Section 2 below. 
8 KN Llewellyn, ‘The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study’ (Privately printed edition, 1930) 3. This 
edition, to which we refer hereafter as ‘the 1930 edition’ was printed in 1930 and described in the frontispiece as 
“a tentative printing for the Use of Students at Columbia School of Law, New York”. The 1930 edition was 
reproduced in Karl Nickerson Llewellyn on Legal Realism (Birmingham, Alabama, The Legal Classics Library, 
1986). This was also privately printed, in this case for the members of the Legal Classics Library.  
9 KN Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study, 2nd edn (Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana 
Publications, 1951) 12 and 14. Save where otherwise stated, references hereafter to The Bramble Bush are to the 
1960 printing of the 1951 edition, the last printing published in Llewellyn’s lifetime and which contained an addition 
to Llewellyn’s footnotes. The latest edition (KN Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: The Classic Lectures On the Law 
and Law School (New York, Oxford Publishing Inc, 2008)) adopts a new title with a new Introduction and Notes by 
Steve Sheppard.   
10 Ibid, 3. 
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importance of the institutional context in which court decisions were made by judges and the 
underlying reasons for those decisions were given.  
 
1.2 The ‘Law-Jobs’ and ‘Law and Government’ Theory  
 
Secondly, we argue in Section 3 that ‘What officials do about disputes …’, which was not 
intended by Llewellyn as a conceptual definition of law, has a wider institutional and societal 
context beyond simply the way in which judges decide court cases and the way in which those 
decisions are enforced.  That context is the role which various groups in society (including, for 
these purposes, legal officials, legislators, government, executive and administrative officials) 
play and the ways which they adopt in, amongst other things, seeking to resolve ‘trouble cases’ 
which would otherwise frustrate or impair the operation of society as a larger group as a whole. 
‘What officials do …’ is therefore of significant importance in the wider jurisprudential and 
sociological perspective which Llewellyn adopted in setting out his ‘law-jobs’ theory in The 
Cheyenne Way11 and ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problems of Juristic 
Method’.12  This theory embodied what Llewellyn later came to designate as the theory of the 
single institution of ‘law-government’ or ‘law-and-government’ in ‘Law and the Social Sciences 
– Especially Sociology’.13  
 
1.3 ‘Law-Jobs‘, ‘Law-Government’ and Covid-19 
 
In Section 4, we use this institutional theory of ‘law-government’ as a jurisprudential framework 
to examine and evaluate various aspects of official behaviour in the UK in relation to the Covid-
19 lockdown. These aspects are very wide and diverse indeed. They can encompass, 
amongst other things, the authority and actions of legal, parliamentary and administrative 
bodies in formulating and implementing policy, the use and interpretation of legislation and 
regulations, the role of governmental guidance and the advice of public bodies which 
contributes to both that guidance and the formation of public health policy generally, 
enforcement of legislative rules and regulations by the police, the actions of local authorities, 
differences of approaches between the  Four Nations, human rights, and the role, impact and 
effect of public opinion in the formulation and enforcement of the relevant rules and 
regulations.  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a widespread and, in some cases, a devastating effect on 
public health. The restrictions imposed from time to time, including lockdown, have in turn had 
significant adverse economic effects as well as an impact on the well-being of individuals. We 
conclude in Section 5 that the jurisprudential insights afforded by the evaluation of institutional 
behaviour in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic through the framework of the ‘law-jobs’ theory 
demonstrates the continuing relevance of the statement ‘What officials do …’  to Llewellyn’s 
notion of the  ‘law-government’ institution, which remains of importance in jurisprudence today. 
The Covid-19 pandemic may therefore have a significant effect on thinking in jurisprudence, 
just as the cataclysmic events of the Second World led to the revival of Natural Law theory. 
The ‘new normal’ for teaching jurisprudence, and for writing jurisprudentially, is therefore going 
to be different to the way in which we thought about law before lockdown.  
 
2. ‘What Officials do …’   
 
Since we attach such importance to the words ‘What officials do … ‘, it is incumbent upon us 
to explore and  examine in some detail not only the reasons why those words gave rise to 
 
11 Karl N Llewellyn and E Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).  
12 KN Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problems of Juristic Method’ (1940) 49 Yale 
Law Journal 1355. 
13 Karl N Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences – Especially Sociology’ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 1286. 
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such debate in the first place but also Llewellyn’s answer to the criticisms which were made 
of them. That answer is significant here because it is of great relevance to the arguments 
which we advance in this chapter.  
  
2.1 The Criticism 
 
The words ‘What officials do …’ appeared in the original 1930 edition of The Bramble Bush,14 
which consisted of introductory lectures to students at Columbia Law School on the study of 
law. As such, those lectures were essentially pedagogic in nature and the first lecture 
contained what might best be described as rhetorical flourishes in prose which, amongst other 
things, were designed to ‘shock’ students out of any notion of the study of law as consisting 
simply of the rote learning of rules of law. Indeed, Llewellyn stated in the Preface to the 1930 
edition15 (which was subsequently incorporated in the Foreword to the 1951 edition)16 that The 
Bramble Bush was intended not as a primer type of introduction but as a standing introduction, 
which must ‘invite, excite, to a second reading, and a third and fourth; each reading in the 
measure that the student has moved on into the law and gained the wherewithal to read, must 
introduce him further’ and ‘must cut as deep as its author has wit and strength to go’.17 Here, 
it may be noted that HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law18 was also based on introductory lectures 
in jurisprudence19 for undergraduate students with, amongst other things, the pedagogic aim 
of discouraging the belief that a book on legal theory is primarily a book from which one learns 
what other books contain, which Hart considered to be of very small educational value.20  Both 
The Bramble Bush and The Concept of Law came to have a wider general significance in 
jurisprudence beyond their authors’ intended status of those books as introductory texts.   
 
The second statement in ‘What officials do’, namely that ‘rules are … important … in so far as 
they help … see or predict what judges will do or so far as they help … get judges to do 
something. … That is all their importance, except as pretty playthings’ contained an element 
of rhetorical flourish. The first statement, ‘What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, 
the law itself’ did not, although, as we will see below, Llewellyn admitted that it was incomplete 
in itself.  Both statements caused great controversy. This controversy arose in the general 
context of attacks against scientific naturalism and pragmatism. Scientific naturalism 
emphasised behaviourism and empirical, particular and experimentally verifiable knowledge 
and sought to deny any notion of absolute knowledge based on moral or ethical a priori 
knowledge gained through moral or ethical reasoning.21 That attack was also an attack against 
Legal Realism, which was seen as embodying the natural scientific and pragmatic 
approaches,22 and also against Llewellyn himself.  Within the sphere of jurisprudence, in the 
eyes of natural lawyers and others,23 Legal Realism, and particularly Llewellyn’s words, 
attacked the existence of rules and the role and method of deductive logic in judicial 
reasoning.24  
  
This had, in the eyes of those critics, the effect of denying the existence of not only any notion 
of certainty in legal cases but also the traditional inherent ethical and democratic values which 
were to be found in the US legal systems and which were embodied within the concept of the 
 
14 See Section 1 n8 above. 
15 Ibid, vii. 
16 See Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 7. 
17 Ibid.  
18 1st edn (Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, OUP, 1961). 
19 See Leslie Green’s Preface to Hart, Concept of Law, 3rd ed (Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, OUP, 2012) xi. 
20 Hart, Concept of Law, 1st edn (1961), vii. 
21 See, generally, Edward A Purcell , The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of 
Value (Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, 1973) Chapter 2 ‘Naturalism and Objectivism’, 15.  
22  Ibid, Chapters 5 ‘The Rise of Legal Realism’ and 9 ‘Crisis in Jurisprudence’, 74 and 159.  
23 Including Fuller, Dickinson, Goodhart, Kantorwicz, Kocourek and Roscoe Pound - see Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 
1951 edn, 10.   
24 See Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 10. 
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rule of law. Instead Llewellyn and the legal realists supposedly replaced the rule of law with 
the rule of judges, with judicial decisions being based on the prejudices and psychological 
inclinations of individual judges.25 Accordingly, in the views of many of its opponents, Legal 
Realism was essentially amoral in its approach and either dismissed or took no account of the 
traditional democratic and general societal values embodied within the US legal system and 
other legal systems within western societies.26 As will be seen in Section 2.2, however, such 
accusations against Llewellyn himself were essentially misplaced and unjust. 
 
2.2 Llewellyn’s answer  
 
These attacks led to Llewellyn including, in his Foreword to the 1951 edition of The Bramble 
Bush, a section headed, in a rather dramatic style and emphasised in italics, ‘Correcting an 
Error: What these officials do about disputes ….’.27 In that section, Llewellyn states that these 
are ‘plainly unhappy words when not more fully developed and at best a very partial statement 
of the whole truth’: 
‘For it is clear that one office of law is to control officials in some part, and to guide them 
even in places where no thoroughgoing and control is possible, or is desired. And it is 
clear that guidance and control for action and by others than the actor cannot be had 
out of the very action sought to be controlled or guided.’28 (Llewellyn’s emphasis) 
 
This statement has been described as a retraction of the words ‘What officials do … ’ by 
Twining29, and Hart30 and Duxbury31 and as having been withdrawn by Postema.32 
However, we argue that Llewellyn did not retract nor withdraw those words although he did 
significantly qualify them in the Foreword to the 1951 edition (as, indeed, he also did in The 
Bramble Bush itself as we describe below). Nevertheless Llewellyn stated that he had let 
those words stand in the 1951 edition as they were both useful and true in so far as: 
‘The words pose the problem of reform of institutions and press upon us the external 
problem of the need for personnel careful upright and wise. They signal the possibility 
of differential favouritism and prejudice on the one hand; the possibility, on the other, of 
much good being brought out of an ill-designed and limping machinery of measures.’33 
 
In Chapter V of The Bramble Bush itself, Llewellyn stated that he needed to backtrack from 
‘What officials do …’ in Chapter I by asserting, as a ‘corrected hypothesis’ that: 
 
25 Duxbury has described this portrayal as a ‘caricature’ and ‘popular burlesque’ – see Neil Duxbury, Patterns of 
American Jurisprudence (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), 66-8 (originally published in 1995).  
26 See Purcell , The Crisis of Democratic Theory, Chapter 9, ‘Crisis in Jurisprudence’ 159.  
27 See Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 8.   
28 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9. The phrase ‘one office of law’ may here be taken to mean one role, function or 
purpose of law. 
29 William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press 
2012) at 149. The second edition, cited here, contains an Afterword by Twining, which provides a re-assessment 
of some aspects of Llewellyn’s works as well reviewing academic commentary since the publication of the first 
edition in 1973. 
30 Hart considered the two statements contained in ‘What officials do …‘ as extreme in their nature as they 
suggested that the notion of rules controlling courts’ decisions was senseless, but considered that Llewellyn  had 
‘recanted’ from this position by his statements which we have set in the preceding paragraph: see  HLA Hart, 
‘Positivism and the Separation of Law’, 71 Harvard Law Review, 593, 616, footnote 40 and the text to which that 
footnote relates. This article formed the beginning of what has become known as the ‘Hart-Fuller’ debate. Hart did 
not refer to this ‘recantation’ in Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law when discussing ‘rule-sceptism’ but did 
subsequently describe Llewellyn as having retracted ‘What officials do … ‘ although making clear at the same time 
that he considered Llewellyn to be one of the  ‘serious American jurists’ despite his extravagant statements in ‘What 
officials do’ – see HLA Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and Noble Dream’ 
(1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 969, 970 and 974.   
31 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence, 105  
32 Gerald J Postema, Vol 11, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World, of A Treatise 
of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Carolina, Springer Dordrecht, 2016) 83, n 8. 
33 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9. 
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‘ .. law must embrace in its very heart and core what the officials do, and that rules take 
on meaning in life only as they aid one either to predict what officials will do or get them 
to do something. Or, if you prefer to state the dispute aspect of law broadly enough … 
that a heart and core of living law is how disputes are in fact are settled, and that rules 
take on live meaning only as they bear on that’34      
 
2.3 Two significant aspects of ‘What officials do …’  
 
We contend that two very significant aspects attach to the passage in Chapter V of The 
Bramble Bush. The first is that ‘What officials do …’, whether in its original form as given in 
Chapter I or in the form of the ‘corrected hypothesis’ in Chapter V, was never intended by 
Llewellyn as a conceptual definition of law. Here we agree with Twining. The second, which 
follows from the first, is that the ‘corrected hypothesis’ in Chapter 5 highlights what we say 
was in any event inherent in the form of wording of ‘What officials do …’ in Chapter 1, namely 
that those words were intended by Llewellyn to highlight the institutional role which judges as 
individual officials of the courts played in resolving disputes and the manner in which they did 
so.  
 
2.3.1 Not a Conceptual Definition 
 
Turning to the first of these aspects, in one of his most famous papers published in the same 
year as the first edition of The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn cast strong doubt on feasibility of 
framing any conceptual definition of such a loose suggestive symbol as “law”.35 Llewellyn 
observed that the overwhelming difficulty of seeking to define the periphery of the field of law 
was that there were so many things to be included within it and that those things were of such 
a disparate nature that they could not easily be fitted under one ‘verbal roof’.36 Accordingly, 
any conceptual definition will confine that periphery in a rather arbitrary fashion, necessarily 
including some matters within, but excluding others from, the periphery of that field. In 
discussing the scope of legal realism and realistic jurisprudence, Llewellyn therefore sought 
instead to focus upon a point of reference to which he believed all matters legal can be most 
usefully referred without putting or pushing anything outside of the field or concept of law: 
‘I have no desire to exclude anything from matters legal. In one aspect law is as broad 
as life, and for some purposes one will have to follow life pretty far to get the bearings 
of the legal matters one is examining’37    
 
The mistaken perception that ‘What officials do …’ amounted to a conceptual definition of law 
probably contributed to the general controversy which surrounded Legal Realism and 
Llewellyn’s jurisprudence in the 1930s as described in Section 2.1. Llewellyn referred to that 
controversy as ‘a teapot tempest’ which read rather like ‘a grotesque farce’, complaining that 
‘realism’, which Llewellyn maintained was an effort to achieve a more effective legal 
technology, had been mistaken for a philosophy. Llewellyn complained that ‘What officials do 
…’ had been  
‘made the scape-goat for all the sins (real and supposed) of administrators and autocrats 
and the ungodly in general’38  
and used to show Llewellyn himself  
 
34 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 75-6.   
35 Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431. See also KN 
Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (New York and London, Routledge, 2008) 3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, 432. 
38 Llewellyn, Bramble Bush, 9-10. 
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‘to disbelieve in rules, to deny them and their existence and desirability, to approve and 
exalt brute force and arbitrary power and unfettered tyranny, to disbelieve in ideals and 
particularly in justice.’39 
 
 
2.3.2 The institutional context of ‘What officials do …’ 
 
Twining strongly disputed that ‘What officials do …’ had been put forward by Llewellyn as a 
conceptual definition of law.40 We agree with Twining’s assertion. Twining considered that 
‘What officials do …’ and The Bramble Bush were essentially a pedagogic introduction to 
Llewellyn’s juristic ideas addressed particularly to first year students, but did not, however, 
consider them as representative of Llewellyn’s work as a scholar nor as a jurist in 1930, still 
less of his  more mature work, stating: 
‘To do so would almost be akin to judging the achievement of TS Eliot on the basis of 
Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats’.41 
 
Indeed, in his book review of Llewellyn’s The Case Law System in America,42 Twining 
suggested that, on this basis, the contribution to jurisprudence of The Bramble Bush may be 
discounted.43  
 
With this assessment we respectfully disagree, while fully recognising of course, the 
essentially pedagogic introductory intent and nature of the text of The Bramble Bush. The very 
nature of the first statement in ‘What officials do …’, namely ‘What these officials do about 
disputes is, to my mind, the law itself’ evokes the description of law in operation, law ‘as it is’ 
or law in action and the institutional role of the courts and the institutional manner in which 
they operate. Llewellyn’s Prӓjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechen in Amerika,44 is regarded as a 
major piece of work.45 It was based on lectures given by him at the Leipzig Faculty of Law in 
1928- 9, at least one year prior to the publication of The Bramble Bush, although it was not 
published until 1933. In Prӓjudizienrecht, Llewellyn used the word ‘institution’ and ‘institutions’ 
in a slightly different sense to that in which he used those terms in the ‘law-jobs’ theory and in 
the ‘law-government’ institution. In the Leipzig lectures, Llewellyn used ‘institutions’ to refer to 
groups of rules and decisions of the courts and the operation and use of such groups of cases 
as precedents.46 This was very similar to the way in which Llewellyn recommended that 
students should analyse the use of precedent in American case law in Chapter IV of The 
Bramble Bush which, in turn, presaged Llewellyn’s later description of juristic method in the 
‘law-jobs theory. Similarly some parts of Chapter VII of The Bramble Bush presaged, albeit in 
embryonic form, parts of the ‘law-jobs’ theory.47 The suggestion that The Bramble Bush was 
not representative of Llewellyn’s work as a scholar and a jurist and that its contribution which 
made to jurisprudence may be discounted therefore seems inaccurate despite the essentially 
pedagogic context in which it was written.  
 
39 Ibid. 
40 W Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
148-50. 
41 Ibid, 152. 
42 William Twining, ‘The Case Law System in America’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1093. 
43 Ibid, 1094. 
44 Karl N Llewellyn, Prӓjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika (Leipzig, Theodor Weicher, 1933). An English 
translation of Part I, Books 1 and 2 of Prӓjudizienrecht (without the Cases and Materials in Part II) was not published 
until 1989 – see Karl N Llewellyn (ed P Gewirtz, trans M Ansaldi), The Case Law System in America (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 1989).  
45 See, for example, Paul Gewirtz’s Introduction to KN Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, x footnotes 3 
and 4, which lists the academic reviews of Prӓjudizienrecht, including those of Fuller – see L. Fuller, ‘American 
Legal Realism’ (1934) 82 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 429 and L Fuller, ‘Book Review’ (1934) 82 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 551.   
46 See KN Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America 10 footnote 1 and §§64 and 65, 95-8. 




3. Llewellyn’s ‘Law-Jobs’ Theory and the Institution of Law-Government  
 
In section 1.3, we highlighted the very wide and diverse nature of the jurisprudential aspects 
of official and institutional behaviour which fall to be considered in relation to the Covid-19 
lockdown in the UK. These aspects extend well beyond a narrow notion of ‘law’ which 
encompasses merely court proceedings, the interpretation of statutes and delegated 
legislation, and any Human Rights and/or constitutional issues which may arise therefrom. 
They include not only the enforcement of the relevant rules and regulations by the police but 
also the legislative and regulatory processes themselves, the practice and expectations of 
those persons and bodies involved in the legislative, regulatory and administrative processes 
(including bodies such as such as Public Health England (PHE) and the Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies (SAGE) who advise on the formulation of policy in relation to public 
health issues), and also political advisors.  Thus, the notion of ‘law’ in this context extends to 
and encompasses a whole range of disparate activities associated with the ‘law’, some of 
which would often be regarded as extending beyond what is understood as the notion of the 
‘legal’.  
 
Most, but by no means all, of these aspects involve the activities of ‘officials’. The officials 
referred to by Llewellyn in ‘What officials do …’ included not only judges and lawyers but 
enforcement bodies such as the police and the prison service (Llewellyn’s ‘sheriffs’ and 
‘jailors’),48 a list of officials which was compiled in relation to their actions about ‘disputes’. 
However, Llewellyn immediately followed his statement by criticising the approach to law 
which was based on the notion of the heart of law as  comprising a set of rules of conduct 
enforced by external constraint,49 laid down by the state and addressed to the people ‘on the 
street.’50 Llewellyn thought such an approach was misleading and that there was much to be 
said in some parts of the law for the view that ‘rules for conduct’ should be the focus ‘quite 
apart from disputes’51 (Llewellyn’s emphasis), including rules which looked not so much to 
disputes as to administrative convenience, and rules which looked primarily to avoiding not 
disputes but injuries and harm.  
 
Accordingly, Llewellyn considered that examples of rules of conduct went not so much to the 
importance of rules but to ‘the non-exclusive’ importance of ‘disputes’52 (Llewellyn’s 
emphasis). This led to Llewellyn making what was to him the fundamentally important 
observation in relation to the necessary approach to ‘lawyering’ (or practising what was to him 
the ‘craft’ of the law):  
‘And so to my mind the main thing is seeing what officials do, do about disputes, or about 
anything else; and seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing – a regularity 
which makes possible prediction of what they and other officials are about to do 
tomorrow. In many cases that prediction cannot be wholly certain Then you have room 
for something else, another main thing for the lawyer: the study of how to make the 
official do what you would like to have him’.53  
 
The rules and regulations to which Covid-19 has given rise comprise both rules of and for 
conduct in this sense and they have been devised for the principal purpose of protecting the 
health of the public and thereby minimising the harm to health caused by Covid-19. Evaluating 
how such rules and regulations give effect to this purpose from a jurisprudential view will 
therefore involve considering the activities of the full range of officials referred to above. We 
 
48 See The Bramble Bush, 12. 
49 Described by Llewellyn as such in order to distinguish them from rules of morality and some phases of custom. 
50 Ibid, 12-13. 
51 Ibid, 13. 




consider that the ‘law-jobs’ theory, which embodies the notion of the single institution of ‘law-
government’ as its integral part, provides a coherent overall jurisprudential framework and 
perspective for evaluating all these aspects, using Llewellyn’s wider institutionalist and 
sociological approach.  
 
As Llewellyn emphasised in ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next-Step’,54 when discussing 
the limitations of a conceptual definition of law, one cannot always easily draw the line in 
distinguishing the ‘legal’ from the ‘non-legal’ since, depending upon one’s centre of interest, 
matters which might otherwise be regarded as ’background’, ‘foreground’ or ‘underground’ 
cannot easily be disregarded when discussing the ‘legal’.55 A wider perspective must then be 
necessary, which is provided by the ’law-jobs’ theory and the institution of ‘law-government’. 
 
 
3.1 The ‘Law- Jobs’ Theory 
 
Llewellyn primarily described this theory in in The Cheyenne Way56 and his paper ‘The 
Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problems of Juristic Method’.57 The ‘law-jobs’ 
were designed to address certain needs that must be met if a human group is to survive as a 
group and to achieve the purposes for which the group exists. He classified these ‘law-jobs’ 
into the six categories, namely (i) ‘adjustment of the trouble case’; (ii) preventive channelling 
of conduct and expectations; (iii) ‘preventative rechannelling of conduct and expectations to 
adjust to change’; (iv) ‘arranging for the say and saying of things’ – that is to say, allocation of 
authority and procedures for authoritative decision-making; (v) provision of direction incentives 
within the group (which Llewellyn referred to at the job of providing ‘net Positive Drive’); and 
(vi) ‘the job of Juristic Method’.58  
 
The ways in which courts and other institutions sought to address and resolve ‘trouble cases’ 
- disputes, conflicts and sources of grievance – by what Llewellyn termed as ‘juristic method’ 
in situations such the Covid-19 pandemic health crisis are best illustrated and analysed by 
reference to concrete situations. Accordingly, the application of the individual ‘law-jobs’ will be 
considered in detail in Section 4.  
 
3.2 The Law-Government Institution 
 
Twining has explained the inter-relationship between Llewellyn’s theory of ‘law-jobs’ and the 
institution  ‘law-government’ in the following terms: 
‘Groups which qualify to be called societies have ‘institutions’, more or less developed 
and specialised, the peculiar function of which is to perform these law-jobs’. Llewellyn’s 
later usage ‘law-and-government’ (or ‘law-government’) is the term used to refer to such 
institutions. In society ‘law-government’’ is the main but not the only institution for 
performing the law-jobs listed above; conversely ‘the law-jobs are the main but not the 
only jobs of the institution of law government.’’59 
 
The institution of ‘law-government’ is most clearly explained by Llewellyn in his paper ‘Law 
and The Social Sciences – especially Sociology’,60 in which he described the concept of an 
‘institution’ as ‘the central and most important concept in social science’,61 referring to the 
 
54 Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431. 
55 Ibid, 431-2. 
56 Karl N Llewellyn and E Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Norman; University of Oklahoma Press (1941).  
57 KN Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problems of Juristic Method’ (1940) 49 Yale 
Law Journal 1355. 
58 Ibid, 1375-1397.  
59 Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 179 n 37. 
60 Karl N Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences – Especially Sociology’ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 1286.  
61 Ibid, 1290, n 2. 
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discussion of that concept by Walton Hamilton.62 Hamilton describes an ‘institution’  in the 
following terms: 
‘Institution is a verbal symbol which for want of a better describes a cluster of social 
usages. It connotes a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence 
which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people. In ordinary 
speech it is another word for procedure, convention or arrangements.’63 
In his paper ‘The Constitution as an Institution’,64 Llewellyn described an institution as in the 
first instance a set of ways of ‘living and doing’65 but subsequently amended that description 
by stating that ‘I should today focus first upon the jobs to be done, around whose doing ways 
both get organised and take on meaning’.66 
 
As to the institution of ‘law-government’ itself, Llewellyn described it as in essence a single 
institution which is recognized as having the proper authority to speak for ‘the ‘Whole of us’ or 
‘the Entirety’ and provides the machinery for ‘conscious re-kiltering, for deliberate correction, 
for planned cure’67 through the performance of the ‘law-jobs’. Although ’law-government’ is in 
essence one single institution which carries out the various ‘law-jobs’ on behalf of a group, 
those ‘law-jobs’ will be performed at any one time by a number of separate institutions such 
as courts, legislators and administrators in various ways which will interact and combine with 
each other in forming the institution of ‘law-government’ as a whole. Again, in the context of 
Covid 19, the ‘law-government’ institution will be evaluated through the examination of 




4. Applying Llewellyn’s approach to Covid-19  
 
4.1 ‘Trouble-cases’ and the essential job of the ‘Law-government’ institution  
 
Llewellyn indicated that, in his ‘law-jobs’ theory, a ‘trouble-case’, which can consist of an 
offence, grievance or dispute, is typically a minor, “individual” trouble which by itself is usually 
‘bearable’ trouble. As such it can be compared to ‘garage-repair work’ on the general order of 
the group and a trouble-case would disrupt continuance of group life only if sufficiently 
multiplied and sufficiently cumulative.68 Viewed from this perspective, however, the Covid-19 
pandemic is an atypical, magnified ‘trouble-case’ writ large in both its scope and ambit. Its 
widespread impact on the population throughout the UK has not only given rise to a crisis in 
public health but the rules and regulations enacted to counter that crisis through the 
implementation of lockdown and other measures have had a severe economic impact on 
businesses and employment. They have adversely affected the well-being of families and 
individuals confined to their homes and disrupted school and university education.  
 
All of these matters have, in turn, tested the ‘law-government’ institution’s performance of the 
‘law-jobs’ in a number of ways and have caused that institution to be subjected to wide-ranging 
public scrutiny and debate. The pandemic provides in stark relief an instance of what Llewellyn 
described as ‘the great and basic job on which the institution of ‘law-government’ is focused: 
 
62 W Hamilton, ‘Institution’ (1932) Encyclopedia of Social Science 84. 
63 Ibid, cited in W Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd edn (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 176.   
64 KN Llewellyn, ‘The Constitution as an Institution’ (1934) 34 Columbia Law Review 1.  
65 Ibid, 17. 
66 This amendment was contained in the excerpt from ‘The Constitution as an Institution’ which was reproduced in 
Karl N Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (New York and London, Routledge, 2017), 233, 
footnote b (originally published in 1962 by the University of Chicago Press). 
67 Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences – Especially Sociology’ 1296. 
68 Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-jobs: The problem of Juristic Method’ (1940) 49 Yale 
Journal 1375-6.  
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‘It is the job, for any group, for any community, for any society, of becoming and 
remaining and operating as enough of a unity, with enough team-work, to be and remain 
recognisable as a group or as a political entity or as a society. The fundamental law-
and-government job is, then, the job that is fundamental to the existence of any society 
and any social discipline at all: it is the job of producing and maintaining the groupness 
of a group’.69 (Llewellyn’s emphasis)  
 
In the UK, court litigation by way of judicial review of the Covid-19 legislation and regulations, 
from the period beginning with the imposition (in England) of the first lockdown period in March 
2020 to the end of the second lockdown period in December 2020, has been scarce. An 
exception is the Dolan case70 which raised the issue of whether the lockdown restrictions 
imposed by regulations 6 and 7 of the Public Health Act (Control of Disease) Act 1984 were 
ultra vires and/or in breach of the rights to liberty, respect for private and family life and to 
freedom of assembly and movement under Articles 5, 8 and 11 respectively of the ECHR.71 
 
‘Trouble-cases’ arising under the Covid-19 restrictions may, however, be dealt with by the 
intervention of institutions other than the courts and, indeed, by means other than the 
regulations imposing those restrictions. Thus, for example, where members of more than one 
household meet inside or outside a particular property, they may cause nuisance and 
disturbance to immediate neighbours as well as being in breach of those restrictions. In that 
event, the local authority may intervene to prevent such an assembly on the grounds of noise, 
nuisance or disturbance, irrespective of whether there has been any intervention by the police 
on the grounds of a breach of the relevant Covid-19 restrictions.72  
 
4.2 Separate Institutions within the Single Institution of ‘Law-government’ 
 
The last example given in section 4.1 illustrates two important facets of Llewellyn’s concept of 
the ‘law-government’ institution. Firstly, that institution, although a single institution in itself, 
can embrace under its umbrella a number of separate groups or institutions in their own right 
beyond the courts themselves. They extend to institutions (as defined in Section 3.2 above) 
such as the government, the legislature, the police, local authorities and all other bodies which 
have separate regulatory, enforcement or administrative functions.  
 
The second facet is that the overall effectiveness of the ‘law-government’ institution will often 
depend on the way in which those separate institutions interact.73 Their functions, which 
 
69 See Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences – especially Sociology’, 1292.  
70 Dolan v Secretary of State for Social Care [2020] EWHC 1786 (Admin). An appeal against that decision was 
heard on 29 and 30 October 2020, in which was argued that the UK’s lockdown rules were among ‘the most 
onerous restrictions to personal liberty’ in almost four centuries. At the date of writing, its outcome was unknown – 
see R. Craig, ‘Coronavirus Regulations Case reaches the Court of Appeal - Hearing Dates 29-30 October 2020’ 
(UK Constitutional Law Blog, 28 October 2020) <ukconstitutionallaw.org/> and also Jonathan Ames, ‘Simon Dolan: 
Coronavirus lockdown restrictions were unlawful, entrepreneur tells judges’ The Times (London, 30 October 2020).  
71 Similar arguments have consistently been raised by Jonathan Sumption QC, the retired Supreme Court 
Justice, who has maintained that it “is our business, not the state’s, to say what risks we will take with our own 
health.” – see ‘Lord Sumption: The only coherent position is locking down without limit – or not locking down at 
all’ Prospect (London, 26 May 2020) (in reply to Professor Thomas Poole, ‘A new relationship between power 
and liberty’ Prospect (London, 23rd May 2020) and his Cambridge Freshfields Annual Lecture ‘Government by 
decree – Covid-19 and the Constitution’ (Cambridge, October 2020) 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=amDv2gk8aa0>. 
72 Such an instance arose within the personal experience of one of the co-authors of this chapter, who lives in a 
small close of houses, comprising a mixture of both tenanted and privately owned houses facing on to a central 
communal lawn. One neighbour began to hold regular parties on the communal law to which he invited people who 
were not residents in the close. Those parties sometimes lasted until late at night, causing nuisance and annoyance 
to other neighbours. The parties were in flagrant breach of the Covid-19 regulations then in force but there was no 
intervention by the police. The parties were eventually stopped through the intervention of a Housing Officer of the 
local authority concerned.  
73 Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences’, 1290. 
207 
 
comprise the totality of the ‘law-government’ institution, will often overlap. In the particular 
context of the UK, there are four political systems and three legal systems.74 Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland each possess separate devolved institutions of government and powers. 
Each have adopted different responses to the pandemic. Their responses will inevitably vary 
in accordance with the political composition of the elected representative bodies in each 
political system with, for example, different restrictions being applied in Wales and England, 
even though both of those countries share one legal system. Different periods of lockdown 
have been announced from time to time in each country. The introduction of the tier system in 
selected areas and regions within each country complicates the position further. It is, however, 
noteworthy that before announcing the ending of the second period of lockdown in England 
and the new tier system to follow in December 2020, the Government consulted with each of 
the devolved administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland over the nature of the 
relaxation of restrictions which were to be applied over the Christmas period. This 
demonstrates the degree of overlap which can occur within the overall institution of ‘law-
government’. 
 
The precise ‘legal’75 nature of the various separate bodies or institutions which together 
comprise the single institution of ‘law-government will also vary according to the functions of 
each body. In England, for example, the Government has sought the advice and 
recommendations of PHE76 and SAGE77 for medical and scientific advice in relation to the 
precise nature of the restrictions which are necessary to reduce the rate and spread of 
infection of Covid-19. Such advice assists the Government in deciding the precise form and 
substance of both the necessary legislative measures and regulations and the guidance which 
should be published by way of advice to the public on their effect.78  
 
Individually the roles of the Government, PHE and SAGE might be taken to represent what 
Llewellyn has described as the ‘government’ pole within the institution ‘law-government’. 
However, in so far as the roles of SAGE and the Government combine in this context to 
produce legislative measures and regulations, those roles also tend towards what Llewellyn 
describes as the ‘law’ pole within that institution.79   
 
The importance of the role of Sage, in particular, as part of the institution of ‘law-government 
has been recognised by the expression of two concerns. There is concern, first, as to the need 
to review the transparency and independence of the scientific advice provided by SAGE.80 
Secondly, there is concern as to the potential legal and democratic challenge arising from any 
 
74 The legal systems of England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
75  See, in relation to the notions or concepts of ‘law-stuff’ and ‘legal’ generally, Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the 
Legal, and the Law-jobs: The problem of Juristic Method’ (1940) 49 Yale Journal 1358 .  
76 Public Health England, is an executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care. Its responsibilities 
of PHE include advising government and supporting action by local government, the NHS in preparing for and 
responding to public health emergencies – see Public Health England, ‘About Us’ (GOV.UK, n.d.) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england/about>. The Government has announced 
that it will be replaced with a new organisation called the National Institute for Health Protection (NIHP). 
77 The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, whose aims and objectives are to make sure that timely and 
coordinated scientific advice is made available to decision-makers to support UK cross-government decisions in 
the Cabinet Office Briefing Office Room (COBR) - see Cabinet Office, Enhanced SAGE Guidance; A Strategic 
Framework for the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), Part Two (London, 2012) para 16. The 
current group is, at the date of writing chaired by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, and 
the Chief Medical Officer, Professor Chris Whitty, and includes experts from within government and leading 
specialists from the fields of healthcare and academia. 
78 The status of the ‘rules’ set out in such guidance is often unclear to both the public and officials. The concept of 
‘social distancing’, for example is not mandated by law but is one of the most basic elements of the Government 
responses to the pandemic.  
79 See Llewellyn, ‘Law and the Social Sciences’, 196-7. 
80 See N Weinberg and C Pagliari, ‘Covid-19 reveals the need to review the transparency and independence of 
scientific advice’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 15 June 2020) <ukconstitutionallaw.org/>.  
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claim that the Government is deflecting political responsibility and accountability for the 
measures imposing lockdown restrictions by claiming that is only ‘following the science’.81  
 
The degree to which the Government acts upon SAGE’s advice may almost inevitably vary at 
different stages of the pandemic because it also has to weigh in the balance other 
considerations such as political factors (for example, the economic effects on businesses and 
employment as well as the effect on different sections of the public at large) in deciding both 
the timing and nature of any restrictions which are to be imposed.82 This is unsurprising as 
some conflict of view or tension may always exist between the separate groups or institutions 
which together comprise the larger single institution of ‘law-government’ as a whole.83 Those 
individual groups may have different views as to how, in any single instance such as the Covid-
19 pandemic, the essential job of producing and maintaining the groupness of the ‘Entirety’ 
should be performed. Those views will be based on the specialist skills of the individuals who 
comprise the separate group performing a particular function within the larger essential job of 
the single ‘law-government’ institution as whole. As Llewellyn stated of the institution of law in 
The Bramble Bush, each institution by its very nature tends to possess: 
‘a type of ethnocentric and chronocentric snobbery – the smugness of your own tribe 
and own time: We are the Greeks; all others are barbarians.’84  
 
4.3 The Role of Public Support and Opinion 
 
The essential job of the ‘law-government’ institution, that of producing and maintaining the 
groupness of the ‘Entirety’, requires the overall support of that ‘Entirety’ – that is to say, the 
public – in order to do so. Public support will therefore play an important role in promoting that 
groupness. Divisions and frictions within the ‘Entirety’ may therefore impair the attempt to 
achieve that groupness85 and thus the carrying out of the ‘law-job’ of ‘Net Drive’. That ‘law-job’ 
combines the three law-jobs of the adjustment of the ‘trouble-case’, ‘channelling’ and the 
‘Saying’ (through legislation and court cases) in promoting the positive direction of achieving 
the health and balance of the ‘Entirety’.86  
 
Since any institution comprises a group of individual officials, the behaviour of those individual 
officials within the within the sphere of the ‘law-government’ institution may on occasion also 
impair both the operation of the ‘law-job’ of Net Drive and the authority of the institution of 
which they are part.  
 
In the context of Covid-19, there have been a number of well-publicised instances of such 
behaviour which have adversely affected public opinion and support for lockdown policies and 
other restrictions. These include the visit to Durham and Barnard Castle by Dominic 
Cummings, the Chief advisor to the Prime Minster until his resignation in November 2020, 
 
81 See L Trueblood, ‘Following the Science’, a Legal and Democratic Challenge’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 
21st Sept 2020) <ukconstitutionallaw.org/>. 
82 See, for example, Andrew Woodcock, ‘Coronavirus: Scientific: adviser warns Boris Johnson action to beat the 
disease must be ‘fast and hard’’ The Independent (London, 16 October 2020, in which it was revealed that SAGE 
had recommended in September that the country should go into a time-limited ‘circuit breaker’ lockdown to 
prevent the resurgence of the outbreak of Covid-19 but that advice was not acted upon by the Government.  
83 See, by way of an example of such potential tension, BBC News, ‘Covid: London likely to move to tier 3 amid 
rising rates’ BBC News (London, 14 December 2020).  
84 Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, 40-1. 
85 In the UK context of the Covid-19 Pandemic, examples of such division and factions may be found in the anti-
lockdown protests in London in December 2020 (see BBC News, ‘Covid: More than 150 arrests at London anti-
lockdown protest’ BBC News (London: 28 November 2020) and the party political divisions arising from the 
grievances of those living in rural areas with a low rate of Covid-19 cases but which have been included in a higher 
tier of restrictions because of their proximity to cities and towns which have a much higher rate of such cases – 
see for, example Danielle Sheridan, Gordon Raynor and Laura Donnelly, ‘Villagers offered escape routes from 
toughest tiers’ and ‘MPs battle to get villages ‘decoupled’ from hotspots’ Daily Telegraph, 28 November 2020. 
86 Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs’ 1387-95. 
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during the first period of lockdown;87 two visits by Dr Catherine Calderwood, the Chief Medical 
Officer in Scotland, and her family to their second home in breach of Regulation 5 of The 
Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Protection) (Scotland) Regulations 2020;88 and the conduct 
of Margaret Ferrier, the Scottish MP for Rutherglen and West Hamilton, who had previously 
raised questions in Parliament about Dominic Cummings’ visit to Durham. Having displayed 
Covid-19 symptoms and taken a Covid-19 test, she travelled by train to London in September 
2020 while awaiting the test result, and then travelled back by train after speaking in the House 
of Commons and receiving a positive test result.89 It has been claimed that the example of 




The examples cited in Section 4 demonstrate the applicability of both Llewellyn’s ‘law-jobs’ 
theory and the single institution of ‘law-government’ and the phrase ‘What officials do …’ to 
the events of the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. We therefore argue that they support each of 
the contentions which we set out in Section 1 as to the jurisprudential significance of the words 
‘What officials do …’ even in its corrected form in Chapter 5 of The Bramble Bush and the 
Foreword to the second edition of that book.  
 
Those words are relevant to the wider institutional and societal context beyond merely that of 
the way in which judges decide court cases, the reasons which judges give for making their 
decisions and the way in which court cases are used as precedents in subsequent cases as 
Llewellyn described in The Bramble Bush. That wider institutional and societal context consists 
of Llewellyn’s wider sociological approach or perspective as embodied on his ‘law-jobs’ theory 
and the institution of ‘law-government’. In turn, that theory and institution, together with the 
words ‘What officials do …’, provide an extraordinarily useful framework for a jurisprudential 
evaluation of such events as the Covid-19 pandemic and its widespread social effects.  
 
We have therefore concluded that they remain of continuing relevance and significance in 
jurisprudence today. They reinforce the need to merge jurisprudential thinking about law, 
politics, and changing medical and wider scientific advice. As such, we conclude that 
Llewellyn’s institutional analysis from this wider sociological context bears an importance in 
jurisprudence which is equal to that afforded by any of the Hart-Fuller, Hart-Devlin and Hart-
Dworkin debates and should therefore lead to a resurgence of interest in his jurisprudential 
insights.  
 
This chapter is, we hope, a contribution to the opening-up of the wisdom of Llewellyn as we 
come towards the centenaries of significant events in his legal thinking. That wisdom, together 
with the valuable insights to which it gives rise, will, we feel, be of great relevance to lawyers, 
sociologists and other academics in helping us contribute to advancing the concept or idea of 
social justice, which forms such an important part of the Open University’s Mission Statement. 
 
 
87 See BBC News, ‘Cummings drove to Barnard Castle ‘to test vision’’ BBC News (London, 25 May 2020). 
88 See BBC News, ‘Coronavirus: Scotland’s chief medical officer resigns over lockdown trips’ BBC News 
(Edinburgh, 5 April 2020). 
89 See Greg Heffer, ‘Coronavirus: MP Margaret Ferrier who travelled with COVID will face no further action from 
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Liz Hardie, Hugh McFaul, and Francine Ryan 
 
Abstract  
This chapter considers the past, present, and future of clinical legal education (CLE). 
Reflecting on the history of clinical legal education in the UK and beyond, the chapter traces 
the rise in experiential learning to consider its role in both the promotion of the values of social 
justice and the educational benefits for students. It considers the place of clinical legal 
education within the law curricula and advocates for exploring new ways of conceiving how 
we deliver clinical programmes. The chapter offers insights into emerging trends in CLE and 
addresses the prospect of UK law schools’ increased reliance on clinical programmes as a 
result of changes to the training and qualification of solicitors in England and Wales.  
 
1. Introduction  
In Roman mythology Janus, the doorkeeper of the heavens, presided over all forms of 
transitions, including doorways and beginnings and endings.  King of Latium (a region of 
central Italy), he is often depicted as having two heads, one looking backwards whilst the 
second simultaneously looks forward (Davenport, 2017). Likewise, this chapter attempts to 
frame the contemporary practice of CLE in UK law schools both by looking backwards at the 
history of CLE, particularly over the last 50 years, and by looking forwards to consider what 
the future might hold for CLE in the next half century.  
The metaphor of Janus is particularly resonant for CLE as it frequently occupies the centre 
ground between different views and positions within legal education more generally.  For 
example, CLE is often the front line of discussions within law schools about whether the 
undergraduate law degree should be a purely academic undergraduate discipline or 
professional training for a legal career.  There is also debate amongst clinicians as to whether 
the aim of CLE is to offer social justice (in the form of access to justice to the public) or to be 
of educational benefit to students through the development of their skills, particularly their 
employability skills (Drummond and McKeever, 2015).  The response of UK CLE practitioners 
to these issues has often been distinct from those of the US pioneers of the movement, and 
these nuances will be explored in this chapter. 
The definition of clinical legal education itself is contested and it is difficult to find one definition 
agreed upon by everyone (Kerrigan and Murray, 2011).  Many academics based in the USA, 
Canada, Australia and Africa define CLE as involving students working in a law clinic which 
provides legal advice and information to a group in society who are underprivileged or lack 
access to a legal system (for example, Winkler, 2013; Giddings, 2008; Thomson, 2014).  
Within the UK there is generally a broader definition of CLE as being  ‘learning by doing’: a 
learning environment where students identify, research and apply knowledge in a setting 
which replicates the world in which law is practiced (Grimes and Gibbons, 2016).  This 
experiential approach exposes students to real or realistic legal issues and problems through 
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different activities including simulation activities, advice clinics, placement or externships, or 
Street Law projects where students provide public legal education to members of the public 
(Grimes and Gibbons, 2016; Kerrigan and Murray, 2011). This lack of agreement on an 
overarching definition reflects the wide variety of practices and projects within CLE as well as 
the different contexts within which CLE has developed in individual countries.  We will first 
consider the foundations of CLE in the USA. 
2. The History of Clinical Legal Education  
2.1 The birth of the CLE movement in the USA 
CLE first developed in the USA in the 1930s, at which time US law schools had offered 
postgraduate legal study for students to qualify as attorneys for around 60 years. Prior to the 
1870s, most US attorneys qualified through an apprenticeship.  In 1870 Harvard Law School 
introduced the case method of instruction, where students studied a section of appellate 
opinions and distilled the legal principles from them using the ‘Socratic’ method of classroom 
teaching (Grossman, 1973).  Other law schools followed this example and qualification as an 
attorney by postgraduate study became the accepted norm. 
This case method was criticised in the 1920s by legal realists, who stressed the importance 
of law students understanding the interactions of society and the work of courts and lawyers 
to understand how the law and legal profession actually function in a society (Frank, 1933).  
Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn urged law schools to equip students with the ability to adapt 
to a rapidly changing legal environment and to use their legal knowledge in practice, 
recommending the establishment of legal clinics in law schools (Frank, 1933; Llewellyn, 1945; 
Grossman, 1973).  This led to the introduction of simulated practice courts in the 1950s, and 
the establishment of law clinics from the 1960s onwards (Grossman, 1973). 
2.2 50 years of expansion 
The growth of law clinics has been particularly marked over the last 50 years, both in the USA 
and beyond. In the USA this growth was due primarily to two factors.  Firstly, governmental 
funding was made available for law clinics from the 1960s onwards, following which 
philanthropic organisations and alumni donations maintained the income required to staff and 
run law clinics in law schools (Joy, 2012).  The second factor was the USA government’s ‘War 
on Poverty’, which focused attention on the need to provide legal services for those who could 
not afford legal representation (Grossman 1973).  Both in the 1960s and now, there is no 
comprehensive legal aid system in the USA; state funding is provided in criminal cases 
through the public defender’s office and court appointed advocates, with no automatic right to 
civil legal aid (UNODC, 2016). Most of the privately funded legal services are targeted at the 
wealthiest 20% of the population, with some limited legal aid available for the poorest in society 
(Kemp, 2016).  Therefore, American middle-income earners, as well as poor and marginalised 
communities, lacked access to legal advice and representation (Kemp, 2016).  In the 1970s 
the American Bar Association estimated that the middle 70% of society were not getting their 
legal needs met (Orsi, 2013).  This remains the situation fifty years on today where over 85% 
of the civil legal problems reported by low-income Americans received inadequate or no legal 
help (Kemp, 2016; Legal Services Corporation, 2017) There was therefore significant unmet 
legal need in the USA fifty years ago and the development of law clinics through the clinical 
movement was a significant contribution to the provision of legal advice and representation 
which promoted social justice for the American public. Within this context, we can see why 
nearly all of the early writing relating to the establishment of CLE focused on community 
service and social justice as being the main objective, with the educational benefit for students 
being secondary (Grossman, 1973). 
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In the 1970s the CLE movement also started to inspire the establishment of programmes in 
other countries around the world: initially in Canada, Australia, the UK, and South Africa 
(Winkler, 2013). The next section will consider the reasons for the spread of CLE to other 
countries, before examining the history of CLE in the UK. 
2.3 The growing global influence of CLE 
Following the development of the clinical movement in the USA, the first countries to establish 
law clinics as part of a CLE programme in universities were Canada (in 1971), South Africa 
(in 1972), the UK (in 1973) and Australia (in 1975) (Winkler, 2013).  In Canada, South Africa 
and Australia, their social and political contexts ensured that social justice was, as in the USA, 
an important influence in establishing law clinics to ensure access to justice and the courts for 
the most marginalised and poorest of citizens.   
Since 2000 there has been a much greater development of CLE across the globe (Giddings, 
2008).  CLE expanded to a number of countries in the global south to supplement the work of 
national legal aid bodies in assisting communities to access justice (McQuoid-Mason, 2011). 
At the same time CLE pedagogy began to influence law schools in Russia and Eastern Europe 
following the collapse of the USSR (Winkler, 2013).  CLE programmes in these countries 
tended to focus on issues such as the rule of law, human rights, and democracy; possibly due 
to the establishment of new democracies and legal systems following the overturning of old 
regimes (Winkler, 2013).    
By contrast the UK’s 50-year development of CLE programmes has taken a slightly different 
form, as it responded to its own political and social context and in particular the availability of 
state funded legal advice and representation. 
2.4 50 years of CLE in the UK 
The development of CLE in the UK reflected its distinct social and economic context. In 
common with the USA, before the mid-1800s most solicitors and barristers qualified following 
a period of apprenticeship, although when English law was introduced into university 
education from the 1850s onwards it was as an undergraduate subject.  English law degrees 
did not adopt the same narrow educational focus as US law schools and instead stressed their 
academic status incorporating a liberal arts approach (Slapper, 2011).  As qualification routes 
developed in the Victorian period, the existing division of training into academic, vocational, 
and work experience stages was formed with the undergraduate law degree focusing on the 
academic stage.  Nevertheless, law schools were aware that many of their law graduates went 
on to the vocational training stage and qualified as solicitors or barristers, which led to a 
tension developing in law schools as to whether they were teaching a purely academic 
undergraduate degree or equipping students for their subsequent professional training 
(Goldfarb, 2012).   
Following the Second World War the UK government introduced as part of the welfare state, 
state funded legal advice and assistance for both civil and criminal law issues, through the 
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949.  This paid the legal fees of solicitors and barristers for both 
legal advice and representation.  A number of not-for-profit advice agencies and Law Centres 
also sprang up, funded by local authority grants (Kemp, 2016).  Over the next forty years the 
legal aid scheme expanded until most legal issues were covered and by 1996/7 the net legal 
aid cost (after contributions from assisted person) was £1476 million a year from a total 
government spend of £330 billion (Rickman et al, 1999; H M Treasury, 1998).  Individuals who 
could not afford legal fees could seek advice on most legal issues from advice agencies, 
legally aided solicitors, or law clinics (Pleasence, 2004).  This meant there was not the level 
of unmet legal need seen in the USA and other countries, so the social justice imperative for 
the introduction of CLE in the UK was arguably not as influential. 
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The University of Kent introduced the first law clinic in a UK university in 1973, closely followed 
by the University of Warwick in 1975, initially aimed at university students but then opened to 
members of the public in the surrounding areas (Winkler, 2013).  However, within a few years 
the clinics had either closed or separated from the university law school due to disagreements 
over the role of the clinic (Winkler, 2013).   In the 1980s there were just four university law 
clinics in existence in the UK: Birmingham, Warwick, South Bank and Northumbria (Kemp, 
2016).  These early adopters of CLE were explicit that the reason for their clinical activities 
was the educational benefits for the students, rather than being driven by a commitment to 
provide legal services for the public who could gain legal advice from government-funded 
schemes (Winkler, 2013). 
CLE started to gain traction in the UK in the 1980s following publications from educational 
theorists, who stressed the importance of experiential learning for students. These developed 
ideas in the tradition of the early twentieth century philosopher John Dewey who emphasised 
the importance of experience-based learning through exposing students to the working world 
of which they were soon to be part (Thomson, 2014).  Theorists in the 1980s developed this 
further, linking experiential learning with reflective practice.  Professor David Kolb developed 
his learning styles model in 1984 which included a cyclical model for reflective practice; this 
was adapted by Graham Gibbs in 1988 into a six step reflective cycle (Kolb, 2014; Gibbs, 
1988, Kemp, 2016).  At the same time Schon developed the theory of the reflective practitioner 
(Schon 1983; Kemp, 2016).  These theories stressed the importance of putting into practice 
the theoretical knowledge acquired through education and reflecting on the outcome, which 
would develop students’ ability to improve their professional actions and judgment and to 
adapt to changing circumstances in the workplace.  
As these educational theories were applied to the study of law, this led to renewed interest in 
CLE which enabled students to experience practical legal work whilst studying for their law 
degree.  There was ‘a flurry of activity on the clinical front’ in the 1990s led by the Universities 
of Northumbria, Sheffield Hallam, and Kent (Grimes, 2000). During this time the nationwide 
Clinical Legal Education Organisation was formed.1 
At this time there was a marked difference between universities founded since 1960 and those 
founded earlier.  Kemp notes that CLE ‘has effectively been pioneered by recently established 
universities’ with a ‘relatively low level of support for CLE activities provided by traditional’ (i.e. 
older university) law schools (Kemp, 2016). Kent and Warwick were founded in 1965, York in 
1963 and Northumbria, Nottingham Trent, and Sheffield Hallam in 1992.  The first 1994/5 
LawWorks survey noted that 23% of the new universities offered live client clinics, while only 
5% of the old universities offered the same (Grimes, 2000).  The inclusion of CLE programmes 
into new universities’ undergraduate courses offered an opportunity to focus on students’ 
employability skills, improve students’ opportunities of obtaining graduate employment and 
assist in student recruitment and marketing.  However, the new universities were also open to 
adopting the new experiential educational pedagogies which supported this approach (Kemp, 
2016).  By contrast the old, more traditional universities tended to adopt a conventional ‘black 
letter’ approach to legal education informed by their research (Kemp, 2016).   
In response to the educational theories on experiential and reflective learning, the UK also 
saw a rise in simulated clinics and activities during this time.  York University Law School was 
influential in simulated experiential learning, as well as offering students an opportunity to work 
with ‘live’ clients in their law clinic (Kemp, 2016).       
There was further incremental growth in the number of law schools introducing CLE in the 
2000s including Nottingham Trent University, Strathclyde University and Lancaster University.  





skills of law graduates entering the profession.  The development of CLE in the UK during the 
first forty years therefore focused on the educational benefit to students of acquiring 
employability skills rather than concerns about social justice.  However, this changed in the 
2010s, when there was an explosion of interest in CLE in the UK. 
2.5 The growth of CLE in the UK in 2010s 
Since 2010 there has been a rapid expansion of CLE within UK law schools. As will be 
discussed below, these changes were driven by a focus on employability following the adverse 
economic climate in this decade and social justice concerns following reform of the legal aid 
scheme. 
The UK legal profession faced a perfect storm in the 2010s.  The economic recession in 2008, 
the globalisation of the legal profession and the potential impact of technology led to new 
pressures and uncertainties for law firms (Thomson, 2014). Law students became concerned 
about whether there would be a reduction in the size of the legal profession and shrinking 
graduate job opportunities, while law schools considered whether traditional legal education 
was sufficient to properly prepare graduates for the realities of legal practice which had 
become more uncertain in the 21st century (Thomson, 2014).   
At the same time, student tuition fees at English universities (which were introduced at the 
rate of £1,000 a year in 1998) were increased to £3,000 a year in 2004 and then up to £9,000 
a year in 2010 (Anderson, 2016). Students were concerned about their chances of obtaining 
a job within the legal profession at the end of their university studies, at the same time their 
tuition costs rose nine-fold.  In response, many universities turned to CLE as a way to enhance 
the graduate employment opportunities of their students and reassure their students about 
their future employability. The pedagogical basis of CLE in developing reflective practitioners 
able to discover, synthesize and apply relevant legal principles in any substantive or 
developing area of law offers some assurance that law students will be able to work in a rapidly 
changing legal arena and profession (Goldfarb, 2012). The practical work experience offered 
by CLE increases students’ employability and is seen as giving them a competitive edge when 
applying for graduate legal jobs (Kemp, 2016).  
The second factor which led to an increase in clinical programmes was increasing unmet legal 
need following the reform of the legal aid scheme introduced by the Legal Aid Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  As part of the spending and efficiency cuts introduced 
following the 2008 recession, the government reformed the legal aid scheme to reduce costs.  
The majority of civil law was taken out of the scope of legal aid, and after 2012 state-funded 
legal aid was not generally available for issues involving social welfare, debt, employment, 
family, housing and mental health law.  Where legal aid remained, the financial eligibility 
criteria were made more severe so that most of those in employment were no longer eligible 
for legal aid.  The same budgetary constraints affected local authorities who stopped funding 
advice centres and law centres. Following 2012 the number of legally aided solicitors, not-for-
profit law clinics and legal advice agencies drastically reduced leading to ‘advice deserts’ in 
geographical areas of the UK.  This had a disproportionate effect on the ability of the most 
vulnerable and marginalised groups to access justice (Sommerland and Sanderson, 2013; 
Law Society, 2017).  The level of unmet legal need increased dramatically, something not 
previously seen in the UK (Law Commission, 2014). 
While the first 40 years of the development of CLE in the UK focused on the educational 
benefits for students, the last decade has presented mounting levels of unmet legal need 
which clinicians and law students responded to by developing programmes that could assist 
with social justice and access to justice for the public, particularly in civil law issues.  
Concurrently there was a vigorous debate about the role of CLE and whether it is the 
responsibility of clinical programmes or the government to improve access to justice (Kemp, 
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2014).  These two forces (employability and social justice) still shape the contemporary 
landscape of CLE in the UK as will be discussed in Part 2 below.  
3. The contemporary CLE landscape 
The previous section has traced the development of clinical legal education from its origins as 
a pedagogical counterweight to the prevailing case study method used in US law schools, to 
its later expansion across common law jurisdictions. It also has traced the increasing 
importance given to social justice in the practice of clinical legal education in UK law schools. 
This section aims to take stock of the contemporary position of clinical legal education within 
university law schools before progressing to a discussion on the future directions of this 
increasingly influential sub-discipline in Part 3. It begins by placing current CLE practice in UK 
law schools in the context of the contemporary global clinical movement, before highlighting 
how this pedagogy can be adapted for delivery in an online distance learning environment, 
using The Open University Law School’s Open Justice Centre as a case study. This 
exploration of the use of technology to design and deliver experiential learning activities, which 
are the bedrock of clinical programmes, is of particular contemporary significance due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Social distancing measures have made it more difficult for universities to 
run face-to-face clinical programmes and interest in online alternatives has unsurprisingly 
increased.  
3.1 CLE in Global Perspective 
Frank Bloch’s edited collection on clinical legal education gave a clear illustration of the global 
reach of this pedagogical approach (Bloch, 2010). By 2020, strong international networks of 
clinical educators had become well established. These now include the Global Alliance for 
Justice Education, in addition to active regional and national bodies including the European 
Network for Clinical Legal Education, the US-based Clinical Legal Education Association, and 
the UK-based Clinical Legal Education Organisation to name but a few. These groups support 
a vibrant programme of conferences, seminars and knowledge sharing events. The plethora 
of professional organisations devoted to clinical legal education is supplemented by a growing 
number of journals which address clinical legal education issues including the International 
Journal of Clinical Legal Education, the Clinical Law Review, the Journal of Public Legal 
Education, the Law Teacher and the Asian Journal of Legal Education. Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to claim that the reach and influence of clinical legal education has never been 
greater than it is in 2020. This is borne out by the UK experience briefly addressed below.  
3.2 CLE in the UK today 
CLE is a significant feature in the curricula of UK law schools. The most recent published 
comprehensive survey of clinical activity was conducted by Carney et al in 2014 on behalf of 
Law Works.2 The survey has taken place periodically since the mid-1990s and offers a useful 
snapshot of CLE activity in UK higher education.  In 1995, less than a quarter of post-1992 
Universities and only 5 % of pre-1992 Universities ran clinical programmes (Grimes, 2000). 
From this modest base, the most recent survey demonstrated 96% of law schools who 
responded reported running some form of clinical activity, estimated at over 10 000 students 
taking part in CLE activities across the UK (Carney et al, 2014).  
The 2014 survey highlighted the variety of activities taking place under the CLE umbrella.  
Public legal education activities were reported as being the most common, followed by the 
more resource-intensive provision of legal advice services. Other work included criminal 
 
2 Law Works is the Law Society’s pro bono charity. The Law Society is the professional body for Solicitors operating 




appeal project and court and tribunal support and representation in addition to miscellaneous 
work such as mentoring and form-filling assistance. (Carney et al, 2014). The trend towards 
incorporating clinical methods into the assessment regime of undergraduate legal education 
continued in an upward direction, with 25% of law schools providing academic credit for their 
CLE programmes, an increase from a base of 10%. (Carney et al, 2014,) Drummond and 
McKeever’s (2015) more recent but smaller survey of 62 university law schools highlights the 
importance of collaboration with external partners. Three quarters of their respondents 
reported collaboration with external partners as being important to help university clinics to 
expand the range of types of advice that can be adequately supervised.  
Clinical practitioners continue to develop innovative ways of offering legal advice clinics 
including in 2015 Nottingham Trent university becoming the first law clinic regulated as an 
alternative business structure by the Law Society.  This offers their students the opportunity 
to undertake experiential learning within a regulated environment, as well as offering the 
potential to charge fees for the legal advice work it undertakes with members of the public 
(Kemp, 2016).  Other law schools developed partnerships with organisations to provide legal 
advice and assistance such as the Community Legal Outreach Collaboration Keele (CLOCK) 
(Keele University) and partnerships with the Welsh Rugby Union (Swansea University) and 
Dementia UK and the Alzheimer’s Society (University of Manchester). 
The increase in clinical activity, and the move towards more of it being formally assessed, is 
perhaps reflective of the broader trends identified in Part II of  universities foregrounding the 
development of skills that are attractive to employers, in addition to increased competition 
amongst higher education providers to offer innovative educational experiences to their 
prospective students. However, notwithstanding these market-driven influences, both surveys 
highlighted the social justice and educational values as being key motivating factors for the 
academic staff working to provide these opportunities (Carney et al, 2014; Drummond and 
McKeever, 2015)  
3.3 The Open University and CLE 
Law was a relative latecomer to The Open University (OU) curriculum. The OU began to offer 
law degrees, in partnership with the College of Law, in 1997 before releasing its own degree 
curriculum in 2014. The Open Justice Centre was established as part of the expansion of the 
OU Law School in 2016 with the aim of utilising digital technologies to provide opportunities 
for students to participate in clinical legal education. The OU law student body is unique, not 
only being the largest in Europe, with over 7000 students, but also in the prevalence of part-
time learners and its use of distance learning pedagogy. This meant that many of the 
traditional modes of clinical legal education discussed earlier in this chapter would have to be 
reimagined in order to allow online distance learning students to participate. The problem, as 
outlined in McFaul et al (2020), was to design a learning programme that could engage 
students studying mostly part-time and based across the four nations of the UK in meaningful 
and socially useful legal pro bono activities. The solution was to develop Justice in Action, a 
30-credit level 6 module which was incorporated into the undergraduate law degree. The 
module is delivered online in three phases: 
3.3.1 Phase I 
This introduces students to academic discourse around themes of social justice, professional 
identity, and professional ethics before developing transferable skills of legal research, writing, 
oral advocacy and online collaboration. There is specific focus on how technology is 
transforming the delivery of legal services and on developing the skills and competencies 
required for professional practice.  
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3.3.2 Phase II 
This involves students collaborating online to support the delivery of a range of pro bono 
projects. These projects fit into three broad categories:  bespoke online projects run entirely 
online, projects which are prepared and supported online but delivered in face to face settings, 
and projects which are hosted by external partners. Bespoke online projects include our online 
legal clinic (Ryan, 2019), providing supervised legal advice to members of the public on civil 
law issues, in addition to the Digital Justice project which supports students in the creation of 
smartphone apps and chatbots for the delivery of public legal information (McFaul et al, 2020). 
Projects supported online but delivered in face-to-face environments include prison-based 
legal research and guidance sessions, in partnership with the St Giles Trust, in addition to a 
series of school-based Street Law sessions. Projects hosted by external partners include 
externships with legal support charities such as Support Through Court and Citizens Advice.3 
3.3.3 Phase III 
The final phase of the module requires students to produce an assessed reflection on their 
participation, drawing on the themes introduced in phase I.  
The module has now grown to take an intake of just under 200 students per year, with a 
significant number of additional students taking part in clinical projects on an extracurricular 
basis. The Open Justice Centre has demonstrated that it is possible to take the essence of 
clinical legal education that is now a mainstay of legal education throughout the world, and to 
translate it successfully into an online environment. That is not to say that the endeavour is 
not without significant challenges, an account of which, in addition to a summary of the 
emerging pedagogical issues presented by this approach, is given in McFaul et al 2020. A key 
consideration in the development and evaluation of the Open Justice Centre’s experiment with 
online experiential legal education, is the role that technology may play in shaping not only the 
next 50 years of legal education, but the legal profession itself: topics which will be addressed 
below.   
4. The Future of CLE 
Having traced the rise in experiential learning, and the rich history of clinical legal education, 
in this section we consider the factors that might shape the future of CLE over the next 50 
years. Each law school has developed its own approach to clinical legal education, and this 
functions to allow universities to differentiate and create unique offerings within their own 
institutions. There is evidence to suggest that both students and employers place value on the 
practical legal skills that are developed through engagement in clinical programmes (Thomas 
2018). It might therefore be assumed there will be an expansion of CLE over the next 50 years.   
4.1 Expansion and sustainability  
While the last fifty years has seen the establishment and rise of clinical legal education 
programmes, the next fifty years are likely to be about sustaining programmes over the long 
term. One of the challenges universities face is how to provide scalable work-related 
opportunities for students. Clinical programmes are expensive to run because the need for 
supervision requires lower student-to-teacher ratios and resources are required to ensure the 
value and benefits of CLE can be delivered (Gilman, 2019). In examining how UK law schools 
foster the sustainability of CLE, we must consider that universities are in a period of 
transformation and the future of curriculums is linked to both changes to the profession and 
the policies of universities (Giddings, 2008).  Many law schools have embedded CLE into their 
 




curriculum as credit-bearing modules; this approach has been adopted as a means of ensuring 
the continued viability and sustainability of clinical work.  
In line with the changes proposed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) to the way in 
which solicitors train and qualify in England and Wales, there may be further opportunities to 
embed clinical programmes into the curriculum for those law graduates who want to become 
solicitors.4 The Legal Services Board have approved the SRA plans to replace the Legal 
Practice Course with the two-part Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE). To qualify as a 
solicitor in England and Wales, students will need to have a degree in any subject (or 
equivalent qualification or work experience), pass both SQE 1 and 2 and have two years’ 
qualifying work experience (QWE).5 Although the new regulations retain a period of legal work 
experience, qualifying work experience is more flexible than its predecessor, the training 
contract, as it can be undertaken across four different organisations and there is the potential 
for a wider range of experiences to qualify. The draft regulations do not specify what type of 
work experience counts for QWE. The SRA state that QWE is any experience of ‘providing 
legal services’ that provides the opportunity to develop some or all of the competencies 
required to practise as a solicitor.6 The SRA has indicated that clinical legal education can 
qualify as work experience. However, the draft regulations do not reference CLE or law clinics; 
therefore, at the current time it is still uncertain as to what could count as QWE.  
Responding to these changes raises interesting questions about the potential impact on the 
pedagogical value of clinical programmes. Students may be attracted to universities that offer 
opportunities to count their time in clinical legal education projects as part of their qualifying 
work experience, and some universities might be attracted to the idea of making such an offer 
as a way of pursuing competitive advantage, both of which have implications for CLE's 
educational and social justice value. Clinical work enables students to develop a range of skills 
and has a role in supporting student employability about which Thomas (2018) argues law 
schools should be more explicit.  
Students often have different or mixed motivations for doing CLE: some are deeply concerned 
about social justice whilst others are interested in improving their employment prospects 
(McKeown, 2015 and 2017). The potentially different drivers for CLE are not necessarily 
problematic, but there are increasing pressures on universities to meet changing student 
expectations. If law schools place unrealistic expectations on clinical programmes to use CLE 
as a means of offering QWE to service student demands, that has the potential to undermine 
the core values of CLE and pro bono. The increasing focus on clinical programmes brought 
about by SQE will require law schools to pay close attention to the challenges and 
opportunities presented, and multiple strategies may be required to develop different clinical 
methodologies.7  
 
4 From September 2020 qualification as a barrister requires a degree in law (or another subject plus the Graduate 
Diploma in Law). Further,  a vocational component consisting of Bar training with an Authorised Education and 
Training Organisation is required. . The Bar Standards Board website details the organisations that have been 
authorised to provide the vocational training. Once the training has been completed the person is required to 
undertake a 12-month pupillage which is a period of work based and practical training under the supervision of an 
experienced barrister.   
5 In Scotland the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 sets out the training and legal education requirements for entry into 
the Scottish legal profession. Solicitors in Northern Ireland are regulated by the Law Society of Northern Ireland. 
The Institute of Professional Legal Studies (IPLS) at Queen’s University, Belfast, is responsible for the professional 
training of solicitors and barristers. Trainee solicitors must undertake a 2-year apprenticeship which combines 
office-based work with studying the Certificate of Professional Studies at the IPLS. Solicitors who have qualified in 
England and Wales and Scotland may transfer to NI without taking any further exams.   
6 SRA (note 4) Regulation 2.3(b).  
7 For more discussion on QWE see Roper, V, Dunn, R and Kennedy, V. (2020) Clinical legal education as solicitor 
qualifying work experience in Thomas, L. and Johnson, N. (2020) Clinical Legal Education Handbook, University 
of London Press.  
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One interesting way that CLE might be developed is through the creation of a law firm within 
a law school. Johnson (2020) describes the model as a ‘teaching law firm’ that has similarities 
with clinical methodologies developed in US law schools. Some law schools may consider 
replicating the approach of Nottingham Trent Law School and applying for an alternative 
business structure (ABS) licence which allows for charging for some services. Nottingham 
Trent University’s Legal Advice Centre provides a business and enterprise service that offers 
affordable legal advice to small businesses, charities and not for profit companies 
(Connelly,2017). It is not a straightforward process to become an ABS and requires a 
significant commitment and investment from the university, but one of the benefits is the ability 
to charge for some services which may allow for some recuperation of costs. Although this 
may offer new ways of ensuring affordable access to legal services it is not without risk. 8  
There may be a growing interest in this approach as a way of delivering QWE.   The offering 
of QWE may also align with individual university’s broader strategy to embed employability 
further into its curricula especially for those universities whose students lack the connections 
and networks to advance easily into the profession. However, it is a strategy that is not without 
risk as extending clinical programs to include QWE requires support from the university to 
prioritise and well-resource CLE to ensure it preserves its rich learning environment and 
community benefit.    
4.2 New models of clinical legal education 
The expansion of clinical pedagogy in UK law schools has led to the development of different 
models of clinical legal education and these are likely to evolve further over the next 50 years. 
The increased use of technology in a post-COVID world requires law graduates of the future 
to be a different kind of legal professional who can work in teams with both an understanding 
of technology and creativity (Ryan, 2020). The Law Society (2018) argues that future lawyers 
need to be agile and adaptable, curious, and imaginative, coupled with having initiative and 
an entrepreneurial mindset. As technology transforms old ways of working future workers will 
need to develop virtual collaboration skills. The ability to use conference platforms and apps 
to maintain relationships with colleagues and clients is going to be critical for adapting to the 
changing work environment. Remote working and virtual collaboration are the new norm; 
clinical programmes are well positioned to respond to these changes and help students 
develop the skills and attributes required for new ways of working. This is recognised by the 
OU Law School: the creation of the Open Justice virtual law clinic gives students the 
opportunity to work with clients at a distance to acquire those skills (Ryan, 2020).9 
Technology is not just changing how we interact at work, but in line with changes that are 
happening more broadly within the labour market it is also leading to questions about how new 
technologies will affect future jobs. Automation and algorithms have the potential to impact on 
all areas of work, including the delivery of legal services. Technology will create new 
opportunities, but it will also reduce some types of work (World Economic Forum, 2018). It is 
not just a proficiency in technological skills that is going to be important, but ‘human’ skills 
such as critical thinking, complex problem solving, persuasion and emotional intelligence are 
becoming even more valued (World Economic Forum, 2018). Current clinical pedagogies 
expose students to situations that challenge and test them; they encounter ethical issues and 
complex client situations that support the development of ‘human skills’ (Giddings, 2008). As 
we move into the next 50 years, technology is going to further augment and disrupt many 
industries. We need to consider how to leverage technology to develop new models of CLE 
that will not only enhance student learning, but support access to justice.  
 
8 The creation of Alternative Business Structures to develop separate legal entities to deliver legal services has 
implication for social justice. Charging for legal services brings an ABS into competition with law firms, this may 
impact on the wider relationship with the legal profession. An exploration of these issues is outside the scope of 




The use of artificial intelligence-based technology within legal practice has been much 
discussed, but the development of legal tech solutions has not so far been on the scale 
predicted by proponents of the tech revolution such as Richard Susskind10 (Sako et al, 2020). 
However, COVID- 19 may accelerate the adoption of new technologies to meet the challenges 
created by the economic consequences of the pandemic. In the future, we may see an 
investment in technology to move towards different operating models for legal practice. 
Working with emerging technologies will require a multi-disciplinary team approach that 
includes lawyers working with non-lawyers like data scientists, project managers and 
designers. This may become a new pattern of working in the future (Sako et al, 2020). Clinical 
programmes may explore new models of CLE to provide students with opportunities to work 
with technology in multi-disciplinary teams. 
In recognition of the challenges posed by technology, UK law schools have started 
experimenting with legal tech and offering students hands-on opportunities to engage with 
emerging technologies. There is also a growing interest in the potential of legal tech to address 
the access to justice crisis (McFaul et al, 2020). Legal tech projects provide the opportunity 
for interdisciplinary and cross-faculty collaborations bringing together both students and 
academics to develop innovative technological solutions to benefit society (McFaul et al, 
2020). The interest in legal tech has been influenced by the approaches adopted by some US 
universities, in particular the Legal Design Lab at Stanford University.11 One of the functions 
of the Legal Design Lab is to be an interdisciplinary programme that introduces human-centred 
design methodologies into legal education. It adopts an experiential learning approach to its 
teaching and works in partnership with community organisations to develop innovative 
solutions to access to justice problems (Hagan, 2020). The future of CLE could see the further 
development of initiatives that adopt a partnership and multidisciplinary approach. One area 
where there needs to be more research is how more incubator projects can be scaled up 
beyond the law school (McFaul et al, 2020).  
In the future we may also see the development of more project-based clinical legal education 
that shares some similarities with the work of the legal design labs but incorporates legal 
project management into its teaching (Carpenter, 2020). In project-based clinical legal 
education, the learning is student-driven; students work in interdisciplinary teams on a real-
world problem to develop a project plan in collaboration with a project partner that could be a 
community organisation, the courts, or a group of self-represented litigants. The teacher 
facilitates and supports the team, but the group is responsible for managing all aspects of the 
project. Carpenter (2020) argues that students learn resilience and it helps to prepare for them 
for a complex changing world. Moving forward, clinical programmes are likely to continue to 
innovate to find new ways of bridging the gap between students’ learning and supporting 
community engagement.  
4.3 Looking to the future 
The future of clinical legal education looks bright. The value of experiential learning in 
providing students with the opportunity to develop multidisciplinary skills required to navigate 
a changing world is recognised by many in legal education (Giddings et al, 2020). The potential 
to harness technology to help build and improve legal systems can drive future innovation in 
clinical legal education. But it is also recognised that there are challenges; higher education is 
dominated by neoliberal forces of globalisation, massification and marketisation (Bosanquet 
et al, 2020). Clinical programmes are not immune from the impact of neoliberal ideologies of 
increasing participation and the drive to create competitive advantage. The changes proposed 
by the regulators in England and Wales are complex and clinical programmes may struggle to 
 
10 Richard Susskind argues that technology is going to transform the practice of law in many of his publications 




respond to the potential competing priorities of students and law schools. QWE may offer 
strategic opportunities for universities but it is not without risk. Law schools need a clear vision 
and adequate resources to expand their clinical programmes to provide students with these 
experiences. These are interesting times, but there is much reason for optimism, as over the 
past 50 years CLE has been able to navigate a complex path to becoming a defining feature 
of legal education. Although there may be challenges ahead, we are confident that CLE will 
remain a vibrant and dynamic part of the curriculum.   
5. Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the development of CLE in and beyond the UK and considered its 
contribution to enriching the learning experiences of law students. It has shown the important 
contribution clinical programmes make to developing law students' skills, but also to teaching 
the values of equality and justice. For those students who want to practice law after graduation, 
clinical work gives them the opportunity to work with clients and introduces them to practical 
legal work. At the same time, clinical programmes have expanded, and students benefit from 
a variety of innovative clinical learning experiences that have a broader and multidisciplinary 
focus.  
COVID 19 has demonstrated how CLE is able to respond to a changing environment. Clinical 
programmes have begun to embrace digital technologies in a way that was unimaginable prior 
to the pandemic to ensure that they continue to deliver experiential learning opportunities for 
students and to support those with unmet legal need. Clinical legal education will face many 
challenges in the coming 50 years, especially in response to shifting regulatory frameworks, 
increasing pressures on university budgets and the accelerated pace of digital change 
instigated by the pandemic.  However, this chapter’s exploration of the history of CLE provides 
grounds for optimism that this dynamic pedagogy can continue to make a dynamic  
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